govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_25-cv-01368-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
MONICA KINCAID HICKS, 
 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
SHANNON WICKS, 
 
 Respondent. 
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
BEATTY, Magistrate Judge: 
Petitioner Monica Kincaid-Hicks brought this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 , challenging the computation of her federal sentence and the B ureau Of 
Prison’s (BOP) failure to apply earned Federal Time Credits under the First Step Act. For 
the reasons explained below, Ms. Kincaid-Hicks’s § 2241 petition is DENIED. 
BACKGROUND 
Ms. Kincaid -Hicks is currently serving a 46 -month sentence for conspiracy to 
commit wire fraud and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349 and 1343 (see Doc. 29-
2 at p. 2). Ms. Kincaid-Hicks’s Petition alleges that at the time of its filing on July 14, 2025, 
she was incarcerated at a federal facility in Greenville, Illinois (Doc. 1). However , as of 
March 11, 2026, Ms. Kincaid -Hicks was released from her Residential Reentry 
Management placement and placed on home confinement under the supervision of the 
BOP (Doc. 32). 
Ms. Kincaid -Hicks was determined to be eligible to earn Federal Time Credits 
(“FTCs) under the First Step Act of 2018 (Doc. 1 at p. 2; Doc. 29 -2 at p. 2). Pertinently, at Page ID
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the time her Petition was filed, Ms. Kincaid -Hicks had been credited with earning 270 
days of FTCs toward release (Doc. 1 at p. 5; Doc. 29-2 at p. 3). Therefore, when accounting 
for those FTCs, Ms. Kincaid-Hicks’s projected release date of July 24, 2027, was calculated 
for a First Step Act projected release date of October 27, 2026 (Doc. 29 -2 at p p. 3 & 8). 
Furthermore, Ms. Kincaid -Hicks’s maximum statutory home confinement placement is 
140 days (10% of her sentence as outlined by the Second Chance Act) ( see Doc. 29-2 at p. 
6). Thus, the earliest Ms. Kincaid-Hicks could be placed on home confinement was March 
11, 2026, which is 140 days from her current First Step Act conditional release date (Doc. 
29-2 at p. 6). And again, Ms. Kincaid -Hicks was released from her Residential Reentry 
Management placement on March 11, 2026, and placed on home confinement (Doc. 32). 
DISCUSSION 
The Attorney General, acting through the BOP, has the responsibility for 
administering a federal prisoner’s sentence, which includes calculating the prisoner’s 
period of incarceration for the sentence imposed and providing credit for time served. 
United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 -335 (1992). In instances such as Ms. Kincaid-
Hicks, where a prisoner believes the BOP has erred in its calculation of h er federal 
sentence, the prisoner may, after exhausting administrative remedies, challenge the 
execution of h er sentence by bringing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 
U.S.C. § 2241. See United States v. Walker, 917 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2019). See also 
Romandine v. United States, 206 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2000) (requests for sentence credit, 
or for recalculation of time yet to serve come under § 2241). A writ of habeas corpus will Page ID
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only be granted when the petitioner shows that the BOP’s sentencing calculation violates 
federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 
In this instance, Ms. Kincaid-Hicks alleges that she is in custody in violation of 18 
U.S.C § 3624(c) and BOP Program Statement 7310.04 because the BOP did not provide an 
individual assessment for Second Chance Act placement and/or unlawfully limited her 
Residential Reentry Center or home confinement time (Doc. 1 at p. 2). Additionally, Ms. 
Kincaid-Hicks alleges that the BOP’s refusal to apply her earned time credits under the 
First Step Act violates 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4) and unlawfully prolongs her incarc eration 
(Id.). 
Respondent Shannon Wicks, Residential Reentry Manger of the Cincinnati 
Residential Reentry Management Office, filed a response in opposition, which first 
argues that Ms. Kincaid-Hicks failed to exhaust her administrative remedies (Doc. 29 at 
pp. 6-8). In addition, Respondent contends that: (1) Ms. Kincaid-Hicks’s Petition is moot 
because her needs under the First Step Act have been appropriately assessed ( Id. at pp. 
8-9); (2) a challenge to her place of confinement is not cognizable in habeas ( Id. at pp. 9-
10); (3) the Court lacks authority to review Ms. Kincaid-Hicks’s place of confinement (Id. 
at pp. 11-12); and (4) the BOP has complied with the law in its calculation of Ms. Kincaid-
Hicks’s sentence calculation and administration (Id. at p. 12). 
The Court first analyzes the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies before 
addressing the parties’ substantive arguments because that issue is dispositive. See Kane 
v. Zuercher, 344 Fed. App’x 267, 269 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[A] district court is entitled to require Page ID
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a prisoner to exhaust the administrative remedies that the BOP offers before it will 
entertain a [§ 2241] petition.”) (citing Clemente v. Allen, 120 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
A. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
While there is no statutory exhaustion requirement that applies to § 2241 petitions, 
the Seventh Circuit has recognized that a common law exhaustion requirement applies. 
Richmond v. Scibana, 387 F.3d 602, 604 (7th Cir. 2004). Exhaustion is an affirmative defense 
that the respondent has the burden of pleading and proving. Acosta v. Daniels, 589 Fed. 
App’x 870, 873 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1200 (10th Cir. 2010)); 
Luedtke v. Berkebile, 704 F.3d 465, 466 (6th Cir. 2013); George v. Longley, 463 Fed. App’x 136, 
139 (3d Cir. 2012). See also, e.g., Massey v. Helman , 196 F.3d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A 
prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a claim constitutes an 
affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
In order to properly exhaust their administrative remedies, an inmate is required 
to “comply with the BOP’s rules governing filing and prosecution of a complaint.” Ihmoud 
v. Jett, 272 Fed. App’x 525, 527 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Woodford v. Ngo , 548 U.S. 81, 90 
(2006)). See also Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002) (Stating that, in the 
context of a § 1983 lawsuit, “[t]o exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and 
appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.”) 
The BOP administrative remedy process is comprised of one informal and three 
formal steps (Doc. 29-1 at pp. 1-2). See also 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-19. First, the inmate must 
attempt to informally resolve the issue (Doc. 29-1 at p. 2). Thereafter, the administrative 
remedy process is formally commenced by filing a Request for Administrative Remedy Page ID
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(BP-9 form) at the institution where the inmate is incarcerated ( Id.). If an inmate is not 
satisfied with the response at the institutional level, she may appeal that response by 
filing a Regional Administrative Remedy Appeal (BP -10 form) with the regional office 
(Id.). Finally, if the inmate is also unsatisfied with the regional office’s response, she may 
file a final appeal (BP-11 form) with the Central Office (Id.). 
An inmate’s failure to complete all steps of the administrative remedy process 
prior to filing a § 2241 petition may be excused if the administrative remedy process was 
rendered unavailable by prison officials. Fazzini v. Ne. Ohio Corr. Ctr. , 473 F.3d 229, 236 
(6th Cir. 2006) (“[A] habeas petitioner ’s failure to complete the administrative remedy 
process may be excused where his failure is due to the administrator, rather than the 
petitioner . . . .”). See also Schmanke v. Irvins, 207 Fed. App’x 655, 657 (7 th Cir. 2006) ( A 
habeas petitioner’s failure to exhaust “can be excused only upon a showing of cause and 
prejudice.”) (citing Sanchez v. Miller, 792 F.2d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 1986)). Additionally, in 
certain limited circumstances, an inmate’s failure to exhaust may be excused when 
exhaustion would either be futile or result in irreparable harm. See, e.g. , Gonzalez v. 
O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing the heavy burden for applying 
a futility exception). 
B. EXHAUSTION ANALYSIS 
Here, Ms. Kincaid -Hicks concedes that she did not complete the exhaustion 
process prior to filing her Petition and instead argues that her failure to exhaust should 
be excused because the administrative exhaustion process is unduly lengthy and would 
either be futile or result in irreparable harm (Doc. 1 at p. 2). In addition to agreeing with Page ID
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Ms. Kincaid -Hicks’ concession that she did not exhaust, Respondent has provided 
evidence to further demonstrate that Ms. Kincaid-Hicks did not properly exhaust her 
administrative remedies prior to filing this Petition (Doc. 29 at p. 7; see also Doc. 29-1 at 
pp. 3-4). Moreover, Respondent argues that exhaustion would have neither caused Ms. 
Kincaid-Hicks irreparable harm nor been inherently futile (Doc. 29 at pp. 7 -8). Although 
Ms. Kincaid-Hicks filed a Reply Brief in support of her petition, that reply did not address 
Respondent’s exhaustion arguments (see generally Doc. 31). 
Significantly, the Court finds that Ms. Kincaid-Hicks had plenty of time to engage 
in the administrative exhaustion process and still obtain the full extent of relief sought 
from the BOP, and if necessary, from the Court afterwards. In fact, as Respondent 
established, Ms. Kincaid-Hicks filed an institution-level request (BP-9 form), which was 
responded to by her institution’s Warden (see Doc. 29-1 at p p. 3 & 15). Thereafter, she 
appealed the institution’s response to the BOP’s North Central Regional Office, which 
filed a response on June 13, 2025 (Id. at pp. 3 & 16-17). Next, Ms. Kincaid-Hicks appealed 
that response to the BOP’s Central Office on August 11, 2025 ( Id. at pp. 3 -4 & 18). That 
appeal was then resubmitted in September 2025 because Ms. Kincaid-Hicks had failed to 
sign her original appeal ( Id. at pp. 4 & 18 -19). Finally, the Central Office provided an 
explanation and closed the remedy appeal on December 17, 2025 (Id. at pp. 4 & 20). Thus, 
as evinced by the above administrative remedy history, the administrative process was 
not unduly lengthy and could have been exhausted by Ms. Kincaid-Hicks before she filed 
the instant Petition. 
Additionally, Ms. Kincaid -Hicks’s cursory exhaustion analysis provides no Page ID
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meaningful argument or explanation as to why exhaustion would have been futile or 
otherwise resulted in irreparable harm in her specific circumstances ( see generally Doc. 1 
at p. 2). Ultimately, as this Court has recently explained, “ Petitioners citing futility ‘face 
a heavy burden ’ because they must demonstrate that there is ‘no reasonable prospect ’ 
that they could obtain any relief from that agency. ” Beam v. Sproul, 3:24-CV-02255-GCS, 
2025 WL 1359903, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 2025) (quoting Gonzalez v. O 'Connell, 355 F.3d 
1010, 1016-17 (7th Cir. 2004 )). Yet, here, Ms. Kincaid-Hicks “has neither exhausted [her] 
administrative remedies nor shown that available remedies are inadequate, ineffective, 
or would cause irreparable injury. ” Id. And tellingly , “[t] he general belief that the 
administrative process would not succeed is not an excuse to not take that step. ” 
Botsvynyuk v. Emmerich , 25 -CV-135-WMC, 2026 WL 457354, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 18, 
2026). Thus, as Respondent fairly argues, Ms. Kincaid -Hicks’s failu re to exhaust her 
administrative remedies prior to filing the instant Petition deprived the BOP of the ability 
to fully address her contentions (Doc. 29 at p. 8). See also DANIEL ROSS VIETH v. ERIC 
WILLIAMS, 21-CV-170-JPG, 2021 WL 5177567, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2021) (finding that 
the petitioner should have exhausted his administrative remedies because, among other 
reasons, “ the BOP is in the best place to answer these types of questions in the first 
instance in a consistent manner for all inmates before scarce Court resources are 
expended.”). 
For these reasons, Ms. Kincaid-Hicks has not met the heavy burden of establishing 
why futility justified her failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. Therefore, her 
petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is DENIED (Doc. 1) and t his cause of Page ID
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action is DISMISSED with prejudice . The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter 
judgment accordingly. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 DATED: May 7, 2026 
 
 MARK A. BEATTY 
 United States Magistrate Judge Page ID
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