govinfo:USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cr-01263-5

Corpus: 543,223 opinions · 3,177 judges · newest 2026-06-23 · expanding Coverage ↗

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

Ahmed Alahmedalabdaloklah,

Defendant.
No. CR-12-01263-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Superseding Indictment
Due to Violation of the Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Tr ial, or, Alternatively, to
Dismiss Counts 5 and 6 Under the Speedy Trial Act (Doc. 213).
I. OVERVIEW
Defendant was arrested by Turkish auth orities on May 18, 2011 , and surrendered
to the United States on August 27, 2014. Trial is set for October 3, 2017. Defendant
contends that his Sixth Amendment righ t to a speedy trial was violated by the
Government’s intentional dela y in obtaining his extradition. Defendant also contends
that, under the Speedy Trial Act, Counts Five and Six of th e Second Superseding
Indictment must be dismissed with prejudi ce because the Government did not obtain an
indictment against him within thirty days after his arrest by Turkish authorities.
This case involves two extr adition requests. The first request was presented to
Turkey on June 21, 2011, and based on a crim inal complaint with two charges, which
was filed on May 10, 2011. The second request was presented to Turkey on November 2,

- 2 -

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

2012, and based on a grand jury indictment with four different charges, which was
returned on June 28, 2012. Defendant’s theory is th e Government made a strategic
decision to file the second ex tradition request for the purpose of delaying processing of
the first request because it did not have sufficien t evidence to obtain an indictment on the
two charges in the criminal co mplaint and it would not be ab le to bring different charges
after Defendant was extradited. The Governme nt contends that Turkish authorities said
the second request would be considered by th e Turkish courts separately from the first
request, for which judicial review had been completed and executive decision for
implementation was pending. It appears that the two requests were decided separately by
the Turkish courts, but the execu tive decision to implement the judicial determinations
was made for both extradition requests at the same time. It is not apparent, however, that
the second request delayed the executive decision.
After Defendant was surrendered to the Un ited States on August 27, 2014, trial
continuances have been granted only with hi s consent. The Motion to Dismiss does not
argue that any delay after August 27, 2014, is a violation of Defendant’s rights, but rather
argues that the Government’s delay in produci ng exculpatory eviden ce demonstrates an
intentional strategy of delay and necessitated the trial continuances.
II. DEFENDANT’S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
The Government’s response includes the Declaration of Jeffrey M. Olson, an
Associate Director with the Office of International Affairs in the Criminal Division of the
United States Department of Justice. (Doc. 268-1.) Defendant objects to paragraphs 14–
32 of the Olson Declaration as inadmissible under Rules 602 and 802 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence because, Defendant cont ends, those paragraphs are not based on
personal knowledge and include inadmissible hearsay.1

1Although Defendant contends the Court must consider only admissible evidence
in deciding this motion, his motion and repl y brief include numerous exhibits, including
letters, translations, and other out-of-court st atements, without any ju stification for their
admissibility.

- 3 -

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Although Rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that a court is not
bound by evidence rules in deciding certain preliminary questions, the parties have not
cited any authority expressl y deciding whether Rule 104( a) applies in the present
circumstances. Nevertheless, a declaration or a ffidavit is relevant only to the extent it is
reliable, and the Federal Rules of Evidence provide guidance for a ssessing the reliability
of the Olson Declaration.
The Olson Declaration, made under pe nalty of perjury, describes Olson’s
employment history with and responsibilities for the Office of International Affairs. It
declares that in 2013 Olson began overseeing matters in Turkey, in 2013 and 2014 he had
in-person communications with his Turkish counterparts regarding Defendant, and he
supervised others responsible for the day-to-day communications regarding this case. It
further declares that Olson reviewed the file regarding Defendant’s extradition.
Paragraphs 15, 17, 21, 22, and 25 of the Olson Declaration declare facts consistent
with those asserted by Defendant and are th erefore undisputed. Paragraphs 14, 16, 18–
20, 23–24, and 26–31 declare facts based on Olson’s personal knowledge or his review of
the Office of International Affa irs’ file for Defendant. Info rmation from the file is not
considered as proving the truth of the inform ation in the records, but rather as showing
the basis for Olson’s conclusion in paragraph 32, which is:
In sum, the United States remained in constant contact with Turkish
authorities during the relevant period and took all r easonable steps possible
to speed [Defendant’s] extradition. In my opinion, the extradition occurred
as expeditiously as possible given the United States’ relations with Turkey
and the applicable Turkish process.
(Doc. 268-1 at 11.)
Defendant’s evidentiary objections to pa ragraphs 14–32 of the Olson Declaration
are therefore overruled.

- 4 -

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Defendant’s Arrest by Turkish Authorities
On May 10, 2011, the United States file d a sealed criminal complaint against
Defendant, and the Court issued an arre st warrant. On Ma y 12, 2011, Interpol
Washington disseminated a request to lo cate Defendant and notify United States
authorities to enable them to seek Defendant’s arrest a nd extradition. On May 16, 2011,
United States authorities learned that Defendant would be traveling from China to Turkey
on a flight that departed China on May 17, 2011. On May 16, 2011, the Office of
International Affairs transmitted a request fo r Defendant’s provisional arrest to the
Department of State, which submitted the request to the United States Embassy in
Ankara. On May 17, 2011, the United States Embassy in Ankara presented the
provisional arrest request to the Turkish government via di plomatic note. On May 18,
2011, Turkish authorities arre sted Defendant at the Istanbul Ataturk Airport after he
disembarked from a flight from China. He was transferred to the Office of the State
Prosecutor. On May 20, 2011, Defendant wa s ordered detained by the Barkiköy 11th
Lower Criminal Court. On May 23, 2011, through Turkish counsel, Defendant appealed
the detention order. On May 27, 2011, the appeal was denied.
B. Extradition from Turkey Generally
The process for submitting extradition reque sts involves the local United States
Attorney’s Office, the Office of International Affairs in the Criminal Division of the
Department of Justice, the United States Department of State, the United States Embassy
in Ankara, Turkey, and the Department of Justice’s National Security Division. The
process requires preparation, review, and tr anslation of materials that are sent by the
Department of State to the United States Embassy in Ankara, which presents the
extradition packag e and diplomatic note requestin g extradition to the Turkish
government.

- 5 -

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Generally, an extradition request is initially routed through the Turkish Ministry of
Justice, which serves as the point of contac t for the Office of Inte rnational Affairs and
coordinates with other Turk ish government authorities regarding the request. If a
defendant opposes extradition, the extradition request is reviewed by a lower level court
and an appellate court. If the courts find the defendant eligible for extradition, the
judicial decision is submitted for implementati on to the Council of Ministers, which has
final authority over extradition requests under the Turkish Penal Code.
C. The First Extradition Request
On June 21, 2011, the Un ited States Embassy in A nkara presented its first
extradition request to the Turkish government via diplomatic note. Defendant challenged
his extradition in the Tu rkish courts. On July 29, 2011, after an evidentiary hearing over
several days, the Barkiköy 8th Aggravated Felony Court found De fendant eligible for
extradition. Defendant then appealed to the Supreme Cour t 9th Criminal Department.
On November 1, 2011, the Supreme Court di smissed the appeal. On March 6, 2012,
Defendant’s petition for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s decision was denied. On
August 17, 2012, the first extradition reques t was submitted to the Council of Ministers
for implementation.
On September 24, 2012, Defendant was notified by the Ministry of Justice that the
decision of the Council of Ministers was pendi ng for implementation of the decision for
Defendant’s eligibility for extradition. In response to Defendant’s inquiries regarding the
status of his extradition, he was notified by the Ministry of Justice that the decision was
still pending on November 16, 2012, January 30, 2013, and February 21, 2013.
On March 13, 2013, Defendant began a h unger strike to protest the delay in
receiving a decision from the Co uncil of Ministers whether to implement his extradition.
On April 12, 2013, Defendant submitted a letter to prison authorities in which he stated
that he accepted the July 29, 2011 decision by the Barkiköy 8th Aggravated Felony Court

- 6 -

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

regarding his extradition. On April 15, 2013, Defendant ended the hunger strike because
it had not had any effect.
D. The Second Extradition Request
On June 28, 2012, a grand jury indictme nt against Defendant was returned with
four charges, which were different from th e two charges included in the May 10, 2011
complaint, but based on the same factual allegations. On Nove mber 2, 2012, the
Government submitted a second request to Tu rkey for Defendant’s extradition based on
the June 28, 2012 indictment. The Office of International Affairs’ file indicates that
before submitting the second request, the Gove rnment was informed by the Ministry of
Justice that the second request would be pr ocessed separately from the first request and
that Defendant could be extradited on the firs t request while the second request remained
under consideration. The file indicates that the Government inquired again on January 4,
2013, and on March 27, 2013 . On March 28, 2013, th e Government received a
communication from the Ministry of Justice suggesting that the second request would not
be considered by the Turkish courts, but instead be sent directly to the Council of
Ministers. However, on June 10, 2013, the Mi nistry of Justice in formed the Office of
International Affairs the second extradition request had been sent to the Turkish courts.
On June 13, 2013, the Mini stry of Justice informed Defendant that the first
extradition request was still pend ing before the Council of Mi nisters. The Ministry of
Justice also stated that a se cond extradition request had been forwarded to the Bakirköy
State Prosecutor and that a decision of the Council of Ministers an d a response from the
Bakirköy State Prosecutor were expected before Defendant’s extradition would be
executed. On July 10, 2013, Defendant told the Bakirköy 16th Criminal Court he did not
accept the request for extradition because he be lieved he would be to rtured if he was
extradited to the United Stat es. On November 21, 2013, the Bakirköy 16th Criminal
Court granted the second extradition request. De fendant waived his right to appeal that

- 7 -

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

decision. The second reques t was forwarded to the Counc il of Ministers, which in
approximately June 2014 decided to implement the judicial extradition decision.
E. The United States’ Communications with Turkey
The Office of International A ffairs’ file indicates that the Department of Justice’s
Resident Legal Adviser at the United States Embassy in Ankara met with a representative
of the Turkish Ministry of Justice on May 20, 2011, December 14, 2011, April 25, 2012,
and August 28, 2012. On November 20, 2012 , the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
contacted the United States Em bassy in Ankara to confirm that the extradition had been
approved by the Supreme Court on November 1, 2011, and that the extradition request
was submitted to the Council of Ministers on August 17, 2012. On December 27, 2012,
the Office of International Affairs requested a status update and was told by the Ministry
of Justice that the case remained with the Council of Ministers. On January 3, 2013, the
Ministry of Justice stated that it could take up to a year a nd a half for the executive phase
to conclude. On March 27, 2013, the Offi ce of International Affairs again asked the
Ministry of Justice for a status update. On May 9, 2013, the Ministry of Justice informed
the Office of International Affairs it had no estimate about a final decision.
In late August 2013, Olson, representing the Office of International Affairs, went
to Turkey and was informed by his Turkish counterparts that no decision had been made
by the Council of Ministers on the first extrad ition request. Olson was informed that the
second extradition request remained with the Turkish court.
The Office of International Affairs ma de inquiries regarding the status of
Defendant’s extradition on October 9, 2013 , December 3, 2013, March 14, 2014, and
April 3, 2014. On December 4, 2013, the Mi nistry of Justice said the second extradition
request remained with the 16th Aggravated Felony Court. On April 11, 2014, the
Ministry of Justice said the Turkish court ha d found Defendant eligible for extradition on
the second request and had submitted the second request to the Council of Ministers four

- 8 -

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

or five months earlier. On May 23, 2014, Olson met with his Turkish counterparts and
was told Defendant’s case remained pending with the Council of Ministers.
On June 26, 2014, the Ministry of Ju stice notified Olson that the Council of
Ministers had decided to extr adite Defendant. Transfer of custody involv ed the United
States Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona, the National Security Division of the
United States Department of Justice, the O ffice of International Affairs, the FBI, the
United States Embassy in Ankara, and Tu rkish authorities. On August 27, 2014,
Defendant was surrendered to the United States.
F. The Charges Against Defendant
The first extradition request was based on a criminal compla int filed May 10,
2011, which charged Defendant with:
(1) Conspiracy to Commit Extraterr itorial Murder of a United States
National (18 U.S.C. § 2332(b)(2)) and
(2) Providing Material Support to Terrorists (18 U.S.C. § 2339A).
The second extradition request was based on the June 28, 2012 indictment, which
charged Defendant with:
(1) Conspiracy to Use a Weapon of Mass Destruction (18 U.S.C.
§§ 2332a(a)(1), (3));
(2) Conspiracy to Maliciously Dama ge or Destroy U.S. Government
Property by Means of an Explosive (18 U.S.C. 844(f)(1), (2), and
(n));
(3) Possession of a Destructive Devi ce in Furtherance of a Crime of
Violence and Aiding and Abetti ng (18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A),
(B)(ii), and 2); and
(4) Conspiracy to Possess a Destru ctive Device in Furtherance of a
Crime of Violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(o)).
On August 12, 2014, the grand jury returned a Superseding Indictment, which charged
Defendant with:
(1) Conspiracy to Use a Weapon of Mass Destruction (18 U.S.C.
§§ 2332a(a)(1), (3));

- 9 -

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

(2) Conspiracy to Maliciously Dama ge or Destroy U.S. Government
Property by Means of an Explosiv e (18 U.S.C. § 84 4(f)(1), (2), and
(n));
(3) Possession of a Destructive Devi ce in Furtherance of a Crime of
Violence and Aiding and Abetti ng (18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A),
(B)(ii), and 2);
(4) Conspiracy to Possess a Destru ctive Device in Furtherance of a
Crime of Violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(o));
(5) Conspiracy to Commit Extraterr itorial Murder of a United States
National (18 U.S.C. § 2332(b)(2)); and
(6) Providing Material Support to Terrorists (18 U.S.C. § 2339A).
Thus, the Superseding Indictment incorpor ates the two charge s from the criminal
complaint as Counts Five and Six. On May 30, 2017, the gr and jury returned the Second
Superseding Indictment, which includes the same six charges. All of the charges in the
criminal complaint and the indictments rely on essentially the same factual allegations.
IV. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
A. Legal Standard
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .”
“[U]nlike the right to counsel or the right to be free from compelled self-incrimination,
deprivation of the right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice th e accused’s ability to
defend himself.” Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972) . It is impossible to
determine with precision wh en the right to a speedy trial has been denied. Id. For
example, a “continuance is not a violatio n of the right to speedy trial unless the
circumstances of the case are such that furthe r delay would endanger the values the right
protects.” Id. at 522. “Thus, . . . , any inquiry in to a speedy trial claim necessitates a
functional analysis of the right in th e particular context of the case.” Id. The only
possible remedy for deprivation of the right to a speedy trial is dismissal of the
indictment. Id.

- 10 -

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

To determine whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been deprived,
courts weigh four factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) th e reason for the delay, (3) the
defendant’s assertion of his right, a nd (4) prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530. The
length of the delay is a threshold factor. United States v. Alexander, 817 F.3d 1178, 1181
(9th Cir. 2016). “[T]he length of the delay is measured from the time of the indictment to
the time of trial.” United States v. Mendoza, 530 F.3d 758, 762 (9 th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). “If the length of delay is long enough to be
considered presumptively prejudicial, an inquiry into the other three factors is triggered.
Generally, a delay of more than one y ear is presumptively prejudicial.” Id. (citations
omitted). However, the length of delay that will be consider ed presumptively prejudicial
depends on the particular ci rcumstances of the case. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31. For
example, the length of delay tolerable for an ordinary street crime is considerably less
than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge. Id. at 531.
“The reason for the delay is the focal inquiry.” United States v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 877 F.2d 734, 739 (9th Ci r. 1989). If the government is reasonably diligent in
pursuing a defendant and bringing him to trial, the defendant does not have a speedy trial
claim. Mendoza, 530 F.3d at 762-63. But “if the government is negligent in pursuing the
defendant, prejudice is presumed.” Id. at 763. Evidence that the government
intentionally delayed prosecution to gain so me impermissible adva ntage at trial would
weigh heavily against the government. Doggett v. United States , 505 U.S. 647, 656
(1992). “If the government intentionally delayed or negligently pursued the proceedings,
. . . prejudice may be presumed , and its weight in the defe ndant’s favor depends on the
reason for the delay and the length of the delay.” Alexander, 817 F.3d at 1182.
“[W]here our government has a good faith belief supported by substantial
evidence that seeking extrad ition from a foreign country wo uld be futile, due diligence
does not require our gove rnment to do so.” United States v. Corona-Verbera , 509 F. 3d
1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007) (after extradition became more likely, the government

- 11 -

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

obtained an arrest warrant and diligently sought extradition). Further, where our
government pursued extradition with reasonable diligence, and it did not participate in or
encourage the delay caused by the foreign authorities, the length of delay attributed to the
United States excluded both the delay cause d by the foreign authorities and the delay
caused by the defendant’s opposition to extradition. Alexander, 817 F.3d at 1182-83.
“[A]ffirmative proof of particularized pr ejudice is not essential to every speedy
trial claim.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656. “The amount of prejudice a defendant must show
is inversely proportional to the length and reason for the delay.” Alexander, 817 F.3d at
1183. Post-indictment delay can cause differe nt types of prejudice: (1) oppressive
pretrial incarceration, (2) anxiety and concer n of the accused, and (3) potential loss of
exculpatory eviden ce and impaired memories resulti ng in a defendant’s inability to
adequately prepare his case. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654. But, generally, “excessive delay
presumptively compromises the re liability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove
or, for that matter, identify.” Id. at 655.
B. Analysis
Length of delay. Th e length of the delay, i.e., the time from the initial indictment
on June 28, 2012, to October 3, 2017, is five years and three months. The length of delay
is presumptively prejudicial.
Reasons for delay in Turkey. After the June 28, 2012 indictment, Defendant was
detained in Turkey until he was surrendered to the United States on August 27, 2014.
Even before the indictment, however, the Government acted with reasonable diligence in
obtaining Defendant’s extradition.
On May 18, 2011, Defendant was arrested by Turkish authoritie s. By June 21,
2011, the Government had prepared the formal extradition request and presented it to the
Turkish government via diplom atic note. On March 6, 2012, Defendant’s petition for
reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s deci sion denying his appeal was denied. The
Office of International Affairs’ file indicat es that the Government contacted a Turkish

- 12 -

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

representative on April 25, 2012. Nevert heless, the Turkish c ourt did not submit the
extradition request to the Council of Minister s for implementation until August 17, 2012.
The file indicates that the Government repeatedly contacted Turkish authorities regarding
the status of Defendant’s extradition. On April 15, 2013, Defendant submitted a letter to
prison authorities stating he accepted the judici al decision regarding the first request, but
by that point the judicial decision already ha d been submitted to the Council of Ministers
for implementation.
Defendant concedes the Government is not responsible for the period during
which its first extradition request was pendi ng in the Turkish court and administrative
system. He contends, however, that the Gove rnment is responsible for delay caused by
the second extradition request, which the Gove rnment presented on November 2, 2012.
There is no evidence, however, that the Government intend ed or caused delay in the
processing of either extradition request. The records indicate that the Government
monitored proceedings and made frequent contacts with Turkish authorities.
Communications from Turkish authorities were in consistent, but they indicated that the
length of time for decision by the Council of Ministers was inde finite. The first
extradition request was submitte d to the Council of Minister s on August 17, 2012, and
the second request was submitted to the Council of Ministers in December 2013. It is
possible that the Council of Ministers dela yed implementation of the first extradition
request after it received the judicial decisi on on the second request, but even so, the first
request had been pending for sixteen months by then.
Moreover, there was no apparent incentive for the Government to delay processing
of the first extradition request. Defendant speculates that the Government delayed
extradition because it did not have the evidence necessary to obtain a grand jury
indictment. There is no basi s in the record for such speculation. The statement of
probable cause supporting the criminal comp laint includes many of the same factual
allegations as the original indictment.

- 13 -

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Defendant further contends that, under the doctrine of specialty, if the Government
took custody of Defendant more than thir ty days before it wa s able to obtain an
indictment, it would be required to dismiss th e charges described in the first extradition
request. “The doctrine of specialty prohib its the requesting natio n from prosecuting the
extradited individual for any offense other than that for which the surrendering nation
agreed to extradite.” United States v. Iribe, 564 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). However, a “crimi nal defendant is protected
under an extradition treaty only to the extent that the surrendering country wishes.” Id. at
1159. “An extradition treaty does not purport to limit the discretion of the two sovereigns
to surrender fugitives for reasons of co mity, prudence, or ev en as a whim.” Id. A n
extradition treaty does not create a right to avoid extradition outside of the treaty’s
express terms. Id. (the surrendering country agreed to prosecution under a superseding
indictment that was obtained after extraditio n where the indictment added charges based
on the same facts underlying the extradition request). Thus, it would have been possible
to obtain Turkey’s approval of additional charges afte r extradition, especially where the
additional charges were no more serious than the initial charges.
Therefore, Defendant and Tu rkish authorities are respons ible for all of the time
Defendant was detained in Tu rkey after the June 28, 2 012 indictment, until he was
surrendered to the United States on August 27, 2014.
Reasons for delay after extradition. Defendant has agreed to every trial
continuance that the Court has granted. He contends that cont inuances have been
necessary because the Go vernment has not timely fulfilled its disclosure obligations, but
he did not oppose any continuance.
Defendant’s assertion of his right to a sp eedy trial. While in Turkey, Defendant
made numerous inquiries regarding the status of his extradition. Bu t he did not plainly
agree to accept the judicial decision regardin g the first request until April 12, 2013.
Although he received notice of the second extradition request on June 13, 2013, he did

- 14 -

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

not inform Turkish authorities at that time that he agreed to be extradited, and he did not
waive his right to appeal the judicial de cision regarding the second request after
November 21, 2013. In fact, on July 10, 2013, Defendant told the Turkish court that he
opposed extradition.
Prejudice. Trial preparation for both par ties likely has been adversely affected by
the lengthy time Defendant was detained in Turkey, but more so for Defendant who was
confined and lacked American legal counsel. Defendant has identified one exculpatory
witness with whom he lost contact and cert ain physical evidence that defense counsel
believes to be lost or destroyed. It is undisputed that Defendant suffered anxiety and
distress being held in a Turkish prison.
Nevertheless, the Government was reason ably diligent in pur suing Defendant’s
extradition, and it is not responsible fo r delay caused by Turk ish authorities and
Defendant’s opposition to extrad ition. Defendant’s constituti onal right to a speedy trial
has not been violated.
V. SPEEDY TRIAL ACT (18 U.S.C. § 3161(b))
A. Legal Standard
The Speedy Trial Act provid es: “Any information or indictment charging an
individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the
date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with
such charges.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). “If a vi olation of this prov ision occurs, the Act
requires dismissal.” United States v. Benitez , 34 F.3d 1489, 1493 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing
18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1)). Only a federal arrest, i.e., detention pursuant to federal charges,
triggers the running of the thirty-day period set by § 3161(b). Id.
B. Analysis
Defendant contends that Counts Five and Six must be dismissed because the
Superseding Indictment that included Counts Five and Six was filed more than thirty
days after his provisional arre st by Turkish authorities on May 18, 2011. However, his

- 15 -

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

federal arrest on federal charges occurred on August 27, 2014, which occurred after the
grand jury returned the Superseding Indict ment on August 12, 2 014. Therefore, the
Speedy Trial Act was not violated.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERE D that Defendant’s Mo tion to Dismiss the
Superseding Indictment Due to Violation of the Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy
Trial, or, Alternatively, to Dismiss Counts 5 and 6 Under the Speedy Trial Act (Doc. 213)
is denied.
Dated this 26th day of July, 2017.

Passage view · GavelSight