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govinfo:USCOURTS-pawd-2_25-cv-00623-0

U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania · 2026-05-07

· GavelSight synced 2026-09-06 03:50:54

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
 
 v. 
 
MONROE BLANKS, III, 
 
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No. 2:15-cr-146 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
MONROE BLANKS, III, 
 
 Petitioner , 
 
 v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
 Respondent. 
 
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No. 2:25-cv-623 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Robert J. Colville, United States District Judge 
 Before the Court are the following motions filed by Defendant/Petitioner Monroe Blanks, 
III: (1) a Motion for Sentence Reduction Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 821 
(“Amendment 821 Motion # 1”) (ECF No. 70 at 2:15- cr-146); (2) a Motion to Vacate Sentence 
(“Motion to Vacate”) (ECF No. 72 at 2:15-cr-146 and ECF No. 1 at 2:25-cv-623);1 and (3) a Pro 
 
1 For ease of reference, and specifically because each of Mr. Blanks’s motions at issue herein are filed at the criminal 
docket, the Court will only cite to the documents filed in Mr. Blanks’s criminal case throughout the rest of this 
Memorandum Opinion. 

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Se Motion for Order Regarding Amendment 821 and Reduction in Status Points (“Amendment 
821 Motion # 2”) (ECF No. 81). The Government has filed Responses (ECF Nos. 78; 79; and 83) 
in opposition to the pending motions, and Mr. Blanks has filed Replies (ECF Nos. 80 and 84) in 
support of his motions. The Court considers the motions at issue to have been fully briefed and 
ripe for disposition. 
I. Background 
On December 17, 2015, Mr. Blanks pled guilty to the one-count Indictment in this matter, 
which charged him with possession of a firearm and/or ammunition by a convicted felon in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) , and further pled guilty to the one -count Information in the 
matter at case no. 2:15 -263, which charged him with conspiracy to tamper with a witness in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k) . Mr. Blanks pled guilty in each of his cases pursuant to a Rule 
11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement. ECF No. 39 at ¶ 8. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Mr. Blanks 
stipulated that an appropriate sentence would include, inter alia, a term of imprisonment of 188 
months in each case, to be served concurrently, with concurrent five -year terms of supervised 
release to follow. Id . On April 5, 2016, Judge Ambrose imposed the parties’ agreed- upon 
sentence. ECF No. 53. Mr. Blanks did not file a direct appeal of his conviction in this matter or 
of the sentence imposed. 
II. Discussion 
A. Motion for Sentence Reduction Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and 
Amendment 821 (ECF No. 70) & Pro Se Motion for Order Regarding Amendment 
821 and Reduction in Status Points (ECF No. 81) 
 
By way of Amendment 821 Motion # 1 and Amendment 821 Motion # 2 (collectively, the 
“Amendment 821 Motions”), Mr. Blanks seeks materially similar relief on the same bases, and 
 
 

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these motions can be addressed in tandem for that reason. Mr. Blanks seeks relief under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2), which provides that a Court may, after considering the Section 3553(a) factors, 
reduce a term of imprisonment “ in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing 
Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o) .” In seeking relief, Mr. Blanks relies on the “status 
point” provision of Amendment 821, which was passed in November of 2023. The United States 
District Court for the District of Nevada has aptly summarized the “status point” provision of 
Amendment 821, as follows: 
“Part A of Amendment 821 limits the overall criminal history impact of ‘status 
points’ . . . under § 4A1.1 (Criminal History Category).” Specifically, regarding 
“status points,” under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1, a defendant who committed the instant 
offense “while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, 
supervised r elease, imprisonment, work release, or escape status,” previously 
received two additional criminal history points. 
 
Amendment 821 amends § 4A1.1 to: (1) eliminate such status points for any 
defendant who otherwise has six or fewer criminal history points; and (2) apply one 
point, instead of two, for defendants who otherwise present seven or more criminal 
history points. 
 
United States v. Nguyen, No. 203CR00158KJDPAL, 2024 WL 1701903, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 18, 
2024). 
Quite simply, Mr. Blanks is not entitled to relief because his sentence was not based on a 
guideline range that was subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission due to the passage 
of Amendment 821, and he is thus not eligible for relief under the “status point” provision of 
Amendment 821. Mr. Blanks’s criminal history category of VI is unchanged by the application of 
Amendment 821 because his criminal convictions described in the Presentence Investigation 
Report result in a subtotal criminal history score of 13. At sentencing, Mr. Blanks received two 
“status points” because he committed the offense of conviction while under a “criminal justice 

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sentence,” and his total criminal history score at sentencing was, accordingly, 15. Under 
Amendment 821, he would receive one status point due to his 13 criminal history points, for a total 
score of 14 and a category of VI .2 3 The effect of Amendment 821 is to reduce Mr. Blanks’s 
criminal history score from 15 to 14, but it, quite simply, has no effect on the Guideline range of 
180 months to 210 months’ imprisonment. Accordingly, Mr. Blanks is not entitled to relief under 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), and the Amendment 821 Motions will be denied.4 
B. Motion to Vacate Sentence (ECF No. 72) 
Initially, Mr. Blanks relies on Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) in 
arguing that he is entitled to the relief he seeks by way of the Motion to Vacate. Following review 
of the Motion to Vacate when it was originally filed, the Court interpreted the motion as a petition 
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and the Court subsequently issued a Miller Notice and Order 
(ECF No. 74). Mr. Blanks responded to the Court’s Miller Notice and Order and did not challenge 
the Court’s interpretation, and instead responded that he would like the Motion to Vacate to be 
ruled on as filed. 
 By way of the Motion to Vacate , Mr. B lanks clearly seeks to invalidate his criminal 
conviction in this matter, and his avenue for such relief, if any, is a habeas petition under Section 
 
2 Mr. Blanks asserts in Amendment 821 Motion # 2 that his criminal history score should be reduced from 15 to 13. 
That is incorrect, and, in any event, irrelevant. Mr. Blanks’s 13 criminal history points alone, i.e. , before adding any 
additional points, would have resulted in a criminal history category of VI. Amendment 821 would have no impact 
on his Guideline range for a sentence of imprisonment. 
 
3 The Court hereby recognizes and acknowledges that retroactive app lication of Amendment 821 would result in a 
reduction of Mr. Blanks’s total criminal history score from 15 to 14. 
 
4 In Amendment 821 Motion # 1, Mr. Blanks offers statements respecting his post -sentencing rehabilitation, 
specifically for the Court’s consideration of the Section 3553(a) factors had Mr. Blanks been eligible for possible 
relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He is not, and the Section 3553(a) factors need not be considered. In the interest 
of completeness, the Court further notes that “ rehabilitation of the defendant is not, by itself, an extraordinary and 
compelling reason” that could warrant a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). 
 

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2255, not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 See United States v. Schmutzler , No. 1:CR-13-
0065, 2017 WL 930455, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2017) (“While Rule 60(b) has an ‘unquestionably 
valid role to play in habeas c ases,’ a motion under Rule 60(b) will be treated as a 2255 motion if 
in substance it presents a claim for relief from the criminal judgment.” (quoting Gonzalez v. 
Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 534 (2005))). A motion purportedly filed under Rule 60(b) will be 
interpreted as a Section 2255 motion “if the Rule 60(b) motion (1) presents a new claim for relief 
from the criminal judgment or (2) presents a claim that the court ’s resolution of a previous claim 
in section 2255 proceedings attacking the criminal judgment was erroneous.” Id. That is the case 
in the instant matter , and the Court will continue to construe the Motion to Vacate as a Section 
2255 motion. 
 By way of the Motion to Vacate, Mr. Blanks asserts that his conviction in this matter is 
invalid following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 
225 (2019). In response to the Motion to Vacate, the Government argues that the Motion, whether 
pursued under Rule 60(b) or Section 2255, should be denied or dismissed as untim ely. ECF No. 
78 at 1. 
A prisoner in federal custody may move to vacate his or her sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 
2255 if such “sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). As a collateral challenge, a motion under § 2255 is “reviewed much less 
favorably than a direct appeal of the sentence.” United States v. Travillion, 759 F.3d 281, 288 (3d 
Cir. 2014). Section 2255 relief “is available only when ‘the claimed error of law was a 
fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, and . . . present[s] 
exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ . . . is apparent.’” 
 
5 The Court agrees with the Government that, in any event, the Motion to Vacate would be untimely under Rule 60(b). 

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Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974)). The Supreme Court has explained 
that “[h]abeas review is an extraordinary remedy and ‘will not be allowed to do service for an 
appeal.’” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (quoting Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354 
(1994)). 
A district court must order an evidentiary hearing in a federal habeas case if a defendant’s 
§ 2255 allegations raise an issue of material fact. United States v. Biberfeld, 957 F.2d 98, 102 (3d 
Cir. 1992). But, if there is “no legally cognizable claim or the factual matters raised by the motion 
may be susceptible of resolution through the district judge’s review of the motion and records in 
the case,” the motion may be decided without a hearing. United States v. Costanzo, 625 F.2d 465, 
470 (3d Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Tolliver , 800 F.3d 138, 140- 41 (3d Cir. 2015). If a 
hearing is not held, the district judge must accept the defendant’s allegations as true “unless they 
are clearly frivolous on the basis of the existing record.” Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Bradshaw, 726 
F.2d 115, 117 (3d Cir. 1984). Similarly, “vague and conclusory allegations contained in a § 2255 
petition may be disposed of without further investigation by the District Court.” United States v. 
Thomas, 221 F.3d 430, 437 (3d Cir. 2000). 
With respect to timeliness, Section 2255 explains as follows: 
(f) A 1 -year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The 
limitation period shall run from the latest of— 
 
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; 
 
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by 
governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making 
a motion by such governmental action; 
 
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by 
the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the 
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 
collateral review; or 

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(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims 
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 
diligence. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). 
 The Court agrees with the Government that the Motion to Vacate is plainly untimely. The 
Motion to Vacate was filed more than nine years after Judge Ambrose imposed Mr. Blanks’s 
sentence in this matter, and nearly six years after the Supreme Court issued its Opinion in Rehaif. 
Section 2255(f)(1) and (2) are clearly inapplicable in this matter. Rehaif was decided in June of 
2019, and Mr. Blanks dated his Motion to Vacate “ April 28, 2025,” which means that it is dated 
nearly five years after the one -year limitations period expired under Section 2255(f)(3). Finally, 
as the Government correctly notes, “a defendant ’s discovery or awareness of a new legal theory 
does not constitute a fact for purposes of [the] exception [provided under Section 2255(f)(4)].” 
United States v. Brolin, No. CR 20- 07, 2025 WL 509413, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2025) . The 
Motion to Vacate is thus untimely under each of the four options provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). 
 To the extent that Mr. Blanks intends to rely on equitable tolling to save his untimely 
Motion to Vacate , the Motion to Vacate itself establishes that there is simply no basis for the 
application of tolling. A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling on a motion under Section 2255 
“only if he shows ‘ (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some 
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Fla., 560 
U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). “Equitable tolling 
is not available where the late filing is due to a movant’ s excusable neglect. ” Faines v. United 
States, 808 F. Supp. 2d 708, 712 (D. Del. 2011). 
It defies credulity to even entertain an assertion that Mr. Blanks was reasonably diligent in 
pursuing his ri ghts where he waited more than four years after the running of the statute of 

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limitations to raise any issue associated with Rehaif .6 He further cannot establish that his former 
trial counsel’s failure to file an emergency motion on his behalf after the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Rehaif is an “extraordinary circumstance ” that somehow prevented Mr. Blanks himself from 
filing a motion based on Rehaif in a timely manner. Trial counsel’s role in this matter concluded 
after the time for filing an appeal passed with no appeal being filed, i.e., about three years before 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif . Further, “ [t]here is no absolute constitutional right to 
counsel in federal habeas corpus proceedings .” Austin v. Ferguson, No. 17- CV-981, 2017 WL 
11464315, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2017) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 
(1991)). Accordingly, Mr. Blanks’s failure to take any action is attributable only to Mr. Blanks 
himself, not an “extraordinary circumstance” that prevented him from taking action. At best, this 
case involves, inarguably, inexcusable neglect. Equitable tolling does not apply. 
To the extent that Mr. Blanks asserts that he can establish “actual innocence” such that 
tolling of the statute of limitations is appropriate, the Court notes that “[a]ctual innocence means 
‘factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.’” United States v. Plante , No. 1:17-CR-00013-
WAL-EAH, 2025 WL 4666040, at *7 (D.V.I. Sept. 9, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 
No. 1:17-CR-0013, 2026 WL 837653 (D.V.I. Mar. 26, 2026) (quoting Bousley v. United States , 
523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998)). “According to Rehaif, to secure a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922, 
the Government must establish that a defendant both ‘knew he possess ed a firearm and that he 
knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.’” United 
States v. Howard, No. CR 13- 135, 2021 WL 2401392, at *3 (W.D. Pa. June 11, 2021) (quoting 
 
6 His Reply seemingly indicates that he became aware of the Rehaif decision while incarcerated, though it is unclear 
exactly when, but failed to act within the requisite timeframe because he was unaware of the deadline established by 
the law for the filing of a Section 2255 motion. While the Court understands that Mr. Blanks is not trained in the law, 
“[i]gnorance of the law does not justify equitable tolling of a statute of limitations.” Fadayiro v. United States, 30 F. 
Supp. 2d 772, 781 (D.N.J. 1998). 

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Rehaif, 588 U.S. at 227)). To satisfy the second element for a § 922(g)(1) offense, the Government 
must prove that the defendant knew, at the time that he possessed the firearm, that he had a prior 
felony conviction, i.e., not that his status as a felon precluded him from firearm possession. See 
id.; see also United States v. Bowens, 938 F.3d 790, 797 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Rehaif did not graft onto 
§ 922(g) an ignorance-of-the-law defense by which every defendant could escape conviction if he 
was unaware of this provision of the United States Code.”). 
Mr. Blanks’s Motion to Vacate fails because, while Mr. Blanks initially cites Rehaif for its 
proper holding, he immediately thereafter argues that he should have been instructed at the change 
of plea hearing that the Government was required to prove that he knowingly possessed a firearm 
and “that he knew it was illegal.” ECF No. 72 at 3 (emphasis added). This is exactly the type of 
“ignorance-of-the-law” argument that district and appellate courts around the country have roundly 
rejected following the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif. 
Mr. Blanks has not asserted or claimed that he was somehow unaware of the existence of 
his four prior predicate felony convictions at the time he possessed the firearm and ammunition at 
issue in this case. The Indictment (ECF No. 4) and Presentence Investigation Report (ECF No. 
38) plainly lay out the predicate convictions, each of which occurred within nine years of the 
offense conduct at issue in this matter and the most recent of which occurred within less than three 
years of the conduct that resulted in Mr. Blanks’s conviction herein. In entering a guilty plea, Mr. 
Blanks stipulated to being a convicted felon.
7 It again defies credulity that Mr. Blanks could 
establish actual innocence relying on Rehaif , as he advance s no argument or claim that could 
support the same , and rather just relies on conclusory assertions of his “actual” and “factual” 
innocence. Mr. Blanks’s Motion to Vacate is time -barred, and any argument he advances to the 
 
7 He, obviously, also stipulated to possessing a firearm and ammunition. 

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contrary is frivolous and meritl ess. The Motion to Vacate turns exclusively on an issue of law, 
and no evidentiary hearing is warranted. The Motion to Vacate will be denied. 
III. Conclusion 
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will deny each of the motions at issue herein. 
An appropriate Order of Court follows. The Court finds that, because jurists of reason would not 
find it debatable whether Mr. Blanks’s motions should be denied, Mr. Blanks is not entitled to the 
issuance of a certificate of appealability. The denial of a certificate of appealability does not 
prevent Mr. Blanks from appealing the order denying his petition so long as he seeks, and obtains, 
a certificate of appealability, from the Court of Appeals. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
/s/Robert J. Colville_______ 
Robert J. Colville 
United States District Judge 
 
DATED: May 7, 2026 
 
cc: All counsel of record 
 
 Monroe Blanks, III 
35776-068 
Fort Dix 
Federal Correctional Institution 
P.O. Box 2000 
Joint Base MDL, NJ 08640 

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