govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-00794-0

1 
 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
MAHABAD MOHAMMED ISMAEL, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
VIRAJ LEBAILLY, Acting Deputy 
Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy 
in Turkey, et al. 
 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. 25-794 (EGS) 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
 Plaintiff Mahabad Mohammed Ismael (“Ms. Ismael”) seeks 
relief under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 
555(b), 706(1); and the Mandamus Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, and 
requests that the Court compel Defendants Viraj Lebailly, Acting 
Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Turkey; and Marco 
Rubio, Secretary of the U.S. Department of State (collectively, 
“Defendants”) to process and adjudicate her visa application. 
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
(“Mot.”). See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 5.
1 Ms. Ismael opposes the 
Motion, see Opp’n, ECF No. 6; and Defendants have filed a Reply, 
see Reply, ECF No. 7. Upon careful consideration of the Motion, 
Opposition, and Reply thereto; the applicable law; and for the 
 
1 When citing electronic filings throughout this opinion, the 
Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the original page 
number of the filed document. 

 2 
 
reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss. 
I. Background 
A. Statutory and Regulatory 
 The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) allows a U.S. 
citizen or lawful permanent resident to apply for lawful 
permanent resident status for an immediate relative by filing a 
Petition for Alien Resident (I-130). See 8 U.S.C. § 1154; 8 
C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1). Once approved by the U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Service (“USCIS”), the petition is sent to the State 
Department’s National Visa Center (“NVC”), at which time the 
applicant must submit another application to the NVC and wait 
for an interview with a consular officer. 8 C.F.R. §§ 42.61–.62; 
204.2(a)(3). At the end of the interview, “the consular officer 
must [either] issue [or] refuse the visa.” Id. § 42.81(a). If 
the officer determines that they do not have sufficient 
information at the end of the interview to determine if the 
application should be granted or denied, pursuant to Section 
221(g) of the INA, they may “refuse” the application pending 
further administrative processing. U.S. Dep't of State, 
Administrative Processing Information;
2 see 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g). 
“Administrative processing generally means that additional 
information is needed before a consular officer can determine 
 
2 Available at https://perma.cc/44NK-RVZE. 

 3 
 
whether an applicant is qualified for the visa for which she has 
applied.” Giliana v. Blinken, 596 F. Supp. 3d 13, 18 (D.D.C. 
2022). 
B. Factual 
The following facts are drawn from the complaint, which the 
Court assumes are true for the purposes of deciding this motion 
and construes in Ms. Ismael’s favor. See Banneker Ventures, LLC 
v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
In March 2007,
3 Ms. Ismael’s brother, Bashdar Hamad, filed 
an I-130 visa petition with USCIS for her, and of which her 
three children are derivative beneficiaries. Compl., ECF No. 1 
¶¶ 1, 2, 16. USCIS approved the petition, but “[Ms. Ismael’s] 
and her family’s visa petitions remain pending since the 
petitions were filed in 2007.” Id. ¶ 3. Ms. Ismael’s children 
are age 10, 7, and 2. Id. ¶ 7. Mr. Hamad’s “goal was to obtain 
lawful permanent resident status” for Ms. Ismael and her 
children so that they could join him in the United States. Id. ¶ 
17. 
 
3 Paragraph two of the Complaint alleges that the visa petition 
was filed in March 2010. See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 2. The 
subsequent allegations regarding the petition state that it was 
filed in 2007. See id. ¶¶ 3, 16. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Opp’n”) states 
that the petition was filed in March 2007. See Opp’n, ECF No. 6 
at 13. The Court therefore assumes that Plaintiff’s allegation 
that the petition was filed in March 2010 is a typographical 
error. 

 4 
 
On August 23, 2023, Ms. Ismael and her children were 
interviewed at the U.S. Embassy in Turkey in connection with 
their visa application. Id. ¶ 18. Ms. Ismael and her children 
“responded truthfully to all questions and provided all 
requested information,” but their visa application was refused 
and “placed in administrative processing” pursuant to INA § 
221(g).4 Id. ¶¶ 18, 19. That same day, Ms. Ismael was asked to 
“submit the supplemental questions for visa applicants form (DS-
5535),” which she “promptly submitted in September 2023.” Id. ¶ 
19; Exhibit B to Compl. 
On July 31, 2024, Ms. Ismael “received an email from the 
U.S. Embassy in Turkey confirming that the administrative 
processing of their applications was completed.” Compl., ECF No. 
1 ¶ 21. She was requested to “resubmit their DS-260 form and 
obtain new medical examinations for herself and her children.” 
Id.; Exhibit C to Compl. On September 18, 2024, Ms. Ismael 
submitted the requested documents. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 21. 
On October 4, 2024, the U.S. Embassy in Turkey “advised 
[Ms. Ismael] that there were missing documents that they 
required to process the applications,” and requested that Ms. 
Ismael submit the “Joint Sponsor information, Joint Sponsor 
Documents: I-864, Affidavit of Support, IRS transcript 2023 and 
a copy of joint sponsor’s U.S. passport or green card, and a 
 
4 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g). 

 5 
 
[sic] IRS transcript for the most recent year.” Id. ¶ 22; 
Exhibit D to Compl. That same month, Ms. Ismael submitted the 
requested documents. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 22. 
Ms. Ismael and her family have “inquired as to the status 
of these visa applications on numerous occasions and received no 
meaningful responses,” despite her compliance with multiple 
follow-up requests for more information. Id. ¶ 23. 
Ms. Ismael states that “Defendants’ failure to adjudicate 
Plaintiff’s I-130 based [sic] visa applications have put an 
indefinite hold [on] the reunification of Plaintiff and her 
brother, and caused significant personal, financial, and 
emotional hardship.” Id. ¶ 6. Ms. Ismael has been separated from 
her brother, Mr. Hamad, since 2007. Id. ¶ 7. Her children are 
“experiencing ongoing challenges related to their safety and 
well-being”—Ms. Ismael and her husband have separated “due to 
her ties to the U.S. and her efforts to relocate,” and she and 
her children “have been isolated within their community and 
religious circles” since the separation, “facing ongoing 
discrimination.” Id. “Due to persistent bullying, [Ms. Ismael’s 
children] have stopped attending school and now avoid social 
interactions out of fear of harassment.” Id. 
Ms. Ismael’s mother, who resides in the U.S. with her son, 
has become “increasingly frail” and suffers from various 
ailments. Id. ¶ 8. Mr. Hamad has “been unable to maintain 

 6 
 
employment due to the time required to assist her with daily 
activities.” Id. Ms. Ismael had planned to help care for their 
mother, and she “hoped to reunite with her mother and allow [her 
mother] to spend time with her grandchildren, whom she has never 
met.” Id. 
Mr. Hamad had been “assisting with Plaintiff’s living 
expenses in Iraq until they attended an interview in Turkey,” 
but because he lost his job, he is “now reliant on his wife in 
the U.S. to sustain their household,” and the support he gives 
his sister is “inconsistent and not enough to cover their 
needs.” Id. ¶ 9. Ms. Ismael sold their home, car, and other 
belongings to fund their move to the United States, but “due to 
the delay in their case,” they were “forced to return to Iraq 
with no home to go back to.” Id. Ms. Ismael states that “the 
delay has prolonged their hardship, leaving [her] and her family 
without stability or a path forward.” Id. 
C. Procedural 
On March 18, 2025, Ms. Ismael filed her Complaint. Compl., 
ECF No. 1. Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on May 19, 
2025. See Mot., ECF No. 5. Ms. Ismael filed her Opposition on 
June 2, 2025, see Opp’n, ECF No. 6; and Defendants filed their 
Reply on June 9, 2025, see Reply, ECF No. 7. On September 9, 
2025, Ms. Ismael filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority. See 

 7 
 
Notice, ECF No. 8. The motion is ripe and ready for the Court’s 
adjudication. 
II. Legal Standard 5 
 A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning 
v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). To survive a 
12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal (“Iqbal”), 556 U.S. 
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly (“Twombly”), 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when 
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 
draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 
the misconduct alleged.” Id. The standard does not amount to a 
“probability requirement,” but it does require more than a 
“sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
When evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion, the court “may consider 
only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either 
attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of 
 
5 Defendants state that they move to dismiss pursuant to Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Mot., ECF No 5 
at 7. However, Defendants make no argument in support of 
dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). 

 8 
 
which [courts] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis 
Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
Furthermore, the court “must accept as true all of the factual 
allegations contained in the complaint.” Atherton v. D.C. Off. 
of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotations omitted). The court must also give the plaintiff the 
“benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts 
alleged.” Id. at 677 (internal quotations omitted). However, the 
court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched 
as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 
(1986). And “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 
action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are not 
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 
678. 
III. Analysis 
 
A. Reasonableness of the Delay 
 
“The central question in evaluating a claim of unreasonable 
delay is whether the agency’s delay is so egregious as to 
warrant mandamus.” In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 855 
(D.C. Cir. 2008). “To state a claim for unreasonable delay, 
Plaintiffs must first allege that the agency ‘failed to take a 
discrete agency action that it is required to take,’” Da Costa 
v. Immigr. Inv. Program Off., 80 F.4th 330, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2023) 
(quoting Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 

 9 
 
(2004)) (emphasis omitted); “and, second, that the delay was 
unreasonable, id. (citing Am. Anti-Vivisection Soc'y v. U.S. 
Dep't of Agric., 946 F.3d 615, 621 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Ms. 
Ismael’s claims under the APA and the Mandamus Act share this 
standard for obtaining relief. See Viet. Veterans of Am. v. 
Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654, 659 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
1. Discrete Agency Action 
Because, as explained below, the Court concludes that Ms. 
Ismael has failed to state a claim for unreasonable delay, the 
Court takes the approach of other Judges in this District and 
assumes, without deciding, that there is a clear, non-
discretionary duty for Defendants to adjudicate the 
applications. See Baygan v. Blinken, Civil Action No. 23-2840, 
2024 WL 3723714, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2024) (citing Rostamnia 
v. Blinken, Civ. A. No. 23-1638 (RDM), 2024 WL 1328462, at *5 
(D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2024)). 
The Court therefore need not address Defendants’ argument 
that there is no discrete agency action that a consular official 
is required to take. Mot., ECF No. 5 at 11-15. In making this 
argument, Defendants rely heavily on Karimova v. Abate, No. 23-
5178, 2024 WL 3517852 (D.C. Cir. July 24, 2024), an unpublished 
opinion where the court held that under Section 555(b) of the 
APA, once the plaintiff’s visa is “refused,” a final decision 
about the visa has been made, and officers do not have a clear, 

 10 
 
legal duty to act further on these applications. Karimova, 2024 
WL 3517852, at *2–6.6 This holding has called into question a 
long line of cases where “[j]udges on this court have 
consistently held that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability 
does not apply to review of visa applications that have been 
refused under Section 221(g), finding that such refusal is not a 
final agency action.” Shoaie v. Blinken, No. 1:24-cv-01513 
(GMH), 2024 WL 4697732, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2024) (collecting 
cases). However, because it is an unpublished opinion, the 
extent to which it is precedential is not clear. In any event, 
because the Court assumes a non-discretionary duty, it need not 
address the applicability of Karimova here. 
2. The Delay Is Not Unreasonable 
The reasonableness of the delay is analyzed using the 
“TRAC” factors: 
(1) The time agencies take to make 
decisions must be governed by a rule of 
reason; 
 
 
6 Two rules of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) address the precedential weight of 
unpublished opinions. D.C. Cir. R. 32.1(b)(1)(B) states that 
“[a]ll unpublished orders or judgments of this court, including 
explanatory memoranda . . . entered on or after January 1, 2002, 
may be cited as precedent.” D.C. Cir. R. 36(e)(2) states that 
“[w]hile unpublished dispositions may be cited to the court in 
accordance with . . . Circuit Rule 32.1(b)(1), a panel's 
decision to issue an unpublished disposition means that the 
panel sees no precedential value in that disposition.” 
 

 11 
 
(2) Where Congress has provided a timetable 
or other indication of the speed with which 
it expects the agency to proceed in the 
enabling statute, that statutory scheme may 
supply content for this rule of reason; 
 
(3) Delays that might be reasonable in the 
sphere of economic regulation are less 
tolerable when human health and welfare are 
at stake; 
 
(4) The court should consider the effect of 
expediting delayed action on agency 
activities of a higher or competing 
priority; 
 
(5) The court should also take into account 
the nature and extent of the interests 
prejudiced by delay; and 
 
(6) The court need not find any impropriety 
lurking behind agency lassitude in order to 
hold that agency is unreasonably delayed. 
 
Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr. v. FCC (“TRAC”), 750 F.2d 70, 80 
(D.C. Cir. 1984). The first and fourth factors are the most 
important ones when a court considers a challenge in the visa 
context. Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 340. For the reasons explained 
below, the Court concludes that Ms. Ismael has failed to state a 
claim for unreasonable delay. As a preliminary matter, Ms. 
Ismael argues that at the motion to dismiss stage, it is 
premature to engage in an analysis of the TRAC factors. Opp’n, 
ECF No. 6 at 11. Defendants respond that “Plaintiff has failed 
to state a claim for unreasonable delay because any delay here 
is not unreasonable as a matter of law,” Mot., ECF No. 5 at 18; 
and that “it is typical for judges in this District to evaluate 

 12 
 
at the threshold whether a complaint has pled sufficient facts 
to make a claim of unreasonable delay plausible” through a full 
analysis of the TRAC factors, Reply, ECF No. 7 at 19. 
 “It is the majority view in this district that 
‘application of the TRAC factors is appropriate at the motion-
to-dismiss stage when the facts alleged do not support a 
plausible claim of unreasonable delay.’” Hajizadeh v. Blinken, 
Civil Action No. 23-1766, 2024 WL 3638336, at *4 n.4 (D.D.C. 
Aug. 2, 2024) (citing Bega v. Jaddou, No. 22-CV-2171, 2022 WL 
17403123, at *4 n.2 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2022)). The Court concludes 
that, for the reasons explained below, the complaint and 
materials here contain sufficient materials to evaluate the TRAC 
factors. 
a. TRAC Factors One and Two 
Ms. Ismael argues that the “visa application has remained 
unresolved for over fifteen years since the initial filing.” 
Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 31.
7 The Complaint alleges that the visa 
petition was filed with USCIS in March 2007, see Compl., ECF No. 
1 ¶ 16; and that it was approved by USCIS although the date of 
approval is not alleged, id. ¶ 3. The Complaint further alleges 
that the U.S. Embassy in Turkey interviewed Plaintiff and her 
children on August 29, 2023, see id. ¶ 18; that she provided the 
 
7 The Court observes that if the initial filing was March 2007, 
this occurred nineteen years ago, not fifteen. 

 13 
 
responses to supplemental questions in September 2023, see id. ¶ 
19; and that she responded to additional requests from the 
embassy on September 18, 2004, see id. ¶ 21; and in October 
2024, see id. ¶ 22. 
“Courts generally measure the delay from the date of the 
last governmental action.” Al Saedi v. LeBailly, Civil Action 
No. 24-1401, 2025 WL 485410, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2025). Here, 
that is October 2024, when the Embassy last contacted Ms. Ismael 
to request missing documentation. Ms. Ismael argues that the 
delay should be measured from 2007 based on the allegation that 
“Plaintiff’s and her family’s visa applications remain pending 
since the petitions were filed in 2007.” Compl, ECF No. 1 ¶ 3; 
see also Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 30. The Complaint alleges that Ms. 
Ismael’s children are age 10, 7, and 2, id. ¶ 7; and so in 2007, 
they had not yet been born. Ms. Ismael alleges no facts 
regarding the status of the application from 2007 until the 
August 2023 interview, nor has she provided any legal argument 
regarding how her children’s visa applications relate to her 
2007 petition filed before they were born. For all these 
reasons, the Court will measure the delay from October 2024. 
Accordingly, the delay was approximately five months when Ms. 
Ismael filed her Complaint in March 2025, and will have been 
approximately nineteen months in May 2026. 

 14 
 
“[T]he first and second factors ask whether a rule of 
reason governs the agency response time and whether 
Congress, by statute[8], indicated an expected timetable for 
the response time.” Baygan, 2024 WL 3723714, at *6. “Absent a 
congressionally supplied yardstick [as is the case here], courts 
typically turn to case law as a guide” to determine 
whether a delay is reasonable. Sarlak v. Pompeo, Civ. A. No. 20-
0035 (BAH), 2020 WL 3082018, at *6 (D.D.C. June 10, 2020). “In 
assessing whether an agency follows a rule of reason, we 
evaluate the length of the delay in light of ‘the complexity of 
the task at hand, the significance and permanence of the 
outcome, and the resources available to the agency.’” Da Costa, 
80 F.4th at 340 (quoting Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. 
v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 
This factor favors Defendants because “processing visas 
takes a baseline amount of time,” Khazaei v. Blinken, Civil 
Action No. 23-1419, 2023 WL 6065095, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 
2023); and because of the permanence of the outcome. The 
Complaint alleges that Ms. Ismael’s brother seeks “lawful 
permanent resident status for his sister” and her children. 
 
8 Ms. Ismael points to 8 U.S.C. 1571(b) and the suggested 
benchmark of 180 days for processing immigration benefit 
applications, but she acknowledges that this provision does not 
constitute a congressionally imposed deadline. Opp’n, ECF No. 6 
at 30-31. Accordingly, there is no statutory timetable and so 
this factor is inapplicable. 

 15 
 
Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 17. “District courts have generally found 
that immigration delays in excess of five, six, [or] seven years 
are unreasonable, while those between three to five years are 
often not unreasonable.” Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, 
“[c]ourts in this District consistently have held that two or 
three years does not constitute an unreasonable delay.” Tekle v. 
Blinken, Civ. A. No. 21-1655 (APM), 2022 WL 1288437, at *3 
(D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2022) (collecting cases). The alleged delay in 
this case—five months at the time of filing and nineteen months 
as of May 2026—is therefore not unreasonable. 
b. TRAC Factors Three and Five 
 The third and fifth factors weigh in favor of Ms. Ismael. 
Ms. Ismael alleges personal, financial, and emotional hardship 
as a result of the delay in processing her visa application. 
Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 6. Ms. Ismael points to her separation from 
her brother and mother and her children’s separation from their 
uncle and grandmother. Id. ¶¶ 7, 8. The persistent bullying of 
her children due to their connection to the U.S. has led them to 
stop attending school and avoid social interactions. Id. 
Furthermore, Ms. Ismael’s mother—who lives in the U.S. and is 
cared for by her brother—suffers from mental and physical health 
conditions necessitating a caregiver. Id. ¶ 8. Ms. Ismael’s 
brother’s need to provide her care resulted in him losing his 
job, which resulted in financial hardship to Ms. Ismael because 

 16 
 
his ability to send money to them is inconsistent and not enough 
to cover their living expenses. Id. ¶ 9. 
Defendants contend that this factor weighs in favor of them 
because “[p]rioritizing Plaintiff’s case will simply benefit 
Plaintiff to the detriment of other noncitizens, who may have 
experienced the same or worse impacts from a delay.” Mot., ECF. 
No. 5 at 23-24. “However, courts evaluate the third and fifth 
factors in relation to the individualized harm suffered by the 
plaintiff in question.” Baygan, 2024 WL 3723714, at *8. 
c. TRAC Factor Four 
The fourth factor weighs in favor of Defendants. “When 
analyzing this factor, we ‘consider the effect of expediting 
delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing 
priority.’” Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 343 (quoting TRAC, 750 F.2d at 
80). “As many courts have recognized, ordering an agency to 
expedite the review of a particular visa application results in 
line-jumping and ultimately delays the final adjudication of the 
applications that were skipped.” Meyou v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 
Civil Action No. 21-2806, 2022 WL 1556344, at *4 (D.D.C. May 17, 
2022). “This factor often carries significant weight.” Tate v. 
Pompeo, 513 F. Supp. 3d 132, 149 (D.D.C. 2021). 
Ms. Ismael’s Complaint contains no allegations about 
whether there is a visa processing backlog. Nor have Defendants 
provided any information about visa processing backlogs. 

 17 
 
However, granting relief to Ms. Ismael “would necessarily come 
at the expense of other similarly situated applicants.” Da 
Costa, 80 F.4th at 344. Indeed, Ms. Ismael acknowledges that 
“[g]enerally, Courts, including within this District, have 
‘refused to grant relief “where ‘a judicial order putting [the 
petitioner] at the head of the queue [would] simply move[ ] all 
others back one space and produce[ ] no net gain.’” Opp’n, ECF 
No. 6 at 31 (quoting Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, 336 F.3d 
at 1100 (alterations in original) (quoting In re Barr Lab'ys, 
Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991))). Ms. Ismael claims 
that it is not her intention to request this 
Court nor the Defendants to place her case 
before other similarly situated applicants 
facing similar unreasonable delays in the 
adjudication of their visa applications . . 
. [rather] she merely requests that her 
application, which has been placed in 
administrative processing status for an 
indeterminate period of time, be reviewed 
and a final decision rendered as soon as 
practicable. 
 
Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 31. But that is exactly what she requests. 
In her Complaint, she requests that the Court enter an order 
mandating that Defendants process the applications within 15 
days or as soon as reasonably practicable. Compl., ECF No. 1 at 
8-9. In the Proposed Order provided with her Opposition brief, 
she asks the Court to compel Defendants to issue a final 
decision within 30 days of the Court’s decision. See Proposed 

 18 
 
Order, ECF No. 6-2. Were the Court to grant her the relief she 
seeks, her case would necessarily be moved in front of others. 
Finally, Ms. Ismael’s Complaint contains no allegations 
supporting her argument that she does not intend to request that 
her case be put ahead of others in the queue. Contrast Ahmed v. 
Blinken, 759. F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2024) (noting that 
plaintiff sufficiently alleged that she would not be put at the 
head of the queue, resulting in all others being one step back, 
if the Court were to order Defendants to make a decision on her 
application). 
d. TRAC Factor Six 
Ms. Ismael does not allege that the delay is the result of 
any impropriety, nor does she request discovery on the issue. 
See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. “As TRAC directs ... the lack 
of plausible allegations of impropriety does not weigh against 
[Plaintiff].” Fakhimi v. Dep't of State, No. 23-CV-1127, 2023 WL 
6976073, at *11 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2023). Accordingly, the sixth 
factor is neutral. 
In sum, two of the factors weigh in favor of Ms. Ismael, 
two weigh in favor of Defendants, one is inapplicable, and one 
is neutral. Since the two most important factors—whether the 
delay is reasonable and the effect of expediting delayed action 
on agency activities of a higher or competing priority—weigh in 
Defendants’ favor, the Court concludes that Ms. Ismael has 

 19 
 
failed to state a claim of unreasonable delay. She has therefore 
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
B. Consular Non-Reviewability 
 
Defendants also argue that Ms. Ismael’s claims fail under the 
Consular Non-Reviewability doctrine. Mot., ECF No. 5 at 15-18. 
Under this doctrine, a consular official's decision to issue or 
withhold a visa is shielded from judicial review, unless 
Congress says otherwise. Baan Reo Thai Rest. v. Pompeo, 985 F.3d 
1020, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2021). Importantly, the doctrine is not 
jurisdictional. Dep’t of State v. Muñoz, 602 U.S. 899, 907 n.4 
(2024). Defendants argue that Karimova forecloses Ms. Ismael’s 
claim. Mot., ECF No. 5 at 17. Because the doctrine is not 
jurisdictional, however, courts may “assume without deciding” 
that a plaintiff's “claims are reviewable[ ] notwithstanding 
consular nonreviewability.” Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 683 
(2018). Accordingly, “[t]he Court need not determine the extent 
to which Karimova requires it to apply the consular 
nonreviewability doctrine here.” Al-Kawaz v. U.S. Dep’t of 
State, Civil Action No.: 24-1792 (RC), 2025 WL 1768103, at *4 
(D.D.C. June 26, 2025). 

 20 
 
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 5; and DISMISSES the case without 
prejudice. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum 
Opinion. 
SO ORDERED. 
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 
 United States District Judge 
 May 7, 2026 
 

Passage view · GavelSight