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govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-1_26-cv-22937-0

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida · 2026-06-01

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
 

 
 
ROGER EDUARDO RAMOS PEREZ, 
 
 Petitioner, 
v. 
 
KROME SERVICE PROCESSING CENTER, 
Warden, 
 
 Respondents. 
_______________________________________/ 
 
OMNIBUS ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
AND ON PENDING MOTIONS 
 
 THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Petitioner , Roger Eduardo Ramos Perez ’s 
(“Petitioner”), pro se Petition for Writ o f Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 , filed 
April 27, 2026 [ ECF No. 1 (the “Petition”]), Petitioner’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In 
Forma Pauperis, filed April 29, 2026 [ECF No. 6], and Motion for Release by Interested Party 
Billie Jo Ramos, filed on May 12, 2026 [ECF No. 8]. This Court entered an Order to Show 
Cause [ECF No. 7] on May 5, 2026, and Respondents filed a Response on May 14, 2026. 
[ECF No. 9]. 
THE COURT has reviewed the Petition and Response, the Motions , the pertinent 
portions of the record, and relevant legal authorities and is otherwise fully advised. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The background relevant to Petitioner’s immigration status and proceedings before the 
Immigration Court is set forth in the parties’ submissions. See generally Pet., Resp. 
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Petitioner, Roger Eduardo Ramos Perez, is a native and citizen of Cuba who entered 
the United States on or about April 22, 1980, at or near New York, New York. Resp. at Exh. 
A, Form I -213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien (dated Feb. 7, 2026). On August 
30, 1982, Petitioner’s status was adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident. Id. Petitioner 
thereafter sustained multiple criminal convictions. 
On September 27, 1999, Petitioner was convicted of burglary and grand theft. Resp. at 
Exh. G, Form I -213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien (dated July 21, 2009), at 2. 
Based on those convictions, legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated removal 
proceedings. On April 5, 2001, INS issued and served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear 
pursuant to section 240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Resp. at Exh. B, Notice to 
Appear (dated Apr. 5, 2001). The NTA charged Petitioner with remov ability under section 
237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA based on his conviction for an aggravated felony, namely a theft 
or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment was at least one year. Id. 
On May 21, 2001, an Immigration Judge entered an order of removal against 
Petitioner and ordered him removed to Nicaragua or, in the alternative, to Cuba. Resp. at 
Exh. C, Order of the Immigration Judge, Removal Order (dated May 21, 2001). On or around 
September 3, 2001, Petitioner was released on an Order of Supervision (“OSUP”). Resp. at 
Exh. F, Detention History. 
Petitioner thereafter incurred additional criminal convictions. On January 18, 2005, 
Petitioner was convicted of resisting an officer without violence. Resp. at Exh. G at 2. On 
August 15, 2005, Petitioner was convicted of grand theft, burglary, and possession of burglary 
tools. Id. On April 5, 2017, Petitioner was convicted of fleeing and eluding a police officer 
and driving while license suspended, for which he was sentenced to one year and one day 
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imprisonment. Resp. at Exh. A at 2 –3. Petitioner was also convicted of resisting an officer 
without violence and sentenced to 262 days’ imprisonment. Id . Upon completion of his 
sentence, Petitioner was taken into Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody. 
Resp. at Exh . H, Form I -213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien (dated May 12, 
2017), at 3; see also Resp. at Exh. F. On August 16, 2017, Petitioner was again released on 
OSUP. Resp. at Exh. F. 
On February 5, 2026, ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations encountered 
Petitioner at the Turner Guilford Knight Correctional Center in Miami, Florida, following 
Petitioner’s arrest for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, domestic violence. Resp. at 
Exh. A at 2. During that encounter, ICE revoked Petitioner’s OSUP and took him into 
custody. Id. On March 26, 2026, Petitioner was transferred to the Krome North Service 
Processing Center in Miami, Florida. Resp. at Exh. F. Petitioner remains in ICE custody 
pending execution of his removal order. Id. 
Petitioner filed the Petition on April 27, 2026. In the Petition, Petitioner avers that his 
detention is unlawful and unconstitutional and seeks release from custody and bond hearing. 
See generally Pet. Petitioner also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis . [ECF 
No. 6]. And, on May 12, 2026, Petitioner’s husband, Billie Jo Ramos, filed a Motion for 
Release by Interested Party in which he urges the release of the Petitioner, citing medical and 
health issues that are not being addressed while Petitioner has been in custody. See ECF No. 
8. 
Respondents filed a Response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause on May 14, 2026. 
[ECF No. 9]. In the Response, Respondents argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction to prevent 
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the execution of the removal order and that the amount of time Petitioner has b een detained 
is presumptively reasonable. See generally Resp. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Petitioner’s Detention is Governed by the Post-Removal Statutory Framework 
As an initial matter, the parties do not dispute that an Immigration Judge entered a 
final order of removal against Petitioner on May 21, 2001, ordering him removed to 
Nicaragua or, alternatively, to Cuba. Resp. at Exh. C, Order of the Immigration Judge, 
Removal Order (dated May 21, 2001). Nor is there any indication in the record that Petitioner 
appealed that removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals. See Pet. at 4 –5; Resp. at 
2. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, an order of removal becomes administratively 
final upon either “a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such 
order” or “the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such 
order.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B). Where, as here, the t ime to appeal has expired and no 
appeal was taken, the removal order is administratively final by operation of statute. 
B. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Hear Petitioner’s Challenge 
To The Order Of Removal. 
 
In the Petition, Petitioner asks this Court to order his immediate release. To the extent 
Petitioner is challenging the order of removal, this Court agrees with the Respondents that 
this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear such a challenge. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (“no court shall 
have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by … any alien arising from the decision or action 
by [ICE] to … execute removal orders against any alien.”); Camarena v. Dir., Immigr. & Customs 
Enf’t, 988 F.3d 1268, 1273 (11th Cir. 2021) (“Section 1252(g) bars review over ‘any’ challenge 
to the execution of a removal order – and makes no exception for those claiming to challenge 
the government’s ‘authority’ to execute their removal orders.”). 
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C. Any Challenge To The Statutory Basis For Detention Is Not Ripe. 
As indicated above, Petitioner’s removal order is administratively final. The 
consequence of that finality is dispositive. Once a removal order becomes administratively 
final, the statutory “removal period” begins. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i) (providing that 
the removal period begins on “the date the order of removal becomes administratively final”). 
During and following that period, detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231, the post-removal 
detention framework , not by the pre -removal detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226. 
Accordingly, Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1231. 
Because Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1231, his challenge to the statutory 
basis for that detention under any pre -removal framework is no longer ripe for review. The 
only cognizable inquiry at this stage is whether his post- removal detention has become 
constitutionally unreasonable under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), an issue addressed 
separately below. 
D. Petitioner’s Claim of Indefinite Detention Is Not Ripe. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis provides the governing framework 
for evaluating Petitioner’s challenge to his post-removal-period detention. 
In Zadvydas, the Court considered whether 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) authorizes the 
indefinite detention of noncitizens subject to final orders of removal. The Court held that it 
does not. Rather, construing the statute in light of constitutional concerns, the Court 
recognized an implicit temporal limitation on detention. 
Critically, the Court explained: 
“In order to limit the occasions when courts will need to make the difficult 
judgments called for by the recognition of this necessary Executive leeway, it is 
practically necessary to recognize a presumptively reasonable period of 
detention. It is unlikely that Congress believed that all reasonably foreseeable 
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removals could be accomplished in 90 days, but there is reason to believe that 
it doubted the constitutionality of more than six months’ detention. Thus, for 
the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts, six months is the 
appropriate period. Af ter the 6 –month period, once an alien provides good 
reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the 
reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must furnish evidence sufficient 
to rebut that showing.” 
 
Id. at 701. Thus, Zadvydas establishes a two-step framework. 
 
First, detention for a period of up to six months following the commencement of the 
removal period is presumptively reasonable and authorized by statute. During that time, the 
Court affords the Executive Branch “necessary… leeway” to effectuate removal. Id . 
Second, only after that six -month period has elapsed does the burden shift to the 
noncitizen to demonstrate “good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of 
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. If such a showing is made, the Government 
must rebut it with sufficient evidence to justify continued detention. Id. 
Importantly, Zadvydas does not require release after six months. Rather, it establishes 
a burden- shifting inquiry triggered only after that period has passed. Detention remains 
permissible unless and until the noncitizen satisfies the threshold showing and the 
Government fails to rebut it. 
Here, the record reflects that Petitioner was taken into ICE custody on February 5, 
2026. Resp. at 3. Petitioner filed the instant Petition on April 27, 2026. Accordingly, his 
detention remains within the “presumptively reasonable period” recognized by the Supreme 
Court, and no further inquiry under Zadvydas is warranted at this time. And, b ecause 
Petitioner cannot satisfy the threshold requirement for invoking Zadvydas , his habeas 
challenge to his continued detention is premature and must be denied. See Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 
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287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that a petitioner “cannot state a claim under 
Zadvydas until the six-month period has expired.”). 
III. CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, it is hereby 
 ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Petition [ ECF No. 1 ] is DENIED 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. It is further 
 ORDERED that the Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [ECF No. 6] is 
DENIED as moot. It is further 
ORDERED that the Motion for Release by Interested Party Billie Jo Ramos [ECF 
No. 8] is DENIED. 
 The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case. 
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in the Southern District of Florida, this 27th 
day of May, 2026. 
 
 
 ______________________________________ 
 MELISSA DAMIAN 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 
cc: Roger Eduardo Ramos Perez, Pro Se 
A# 022961598 
Krome North Service Processing Center 
Inmate Mail/Parcels 
18201 SW 12th Street 
Miami, FL 33194 
Case 1:26-cv-22937-MD Document 11 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/01/2026 Page 7 of 7

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