govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-0_26-cv-61127-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
 
CASE NO. 26-61127-CIV-SINGHAL 
 
MAXIMILIANO SANTANA DIAZ, 
 
 Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his official capacity 
as Secretary of the United States Department 
of Homeland Security, et al., 
 
 Respondents. 
______________________________________/ 
ORDER 
 
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
(the “Petition”).  (DE [1]).  The Court has considered the Petition (DE [1]) and DENIES  
same for the reasons set forth below. 
I. BACKGROUND. 
Petitioner is a Mexican citizen who is present in the United States without 
admission.  (DE [1] at ¶¶ 11, 17).  Petitioner was detained by immigration authorities on 
April 9, 2026, after he was arrested for driving without a driver’s license.  (DE [1] at ¶ 2).  
He has not moved for bond before the immigration judge but submits that this failure is 
excused because the immigration judge is bound by caselaw to hold he is an “applicant 
for admission” who is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).  (DE 
[1] at ¶ 11 (citing Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)). 
Petitioner seeks habeas relief, arguing that his detention violates (1) the Fifth 
Amendment’s due process clause; (2) the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) to the 
extent he is subject to section 1226, not section 1225; and (3) a “[b]ond [r]egulation[]” 
promulgated in 1997.  (DE [1] at 7–10). 
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II. LEGAL STANDARD. 
District courts have authority to grant writs of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). 
Habeas corpus is fundamentally “a remedy for unlawful executive detention.”  Munaf v. 
Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (citation omitted).   A writ may be issued to a petitioner 
who demonstrates that he is being held in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal 
law.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).  The court’s jurisdiction extends to challenges involving 
immigration-related detention.  See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 
Section 2243, however, authorizes courts to deny legally insufficient petitions for 
habeas corpus without ordering responsive briefing. See  28 U.S.C. § 2243 (“A court . . . 
entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or . . . 
direct[] the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless  it 
appears from the application that the applicant . . . is not entitled thereto.”); see also  
Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 810 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Federal courts  are authorized to 
dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face . . . .” 
(quoting McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994))). 
III. DISCUSSION. 
Petitioner’s arguments are addressed in turn. 
A. Petitioner is Lawfully Detained Pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2). 
Petitioner first argues that he is subject to section 1226, not section 1225(b)(2).  As 
this Court explained in Morales v. Noem, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2026 WL 236307 (S.D. Fla. 
Jan. 29. 2026), aliens present in the United States without admission are “applicants for 
admission” subject to section 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention scheme.  Although 
parting ways with the Seventh Circui t’s decision in Castañon- Nava v. Department of 
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Homeland Security, 161 F.4th 1048 (7th Cir. 2025), this Court’s interpretation keeps good 
company with the Fifth and Eighth circuits’ holdings in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 
F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), and Avila v. Bondi, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. March 
25, 2026).  Because Petitioner is present in the United States without admission, he is an 
“applicant for admission” and subject to section 1225(b)(2).  Accordingly, his mandatory 
detention does not violate the INA. 
B. Petitioner’s Detention Does Not Violate Due Process. 
Petitioner’s reliance on Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976),  is misplaced.  
That case addressed whether the Fifth Amendment required an evidentiary hearing 
before the government could terminate a social security benefit.  Id. at 323.  In answering 
that question, the Court explained that 
due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, 
the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail. 
 
Id. at 335 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263–71 (1970)). 
But here, Petitioner does not assert that the government has erroneously  
deprived him of liberty by, for example, erroneously detaining him instead of a different 
alien.  Indeed, Petitioner admits that he entered the United States without admission or 
parole before being detained.  (DE [1] at ¶ 11).  Because Petitioner’s detention complies 
with section 1225(b)(2) and he identifies no risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty caused 
by his bond denial, Mathews is inapposite. 
 
 
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C. Petitioner’s Detention Does Not Violate a Federal Regulation. 
Finally, Petitioner’s reliance on a purported 1997 federal regulation fails for three 
reasons.  First, the cited authority in the Federal Register  is not part of a codified 
regulation but is the agency’s explanation, during the notice and comment process, of an 
interim rule.  In other words, it binds no one.  See Varela v. Nunez, 2026 WL 942263, at 
*2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2026).   Second, the mere fact that the executive chose to treat 
applicants for admission as eligible for bond, as evidenced  by the 1997 agency 
explanation, does not mean that it cannot now change course and enforce the statute as 
written.  See Id. (citing Morales, --- F. Supp. 3d ---,  2026 WL 236307).  Third, the 1997 
explanation cuts against Petitioner’s position to the extent it acknowledges that “ aliens 
who are present without having been admitted or paroled . . . will be eligible for bond and 
bond redetermination” “despite being applicants for admission.”  Id. (quoting 62 Fed. Reg. 
at 10333 (emphasis added)).  Accordingly, the 1997 explanation does not help Petitioner. 
Because Petitioner is not unlawfully detained, it is hereby 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Petition (DE [1]) is DENIED.  The Clerk of 
Court is directed to CLOSE  this case, CANCEL all hearings and deadlines, and DENY 
AS MOOT any pending motions. 
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 23rd day of 
April 2026. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copies furnished counsel via CM/ECF  
 
 
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