govinfo:USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00180-9

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Southwest Fair Housing Council,

Plaintiff,

WG Scottsdale LLC,

Defendant.
No. CV-19-00180-TUC-RM

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Southwest Fair Housing Council ’s
Supplemental Motion for Award of Additional Attorneys’ Fee s (Doc. 181), which is fully
briefed (Docs. 183, 185). For the following reasons, the Motion will be partially granted.
I. Background
Following a four -day trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, finding
that Defendant WG Scottsdale LLC, d/b/a Atria Sierra Pointe, violated the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and the Arizona Fair
Housing Act (“AZFHA”). (Do c. 120.) The jury awarded nominal damages and
$100,000 in punitive damages. ( Id.) The Clerk entered judgment on May 17, 2022.
(Doc. 123.) Plaintiff thereafter filed a Motion for Attorneys’ Fees on May 31, 2022.
(Doc. 127.) Due to certain ambiguities in the Motion, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file
exhibits showing a final accounting of the attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses being
sought. (Doc. 159.) Plaintiff filed exhibits showing a final accounting on October 3,
2022, reflecting fees and expe nses incurred as of the date of the filing of the Motion for

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Attorneys’ Fees. (Doc. 163.) The Court resolved the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees on
November 4, 2024. (Doc. 170.)
After Plaintiff filed its initial Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, the parties bri efed
Plaintiff’s Motion for Permanent Injunction (Doc s. 125, 135, 140 ); Defendant’s Motion
for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, Alternatively, for a New Trial (Doc s. 134, 147, 149),
Defendant’s Motions to Stay (Docs. 158, 160, 164, 174, 175); and the partie s’ proposed
plans for permanent injunctive relief (Docs. 161, 167, 171, 173).
Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on September 7, 2022 (Doc. 155), and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a memorandum disposition affirming t his Court’s
judgment on Oct ober 17, 2023 (Doc. 180 -1). The Ninth Circuit issued its mandate on
December 4, 2023. (Doc. 180.) Plaintiff then filed the pending Supplemental Motion for
Award of Additional Attorneys’ Fees on December 18, 2023, seeking appellate attorneys’
fees and attorneys’ fees incurred for work in this Court after the filing of Plaintiff’s initial
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. (Doc. 181.) On January 9, 2024, the Ninth Circuit
determined that Plaintiff was entitled to attorneys’ fees on appeal and referred the
determination of an appropriate amount of appellate fees to the Appellate Commissioner.
(Doc. 186.) On April 5, 2024, the Appellate Commissioner awarded Plaintiff $58,315.00
in appellate attorneys’ fees. (Doc. 189.)
II. Legal Standard
The ADA, FHA, and A ZFHA each permit a prevailing plaintiff to recover
attorneys’ fees and costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2), A.R.S. § 41 -
1491.36. In civil rights cases where an award of attorneys’ fees is authorized by statute,
“a prevailing plaintiff sho uld ordinarily recover an attorney ’s fee unless special
circumstances would render such an award unjust. ” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
429 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Courts employ a two -step “lodestar method to determine a reasonable attorney ’s
fees award.” Kelly v. Wengler , 822 F.3d 1085, 1099 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation
marks omitted)) . First, to calculate the lodestar figure, the court must determine “the

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number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation mul tiplied by a reasonable hourly
rate.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. “Second, the court determines whether to modify the
lodestar figure, upward or downward, based on factors not subsumed in the lodestar
figure.” Kelly, 822 F.3d at 1099.
In determining wh at constitutes a reasonable hourly rate, courts look to the
prevailing market rates in the relevant community “for similar work performed by
attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Schwarz v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 73 F.3d 895, 908 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d
1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992) (courts generally look to the rates of attorneys practicing in
the forum district). The party seeking an award of attorneys’ fees bears the burden of
producing “satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits —that the
requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by
lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation .” Camacho v.
Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008).
Counsel for the prevailing party should exclude hours that are “excessive,
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary,” and “billing judgment is an important component
in fee setting.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (internal quotation marks omitted). “ Where the
documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award
accordingly.” Id. at 433.
In the second part of the analysis —determining whether the lodestar figure should
be adjusted upward or downward—courts consider the following:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty
of the questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform the
legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment
by the attorney due t o acceptance of the case; (5) the
customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7)
time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;
(8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the
experience, reputation, and ability of t he attorneys; (10) the
“undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in
similar cases.

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Carter v. Caleb Brett LLC, 757 F.3d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 2014); see also LRCiv 54.2(c)(3).
Local Rule of Civil Procedure 54.2(c) requires that a motion for award of
attorneys’ fees be supported by a memorandum of points and authorities that discusses
the party’s eligibility and entitlement to the award and the reasonableness of the amount
sought. The party seeking fees must also provide an itemized statement setting forth:
“(A) The date on which the service was performed; (B) The time devoted to each
individual unrelated task performed on such day; (C) A description of the service
provided; and (D) The identity of the attorney, paralegal, or other person performing such
service.” LRCiv 54.2(e)(1). Rule 54.2(e)(2) provides that “[t]he party seeking an award
of fees must adequately describe the services rendered so that the reasonableness of the
charge can be evaluated.”
III. Discussion
Defendant argues, first, that the fee award requested in Plaintiff’s Supplemental
Motion should be reduced to eliminate reimbursement for appellate work. (Doc. 183 at
3-4.)1 In its Reply, Plaintiff agrees that, given the Ninth Circuit’s decision not to transfer
the matter of appellate fees, this Court should award only fees arising from work
performed in the district court. (Doc. 185 at 1 -2.)2 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s total
supplemental fee request is $23,126. 50 in fees incurred by Richards & Moskowitz PLC
and $7,695.00 in fees incurred by Eisenberg & Baum, LLP. (Id. at 11.)
Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff’s entitlement to a supplemental attorneys’ fee
award but argues that the amount of the award should be reduced to $3,0222.20 for the
following reasons: (1) because Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion is untimely; (2) because
the rates sought for Eis enberg & Baum attorneys are unreasonably high; (3) because

1 All record citations herein refer to the page numbers generated by the Court’s electronic
filing system and, unless otherwise noted, the docket in the above-captioned case.
2 In the Reply, Plaintiff also removes a time entry for research that Plaintiff co ncedes is
appropriately classified as appellate work. (Doc. 185 at 2 n.1, 10.) In its Response,
Defendant had challenged the entry at issue as vague. (Doc. 183 at 8.) The Court notes
that, in the time records submitted with Plaintiff’s Supplemental Mot ion, Plaintiff
highlighted the entry in pink, indicating it was associated with the appeal in this case.
(Doc. 181-1 at 9, 58.) Given that the entry was classified from the onset as appellate, it is
not clear why Defendant challenged the entry as vague or why Plaintiff reduced its
requested fee award in its Reply to remove the entry.

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Eisenberg & Baum’s time entries should be reduced to account for post hoc
enhancements; and (4) to eliminate vague time entries. (Doc. 183.)
A. Entitlement to Supplemental Attorneys’ Fee Award
This Court previously found that Plaintiff, as the prevailing party, is entitled to an
award of attorneys’ fees u nder the ADA, FHA, and AZFHA. (Doc. 170.) Defendants
present no reason to alter this conclusion and do not dispute Plaintiff’s entitlement to a
supplemental fee award . The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to supplemental
attorneys’ fees under the ADA, FHA, and AZFHA for work performed to preserve the
favorable judgment obtained in this case and to obtain permanent injunctive relief.
B. Timeliness of Supplemental Motion
The Court ordered Plaintiff to file exhibits showing a final accounting of the
attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses sought in its initial Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, due
to confusion regarding billing statements that were labeled Eisenberg & Baum but
appeared to reflect work performed by Richards & Moskowitz attorne ys, and due to a
lack of exhibits showing which fees had been reduced or omitted to reach the reduced
attorneys’ fees award that Plaintiff had requested in its Reply in Support of the initial
Motion. (Doc. 159.) The final accounting filed by Plaintiff on October 3, 2022, reflected
only fees incurred as of May 31, 2022 —the date Plaintiff filed its initial Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees. (Doc. 163.)
Defendant argues that the Court should eliminate from Plaintiff’s supplemental
attorneys’ fee award all attorneys’ fees incurred before October 3, 202 2, when Plaintiff
filed its final accounting. (Doc. 183 at 4 -5.) Rule 54.2(b)(2) of the Local Rules of Civil
Procedure states: “unless otherwise provided by statute or court order entered in an
individual case, the party seeking an award of attorneys’ fees and related non -taxable
expenses must file and serve a motion . . . within fourteen (14) days of the entry of
judgment in the action with respect to whi ch the services were rendered.” Defendant
does not contend that this rule precludes a supplemental motion for attorneys’ fees
incurred after the conclusion of briefing on an initial motion for attorneys’ fees.

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However, Defendant appears to argue that Rule 54.2(b)(2) requires a plaintiff to add to
the fee award requested in a n initial motion for attorneys’ fees all fees incurred as of the
date of the completion of supplemental briefing on that motion.
Rule 54.2(b)(2) does not preclude a plaintiff from taking such an approach, and in
many cases it may be the most efficient approach. However, nothing in the language of
the rule requires a plaintiff to seek to amend the attorneys’ fee award requested in a
motion for attorneys’ fees to include fees incurre d between the time of the filing of the
motion and the conclusion of briefin g. The final accounting that Plaintiff filed on
October 3, 2022, related to Plaintiff’s initial Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, and it therefore
was reasonable for Plaintiff to includ e only those fees incurred as of the date of the filing
of the initial Motion. It was also reasonable for Plaintiff to wait until the Ninth Circuit
issued its mandate affirming the judgment of this Court before filing its Supplemental
Motion seeking attor neys’ fees incurred after the date of the filing of its initial Motion.
Even if Plaintiff had sought in its October 3, 2022 final accounting an award of all
attorneys’ fees incurred as of that date, a supplemental motion for attorneys’ fees would
still ha ve been necessary because the parties were continuing to brief issues at the
district-court level as of October 3, 2022. Accordingly, the approach advocated by
Defendant would not have aided judicial efficiency under the circumstances of this
particular case. Furthermore, Defendant has not identified any prejudice resulting from
the timing of Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion.
Local Rule of Civil Procedure 54.2(b)(2) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d)(2)(B)3 provide this Court with discretion to se t an alternative timeframe for filing a
motion for attorneys’ fees, and the Court exercises that discretion here in finding
Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion timely. See Suenos LLC v. Goldman, 633 F. App’x 874,
878–79 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding district court has discretion to set alternative deadline for
filing motion for attorneys’ fees); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, advisory committee note to 1993
amendment (district court may set a new period for filing a request for attorneys’ fees

3 Rule 54(d)(2)(B)(i) states: “Unless a . . . court order provides otherwise” a motion for
attorneys’ fees must be filed no later than 14 days after entry of judgment.

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after an appeal has been resolved).
C. Reasonableness of Requested Hourly Rates
Plaintiff requests supplemental attorneys’ fees for work performed by Richards &
Moskowitz attorneys William A. Richards at $425 per hour, Karen J. Moskowitz at $395
per hour, Natalya Ter -Grigoryan at $300 per hour , Shanya G. Stuart at $275 per hour ;
Richards & Moskowitz law clerks and paralegals at $125 per hour; and Eisenberg &
Baum attorneys Andrew Rozynski at $500 per hour and David John Hommel at $425 per
hour. (Doc. 181 at 12 ; Doc. 181-1 at 4-5, 8-9, 47-50.) Defendant does not challenge the
rates requested for Richards & Moskowitz attorneys, law clerks, and paralegals, and the
Court finds those rates reasonable in light of the prevailing rates charged in this district
for attorneys of similar skill, experience, and reputation.
Defendant argues that the rates requested for Eisenberg & Baum attorneys
Rozynski and Hommel are inflated because they are based on the prevailing rates for
attorneys in New York rather than Arizona. (Doc. 183 at 6 -7.) In ruling on Plaintiff’s
initial Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, the Court found a rate of $350 per hour reasonable for
Rozynski and a rate of $275 per hour reasonable for Hommel. (Doc. 170 at 11.) Plaintiff
did not seek reconsideration of or appeal this C ourt’s prior findings regarding reasonable
hourly rates for Rozynski and Hommel. The Ninth Circuit found the same rates
reasonable in ruling on Plaintiff’s request for appellate attorneys’ fees. (Doc. 189 at 2-5,
9.)
In his declaration, Rozynski cites to a nationwide survey of billing rates, average
rates for attorneys practicing in New York City, and rates that he has been awarded in
other districts. (Doc. 181 -1 at 46 -49.) Plaintiff also cites in its Reply to rates found
reasonable in the Northern D istrict of California. (Doc. 185 at 9.) However, this Court
must look to the prevailing rates charged in this district rather than n ationwide averages,
reasonable rates for attorneys in New York City, or rates awarded in other distric ts. See
Gates, 987 F.2d at 1405. Plaintiff cites only limited District of Arizona cases (Doc. 181
at 14; Doc. 181 -1 at 48, 50), two of which found a rate of $350 per hour reasonable for

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the Arizona market . See Arnhoelter v. Kaus , No. CV-20-00403-PHX-JAT, 2020 WL
4673160, at *4 –5 (D. Ariz. Aug. 12, 2020) ; Fisher v. Lohr , No. CV -74-90-TUC-DCB,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200720, at *16 (D. Ariz. Aug. 8, 2014). Plaintiff cites in its
Reply to one Arizona case finding higher rates reasonable. (Doc. 185 at 8 –9 (citing
ThermoLife Int’l LLC v. Am. Fitness Wholesalers LLC , No. CV -18-04189-PHX-JAT,
2020 WL 1694739, at *8 (D. Ariz. Apr. 7, 2020)).) Both Arnhoelter and Fisher support
this Court’s prior finding that a rate of $350 per hour is reasonab le for Rozynski, and the
discussion in ThermoLife is insufficient to warrant reconsideration of this Court’s prior
findings regarding reasonable rates for Rozynski and Hommel. Given this Court’s prior
findings, and the Ninth Circuit’s fee award, the Court will again award $350 per hour for
work performed by Rozynski and $275 per hour for work performed by Hommel.
D. Eisenberg & Baum’s Time Entries
In its November 4, 2022 Order granting Plaintiff’s initial Motion for Attorneys
Fees, the Court eliminated a number of Eisenberg & Baum time entries as vague and non-
compliant with the descriptive requirements of LRCiv 54.2(e). (Doc. 170 at 13 -18.) On
July 10, 2023, in the related case Southwest Fair Housing Council v. WG Chandler Villas
SH LLC, No. 4:19 -cv-178-RM (“WG Chandler Villas ”), this Court found that Eisenberg
& Baum appeared to have made post hoc enhancements to the descriptions in its
timekeeping records but that the post hoc enhancement s likely affected only timekeeping
entries recorded prior to the June 14, 2022 filing of Defendan t’s opposition to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees in the above -captioned case. ( See Doc. 130 at 21 in WG
Chandler Villas.) The Court accordingly reduced by 20% the fees sought by Eisenberg
& Baum for work performed prior to June 14, 2022 , to account for the likely post hoc
enhancement. ( Id.) The Court noted that it would entertain reconsideration of the
reduction if Plaintiff submitted metadata showing there was no post hoc alteration of
Eisenberg & Baum’s billing records. ( Id.) Plaintiff never submitted the requested
metadata and did not seek reconsideration of the 20% reduction.
Defendant argues in the present case that the Court should reduce Eisenberg &

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Baum’s time entries by 20% to account for post hoc enhancements , consistent with the
approach taken in WG Chandler Villas . (Doc. 183 at 7.) However, the time records
submitted by Eisenberg & Baum in support of Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion do not
include any entries prior to June 14, 2022. ( See Doc. 181-1 at 53-65.) Because the Court
found in WG Chandler Villas that a reduction for post hoc enhancement was appropriate
only for work performed prior to June 14, 2022, and no such work is at issue here, the
Court rejects Defendant’s request to reduce Eisenberg & Baum’s fees by 20%.
The Court also rejects Defendant’s request to eliminate Eisenberg & Baum time
entries for vagueness. The Court has reviewed the challenged entries and find that they
“adequately describe the services rendered” such that “the reasonableness of the charge
can be evaluated.” LRCiv 54.2(e)(2).
E. Conclusion
The Court does not find that any other adjustments to Plaintiff’s requested fee
award are appropriate. The significant time and labor required, the skill and experience
of Plaintiff’s counsel, the contingency fee ar rangement at issue, the preclusion of other
employment, the nature and length of counsel’s professional relationship with Plaintiff,
and the results obtained all support an award of the requested fees without further
adjustment. See Carter , 757 F.3d at 86 9. Accordingly, t he Court will reduce the fees
requested by Eisenberg & Baum to reflect an hourly rate of $350 for Rozynski and an
hourly rate of $275 for Hommel, but will not otherwise reduce the requested fee award.
Plaintiff has lodged a proposed judgm ent awarding attorneys’ fees. (Doc. 182 -1.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a)(3) provides that a separate judgment is not
required for an order disposing of a motion for attorney’s fees under Rule 54.
Accordingly, the Court will not issue a separate judgment. See United States v. Business
Recovery Servs., LLC , No. CV 11 –0390–PHX–JAT, 2012 WL 3064253, at *2 (D. Ariz.
July 26, 2012) (declining to issue a separate judgment on attorney’s fees order because
doing so is unnecessary under Rule 58(a)(3)).

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IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion for Additional Attorneys’
Fees (Doc. 181) is partially granted. Plaintiff is awarded supplemental attorneys’ fees
in the amount of $28,749.00, reflecting $23 ,126.50 for work performed by Richards &
Moskowitz timekeepers and $5,622.50 for work performed by Eisenberg & Baum
timekeepers.
Dated this 29th day of May, 2024.

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