govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-2_24-cr-00021-1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
GAINESVILLE DIVISION 
 
 
 
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 
 
 2:24-CR-00021-SCJ 
 
 
 
 
 
ORDER 
This matter appears before the Court on the Report and Recommendation 
(“R&R”) filed by the Honorable Anna W. Howard, United States Magistrate 
Judge. Doc. No. [53]. 1 In the R&R, Judge Howard recommends that Defendant’s 
Motion to Suppress Evidence from Traffic Stop (Doc. No. [22]), be denied. 
The facts and procedural histor y are found in the R&R and are 
incorporated by reference. Doc. No. [53]. 
As stated in the R&R, an Indictme nt filed August 6, 2024 charges 
Defendant with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 
 
 
1 All citations are to the electronic docket unless otherwise noted, and all page numbers 
are those imprinted by the Court’s dock eting software. Transcript page number 
citations are to the actual transcript pages, not the imprinted numbers on CM/ECF. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DERRACE RESHAND DAMONS, 
 
 Defendant. 

 
2 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Doc. No. [1]. Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized 
from his vehicle and person during a traffic stop. Doc. No. [22]. 
 The Magistrate Judge conducted a hearing on Defendant’s Motion to 
Suppress on June 27, 2025 (Doc. No. 25), an d the hearing transcript was filed on 
July 10, 2025 (Doc. No. [33]). 
The facts from that hearing relevant to the Motion to Suppress are as 
follows. 
On March 15, 2024, Andrew Ferguson , a Deputy Sheriff with the White 
County Sheriff’s Office, responded to a “threats call” at a location on Post Road. 
Hrg. Tr. 8, 27. According to the dispatch report, someone reported to dispatch on 
that date at around 7 p.m. that a man named “Shy” was “outside threatening to 
come in and shoot them,” “he has a gun,” he was “outside in his vehicle,” a white 
SUV with Arizona plate number DFW3223, and he was “screaming and blowing 
the horn,” but then he left. Doc. No. [28-1], Def. Ex. 4 at 1–2. The dispatch report 
indicates that “the lady with the caller is the ex-girlfriend of the ‘Shy’ subject,” 
and the ex-girlfriend’s name is Ashley Hu dson. Id. at 2. The caller also advised 
that “he broke in yesterday” and “stole things.” Id. Dispatch wrote that the caller 

 
3 
“seems possibly intoxicated.”2 Id. The dispatch report also corrected the subject 
tag number to Arizona plate number CFW3223 (instead of DFW3223) and 
reported that it was a rental car, “white Cube.” Id. The caller also reported that 
there were multiple people who were ar med but the only ones she knew were 
“Reno” and “Shy,” who “is Darius Damo n,” and “they showed them multiple 
guns that they just stuck out the window.” Id. 
When he arrived, Deputy Ferguson met with Ashley Hudson, who said 
that her ex-boyfriend, identified as Derrace Damons, had been at her house 
making threats towards her, that he was in possession of a firearm, and he made 
threats with the firearm as well. Tr. 8–9, 27–28. Hudson reported that Damons 
had also been there a couple of days prior and had shot some rounds off over the 
house towards a window. Tr. 8–9. Neither Defendant nor his vehicle were there 
when Ferguson was present. Tr. 28. Huds on said that Defen dant is “normally 
armed with a handgun,” and she provided a vehicle description, i.e., a white 
rental car with Arizona plates. Tr. 10, 31. Hudson identified the vehicle as a 
 
 
2 Defendant asserts that “[t]he dispatcher noted the caller, ASHLEY HUDSON, was 
‘possibly intoxicated,’ ” Doc. 37 at 3, but th e dispatch report does not indicate that 
Hudson was the caller. Instead, it indicate s that Hudson’s unidentified friend or 
acquaintance was the caller as the report states that “the lady with the caller is the ex-
girlfriend” and the caller had to ask Hudson for her last name. See Def. Ex. 4 at 2. 

 
4 
Nissan Cube. Tr. 31, 46. Hudson also said that at one point she had been driving 
the vehicle. Tr. 46. 
During the hearing on the motion to suppress, Ferguson was asked 
whether Hudson identified the car as a Kia Soul, and he responded, “I don’t 
recall, I may have got my vehicles mixe d up,” but he was looking for a white 
vehicle with an Arizona plate. Tr. 31–32. Ferguson testified that he thinks that the 
Kia Soul and the Nissan Cube “are kind of the same vehicle.” Tr. 32. Hudson also 
“advised that [Damons] was possibly wa nted” or he “may have warrants.” 
Tr. 10, 33. Another woma n was present when Ferguson was talking with 
Hudson, who appeared to be a friend of Hudson’s, and she was “kind of co-
witnessing to what Ms. Hudson was advising.” Tr. 10. She was also present when 
Damons “supposedly fired the round off towards them at the window.” Tr. 10. 
This woman said that Damons was making threats and “that she had knowledge 
of him making threats to her and that if this other female was a witness to 
anything that he did to Ms. Hudson, she would have repercussions as well.” 
Tr. 10–11. Ferguson took Damons’s name and date of birth and ran it in through 
GCIC (Georgia Crime Information Center) on his computer on the 15th, “and it 
came back with a positive warrant or active warrant out of Habersham County.” 
Tr. 18, 33–34. 

 
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Damons had a failure to appear bench warrant from the Superior Court of 
Habersham County for failing to appear before that court on a charge of 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, which Ferguson believes is the 
warrant that he verified. Tr. 18-19; Doc. No. [27-1], Gov’t Ex. 2. That warrant was 
signed and filed on February 2, 2024. Gov’t Ex. 2. When asked whether the 
computer told him what kind of warrant it was, Ferguson responded that it did: 
“It gives you the actual warrant information. It was a bench warrant, and I clued 
in on–-the possession of firearm by convicted felon is what I kind of focused on.” 
Tr. 19, 34. Ferguson did not call Habersham County to confirm that the warrant 
was still active. Tr. 34–35. 
Ferguson agreed that the certified co py of the warrant presented at the 
hearing on Defendant’s motion to su ppress was “reflective of the same 
information [he] viewed on the computer[.]” Tr. 19–20. 
Ferguson did not take out an arrest warrant for the March 15, 2024 incident 
involving Ashley Hudson because there was “insufficient probable cause.” 
Tr. 54. He did not flag Defendant’s vehicle through GCIC, an d he did not check 
the boxes for wants or warrants on his incident report, but he passed along to the 
rest of his shift that Defendant was “possibly wanted.” Tr. 52–55. 

 
6 
Two days later, on March 17, 2024, Deputy Ferguson was patrolling the 
County from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. Tr. 6–7. At approximately 3:00 a.m., Ferguson was 
sitting on the shoulder of Hulsey Road in White County when he saw “a white 
vehicle traveling southbound on Hulsey Road that was a vehicle of interest that 
I had taken a report a couple of days prior of a subject that may have had 
warrants or confirmed warrants out of Habersham County.” Tr. 7, 16, 35. The 
vehicle was a white Kia Soul. Tr. 7–8. Ferguson did not see that it was Defendant 
who was driving the vehicle. Tr. 36. Ferguson started following the vehicle. Tr. 7, 
36–37. 
Once he was behind the vehicle, he observed that it “had an out-of-state 
plate that [he] had run previously.” Tr. 8. It was a rental vehicle from the prior 
incident that Ferguson had investigated a couple of nights prior. Tr. 8. Once 
Ferguson ran the vehicle, he “confirmed that it was the same vehicle in question,” 
and he “knew the subject that was occupy ing the vehicle may have warrants or 
had warrants out of another agency.” Tr . 8. Ferguson “confirmed [from] the tag 
number that was the same vehicle that [he] was actually looking for.” Tr. 11. 
He followed the vehicle for a couple of miles and “made contact with other 
deputies that were on the shift with [him] to prepare for a felony stop because we 
knew the gentleman was armed.” Tr. 11, 38 . The warrants that they “found on 

 
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file for him were active warrants for weapons possession,” so they were going to 
conduct a felony stop. Tr. 11. 
Deputy Ferguson arrived at a location called Tommy Cowart on U.S. 129, 
and Deputy Poreda was set up on 129. Tr . 11. As Ferguson was following the 
vehicle, he did not observe any traffic infractions. Tr. 12, 38. He could not see who 
was driving the car. Tr. 38. Deputy Pore da joined behind Ferguson and was 
following as well. Tr. 12. Ferguson ac tivated his blue lights and sirens, and 
Poreda did as well, but the vehicle they were following did not stop, i.e., the 
driver failed to yield to the blue light s. Tr. 12, 39–40. Sergeant LeCompte, who 
was then a deputy but was the supervisor or officer-in-charge (OIC) on shift that 
night, heard over the radio that deputies were engaged in a chase, joined the 
pursuit a couple of miles in, and took the primary position in front. Tr. 12, 38, 44, 
59–60, 66. 
LeCompte pulled up beside the Kia Soul and turned his spotlight on to see 
if there was anybody else in the vehicl e. Tr. 12, 60. He observed Defendant 
“sitting in the driver’s seat operating the vehicle with nobody else in the vehicle.” 
Tr. 60. 
LeCompte also saw that the car had Arizona plates. Tr. 61. Prior to the 
pursuit, LeCompte had information that Deputy Ferguson had received a call “in 

 
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reference to an individual operating a vehicle that has warrants as well as 
possibly shot up the house that he was located at the time.” Tr. 61. Although 
LeCompte had not seen Defendant before that encounter, LeCompte explained 
that Defendant “had warrants for his ar rest and his driver’s license picture 
showed up on our computers in our vehicle” when Ferguson “ran the tag of the 
vehicle and then we have Mr. Damons’[ s] information.” Tr. 70, 90. LeCompte 
isn’t sure if he saw Defendant’s driver’s license on his computer on the 15th, but 
he saw it on the 17th. Tr. 70–71. 
LeCompte was at the Sheriff’s Office when he heard Ferguson’s call that 
he was following a vehicle. Tr. 83. He remembers seeing Defendant’s picture and 
information come up on a computer prio r to joining the chase, but he does not 
recall where he was or on what computer he saw that information that night. 
Tr. 84, 89. LeCompte also had inform ation from the night before from 
Deputy Ferguson about “a lookout of a vehicle with Arizona plates. And known 
to carry guns and drugs was the info rmation that [LeCompte] received.” 
Tr. 84–85. 
After LeCompte confirmed that Defendant was the only person in the car, 
he decided to utilize a precision immob ilization technique (“PIT”) maneuver to 
force the vehicle to stop, and he advised the other deputies via radio that he was 

 
9 
going to perform the PIT maneuver. Tr. 13, 61–62. At that point, the deputies had 
been following the subject vehicle about 4 to 5 miles with their blue lights and 
sirens. Tr. 13, 43. There was little to no traffic at that time of night, and the weather 
was clear. Tr. 13, 61. The deputies were travelling no more than 60 to 65 miles per 
hour, on a highway with a speed limit of 55 miles per hour. Tr. 13–14. LeCompte 
testified that if the PIT maneuver is done properly, it is not dangerous. Tr. 62, 
74–75. He is certified in performing PIT maneuvers, he has been a driving 
instructor since 2014, he is a PIT inst ructor, and he teaches other deputies, 
officers, and troopers in that technique. Tr . 62. Sheriff’s Office policy requires a 
supervisor to approve the use of a PIT maneuver, and on that night, LeCompte 
was the shift supervisor and approved its use. Tr. 44, 62–63, 67. 
When Sergeant LeCompte performed the PIT maneuver, Defendant was 
traveling 57 miles per hour. Tr. 63. Le Compte considered the speeds of the 
vehicles involved in the chase to that point, 50 to 60 miles per hour, to be “pretty 
low speed.” Tr. 74. After th e PIT maneuver, the vehicl e spun counterclockwise, 
went up on a bank and over a curb, and hit a couple of road signs, including a 
mile marker, but the driver w a s a b l e t o r e c o v e r , g e t b a c k o n t h e r o a d , a n d 
continue south on Highway 129 into Hall County. Tr. 14, 43, 63, 80. LeCompte 
explained that Defendant “pulled out of the PIT maneuver because it was done 

 
10 
at a slow speed.” Tr. 63. The subject ve hicle then began driving approximately 
100 miles per hour, and Deputy Ferguson was traveling 95 to 100 miles per hour 
to try to keep up with the vehicle. Tr. 14, 42. The pursuit continued into 
Hall County,3 and after three to five miles, the front driver’s side tire came off the 
subject vehicle, causing the vehicle to leave the roadway an d travel through a 
horse fence and stop, stuck on the fenc e. Tr. 14–16, 63–64. Defendant went out 
the passenger window and started runni ng through a pasture. Tr. 15, 64. 
Sergeant LeCompte stopped and went to the left side of the vehicle, and 
Deputies Ferguson and Poreda pulled up. Tr. 15. 
Ferguson ran by the car and confirmed that nobody else was in it and then 
chased the driver through the pasture. Tr. 15–16. LeCompte followed Defendant 
in his vehicle, opened a gate, and then he continued pursuing Defendant in his 
patrol car “until he finally gave up and started listening to commands” and was 
taken into custody. Tr. 15–16, 64–65. LeCompte put Defendant in handcuffs. 
Tr. 78. The deputies were wearing bodycams during this encounter. Tr. 16–17.4 
 
 
3 Sergeant LeCompte testified that they could continue the pursuit across county lines: 
“As supervisor, I could authorize that.” Tr. 61. 
4 The parties submitted those recordings on a DVD and USB drives. See Gov’t Ex. 1; Def. 
Exs. 1, 3. 

 
11 
Once Defendant was arrested, he was placed in LeCompte’s patrol vehicle, 
and the deputies returned to the scene of the crash, called for a wrecker to tow 
the vehicle, and they began inventorying the vehicle. Tr. 21, 77. The vehicle was 
a rental car, a Kia Soul. Tr. 45. During the inventory, the deputies found a 
handgun and suspected narcotics in the pa ssenger’s side floorboard. Tr. 21, 81. 
The deputies had the vehicle towed pursuant to Sheriff’s Office policy because it 
was not operable and was on private prop erty. Tr. 21–22. Sheriff’s Office policy 
also requires the deputies to conduct an inventory search of a towed vehicle 
before it is towed. Tr. 22. The White Coun ty Sheriff’s Office issued citations to 
Defendant for no proof of insurance, no dr iver’s license on person, violation of 
safety restraint law, failure to maintain lane, and fleeing and attempting to elude. 
Doc. No. [27-4], Gov’t Ex. 5; Tr. 65–66. 
Defendant filed a post-hearing brie f (Doc. No. [37]), the Government 
responded (Doc. No. [38]) and Defendant filed a reply (Doc. No. [39]). 
By Order and Report and Recommendation (R&R) entered October 9, 2025, 
the Magistrate Judge recommended th at Defendant’s Motion to Suppress 
evidence from traffic stop (Doc. No. [22]), be denied, and certified the case ready 
for trial. Doc. No. [40]. 

 
12 
Defendant’s attorney at that time, L. Burton Finlayson, filed objections to 
the R&R (Doc. No. [44]), and Defendant then wrote a letter to the Court 
requesting “inquiry into counsel conflict and appointment of new counsel,” Doc. 
No. [46]. Mr. Finlayson moved to with draw as counsel for Defendant. Doc. 
No. [47]. By Order entered December 17, 2025, the District Judge decertified the 
case as ready for trial, returned the case to the Magistrate Judge for consideration 
of Defendant’s request for inquiry into counsel conflict, appointment of new 
counsel, and Mr. Finlayson’s motion to withdraw, and recommitted the matters 
in the October 9th R&R to the Magistrate Judge in light of Defendant’s statements 
in his letter. Doc. No. [48]. 
By Order entered Decem ber 19, 2025, the Magistrate Judge granted 
Mr. Finlayson’s motion to withdraw an d appointed Graham McKinnon, IV, to 
represent Defendant. Doc. No. [49]. The Magistrate Judge also directed substitute 
counsel to, within 45 days, “evaluate wh ether he believes Mr. Finlayson had a 
conflict at the time motions were filed, an d if so, to file a motion to re-open the 
pretrial motion period that outlines how or why a conflict existed during the 
initial representation.” Id. at 2. The Court granted Defendant’s requested 
extensions of that deadline, with the most recent deadline of March 31, 2026, see 
Docs. Nos. [50], [51], but Defendant did no t file a motion to reopen the pretrial 

 
13 
motion period based on an alleged co nflict with Defendant’s prior attorney. 
Because Defendant has not shown that th ere was a conflict involving his prior 
attorney that warrants a re-opening of the pretrial motion period, the 
Magistrate Judge re-stated the Orde r and Report and Recommendation 
originally entered October 9, 2026 on Defendant’s pretrial motions. Doc. No. [53]. 
As re-stated in the R&R, on April 2, 2026, the Magistrate Judge entered a 
R&R recommending denial of the pending motions to suppress. Doc. No. [53]. 
On April 17, 2026, Defendant file d objections to the R&R, which 
incorporated the objections the initial R&R. Doc. Nos. [44]; [55]. Defendant’s 
objections to the R&R are: (1) Mr. Damons never threatened Ms. Hudson with a 
firearm on March 15, 2024, and did not discharge a weapon over the house the 
day before; (2) the allegations of misc onduct amount to unreliable hearsay; 
(3) officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the rental car on March 17, 2024; 
(4) the evidence of a warrant for Def endant’s arrest is insufficient; 
(5) identification of the driver was requ ired prior to stopping the rental car; 
(6) corroboration was required before the blue-lights and PIT 5 maneuver, not 
after; (7) the White County deputies were not credible; (8) the PIT maneuver was 
 
 
5 “PIT” means precision immobilization technique. Doc. No. [53], 10. 

 
14 
an unreasonable and unlawful use of deadly force; (9) Defendant’s failure to stop 
was justified and reasonable; and (10) Defendant maintained standing to 
challenge the seizure and search of the vehicle he was lawfully driving. 
I. LEGAL STANDARD 
This Court must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the 
report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which” a party 
objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Co urt “may accept, reject, or modify, in 
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate 
judge.” Id. And this Court may “receive further evidence or recommit the matter 
to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id.6 
The Court now considers Defendant’s objections in turn. 
II. OBJECTION 1 
Defendant’s first objection is that he never threatened Ms. Hudson with a 
firearm on March 15, 2024, and did not discharge a weapon over the house the 
 
 
6 The Court has also carefully reviewed th e transcript of the hearings before the 
magistrate judge (Doc. No. [33]), exhibits, as well as the briefing and the full record. See 
United States v. Elsoffer, 644 F.2d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (holding that the 
district judge must also “read the transcrip t of the hearing before a magistrate on a 
motion to suppress, before adopting the magistrate’s recommendation”); Bonner v. City 
of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as binding 
precedent all decisions rendered prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981 by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit). 

 
15 
day before. Doc. No. [44], 2. In support of this objection, he includes a sworn 
statement from Ashley Hudson that was not presented to the Magistrate Judge 
at the suppression hearing. Doc. No. [44-1]. Defendant admits that 
Deputy Ferguson testified he had been told about the threats and weapon by the 
women, i.e., Ms. Hudson an d her friend. Doc. No. [44 ], 2 (citing June 27, 2025 
Hrg. Tr., Doc. No. [33], 8–9,27–28). Defendant’s admission as to the contradictory 
evidence about his actions on the date in question creates an issue for the jury, 
not for this Court to resolve by objections to the R&R. In addition, it has been 
held that “an objection to a report and recommendation is not the place to assert 
new factual allegations.” Powell v. Burger Docs Atlanta, Inc., No. 1:19-CV-3808-
MLB, 2021 WL 4192864, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2021). Defendant’s first objection 
is OVERRULED. 
III. OBJECTION 2 
Defendant’s second objection is that the allegations of misconduct amount 
to unreliable hearsay. Doc. No. [55], 1. 
The Court first notes that a hearsa y argument was not raised in the 
post-hearing briefing before the Magistrate Judge. Nevertheless, “[a] district 
court does not abuse its discretion by ac cepting an argument not raised before 
the magistrate judge.” United States v. Franklin, 694 F.3d 1, 6 (11th Cir. 2012). To 

 
16 
the extent that it is proper for the Court to consider the hearsay objection, it is 
overruled, as the Supreme Court has held that “[a]t a suppression hearing, the 
court may rely on hearsay and other evidence, even though that evidence would 
not be admissible at trial.” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U. S. 667, 679 (1980). 
Defendant’s second objection is OVERRULED. 
IV. OBJECTION 3 
 Defendant’s third objection is that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion 
to stop the rental car on March 17, 2024. Doc. No. [44], 2. Defendant asserts that 
the deputies only had a “hunch” and “no particularized or objective basis for 
suspecting the Kia driver of criminal activity.” Id. 
 After de novo review, the Court finds the Magistrate Judge’s R&R to be 
correct in law and fact. As stated in the R&R, the Court finds that under the 
totality of the circumstances, Deputy Fe rguson had a reasonable articulable 
suspicion to believe that Defendant was driving the vehicle used in the alleged 
threats on Ms. Hudson and her friend re ported less than 48 hours before and 
therefore had authority to co nduct an investigative stop of the vehicle in order 
to: (1) investigate whether Defendant was driving the vehicle, (2) investigate the 
allegations that Ms. Hudson and he r friend made against Defendant, 
(3) investigate the involvement of that vehicle in the events reported by Hudson 

 
17 
and her friend, and (4) investigate th e issuance of the bench warrant by 
Habersham County. Doc. No. [53], 16. In essence, there was a particularized and 
objective basis for suspecting the Defen dant of criminal activity and his 
assertions to the contrary do not undermine the finding of reasonable suspicion. 
See Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 39 3, 396 (2014) (indicating that an officer 
making a stop must have “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the 
particular person stopped of criminal acti vity”) (citing United States v. Cortez, 
449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)). 
V. OBJECTION 4 
 Defendant’s fourth objection is that the evidence of a warrant for 
Defendant’s arrest is insufficient. Doc. No. [55], 4. Defendant states that the 
“evidence of Deputy Ferguson verifying th e existence of an arrest warrant on 
May 15, 2024 is inconsistent.” Id. Defendant states that “[n]o documents were 
presented that confirm any GCIC inqu iry was made by Deputy Ferguson on 
May 15, 2024 or at anytime before the traffic stop on May 17, 2024.” Id. And 
“Deputy Ferguson admits that he failed to verify the validity of any arrest 
warrant prior to Defendant’s traffic stop several days later on May 17, 2024.” Id. 
 After de novo review, the Court again finds the Magistrate Judge’s R&R to 
be correct in law and fact. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s finding 

 
18 
that Defendant’s evidence and argume nt do not “undermine Ferguson’s 
testimony that he knew about the Habe rsham County bench warrant before the 
stop on March 17, 2024.” Doc. No. [53 ], 21. And Defendant cites no binding 
authority that shows that Deputy Ferguson had to obtain a copy of the warrant 
or do more than he testified to with respect to the arrest warrant, prior to 
initiating a traffic stop. 
VI. OBJECTION 5 
 Defendant’s fifth objection is that identification of the driver was required 
prior to stopping the rental car. Doc. No. [44], 4. 
 After de novo review, the Court finds the Magistrate Judge’s R&R to be 
correct in law and fact and upholds the Magistrate Judge’s finding that 
Sergeant LeCompte testified credibly co ncerning his involvement in the events 
of March 17, 2024, even if his memory might not have been perfect. Doc. No. [53], 
20. Also, as stated by the Magistrate Judge, “it is not disputed that prior to 
performing the PIT maneuver, LeCompte pulled up next to Defendant’s vehicle 
and was able to determine that Defendant was driving and that no one else was 
in the vehicle.” Doc. No. [53], 23 (citing Tr. 12, 60).7 
 
 
7 And to the extent that Defendant’s objection is actually addressing, Deputy Ferguson’s 
initial attempt to stop the car, the Court notes that he does not address the 
 

 
19 
 Objection Number 5 is OVERRULED. 
VII. OBJECTION 6 
 Defendant’s sixth objection is that corroboration was required before the 
blue-lights and PIT maneuver, not after. Doc. No. [44], 9. Defendant states that 
Deputy Ferguson “observed nothing to corroborate the allegations from 
Ms. Hudson and her friend.” Id. at 10. In support of his argument, Defendant 
cites authority regarding “tips” to polic e; however, the Court notes that Ms. 
Hudson and her unidentified friend 8 are considered alleged victims under the 
facts presented and the Eleventh Circuit has held that “[t]here is no need to 
establish the reliability of information received from the victim of a crime.” 
United States v. Johnson, 713 F.2d 654, 660 (11th Cir. 1983); see also United States 
v. Holmes, 141 F.4th 1183, 1195 (11th Cir. 2025).9 
 
 
Magistrate Judge’s citation of authority explaining that “if there is reasonable suspicion 
to believe that a particular car was involved in a prior crime, there is no need to have 
reasonable suspicion . . . that the occupa nts themselves had been involved in the 
[crime].” Doc. No. [53], 19 (cleaned up) (c iting United States v. Turk, No. 1:20-CR-253-
TWT-CCB, 2024 WL 5670642, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 2024) (quoting United States v. 
Jackson, 700 F. App’x 411, 416 (6th Cir. 2017) an d citing United States v. Marxen, 410 
F.3d 326, 332 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding reason able suspicion where the officers had 
information connecting the car, but not the owner of the vehicle, to a prior robbery)), 
adopted by 2025 WL 1211110 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2025). 
8 As stated above, the unidentified friend was also present when Damons “supposedly 
fired the round off towards them at the window.” Tr. 10 (emphasis added). 
9 Even if there were a corroboration requirem ent, the Magistrate Judge correctly noted 
 

 
20 
 The sixth objection is OVERRULED. 
VIII. OBJECTION 7 
 Defendant’s seventh objection is that the White County deputies were not 
credible. Doc. No. [44], 11. 
“‘[T]o adequately determine the credibility of a witness . . . the fact finder 
must observe the witness.’” United States v. Powell, 628 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 
2010) (citing Louis v. Blac kburn, 630 F.2d 1105, 11 10 (5th Cir. 1980)). “This 
requirement is satisfied ‘either by the di strict judge accepting the determination 
of the magistrate after reading the record, or by rejecting the magistrate’s decision 
and coming to an independent decision after hearing the testimony and viewing 
the witnesses.’” Id. (citation omitted). 
Here, the Court has read the record 10 and after reading the record, the 
Magistrate Judge’s credibility determinations are accepted. The Court is not 
required to rehear the testimony on which the magistrate judge’s findings and 
 
 
that the deputies sought to corroborate by looking for the vehicle with the tag number 
at issue. Doc. No. [53], 18. 
10 “The statutory obligation of the district co urt to give independent consideration to 
those portions of the R&R to which objection is made does require the court to consider 
the actual testimony relevant to the objections, and not merely the R&R.” United States 
v. Dorvilus, 357 F. App’x 239, 245 (11th Cir. 2009). 

 
21 
recommendations are based to make an independent evaluation of credibility. 
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673 (1980). 
Defendant’s seventh objection is OVERRULED. 
IX. OBJECTION 8 
Defendant’s eighth objection is that the PIT maneuver was an 
unreasonable and unlawful use of deadly force. Doc. No. [44], 14. 
The Court does not agree and after de novo review, the Court concludes 
that the R&R is correct in law and fact. As correctly stated by the 
Magistrate Judge, in considering the applicable legal factors, “it was objectively 
reasonable for LeCompte to use the PIT maneuver to attempt to stop Defendant.” 
Doc. No. [53], 25. 
Defendant had not complied with multiple deputies 
signaling to him to stop by their sirens and blue lights. 
The deputies had information that Defendant had a 
bench warrant from Habersham County for failing to 
appear in court for a felon in possession of a firearm 
charge, and they had information that his ex-girlfriend 
and another witness accused him of very recently 
threatening them and discharging a firearm, thus 
indicating that he continued to be armed and a threat to 
others. LeCompte, who was certified and trained in PIT 
maneuvers—and even taught other officers how to 
conduct them, attempted to perform the PIT maneuver 
at a low speed at a time wh en there was not a lot of 
traffic on the road, thus minimizing the risk of danger 
to Defendant, the other officers, and the travelling 
public. 

 
22 
 
Moreover, the force used to perform the maneuver was 
insufficient to actually stop, i.e., seize, Defendant as he 
was able to continue drivin g for miles thereafter, at 
speeds of approximately 100 miles per hour. The record 
does not contain any evidence of injury to Defendant, 
but Defendant asserts that “the Kia Soul was severely 
damaged by the PIT maneuver” as its “front tires were 
shredded when the car was forced to strike two curbs.” 
Doc. 37 at 32. The record does not show whether the tire 
damage was caused by the PIT maneuver, Defendant’s 
excessive speed following the PIT maneuver, or a 
combination, but the damage from the PIT maneuver 
was not so great that it prevented the vehicle from 
continuing to be mobile and capable of driving 
approximately 100 miles per hour. 
 
Doc. No. [53], 25–26. 
 
Defendant also cites no binding author ity (in support of his objection) in 
which the Eleventh Circuit or the Su preme Court has excluded evidence 
following an arrest based on the use of a PIT maneuver (or an alleged violation 
of the County’s policy regarding use of excessive force). 
In Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009), the Supreme Court 
held that “[t]he fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred—i.e., that a 
search or arrest was unreasonable—d oes not necessarily mean that the 
exclusionary rule applies.” And in an analogous context in which the Eleventh 
Circuit was considering an argument about whether the district court abused its 
discretion in denying a defendant’s motion for new counsel, the Court stated: 

 
23 
For example, [the defendant] testified that counsel 
refused to heed his argume nt that the police used 
excessive force when they arrested him and searched 
his car. But the magistrate judge explained that [the 
defendant’s] argument “wouldn’t keep the evidence 
[that he sought to suppress] from coming in at trial.” 
Because [the defendant] did not establish good cause,
11 
the district court correctly denied his motions for new 
appointed counsel. 
 
United States v. Joyner, 899 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 While not entirely on point (in term s of procedural posture), the Court 
draws guidance from the Joyner decision in which the Eleventh Circuit did not 
find a fundamental problem (or error) with the magistrate judge’s statement 
regarding an excessive force argument not keeping evidence (that was sought to 
be suppressed) from coming in at trial.12 
 
 
11 “Good cause in this context means a fund amental problem, ‘such as a conflict of 
interest, a complete breakdown in communica tion or an irreconcilable conflict which 
leads to an apparently unjust verdict.’ ” United States v. Joyner, 899 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11th 
Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). 
12 It also appears that non-binding authori ty (from the Court’s independent research) 
does not entirely support Defendant’s objection. See Evans v. Poskon, 603 F.3d 362, 364 
(7th Cir. 2010) (“The exclusionary rule is used in only a subset of all constitutional 
violations—and excessive force in making an arrest or seizure is not a basis for the 
exclusion of evidence.”); Williams v. United States, No. 215CR00283LSCSGC15, 2019 
WL 2338607, at *6 (N.D. Ala. June 3, 2019) (“[E]ven if this Court were to have concluded 
that the flash bangs that was used constitute d excessive force, it does not necessarily 
follow that the evidence obtained later was due to be suppressed.”); United States v. 
Tyms, No. 2:22 CR 21, 2022 WL 16855307, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 10, 2022) (“[E]ven if high-
speed chases violate constitutional protections (and, for clarity’s sake, the court does not 
 

 
24 
In light of the above, after de novo review, the Court concludes that the R&R 
is correct in law and fact. Defendant’s eighth objection is OVERRULED. 
X. OBJECTION 9 
 Defendant’s ninth objection is that Defendant’s failure to stop was justified 
and reasonable. Doc. No. [44], 19. The essence of Defendant’s argument is that he 
had the “right to flee an illegal arrest,” under Georgia law. Doc. No. [44], 21. 
However, in light of the R&R (as adopted by this Court after de novo review) and 
above-stated authority and analysis, the Court does not agree that Defendant’s 
stop and arrest were unlawful. As such, Defendant’s ninth objection is 
OVERRULED. 
 
 
 
conclude that they do), the interest involved (the protection of human life and limb) is 
unrelated to an individual’s interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking 
objects from inside his vehicle. Like a kn ock-and-announce violation or the use of 
excessive force during an arrest, the fact that a pursuit was made at high speeds is 
collateral to a subsequent seizure. Accordin gly, the exclusionary rule does not apply 
and suppression of evidence is not an available remedy.”); United States v. Ankeny, 502 
F.3d 829, 837 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Ultimately, we need not determine whether the entry was 
unreasonable because we agree with the di strict court that suppression is not 
appropriate in any event. The alleged Four th Amendment violation and the discovery 
of the evidence lack the causal nexus that is required to invoke the exclusionary rule.”).
 
 

 
25 
XI. OBJECTION 10 
 Defendant’s final objection is that he maintained standing to challenge the 
seizure and search of the vehicle he wa s lawfully driving. Doc. No. [44], 22. 
Defendant states that “[a]ny abandonment of the vehicle by [him] was 
involuntary and proximately caused by the White County deputies’ misconduct, 
including the illegal traffic stop and the deputies’ excessive use of force.” Doc. 
No. [44], 23. 
In light of the R&R (as adopted by this Court after de novo review) and 
above-stated authority and analysis, the Court does not agree that Defendant’s 
stop and arrest were unlawful. The Cour t also upholds the Magistrate Judge’s 
finding that the deputies acted reason ably in pursuing Defendant and in 
attempting the PIT maneuver to try to st op his vehicle and that their efforts did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment, including the prohibition on excessive use of 
force to effectuate their seizure of Defendant. Doc. No. [53], 30. 
Under applicable law and the circumstances (of which Defendant fled the 
Kia Soul through the passenger window after crashing it and then ran away from 
the vehicle through a pasture, only stopping after law enforcement gave chase 
and apprehended him), the Court finds that Defendant voluntarily abandoned 
his reasonable expectation of privacy in the Kia Soul and its contents. See United 

 
26 
States v. Johnson, 811 F. Ap p’x 564, 569–70 (11th Cir. 2020) (“In applying the 
abandonment doctrine in the automobile context, [the Eleventh Circuit] has held 
that a defendant who abandons his car to flee from law enforcement officers has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the car and thereby forfeits 
his right to Fourth Amendment protection in it.”); see also Doc. No. [53], 31–32. 
Defendant’s tenth objection is OVERRULED. 
XII. CONCLUSION 
After de novo review, the R&R (Doc. No. [53]) is ADOPTED as the order of 
the Court. Defendant’s objections to the R&R (Doc. Nos. [44] and [55]) are 
OVERRULED. The Motion to Suppress (Doc. No. [22]) is DENIED. 
A Jackson-Denno hearing will be sc heduled regarding the Motion to 
Suppress Statements (Doc. No. [23 ]) at a later date. The Clerk is DIRECTED to 
reopen the motion at Doc. No. [23] and return the Motion to the Court’s pending 
motions list. 
A pretrial conference and trial date will be scheduled at a later time by the 
Courtroom Deputy Clerk. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this 27th day of May, 2026. 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 HONORABLE STEVE C. JONES 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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