govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_26-cv-01250-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
DAGOBERTO GUZMAN, 
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
PAM BONDI, et al., 
 
Respondents. 
 
Civil Action No. 26-1250 (KSH) 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
 
This matter comes before the Court on Dagoberto Guzman’s Petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his mandatory detention without bond by 
immigration authorities. Guzman entered the United States in June 2022; immigration officials 
paroled him into the country under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) for one year, and he applied for 
asylum. Years later, after his parole expired, he was arrested by Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”) in the interior of the United States. At issue is whether Respondents can 
detain him without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) until his asylum proceedings conclude. For 
the reasons explained below , the Court finds that Guzman is unlawfully detained under § 
1225(b)(1), GRANTS the Petition on that basis, and orders Respondents to release Guzman from 
detention within 24 hours. The Court does not reach his arguments that his medical conditions 1 
entitle him to relief under Lucas v. Hadden, 790 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 
 
 
1 Because the Court decides the Petition on a different basis and to protect Guzman’s privacy, the 
Court does not discuss his medical conditions or history. PageID:
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I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Guzman is a citizen of Colombia and entered the United States on May 24, 2022. (ECF 
No. 1, Petition at ¶¶ 2, 35; ECF No. 7- 1 (Form I-860). On May 31, 2022, a border patrol agent 
apprehended Guzman, found him inadmissible to the United States, and issued a Notice and Order 
of Expedited Removal. (Id.) After Guzman expressed a fear of returning to Colombia, he was 
referred to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Asylum Office for a credible fear 
interview. (ECF No. 1 (Petition at ¶¶ 2, 5); ECF No. 7-1 (Notice to Appear).) It is undisputed that 
he was paroled from custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) on or around June 8, 2022, and his parole 
period expired on June 7, 2023. (ECF No. 1 , Petition at ¶ 2 (citing ECF No. 1- 2 ( Parole 
Document).) 
On April 19, 2023, while on parole, Guzman filed an application for asylum, Withholding 
of Removal and protection under the Convention against Torture . (Id. at ¶ 3.) On June 4, 2025, 
Petitioner’s Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, was dismissed 
by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) because he had not undergone a credible 
fear interview. ( Id.; ECF No. 1-3.) On December 12, 2025, ICE arrested Guzman at his home, 
and he remains detained without bond at Delaney Hall, in Newark, New Jersey. (ECF No. 1, 
Petition at ¶¶ 4, 35). 
Removal proceedings were initiated on or about December 27, 2025, and Guzman’s Notice 
to Appear states that he “has not been admitted or paroled” despite the fact that he was indeed 
paroled following his apprehension. (See ECF No. 7-2 (Notice to Appear).) His belated credible 
fear interview also occurred on December 27, and the asylum officer determined that Guzman 
demonstrated a credible fear of persecution or torture and referred his case to the immigration court 
for asylum proceedings. ( ECF No. 1 -4 (Form I -870).) The immigration court pretermitted PageID:
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Guzman’s asylum application and ordered him removed to Ecuador , and in the alternative to 
Honduras; he has appealed that determination to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). (ECF 
Nos. 7-4; ECF No. 9 at 5.) 
This habeas petition, which challenges his detention on multiple grounds, followed. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is available to every individual 
detained within the United States. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld , 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. 
Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). District courts have the power to grant writs of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241(a). A district court’s authority includes jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges to 
immigration-related detention. Zadvydas v. Davis , 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). The burden is on 
petitioner to show that he is in cus tody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241(c)(3); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Respondents argue that Guzman is lawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) 
because he was (i) apprehended at a port of entry or near the border, (ii) placed into expedited 
removal proceedings, and (iii) had a credible -fear screener interview for an asylum claim, where 
he was found to have a credible fear claim. (ECF No. 7, Answer at 2 (citing Castro v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 425 (3d Cir. 2016) ( additional citations omitted) .) Guzman 
argues that he is not subject to mandatory detention because “the plain language of § 
1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) unambiguously excludes individuals who have been paroled into the United 
States” and that “the statutory text of § 1182(d)(5)(A) does not support returning them to their pre-
parole status[.]” (ECF No. 9, Reply Brief at 1- 2.) For the reasons explained below, the Court 
agrees with Guzman. PageID:
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 In broad strokes, the detention framework of the INA distinguishes between those 
noncitizens seeking entry into the United States and those noncitizens who are already here. See 
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (explaining that “U.S. immigration law authorizes 
the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) 
and (b)(2)” and “also authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country 
pending the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and ( c).”) (emphasis added) . 
Sections 1225 and 1226 both govern the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of removal, 
see id. at 287- 89, but “§§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate detention of aliens throughout the 
completion of applicable proceedings[.]”2 Id. at 302. In contrast, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governs the 
detention of noncitizens (without qualifying criminal convictions or charges) already present 
within the United States who may be detained pursuant to a warrant based on flight risk or 
dangerousness and are entitled to receive a bond hearing before an immigration judge. See id. at 
288. 
A noncitizen like Guzman who enters the United States and is detained shortly after making 
an unlawful crossing of the border may be subject to expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1). See 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 139-40 (2020). Section 1225(b)(1) is “a 
separate track for expedited removal proceedings,” which “‘substantially shorten and speed up the 
removal process.’” Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar , 811 F.Supp.3d 274, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) 
(citing Make the Rd. New York v. Wolf , 962 F.3d 612, 618–19 (D.C. Cir. 2020)). Applicants 
covered by § 1225(b)(1) may be removed “without further hearing or review” pursuant to an 
 
2 In 2019, following Jennings, the BIA overruled In Re X-k-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 731, 731 (2005), and 
held that noncitizens who are “transferred from expedited removal proceedings to full removal 
proceedings after establishing a credible fear of persecution or torture” are “ineligible for release 
on bond” and must “be detained until his removal proceedings conclude, unless he is granted 
parole.” Matter of M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509, 509 (2019). PageID:
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expedited removal process unless he “indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear 
of persecution[,]” in which case he is referred for an asylum interview. 8 U.S.C. § 
1225(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). Detention is mandatory, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), 
(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), but the government may, in its discretion, temporarily parole such aliens “for 
urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287-88. 
There appears to be no dispute that Guzman was originally subject to § 1225(b)(1) when 
he was apprehended in 2022. At issue is whether he is still subject to mandatory detention under 
§§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), (b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) following his parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A). Respondents 
argue that his “detention is . . . mandatory pending removal proceedings under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), 
which states that “ with a positive credible fear determination, the alien ‘shall be detained’ 
throughout the removal proceedings.” 
Statutory construction begins with the text of the statute, see Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 
369, 376, (2013) , and Respondents’ argument ignores the fact that noncitizens must meet 
additional requirements to fall within § 1225(b)(1). First, the noncitizen must be “inadmissible” 
to the United States either because he lacks proper entry documents or because he engaged in fraud 
or willfully misrepresented a material fact on his application for admission. 8 U.S.C. § 
1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Second, he must also either be “arriving in the United States,” under 8 U.S.C. § 
1225(b)(1)(A)(i), or be a noncitizen “who has not been admitted or paroled into the United States, 
and has not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that [he] has been 
physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the 
date of the determination of inadmissibility [.]” Id., § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II). The latter provision 
is known as the “Designation Provision,” and when Guzman was apprehended in 2022, it applied 
to noncitizens who had not been admitted or paroled and were encountered within 14 days of entry PageID:
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and 100 miles of the border. See Castro, 835 F.3d at 425 (explaining that Section 1225(b)(1) 
applies to “arriving aliens” and those aliens “encountered within 14 days of entry without 
inspection and within 100 air miles of any U.S. international land border”). 
The record shows that CBP encountered Petitione r near the borde r on May 31, 2022, 
approximately a week after his entry, and that he was initially processed for expedited removal but 
was referred for a credible fear hearing after expressing a fear of returning to Columbia. On June 
8, 2022, he was released on parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A) for a period of a year, until June 7, 2023. 
When ICE arrested Guzman in December 2025, the Designation Provision of Section 1225(b)(1) 
no longer applied to him because the plain language of that subsection applies to a noncitizen “who 
has not been admitted or paroled into the United States[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II). Like 
other courts that have addressed this language, t his Court finds that this phrase “does not refer to 
a legal status but rather to the event of entry into the United States via admission or parole, which 
either did or did not occur.”
3 Rodriguez-Acurio, 811 F. Supp.3d at 300; see also Rivas Rodriguez, 
2025 WL 3485628, at *2 (finding “because § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) applies only to individuals 
‘who have not been . . . paroled,’ the plain language of the statute clearly and unambiguously 
shows that § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) cannot serve as the basis for” de tention of a noncitizen who was 
previously paroled under § 1182(d)(5)(A)); Vasquez-Rosario v. Noem, Civ. A. No. 25-7427, 2026 
WL 196505, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2026) (same); Suazo Rivera v. Blanche , No. 2:26-cv-03892 
(BRM), 2026 WL 1153665, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2026) (same) ; Murillo-Castillo v. Florentino, 
No. 25-16728 (MCA), 2026 WL 1383062, at *5 (D.N.J. May 18, 2026) (same). Thus, although 
Guzman was subject to the Designation Provision when he was initially apprehended in 2022, he 
 
3 Nor is Guzman an “arriving alien” who is “in the process of reaching the United States.” 
Rodriguez-Acurio, 811 F. Supp.3d at 306. PageID:
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is not subject to it now because it plainly exempts those noncitizens who have been have been 
admitted or paroled into the United States. 
Respondents separately contend that the parole statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), returns 
Petitioner to mandatory detention or the custody status he held at the time he entered the United 
States. In reaching this conclusion, Respondents rely on Faqirzada v. Rokosky , No. 25- 16639 
(MAS), 2026 WL 63614, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2026), 4 and several out-of-circuit decisions, but they 
do not analyze the plain language of the parole statute, which states in relevant part that 
such parole of an alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the 
alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served the alien shall 
forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was 
paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the 
same manner as that of any other applicant for admission. 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Here, Respondents “fail to address whether ‘return or be returned to 
the custody from which he was paroled’ plainly means that [Guzman] returns to the same custody 
status, i.e., mandatory detention, that he held when he entered the United States in 2022.” Murillo-
Castillo, 2026 WL 1383062, at *4; Guevara v. Tsoukaris, 2026 WL 969261, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 9, 
2026) (JXN). (“Respondents fail to discuss the plain text of § 1225(b)(1)” or “analyze the statutory 
language of the parole statute, § 1182(d)(5)(A), and how it provides for Petitioner's return to 
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1).”). 
 
4 Although there is some support for Respondents’ interpretation in administrative decisions and 
regulations, the Court “must exercise independent judgment in determining the meaning of 
statutory provisions.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024) (overruling 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). Their 
interpretation also finds support in the so- called “entry fiction,” but the Court agrees with the 
District Court in Rodriguez-Acurio, 811 F. Supp.3d at 306, which found that “Thuraissigiam stands 
for the limited principle that those ‘at the threshold of initial entry’ stand on a different footing for 
due process purposes than noncitizens ‘who have established connections in this country.’” Id. at 
313-14 (citing 591 U.S. at 107). PageID:
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The Court is persuaded that the relevant language does not mandate a return to physical 
detention or to the detention authority that applied prior to parole . Because “custody” is not 
defined in the INA , the Court “turns to the phrase’s plain meaning at the time of enactment.” 
Olimov v. Jamison, 2026 WL 596155, at *4; s ee also Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43, 48 (2020) 
(citing FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 403 (2011)); Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 160 
(2021) (the Court “normally seeks to afford the law’s terms their ordinary meaning at the time 
Congress adopted them”). As observed by the district court in Olimov, 
[w]hen Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952, it included identical language about a return to custody 
following parole. See Pub.L. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 188, § 212(d)(5) 
(June 27, 1952). [FN omitted.] Then, as now, the statute did not 
define “custody.” However, at the time Congress enacted the INA, 
“custody” could refer to charge, control, or possession, as well as 
detention. See Custody, Black's Law Dictionary, 460 (4th ed. 1951). 
Indeed, the term was “very elastic and [could] mean actual 
imprisonment or physical detention or mere power, legal or 
physical, of imprisoning or of taking manual possession.” Id. 
Id. at *5. In Olimov, the district court also analyzed other uses of the words “custody” and “detain” 
in § 1182 found that “Congress’s use of the various forms of the word ‘detain’ demonstrates that, 
in 1952, when Congress wanted to specify physical custody, it knew the words to use.” Id. (citing 
Bittner v. United States, 598 U.S. 85, 94 (2023); Russello v. U.S., 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). The 
district court concluded that because “‘custody’ is an elastic term that could have various 
meanings,” it is “more prudent to assume that Congress meant custody to refer to control over the 
alien, as opposed to physical detention.”
5 Id. at *6 (citing United States ex rel. Petratos v. 
 
5 Section 1182(d)(5)(A) also mandates that “thereafter [the noncitizen’s] case shall continue to be 
dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(d)(5)(A). To the extent this language bears on his detention status at all, it “mandates that 
[Guzman] be treated just as the INA would treat any noncitizen previously granted parole and 
living in the United States.” Qasemi, 2025 WL 3654098, at *12 (holding that “any determination 
as to [the petitioner’s] detention must be conducted under the discretionary framework of Section 
1226(a)”). PageID:
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Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 488 (3d Cir. 2017) (“The use of different words or terms within a 
statute demonstrates that Congress intended to convey a different meaning for those words.”); see 
also Qasemi v. Francis, No. 25-CV-10029 (LJL), 2025 WL 3654098, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 
2025) (finding that return to the custody from which he was paroled does not mean a return to 
physical detention); Murillo-Castillo, 2026 WL 1383062, at *5 (same). Here, the Court finds that 
“return . . . to the custody from which he was paroled” means legal control or supervision and not 
necessarily physical detention. 
Notably, Guzman’s parole expired nearly three years ago in June 2023. There is no 
evidence that ICE attempted to detain him at that time or was unable to locate him . Indeed, he 
applied for asylum while still on parole and was living freely in the interior of the United States 
prior to his arrest by ICE . District courts have found that noncitizens who are not taken into 
custody when their period of parole expires may only be detained under § 1226(a). See Cabrera 
Martinez v. Marich, 816 F. Supp.3d 356, 373 (W.D.N.Y . 2025) (“[T]his Court joins those courts 
that have found that an individual who has been living in the United States outside parole and is 
later apprehended is detained under section 1226). 
The Court also rejects Respondents’ interpretation of §§ 1225(b)(1) and 1182(d)(5)(A) 
because it would require the mandatory detention of noncitizens who have lived in the United 
States for years and formed significant ties here , which “would raise significant constitutional 
issues.” Qasemi, 2025 WL 3654098, at *12; Olimov, 2026 WL 596155, at *6. And “to the extent 
this Court were to find that 1182(d)(5)(A) and/or § 1225 are ambiguous, it would resort to 
constitutional avoidance, a doctrine which permits a court to choose ‘between competing plausible 
interpretations of a statutory text.’” Murillo-Castillo, 2026 WL 1383062, at *6 (quoting Jennings, PageID:
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583 U.S. at 298) ; Gonzalez v. United States , 553 U.S. 242, 251 (2008) (cleaned up) (“When a 
statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional 
questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, [the Court’s] duty is to adopt 
the latter.”). 
For all these reasons, the Court rejects Respondents’ arguments that Petitioner is subject to 
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1). At the time of his arrest by ICE, Guzman may have been 
subject to detention under § 1226(a) , but “the Government did not attempt to follow the 
requirements of that statute in taking him into custody, nor have they used that statute as a basis 
for his detention.” Fajardo-Nugra v. Soto, No. 26-975, 2026 WL 579192, at *1-2 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 
2026). The Court will not convert Petitioner’s detention to “potentially lawful alternate form under 
a different statute with different procedural requirements and rules.” Id. at *2 (granting Petitioner’s 
habeas petition and ordering Petitioner’s release based on the Government's flawed application of 
§ 1225(b)(2)). The Court orders Respondents to releas e Petitioner within 24 hours. The Court 
declines to reach the remaining arguments regarding Petitioner’s medical conditions and any 
remaining claims in light of the relief provided. An appropriate Order follows. 
 
 
 
 s/Katharine S. Hayden 
 Katharine S. Hayden, U.S.D.J. PageID:
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