govinfo:USCOURTS-ksd-5_25-cv-04069-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 
 
ANTHONY THOMPSON, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
RYAN DAVIS, et al. 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 
 
 

 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
Plaintiff Anthony Thompson brings this § 1983 case pro se. 1 He sues Defendant Kansas 
Highway Patrol Trooper Ryan Davis (individual capacity) and Defendant Kansas Highway Patrol 
Superintendent Erik Smith (individual and official capacities) for violating his Fourth Amendment 
rights during a July 2023 traffic stop. Plaintiff alleges that Davis lied about smelling marijuana to 
justify a search of Plai ntiff’s vehicle and that Davis’s conduc t was consistent w ith a widespread 
practice among Kansas Highway Patr ol troopers to fabricate eviden ce about detecting marijuana 
to justify a prolonged stop and vehi cle search. Plaintiff alleges Sm ith was aware of the practice 
and has acquiesced to it by failing to train or discip line officers who engage in it. Plaintiff seeks 
compensatory damages (against both) as well as prospective declarator y and injunctive relief 
(against Smith only). 
Defendants move to dismis s under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Doc. 31. The Court 
dismisses without prejudice the official capacity claim against Smith for want of subject-matter 
jurisdiction except the portion of the claim seeki ng prospective declaratory and injunctive relief. 
 
1 Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, hi s pleadings are construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than 
pleadings drafted by lawyers, but the Court does not assume the role of advocate. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 
1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 

The Court dismisses with prejudice the individual capacity claim against Smith based on qualified 
immunity. The Court finds Plaintiff’s individual capacity claim against Davis for monetary 
damages survives the motion because Davis is not protected by qualified immunity on this record. 
The surviving claims are: a § 1983 claim for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against 
Smith in his official capacity and a § 1983 claim for monetary damages against Davis in his 
individual capacity. 
I. BACKGROUND
2 
On July 26, 2023, Plaintiff was driving in Manhattan, Kansas. He was following his wife’s 
vehicle. Davis initiated a traffic stop of Plaintiff’s vehicle. Davis explained that he stopped Plaintiff 
for following too closely and for dark window tint. Plaintiff acknowledged that it was possible he 
was following too closely because he was followi ng his wife. Davis asked where Plaintiff was 
headed, and Plaintiff responded that he was head ed home to Topeka. Davis then said that he 
thought Plaintiff’s window tint was too dark, an d Plaintiff responded that he bought the vehicle 
with the tint. Davis then conducted the window test and told Plaintiff the vehicle was in violation 
of Kansas law. Davis asked for Plaintiff’s license, registration, and insurance, and told Plaintiff he 
would issue a warning. Davis then returned to his vehicle with Plaintiff’s items and did not mention 
the odor of marijuana. 
Plaintiff’s license identifies hi m as a “registered offender.” Plaintiff also alleges that 
“[a]fter running the identification check it is very probable that [Pla intiff’s] status as a registered 
drug offender and criminal history was reported back to [Davis].” Doc. 29 at 4. Five to ten minutes 
later, another trooper pulled up behind Davis. 
 
2 The following facts are taken from the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint and are accepted as true for 
purposes of evaluating the motion to dismiss. 

Davis then returned to Plaintiff’s vehicle with Plaintiff’s information. Davis asked Plaintiff 
where he had said he had been driving from. Plain tiff said that he never told Davis where he was 
coming from and had only told Davis that he was headed home. Plaintiff asked for his ticket so he 
could leave. While still holding Plaintiff’s information, Davis bent into Plaintiff’s vehicle and said 
that he smelled marijuana and asked Plaintiff if he had marijuana in the vehicle. Plaintiff told Davis 
that Davis made up that statement because there was no marijuana anywhere in the vehicle so it 
would be impossible for Davis to smell it. Davis insisted he did smell it and told Plaintiff he was 
going to search for contraband. Plaintiff told Davi s that Plaintiff did not consent to the search. 
Plaintiff then exited the vehicle. Davis searched the inside of the vehicle. He did not find evidence 
of any crime. Davis then opened the trunk and searched it. No marijuana was found. 
Plaintiff alleges that Davis’s conduct is pa rt of a pattern of re peated constitutional 
violations by Kansas Highway Patrol troopers. Pl aintiff alleges that tro opers lie about smelling 
marijuana to prolong traffic stops and search vehicles. Plaintiff alleges that Smith knows (or should 
know) about this practice and has acquiesced to it. Plaintiff further alleges that Smith is responsible 
for setting and enforcing training and other policies but has failed to take meaningful steps to train, 
supervise, or discipline troopers for engaging in this practice. Plaintiff alleges § 1983 claims 
against Smith (individual and official capaciti es) and Davis (individual capacity). He seeks 
compensatory damages (against both) as well as prospective declaratory and injunctive relief 
(against Smith only).3 
 
 
3 Plaintiff asks the Court to enjoin Davis from “continuing the policy, practice, and custom of fabricating marijuana 
odor.” Doc. 29 at 7. The Court construes this as merely a part of the prospective relief requested against Smith in 
his official capacity, rather than as a separate claim for prospective relief sought against Davis individually. Were 
the Court to construe Plaintiff’s complaint as seeking prospective relief from Davis it would necessarily construe 
that claim as an official capacity one. See, e.g., Chilcoat v. San Juan Cnty., 41 F.4th 1196, 1214 (10th Cir. 2022). 
Moreover, it seems unlikely that Plaintiff would have standing to pursue such claim. For these reasons, the overall 
collection of claims would be the same. 

II. ANALYSIS 
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Rules 12( b)(1) and 12(b)(6). 
Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s official capacity 
claim and argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim because qualified immunity shields Defendants 
from Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims. The Court addresses each argument. 
A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
Plaintiff asserts an official capacity claim against Smith. Defendants argue the Court lacks 
subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s offici al capacity claim based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b) 
and the language of § 1983. Defendants alternatively argue the Eleventh Amendment bars subject-
matter jurisdiction to the extent Plaintiff seek s monetary damages. The arguments and rationale 
overlap. The simplest path is to address the Ru le 12(b)(1) arguments in reverse order. But the 
upshot is that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s official capacity claim to 
the extent he seeks any form of relief (e.g., seeks monetary damages) beyond prospective 
declaratory and injunctive relief . This outcome is dictated by the Eleventh Amendment and the 
exceptions recognized by Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and its progeny. 
Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment recogni zes state sovereign immunity 
and forbids federal jurisdiction over “any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against 
one of the United States by Citizens of another St ate or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Supreme Court has explained that this amendment bars federal 
jurisdiction over suits brought against a state it by its own citizens, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 
13-15 (1890); accord Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236, 1255 (10th Cir. 2007) (Gorsuch, J.), and over 
suits seeking monetary damages against individual state official s in their capacities as state 

officials, Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 24-27 (1991) (explaining th at official capacity claims are 
treated as suits against the state itself when money damages are involved). 
But it is different when the suit seeks prospective injunctive relief. The teaching of Ex Parte 
Young and its progeny is that suits against state of ficials in their official capacities seeking 
prospective declaratory and injunctive relief are not regarded as suits against the entity of which 
the official is an agent and are not treated as suits against the state. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 
159, 167 n.14 (1985). These claims therefore do not offend the Eleventh Amendment and can 
proceed in federal court. Chilcoat, 41 F.4th at 1213-14; Tarrant Regional Water Dist. v. Sevenoaks, 
545 F.3d 906, 910-11 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Hill, 478 F.3d at 1255-56). 
Defendants and Plaintiff seem to recognize this carveout. Plaintiff ev en states that his 
official capacity claim against Sm ith is a claim for prospective d eclaratory and injunctive relief. 
Specifically, he seeks a declaration that it viol ates the Fourth Amendment to instruct Kansas 
Highway Patrol troopers to lie about smelling marijuana to justify prolonging a stop and searching 
a vehicle and seeks an injunction against the practice. He also seeks an injunction against training 
troopers to engage in this conduct in the future. The claim fits comfortably within Ex Parte Young’s 
boundaries. In sum, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s official capacity claim against Smith 
in his official capacity except to the extent he seeks prospective declaratory and injunctive relief. 
The Court dismisses without prejudice any claim agai nst Smith in his official capacity except to 
the extent prospective declaratory and injunctive relief is sought. 
“Person” Under § 1983. Defendants next make a broader argument and contend the Court 
lacks jurisdiction over any clai m against Smith in his offici al capacity (including one for 
prospective declaratory and injunc tive relief) because he isn’t a “person” within the meaning of 

§ 1983.4 This simply is not true because of Ex Parte Young. When a plaintiff seeks prospective 
relief against a state official in his official capacity , a state official is considered a person for 
purposes of § 1983 and can be sued under the statute. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 & n.10 (“Of course a 
state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under 
§ 1983.”); accord Frank v. Lee , 84 F.4th 1119, 1131 (10th Cir. 2023). And here, there’s little 
question that this is the sort of relief Plaintiff seeks (at least in part) fr om Smith in his official 
capacity. Smith is considered a “person” under §1983 for that sort of claim. The Court therefore 
rejects Defendants’ argument to the extent Plaintiff seeks prosp ective declaratory and injunctive 
relief against Smith in his of ficial capacity. The Court dismi sses without prejudice any claim 
against Smith in his official capacity that seeks another form of relief. 
Rule 17. The same reasoning applies to Defendants’ final argument. Defendants insist that 
Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Smith (regardless of relief sought) must be treated as 
one against the Kansas Highway Pa trol and must be dismissed be cause it is a subordinate state 
agency that lacks the capacity to sue or to be sued under Kansas law and Federal Rule 17.5 Again, 
 
4 Whether an official in his official capacity is a “perso n” within the meaning of § 1983 would seem to go to the 
merits of the claim rather than the Cour t’s ability to hear it (i.e., its jurisdiction). It also seems (based on this 
Court’s read of Will v. Michigan Department of State Police) that the reason a state (or an official capacity claim 
against a state official) is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983 is that it enjoys Eleventh Amendment 
immunity for certain claims. 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989). As the Supreme Court reasoned there: 
[P]rior to Monell the Court had reasoned that if municipalities were not persons 
then surely States also were not persons. And Monell . . . undercut[ ] that logic. 
But it does not follow that if municipalities are persons then so are States. States 
are protected by the Eleventh Amendment while municipalities are not and we 
consequently limited our holding in Monell to local government units which are 
not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes. 
Id. at 491 U.S. at 70 (internal quotation and citations omitted). In any event, this argument fails regardless of 
whether it goes to jurisdiction or the merits for claims seeking relief other than prospective injunctive relief. 
 
5 As with Defendants’ § 1983 “perso n” argument, it’s not clear whether this issue actually implicates the Court’s 
subject-matter jurisdiction. Some courts, for instance, trea t arguments that a defendant lacks the capacity to be 
sued as a challenge to their personal jurisdiction. Others treat such arguments as raising an affirmative defense. 
For their part Defendants merely assume that a lack of capacity to be su ed would deprive the Court of subject-
matter jurisdiction. Because the Court has already concluded that it lacks jurisdiction over any aspect of Plaintiff’s 

because of Ex Parte Young, it’s simply not true that Plaintiff’s official capacity claim against Smith 
for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief must be treated as one against the Kansas Highway 
Patrol.6 Smith can be sued in this capacity for this form of relief. Thus , the Court rejects the 
argument that Smith lacks the capacity to be su ed in his official capacity for prospective 
declaratory and injunctive relief. 
In sum, Plaintiff’s claim for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against Smith in 
his official capacity survives. Bu t the Court dismisses without prej udice for want of jurisdiction 
Plaintiff’s official capacity claim against Smith to the extent it seeks any other form of relief. 
B. Failure to State a Claim 
Plaintiff asserts individual capacity claims against Davis and Smith and seeks monetary 
relief. Plaintiff alleges Davis lied about smelling mariju ana and used that lie as a justification to 
prolong the stop and search Plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiff also alleges that Davis was acting pursuant 
to an official policy of Smith’s. Plaintiff alleges Smith instructed his troopers to lie about smelling 
marijuana to justify prolonging stops and searching vehicles. Defendants assert qualified immunity 
and seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).7 
 
official capacity claim that seeks relief beyond prospec tive injunctive relief, and because the Court ultimately 
concludes that Defendants’ § 1983-person argument fails to the extent it’s levelled at Plaintiff’s official capacity 
claim to the extent it seeks prospective relief, the Court does not need to determine whether the argument concerns 
the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. 
6 This is part of Ex Parte Young’s “fiction.” Official capacity claims for prospective relief seek an official solution 
to ongoing violations of federal law. These claims seek to enjoin state officials from doing their jobs, but at the 
same time are apparently distinct from suits against the state itself. 
7 A complaint survives as 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss when it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible if it contains sufficient factual content to 
allow a court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The 
plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” but it “is not 
akin to a ‘probability requirement.’” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts th at are merely consistent with a 
defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. 
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal quotations omitted). 

Qualified immunity is a powerful defense. For public servants like police officers, the 
defense insulates “all but the plainly incompetent or t hose who knowingly violate the law” from 
suit. Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2010) (Gor such, J.) (interna l quotation and 
citations omitted). Once qualified immunity is raised, it be comes the plaintiff’s burden to show 
both (1) the defendant violated his rights under the Cons titution or a federal statute and (2) the 
rights at-issue were “clearly establishe d” when they were allegedly violated. Id. A court has 
discretion to address these two aspects of the analysis in any order it chooses. See Rowell v. Bd. of 
Cnty. Comm’rs of Muskogee Cnty., Okla., 978 F.3d 1165, 1171 (10th Cir. 2020). 
Davis. Davis is not entitled to qualified immun ity on this record. Plaintiff has plausibly 
alleged constitutional violations. He contends that Davis initiated a traffic stop, learned about his 
criminal history, lied about smelling marijuan a, and then violated the Fourth Amendment by 
prolonging the stop and then searching his vehicl e (including his trunk when he came up empty-
handed after searching the passenger compartment). 
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he “does not smoke” and did not ha ve any burnt or raw 
marijuana in the vehicle on July 25 or 26. Doc. 29 at 3. Plaintiff alleges that he had just retrieved 
his vehicle from Briggs Nissan and has no reason to believe any mechanic from that business 
possessed or smoked marijuana in his vehicle. He further alle ges that Davis did not mention any 
odor during the initial enc ounter but stated he sme lled marijuana when he reapproached. By this 
time, Davis had seen Plaintiff’s license (which shows he is a registered offender) and criminal 
background (which shows he is a registered drug offender). Davis prolonged the stop without 
reasonable suspicion, searched the passenger comp artment without probable cause, and (having 
found nothing) continued the stop to search the trunk. In sum, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that 
Davis lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic st op and that he lacked 

probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle under the Fourth Amendment’s 
automobile exception. 
Plaintiff has also shown that the alleged constitutional violations were clearly established 
at the time. Heard v. Dulayev, 29 F.4th 1195, 1203 (10th Cir. 2022) (explaining that a right is 
clearly established when it is “sufficiently cl ear that every reasonabl e officer would have 
understood that what he is doing violates that ri ght”). The unlawfulness of the alleged conduct in 
this case is clearly established. It is beyond debate that, without any other justification, either the 
absence of reasonable suspicion to prolong a tr affic stop or of probable cause to support a 
warrantless search of a vehicle under the Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception violates the 
Fourth Amendment. 
On reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop: 
It is well-established that, duri ng a routine traffic stop, an officer 
may request a driver’s license and registration, run requisite 
computer checks, and issue citations or warnings. An officer may 
also inquire about the driver’s tr avel plans, and ask about matters 
unrelated to the stop. Generally, an officer may also request consent 
to search a driver’s luggage. 
However, a lawful traffic stop may not extend beyond the time 
reasonably required to effectuate its purpose. Continued detention is 
lawful only if the encounter beco mes consensual or if, during the 
initial lawful traffic stop, the officer develops a reasonable suspicion 
that the detained person is engaged in criminal activity. 
United States v. Pettit , 785 F.3d 1374, 1379-80 (10t h Cir. 2015) (interna l quotation and citation 
omitted). Reasonable suspicion means that an officer has a “particularized and objective basis for 
suspecting criminal conduct under a totality of the circumstances.” Id. (internal quotation and 
citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Davis’s only justification for prolonging the stop was 
the smell of marijuana emanating from Plaintiff’s ve hicle. Plaintiff further alleges Davis did not 
smell marijuana and offers well pleaded allegations that render this allegation plausible. Accepting 

these factual allegations as true (as it must on a motion to dismiss), the Court finds that Davis is 
not entitled to qualified immunity at this juncture. 
On probable cause to search the vehicle, it is well-established that a “warrantless search of 
an automobile is reasonable,” and therefore does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment, “if there 
is probable cause to believe it contains contraband.” United States v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523, 1528 
(10th Cir. 1993). Probable cause exists if there is “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of 
a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. at 1257 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
And the Tenth Circuit “has long recognized that marijuana has a distinct smell and that the odor of 
marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement to search a vehicle or baggage.” United 
States v. Zabalza, 346 F.3d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation and citations omitted). 
But whether an officer has probable cause to search based on the odor of marijuana can depend on 
whether the odor he detects is raw marijuana or burnt marijuana. The Tenth Circuit has explained 
that “although the smell of burnt marijuana emanating from a vehicle provides probable cause to 
search the passenger compartment of that vehicle, if that search fails to uncover corroborating 
evidence of contraband, probable cause to sear ch the trunk of the vehicle does not exist.” United 
States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2000). 
Here, it is unclear whether Davis reported sme lling burnt or raw marijuana. But Plaintiff 
plausibly alleges that Davis searched the passenger compartment of his vehicle and, having found 
nothing, then searched his trunk. Davis did not lo cate marijuana. Plaintif f alleges that Davis 
reported the odor of marijuana to justify the search but that he fabricated that justification and did 
not actually smell marijuana. Agai n, crediting the truth of these al legations, Plaintiff sufficiently 
alleges that Davis violated a clearly established right. Namely, Davis’s search of his vehicle for 
marijuana without probable cause violated his F ourth Amendment rights. The Court finds that 

Davis is not entitled to qualified immunity on this record. Discovery may re veal facts that alter 
this analysis. E.g., United States v. George, 2010 WL 431783, at *8 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (concluding 
probable cause to search the defendant’s vehicle existed based on credible testimony that officers 
had smelled marijuana even though their search failed to turn up any marijuana or marijuana 
paraphernalia, because the drug’s odor “can linger” and could have been detected “for a significant 
period of time” after having been smoked). But Davis is not entitled to qualified immunity on this 
record. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Davis in his individual capacity for monetary damages (the 
sole claim against him) survives the motion. 
Smith. Conversely, the Court finds that qualifi ed immunity shields Smith. The Court 
begins with the observation that claims under § 1983 that seek relief for violations of one’s 
constitutional rights require “more specificity” in pleading because “any constitutional violation 
must be traceable to a defendant’s own actions.” Jarett v. City of Garnett, Kan., 2024 WL 4363244, 
at *3 (D. Kan. 2024) (emphasis added) (internal quotation and citations omitted). Yes, supervisory 
liability is available when a de fendant’s subordinates are involved in the vi olation, but it is not 
enough to simply allege “that the defendant was in charge of a person who committed the alleged 
constitutional violation.” Id. Rather, 
[a] plaintiff must first establish th at the supervisor ’s subordinates 
violated the plaintiff’s federal ri ghts. And the plai ntiff must also 
allege an affirmative link between the supervisor’s conduct and the 
violation. A plaintiff may demo nstrate such a connection by 
establishing that: (1) the de fendant promulgated, created, 
implemented or possessed responsibility for the continued operation 
of a policy that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm, 
and (3) acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged 
constitutional deprivation. 
Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that Smith wa s present at the stop. Instead, the source of 
Smith’s individual liability comes from his role as Davis’s supervisor. This means that Plaintiff 

must allege enough non-conclusory facts that, taken as true, woul d plausibly demonstrate that 
Smith was responsible for a practice among Kansas Highway Patrol troopers that caused Davis to 
lie about smelling marijuana to justify prolongi ng the stop and searchi ng Plaintiff’s vehicle. 
Plaintiff has not cleared this bar. To be sure, Plaintiff’s operative complaint does contain some 
allegations that Smith knew about officers lyin g about smelling marijuana to search vehicles 
during traffic stops. And Plaintiff does allege that Smith was responsible for training, supervising, 
and disciplining officers he knew were engaged in this practice. But these allegations are wholly 
conclusory. There are no additional factual allegations from which one could reasonably infer that 
Smith was, in fact, aware of a pervasive practi ce among Kansas Highway Patrol troopers to lie 
about smelling marijuana to just ify prolonging stops and searchi ng vehicles (e.g., other cases 
where the practice has occurred). The bare, conclusory allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint do not 
permit the conclusion that Smith’s conduct as Davi s’s supervisor plausibly violated his federal 
rights. Plaintiff does not satisfy the first prong of qualified immunity, and Smith is therefore 
protected by the defense. The Court dismisses with prejudice Plaintiff’s claim against Smith in his 
individual capacity. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ motion. The 
surviving claims are: a § 1983 claim for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against Smith 
in his official capacity and a § 1983 claim for m onetary damages against Davis in his individual 
capacity. 
THE COURT THEREFORE ORDERS that Defendants’ motion (Doc. 31) is GRANTED 
IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court dismisses without prejudice the claim against Smith 
in his official capacity except the portion seeking prospective declaratory and injunctive relief. The 

Court dismisses with prejudice the claim against Smith in his individual capacity. The Court denies 
the motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of the claim against Davis in his individual capacity. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 1, 2026 /s/ Holly L. Teeter 
 HOLLY L. TEETER 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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