govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-8_26-cv-01530-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
MAURICE B. MOORE, * 
 
Plaintiff, * 
 
v. * Civ. No. DLB-26-1530 
 
JULIE MCKENNA, et al., * 
 
Defendants. * 
 
MEMORANDUM ORDER 
 On April 20, 2026, Maurice B. Moore filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit and a motion for 
leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), which is granted. ECF 1, 
2. Moore claims he accidentally shot a police officer in 1986, and after he served ten years’ 
imprisonment, a judge granted his habeas petition, finding that he did not enter into a guilty plea 
before his incarceration. ECF 1, at 9. Moore sues former Saline County, Kansas, prosecutor Julie 
A. McKenna, former Kansas public defender Ralph J. DeZago, former Saline County Judge Daniel 
L. Herbert, and Assistant Kansas Attorneys General Andrew D. Holder and Bryan Carter Smith 
for wrongfully imprisoning him for ten years and, afte r his conviction allegedly was overturned, 
for keeping him on par ole for more than 20 years. He believes their conduct amounts to a 
conspiracy and violates the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. F or the 
reasons that follow, the complaint is dismissed without prejudice. 
Section 1915(a)(1) permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in this Court without 
prepaying the filing fee. To guard against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute requires 
dismissal of any claim that is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim on which relief may 
be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). 

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“[P]ro se filings are ‘h[e]ld to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 
lawyers.’” Folkes v. Nelsen, 34 F.4th 258, 272 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 
519, 520 (1972)). Accordingly, the Court must construe pro se pleadings liberally. Bing v. Brivo 
Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 618 (4th Cir. 2020). But “liberal construction does not require [the Court] 
to attempt to ‘discern the unexpressed intent of the plaintiff[;]’” the Court need only “determine 
the actual meaning of the words used in the complaint.” Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 805 
(4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). Thus, 
a pro se complaint “still ‘must contain enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on 
its face.’” Thomas v. The Salvation Army S. Territory, 841 F.3d 632, at 637 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting 
King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 212, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). 
Under Section 1983, a plaintiff may file suit against any person who, acting under color of 
state law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “is not itself a 
source of substantive rights, but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 
conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 
137, 144 n.3 (1979)); Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 562 F.3d 599, 615 (4th Cir. 2009). 
Federal venue laws govern where a plaintiff may bring a lawsuit in federal court. Generally, 
a plaintiff may file a civil action in 
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents 
of the State in which the district is located; 
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving 
rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the 
action is situated; or 

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(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided 
in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s 
personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. 
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). If venue is not proper, the Court “shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of 
justice transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1406(a). 
Venue is not proper in this Court. The defendants reside in Kansas, and none of the events 
giving rise to Moore’s claims occurred in Maryland. The Court must dismiss or transfer this case. 
Transfer is not in the interest of justice because Moore’s claims likely would be subject to 
dismissal for failure to state a claim as written . Judge Herbert cannot be sued for decisions made 
in his official capacity. Foster v. Fisher , 694 F. App’ x 887, 888 (4th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) 
(“Judges are absolutely immune from suit for a deprivation of civil rights [under 42 U.S.C. § 1983] 
for actions taken within their jurisdiction”) (alteration and quotation omitted); Stump v. Sparkman, 
435 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1978) (“[J]udges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable 
to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and 
are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.”). McKenna as a county prosecutor and 
Holder and Smith, acting as Kansas S tate’s Attorneys, are quasi -judicial officers who enjoy 
absolute immunity when performing prosecutorial functions. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 
409, 422–23 (1976); see also Kalina v. Fletcher , 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997); Buckley v. 
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). Moore sues them for continuing to seek his incarceration 
and parole when they knew the law required that he be released—an action closely associated with 
judicial process and thus covered by prosecutorial immunity. See Burns v. Reed , 500 U.S. 478, 
479 (1991) (citing Imbler , 424 U.S. at 422–23). Lastly, DeZago was Moore’s public defender 
during his criminal trial. An attorney, whether retained or court-appointed, who “perform[s] a 
lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding,” ordinarily does 

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not act under color of state law, which is a jurisdictional prerequisite for any civil action brought 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 & nn.8–16 (1981) (public 
defender); see also Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 91 (2009) (“Unlike a prosecutor or the court, 
assigned counsel ordinarily is not considered a state actor.”). DeZago was not a state actor subject 
to suit under § 1983. Because Moore’s claims likely would be subject to dismissal for failure to 
state a claim, transfer is not appropriate. Therefore, the complaint is dismissed without prejudice 
for improper venue. 
 Accordingly, it is this 5th day of May, 2026, by the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland, hereby ORDERED that: 
1. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF 2, IS GRANTED; 
2. The complaint IS DISMISSED without prejudice; 
3. The motion for appointment of counsel, ECF 5, IS DENIED as moot; 
4. The Clerk SHALL SEND a copy of this memorandum order to Moore; and 
5. The Clerk SHALL CLOSE this case. 
 ____________________________ 
 Deborah L. Boardman 
 United States District Judge 

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