govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_25-cv-00274-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
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25-CV-274 (SFR) 
CHAZANTINE GRIFFIN, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
KAREN GRANDE, et al, 
 
Defendants. 
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INITIAL REVIEW ORDER 
 
Plaintiff Chazantine Griffin , an individual serving a sentence in the custody of the 
Connecticut Department of Correction (“DOC”),1 brings a civil rights action pro se under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 against 15 Defendants.2 Griffin brings claims under the Eighth Amendment, 
alleging that at a previous DOC facility he experienced unsanitary and unsafe showers and 
received inadequate treatment for his resultant MRSA infection. He also asserts claims of 
retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Griffin sues Defendants in their individual and 
official capacities and seeks damages and injunctive relief. 
For the reasons explained below, the First Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims 
in the Amended Complaint may proceed to service. 
 
1 I may “take judicial notice of relevant matters of public record.” Giraldo v. Kessler , 694 F.3d 
161, 164 (2d Cir. 2012). A search on the publicly available DOC website under the inmate search 
function shows that Griffin was sentenced in 2022 to a seven-year term of imprisonment. 
2 The Amended Complaint names the following Defendants: APRN Karen Grande, Dr. Kavita 
Prabhakar, Elizabeth Barnes, Lieutenant Peau, Warden Daniel Dougherty, Commissioner Angel 
Quiros, Dr. Brain Rader, RCOO Jennifer Sanchez, Dr. Gerald Valletta, Marisa Andexler, Deputy 
Warden Oles, Nurse Heather Mayernik, Nurse Takesha West, Nurse Dawn Bertocki, and Wendy 
Regan. Am. Compl. 1, 15, ECF No. 22. 

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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Procedural History 
After granting Griffin’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, ECF No. 14, I conducted 
an initial review of the Complaint filed on February 21, 2025. I explained in that Order that I 
understood the core of the Complaint to be Griffin’s “claim of Eighth Amendment deliberate 
indifference related to (1) unsanitary showers and (2) failure to treat the MRSA infection which 
Plaintiff says he contracted from the unsanitary showers.” ECF No. 19. Based on that 
understanding, I explained that Griffin’s claims relating to treatment for an injured finger, as 
well as sexual harassment, physical injuries, and retaliation after complaints of mental health 
services were misjoined. Id. 
In reviewing the plausibility of the claims that were properly joined, I stated that the 
length and structure of the Complaint did not permit me to analyze whether any of the 
Defendants named in the caption of the Complaint were liable. Id.3 I therefore dismissed the 
 
3 My Order stated in relevant part: 
As the court explains, although the unsanitary showers and MRSA infection claims 
may be viable, the court does not find that the Complaint as drafted may proceed 
to service. Deliberate indifference to a prisoner ’s serious medical needs may 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See 
Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing 
Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The Eighth Amendment, which 
forbids cruel and unusual punishment, also prohibits conditions in state prisons that 
subject incarcerated individuals to the “wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” 
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). The ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment “ does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit 
inhumane ones.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). A successful claim for deliberate indifference must 
satisfy both objective and subjective components of the test. See Hathaway v. 
Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994). The Complaint satisfies the objective 
component insofar as it alleges that Plaintiff suffered an MRSA infection and 
unsanitary showers that caused the condition. But because of the length of the 
 

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Complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend. Id. Griffin filed an Amended Complaint 
on February 26, 2026. ECF No. 22. 
B. Factual Background 
I accept as true the well -pleaded allegations in the twelve-page handwritten statement 
of facts within the Amended Complaint. Am. Compl. 21-32, ECF No. 22.4 
From January 2024 through April 2024, the showers at Corrigan Correctional 
Institution (“Corrigan CI”) were “filthy” and “filled with black [and] green mold.” Am. Compl. 
21, ¶ 1. The showers lacked non- slip shower mats, and at times were “flood[ed] with 
“sewage[,] foul water, bodily fluids[,] mildew, [and] feces.” Id. These unsanitary conditions, 
which had existed for “the last few years,” were brought to the attention of Peau, Oles, and 
Dougherty after several people slipped in the shower due to the lack of no- slip shower mats. 
Id. Griffin wrote grievances to Oles and Peau about the unsanitary and unsafe showers, id . at 
22, ¶ 5, but his requests were “ignored, denied[,] or delayed,” id. 
In April 2024, Griffin slipped and fell in the shower due to these hazardous conditions. 
Id. at 21, ¶ 2. Days later, Griffin noticed “a bump like a[n] abnormal swollen spider bite.” Id. 
 
Complaint and the difficulty in discerning which factual allegations relate to which 
defendants, the court is unable to establish whether the Complaint satisfies the 
subjective component, which requires a showing that a defendant must have been 
actually aware that his or her actions or inactions would cause a substantial risk of 
harm to the plaintiff. See Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 280 (2d Cir. 2006). 
Although the Complaint identifies 26 individual defendants, it appears that the 
Complaint alleges facts as to only a subset of those individuals. 
ECF No. 19. 
4 Citations are to the page numbers set by ECF rather than to any page numbers appearing within 
the Amended Complaint. 

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This bump continued to grow and became painful, so he sought medical attention. Id. The 
related pain impacted his leg, hip, and lower back. Id. 
Griffin was later diagnosed with MRSA, which is a serious infection. Id. at 22, ¶ 3. He 
showed his wound to Nurse Bertocki and Dr. Valletta, and they informed him that he caught 
MRSA from the unsanitary showers. Id. ¶ 4. Griffin says his MRSA diagnosis required 
additional testing, but Bertocki and Valletta refused and denied and ignored his requests for 
that additional testing. Id. 
In April 2024, APRN Grande told Griffin, “[e]veryone [has] MRSA[,] deal with it.” Id. 
¶ 6. Grande would not treat Griffin until he protested, at which point he did receive some 
treatment. Id. But the treatment Griffin received was ineffective. Id. Griffin says Grande lied 
on state documents “to cover up negligence/inadequate medical care by stating Griffin is 
faking or refusin.” id.; see also id. at 29, ¶ 32. 
Between April 2024 and September 2024, Defendants Barnes, Grande, Andexler, and 
Prabhakar knew about Griffin’s MRSA diagnosis but refused to order additional testing. Id. at 
22, ¶ 7. Grande, Prabhakar, and Barnes prescribed Griffin around three or four courses of 
“ineffective antibiotics ,” id., rather than prescribing “ MRSA-specific treatment ” such as 
Vancomycin, Linezolid, or incision and drainage of the infection, id. at 24, ¶ 11. Griffin says 
these Defendants ignored his reports that his infections were recurring and worsening. Id. 
Griffin states that during this time period, he had skin boil/abscesses spreading on his leg and 
groin area, draining yellowish/greenish puss and blood. See, e.g., id. at 24, ¶¶ 13-14, id. at 26, 
¶ 21, id. at 28, ¶ 31. 
On June 24, 2024, Griffin slipped again in the unsanitary Corrigan CI showers. Id. at 
23, ¶ 8. Griffin went to medical, and he “was forced to walk to medical without a wheelchair 

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despite obvious severe back/hip pain” by Mayernik and West. Id. Griffin told Mayernik and 
West about his previous fall. Id. ¶ 9. Mayernik and West told Griffin they “[w]ould do 
something but don[’]t want to catch MRSA unfortunately sorry.” Id. ¶ 10. Griffin responded, 
“but you are nurses and suppose[d] to treat and provide adequate medical care[,] it[’]s your 
job.” Id. Griffin says his complaints were ignored, and these Defendants did not treat his 
MRSA, including his bloody skin boils and abscesses. Id. 
In late June 2024, Griffin showed Warden Dougherty the MRSA spreading on his body. 
Id. at 25, ¶ 20. Dougherty said he would “look into it but never did” to “cover [it] up.” Id. at 
26, ¶ 21. Griffin later wrote to Dougherty about his inadequate medical treatment and 
unsanitary conditions. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. Griffin also had a friend tell Dougherty and Commissioner 
Quiros about the inadequate treatment and unsanitary conditions. Id. ¶ 23. These Defendants 
ignored Griffin’s condition and failed to protect both him and others in the unit by failing to 
quarantine Griffin in a single cell. Id. ¶ 24. 
In July 2024, Griffin asked RN Andexler for “MRSA- specific treatment,” including 
diagnostic imaging, physical therapy, pain management, or an orthopedic consultation. Id. at 
24, ¶ 15. Griffin explained to RN Andexler that he needed to go to UConn to a specialist 
equipped to deal with his recurring MRSA infections, which were continuing to spread and 
cause abscesses. Id. Griffin also spoke with Barnes requesting similar treatment, but Barnes 
told him those treatments were not necessary because he no longer had MRSA. Id. at 25, ¶ 18. 
Grande and Barnes told Griffin that the treatment he requested “cost too much” and they would 
not “was[te] funds on that” because “everyone [has] MRSA.” Id. (cleaned up). Grande told 
Griffin, “why [do] you expect me to help you when you are suing me?” Id. at 28, ¶ 29. Griffin 

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sought the same relief from Dr. Prabhakar in August 2024 and from Defendants Grande and 
Rader in September 2024. Id. at 28-29, ¶¶ 27-31. 
In August 2024, after Griffin insisted that he was not receiving adequate medical care 
and needed to see an outside specialist, Barnes issued a ticket to Griffin. Id. at 28, ¶ 30. 
According to the Amended Complaint, Barnes became angry and accused Griffin of calling 
her a “bitch” and of filing baseless grievances regarding medical care. Id. The Amended 
Complaint denies that Griffin ever said this to Barnes and contends that Barnes punished 
Griffin in retaliation for Griffin pursuing his rights. Id. 
In September 2024, after a “shakedown” in the unit, Griffin’s prescribed soap was taken 
from him. Id. at 29, ¶ 34. Griffin asked Lieutenant Peau to return the soap, but Peau did not do 
so, instead “ignor[ing]” and “refus[ing]” Griffin’s requests. Id. In November 2024, the 
Corrigan CI showers were boarded up and the mold was “painted over.” Id. ¶¶ 35-36. 
Griffin says that his MRSA infection and resulting scarring has led to him experiencing 
“chronic ongoing severe lower back pain and right hip pain from [the] fall, . . . limited 
mobility[,] difficulty sleeping, and inability to perform daily activities.” Id. at 24, ¶ 12. 
As relief, Griffin seeks monetary damages against each Defendant. Id. at 35. Griffin 
also seeks injunctive relief in the form of installing non-slip mats in the showers, sanitizing the 
showers, and providing him with proper MRSA treatment. Id. Griffin sues each Defendant in 
both their individual and official capacities. Id. at 35-38. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, courts must review civil complaints in which a n 
incarcerated plaintiff seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer and dismiss any 
portion that “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

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granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2). Although highly detailed allegations are not required, the complaint 
must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
“It is well established that a court is ordinarily obligated to afford a special solicitude 
to pro se litigants.” Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010). Consistent with this 
duty, the “submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise 
the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 
474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
III. DISCUSSION 
The Amended Complaint contends that Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment 
through (1) their failure to respond to unsanitary showers at Corrigan CI and (2) their deficient 
response after Griffin contracted MRSA from the unsanitary showers. The Amended 
Complaint also asserts a retaliation claim under the First Amendment. As I explain below, 
Griffin may proceed to service on his Eighth Amendment and First Amendment claims for 
damages but not for injunctive relief. 
A. Eighth Amendment 
To show a violation of Eighth Amendment rights for deliberate indifference to health 
or safety, a plaintiff must allege (1) that he was incarcerated under “conditions posing a 
substantial risk of serious harm” and (2) the prison official putting him in those conditions was 

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deliberately indifferent to his health or safety. Morgan v. Dzurenda, 956 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 
2020) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). For the second prong, a 
defendant “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. (quoting 
Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
When asserting claims of deliberate indifference to safety or medical needs, a plaintiff 
must allege facts to suggest that the defendants acted not merely carelessly or negligently, but 
with a subjectively reckless state of mind akin to criminal recklessne ss. A defendant must be 
aware of a substantial risk that the plaintiff would be seriously harmed if the defendant did not 
act. See, e.g., Spavone v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 
2013). But “[o]fficials need only be aware of the risk of harm, not intend harm.” Id. 
As I explain, both Eighth Amendment claims asserted in the Amended Complaint may 
proceed to service. 
1. Conditions of Confinement: Unsanitary Showers 
“Unsanitary conditions, especially when coupled with other mutually enforcing 
conditions, . . . can rise to the level of an objective deprivation.” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 
17, 30 (2d Cir. 2017). Whether unsanitary conditions are objectively severe depends on “two 
components, severity and duration,” evaluated “on a case -by-case basis.” Id. There is no 
“bright-line durational or severity limits in conditions of confinement cases.” Id. at 31. 
Griffin alleges that the showers at Corrigan CI were “filthy” and “filled with black [and] 
green mold.” Am. Compl. 21, ¶ 1. The showers lacked non-slip shower mats, and at times were 
“flood[ed] with “sewage[,] foul water, bodily fluids[,] mildew, [and] feces.” Id. At the initial 

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review stage, these allegations support the inference that Griffin experienced objectively 
serious unsanitary conditions of confinement at Corrigan CI. 
With respect to the subjective component, Griffin alleges he informed Peau, Dougherty, 
and Oles about the condition of the showers. Id. His allegations suggest that Defendants failed 
to take any steps to remedy his conditions of confinement despite being advised about the 
unsanitary and dangerous condition of the showers. 
Thus, for initial review purposes, I conclude that Griffin’s allegations suffice to state a 
claim against Peau, Dougherty, and Oles. Nonetheless, Griffin has not alleged facts to support 
a claim of deliberate indifference to the condition of the showers against any other Defendant 
in this action. 
Accordingly, I permit Griffin to proceed with his damages claims for an Eighth 
Amendment violation only against Defendants Peau, Dougherty, and Oles in their individual 
capacities due to their deliberate indifference to the unsanitary showers. 
2. Deliberate Medical Indifference: Treatment for MRSA 
Prison officials also violate the Eighth Amendment when they are deliberately 
indifferent to the serious medical needs of a sentenced prisoner. See Darby v. Greenman , 14 
F.4th 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff 
must show that “(1) objectively, the alleged deprivation of medical care was ‘sufficiently 
serious,’ and (2) subjectively, that the defendants acted or failed to act ‘while actually aware 
of a substantial risk that serious inmate harm will result.’” Washington v. Artus, 708 F. App’x 
705, 708 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (quoting Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 279-80). “Whether 
a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject 
to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a 

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factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that 
the risk was obvious.” Suarez v. Morton, 170 F.4th 33, 60 (2d Cir. 2026) (quoting Phelps v. 
Kapnolas, 308 F.3d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 2002)). “It is well-settled that one may disregard a risk–
and thus be deliberately indifferent to it—through either action or inaction.” Id. For example, 
a provider “may be deliberately indifferent if he or she consciously chooses an easier and less 
efficacious treatment plan.” Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998). 
Griffin alleges that he contracted MRSA from the unsanitary showers at Corrigan CI, 
and that Defendants failed to provide him with proper medical treatment. I assume for purposes 
of initial review that deprivation of care with respect to a MRSA infection is sufficiently 
serious to satisfy the objective component. 
I turn therefore to analyze whether any of the Defendants named in the Amended 
Complaint acted with deliberate indifference to the serious risks to Griffin’s health posed by 
his MRSA infection. I will permit Griffin to proceed on the MRSA claim for damages against 
the Defendants plausibly involved in responding to his needs for medical treatment to permit 
further development of the record. This includes Grande, Barnes, Mayernik, Valletta West, 
Bertocki, Andexler, Prabhakar, Rader, and Sanchez. 
According to the Amended Complaint, Grande and Barnes told Griffin that the 
treatment he requested “cost too much” and that they would not “was[te] funds on that” 
because “everyone [has] MRSA.” Am. Compl. 25, ¶¶ 18-19 (cleaned up). And with respect to 
Grande, Griffin alleges Grande told him, “why [do] you expect me to help you when you are 
suing me?” Id. at 28, ¶ 29. Moreover, Griffin alleges Mayernik and West told him that they 
“[w]ould do something but don[’]t want to catch (MRSA) unfortunately sorry.” Id. at 31, ¶ 39. 

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Bertocki (whom the Amended Complaint describes in part as “Dawn B”) and Valletta 
first confirmed that Griffin had MRSA. Id. at 22, ¶ 3. According to the Complaint, Bertocki 
and Valletta “refuse[d], denied and ignored” the need to conduct further testing. Id. ¶ 4. 
Similarly, the Amended Complaint states that Andexle r and Prabhakar declined to order 
further testing to determine the progression of the MRSA infection. Id. ¶ 7. 
The Amended Complaint also contends that Rader, Prabhakar, and Sanchez (along with 
the other treatment providers described here) repeatedly prescribed a course of antibiotics that 
they knew or should have known would be ineffective. Id. at 23, ¶ 11. The Amended Complaint 
contends that Andexler improperly “reject[ed] and stonewall[ed]” Griffin’s grievances, which 
caused an undue delay in necessary treatment. Id. at 24-25, ¶¶ 15-17. 
To be sure, discovery may reveal that Defendants did not respond as alleged, or that 
Defendants reasonably applied their medical judgment in response to Griffin’s needs. Cf. 
Chance, 143 F.3d at 703 (“It is well- established that mere disagreement over the proper 
treatment does not create a constitutional claim. So long as the treatment given is adequate, 
the fact that a prisoner might prefer a different treatment does not give rise to an Eighth 
Amendment violation. ”). But for purposes of initial review, t hese allegations support the 
inferences that these treatment providers were aware of Griffin’s condition and acted with 
deliberate indifference in intentionally choosing an “easier and less efficacious treatment.” Id. 
But I do not find that the Amended Complaint supports the inference that the other 
Defendants—Peau, Dougherty, Quiros, Oles, and Regan — are liable for this claim. These 
individuals do not appear to have been personally involved in providing medical care to 

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Griffin.5 In particular, although the Amended Complaint faults Lieutenant Peau (whom I 
assume to be a correctional officer) for seizing prescription soap following a search of Griffin’s 
cell in September 2024, the Amended Complaint also maintains that the soap was ineffective 
in addressing Griffin’s treatment. See Am. Compl. 29, ¶¶ 33-34. I cannot infer from this record 
that Peau “intentionally den[ied] or delay[ed] access to medical care.” Darby, 14 F.4th at128 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Nor does the Amended Complaint contain any 
non-conclusory facts to support the inference Dougherty, Quiros, or Oles failed to act after 
learning about a substantial risk to Griffin’s health. 
Accordingly, I permit Griffin to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim for damages 
related to MRSA treatment against Grande, Barnes, Mayernik, Valletta West, Bertocki, 
Andexler, Prabhakar, Rader, and Sanchez in their individual capacities. Griffin’s claim against 
all other Defendants is dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. 
B. First Amendment Retaliation 
I did not identify a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim on initial review of 
Griffin’s original Complaint. See ECF No. 19. But the Amended Complaint can be fairly read 
to assert two different First Amendment claims. First, Griffin contends that Grande provided 
inadequate medical care in retaliation for Griffin naming her in a prior action, Griffin v. 
Barroga, No. 3:23-cv-1590 (SFR). Am. Compl. 28, ¶ 29. Second, Griffin asserts that Barnes 
retaliated against him by issuing a ticket after he submitte d grievances accusing her of not 
doing her job. Id. ¶ 31. 
 
5 It appears that Regan may have been involved in managing Griffin’s medical records. Am. 
Compl. 27, ¶ 25. But I cannot discern any non- conclusory facts that would suggest Regan was 
otherwise involved in providing medical care to Griffin. 

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To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show “‘(1) that the 
speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the 
plaintiff, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected speech and the 
adverse action.’” Brandon v. Kinter , 938 F.3d 21, 40 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Gill v. 
Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 380 (2d Cir. 2004)). “Courts must approach prisoner retaliation 
claims with skepticism and particular care, because virtually any adverse action taken against 
a prisoner by a prison official—even those otherwise not rising to the level of a constitutional 
violation—can be characterized as a constitutionally proscribed retaliatory act.” Walker v. 
Senecal, 130 F.4th 291, 298 (2d Cir. 2025) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Accordingly, courts require “prisoner retaliation claims [to] be supported by specific and 
detailed factual allegations, not stated in wholly conclusory terms.” Id. at 299 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
I begin by analyzing Griffin’s retaliation claim against Grande, whom Griffin says 
provided inadequate treatment because of Griffin’s other pending lawsuit against her. The first 
requirement is clearly satisfied because it is well established that “t he filing of a lawsuit or a 
grievance is protected conduct .” Walker, 130 F.4th at 298. The second requirement also 
appears to be satisfied insofar as the Amended Complaint suggests that Grande delayed in 
providing adequate treatment, which I conclude would “deter a similarly situated individual of 
ordinary firmness from exercising his or her constitutional rights.” Id. (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). I also conclude that the third requirement—causation —is satisfied 
here because the Amended Complaint alleges that Grande explained her care decisions by 
directly referencing Griffin’s prior suit. In particular, the Amended Complaint states tha t 
Grande asked Griffin: “Why [do] you expect me to help you when you are suing me?” Am. 

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Compl. 28, ¶ 29. At the initial review stage, these allegations suffice to state a claim under the 
First Amendment. Griffin may therefore proceed on a claim for damages under the First 
Amendment against Grande. 
I turn next to Griffin’s retaliation claim against Barnes. According to the Amended 
Complaint, Barnes issued a ticket to Griffin after Griffin wrote grievances accusing Barnes of 
not doing her job. Id. at 2 8, ¶ 31. Here too the first requirement for a retaliation claim is 
satisfied because filing a grievance is protected conduct. Walker , 130 F.4th at 298. I also 
conclude that the second requirement—adverse action—is satisfied. The Amended Complaint 
states that Barnes issued a ticket to Griffin after he submitted grievances against her . Am. 
Compl. 28, ¶ 31. “ A misbehavior report issued in retaliation for an inmate ’s exercise of a 
protected activity may constitute an adverse action.” Tripathy v. Brotz, No. 6:22-CV-06469-
FPG, 2023 WL 4032831, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. June 15, 2023), aff’d sub nom. Tripathy v. McKoy, 
103 F.4th 106 (2d Cir. 2024); accord Gayle v. Gonyea, 313 F.3d 677, 682 (2d Cir. 2002) (“An 
allegation that a prison official filed false disciplinary charges in retaliation for the exercise of 
a constitution ally protected right, such as the filing of a grievance, states a claim under § 
1983.”). Finally, I conclude that the third requirement —causation —is satisfied because the 
Amended Complaint alleges that Griffin was disciplined because of the content of his 
grievances. 
For these reasons, Griffin may proceed on a claim for damages under the First 
Amendment against Grande and Barnes. 
C. Official Capacity Claims 
The Amended Complaint asserts claims against Defendants in their official capacities. 
To the extent Griffin asserts official capacity claims for monetary damages against Defendants 

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(all presumably state employees), such claims are dismissed as barred by state sovereign 
immunity. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). 
Griffin also seeks injunctive relief in the form of an order directing Defendants to (1) 
remedy unsanitary showers and (2) provide additional diagnostic imaging and treatment for 
his medical needs. Am. Compl. 35. Griffin may proceed for injunctive or declaratory relief 
against a defendant in his or her official capacity only to the extent he alleges an ongoing 
constitutional violation. See Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 254-55 
(2011) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). 
Griffin is now housed at MacDougall -Walker Correctional Institution. ECF No. 27. 
Because Griffin is no longer housed at Corrigan CI, his requests for official capacity relief 
against Defendants who provide medical care at Corrigan and to address conditions in the 
showers at Corrigan are moot. See Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 2006) . 
Nor can I say from this record that Griffin is experiencing an ongoing constitutional violation 
related to his medical needs. I therefore dismiss all requests for declaratory and injunctive 
relief without prejudice and with leave to amend. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS 
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude as follows: 
(1) Griffin may proceed against Grande, Barnes, Mayernik, Valletta West, Bertocki, 
Andexler, Prabhakar, Rader, and Sanchez in their individual capacities on his 
damages claim that Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment in treating his 
MRSA infection. 

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(2) Griffin may proceed against Defendants Peau, Dougherty, and Oles in their 
individual capacities on his damages claim that Defendants violated the Eighth 
Amendment because of the unsanitary showers at Corrigan CI. 
(3) Griffin may proceed against Barnes and Grande in their individual capacities on his 
damages claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. 
All other claims, including official capacity claims, are DISMISSED without 
prejudice and with leave to amend. 
Griffin has two options as to how to proceed in response to this Initial Review 
Order: 
If Griffin wishes to proceed immediately only on the claims against as set forth in 
paragraphs one and two, he may do so without further delay. If Griffin selects this option, he 
shall file a notice on the docket on or before June 30, 2026 informing the court that he elects 
to proceed with service as to the claims as set forth above. The court will then begin the effort 
to serve process on Defendants. 
Alternatively, if Griffin wishes to attempt to replead any of the claims asserted in the 
Amended Complaint that have been dismissed in order to attempt to state a viable claim, he 
may file a Second A mended complaint on or before June 30, 2026. A Second A mended 
Complaint, if filed, will completely replace the complaint, and the court will not consider any 
allegations made in the f irst Amended Complaint in evaluating any Second A mended 
Complaint. The court will review any Second Amended Complaint after filing to determine 
whether it may proceed to service of process on any defendants named therein. If Griffin elects 
to file a Second Amended Complaint, the first Amended C omplaint addressed by this Initial 
Review Order will not proceed to service of process on any defendant. 

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If the court receives no response from Griffin before June 30, 2026, the court will 
presume that Griffin wishes to proceed on the first Amended C omplaint as to the claims 
permitted to go forward in this Initial Review Order, and he will have to show good cause if 
he seeks to amend the complaint in any manner in the future. 
Changes of Address. If Plaintiff changes his address at any time during the litigation 
of this case, Local Rule 83.1(c) provides that he MUST notify the court. Failure to do so may 
result in the dismissal of the case. He must give notice of a new address even if he is 
incarcerated. Plaintiff should write PLEASE NOTE MY NEW ADDRESS on the notice. It is 
not enough to just put the new address on a letter without indicating that it is a new address. If 
Plaintiff has more than one pending case, he should indicate all the case numbers in the 
notification of change of address. Plaintiff should also notify Defendants or counsel for 
Defendants of his new address. 
SO ORDERED. 
 
 
New Haven, Connecticut 
June 1, 2026 
 
/s/Sarah F. Russell 
SARAH F. RUSSELL 
United States District Judge 
 
 

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