govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-1_25-cv-25666-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FQR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Mimni Division
Case Number: 25-25666-C1V-M 0% N0
SHAHER TAYSIR BARGHOUTHI,
Petitioner,
VS.
FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR,
Respondent.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
PETITION FOR W RIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion
for Immediate Temporary Restraining Order requesting Petitioner's immediate release or a bond
hearing before an immigration judge. The Court denies the first request of immediate release, but
grants the second request and orders m, indivtdualized bond hearing before an immigrationjudge
no later than May 20, 2026.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of the Kingdom of Jordan, born in Palestine, and was
admitted to the United States as a lawful penuanent resident on January 28, 1978. On April 15,
1984, Petitioner's parents legally divorced in Louisiana and Petitioner's mother was granted
primary custody with visitation rights granted to his father. Petitioner's father became a naturalized
citizen of the United States on November 27, 1985, when Petitioner was eight years old.
Petitioner's mother became a naturalized citizen of the United States when Petitioner was 45 years
old.
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On March 12, 1998, Petitioner was convicted of Principal to Trafscking in Cocaine. The
legacy Immigration and Nationality Service issued a Notice to Appear on May 27, 1.998, charging
Petitioner with removability. On February 3,2000, the immigration judge ordered Petitioner
removed to Jordan and Petitioner waived appeal. He was released on an Order of Supelwision on
or about May 3, 2000, after the Jordanian Consulate declined to issue a travel document.
On December 7, 2006,Petitioner was convicted of trafficking in phenethylamines;
possession of a firearm, ammo, electric weapon, device, or carry concealed weapon by a convicted
felon; possession or use of drug paraphernalia; and possession of marijuana. Petitioner was
sentenced to 36 months in prison. Upon his release from state custody, the Department of
Homeland Security was unable to effectuate Petitioner's removal, and thus released him and
placed him on an Order of Supervision. Petitioner atlended a11 required check-ins between 2009
and 2025.
On May 19, 2025, Petitioner attended a check-in appointment at lmmigration and Customs
Enforcement (ç$1CE''). 1CE revoked Petitioner's release and detained him. ICE Enforcement and
Removal Operations scheduled Petitioner's Order of Supervision appointment and took Petitioner
into custody to effectuate his removal from the United States. Since then, Petitioner has been
interviewed thzee times by 1CE Enforcement and Removal Operations- twice fonually and once
informally. Following the intelwiews, ICE recommended his continued detainment.
On October 14, 2025, 1CE Enforcement and Removal Operations revoked Petitioner's
Order of Supervision pursuant to 8C.F.R. j 241. 13. 1CE requested a travel document from
Palestine to effectuate Petitioner's removal to Israel on July 9, 2025. 1ts request remains pending,
and Petitioner has not received an individualized bond hearing.
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner raises two claims in llis Petition. In Count 1, Petitioner argues that Respondents
lack authority to detain him because he acquired citizenship through is father's naturalization. In
Count II, Petitioner claims that his prolonged detention violated his due process rights. The Court
held a hearing on the Petition on March 26, 2026. Following the hearing, Petitioner filed a Notice
of Partial W ithdrawal and withdrew Count 1, stating that he çsno longer seeks relief on this ground.''
(D.E. 12 at 1). Accordingly, the Court considers only Count 11.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Constitmion provides that the writ of habeas corpus is Ctavailable to every individual
detained within the United States.'' Hamdi v. Rumsheld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). Habeas corpus
selwes as çda remedy for unlawful executive detention.'' Munafv. Green, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008)
(citation omitted). District courts have the authority to grant writs of habeas corpus when a
petitioner demonstrates that he is being held in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal
law. See 28 U.S.C. j 2241(a); j 2241(c)(3). This jurisdiction extends to petitioners challenging
detention based on the immigration laws of the United States. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 687 (2001).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus for his immediate release based on the alleged
violations of his Fif'th Amendment constitmional right to due process, or in the altelmative, an order
requiring an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge. Respondents oppose
Petitioner's release on several grounds.
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Before the Court may consider the merits of the Petition, it must first determine whether
the Petition nnmes the proper Respondents and whether the Coul't has authority to exercise habeas
jùrisdiction in this case. Kokkonen v. Guardian Lfe Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 511 U.S. 375, 377
(tçFederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.'').
A. The Proper Respondents
Respondents assert that several of the named Respondents are not proper parties to this
habeas action and should be dismissed. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus shall be directed (sto the
person having custody of the person detained.'' 28 U.S.C. j 2243. tsglqn habeas challenges to
present physical confinement- tcore challenges'- the default rule is that the proper respondent is
the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not the Attonwy General or some other
supervisory official.'' Rums#ld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004). Indeed, SGthere is generally
only one proper respondent to a given prisoner's habeas petition.'' 16L at 434.
Respondents contend that because Petitioner is detained at Krome, his immediate çustodian
is acting Assistant Field Office Director Charles Parra. Accordingly, the only proper respondent
to this case is Parra in lvis official capacity. The Eleventh Circuit has held that coul'ts may sua
sponte order substitution for the proper respondent as tçdenial of a habeas petition for failure to
name the proper respondent twould give an umeasonably narrow reading to the habeas corpus
statme.''' Jackson v. Chatman 589 Fed. App'x 490, n.1 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting West v. L ouisiana
478 F.2d 1026, 1029 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd in relevantpart en banc, 510 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1975)).
The Court therefore substitutes Assistant Field Office Director Charles Parra as the sole respondent
to this action. Al1 other named respondents are dismissed.
B. Jurisdiction Pursuant to î 125241)
Respondent contends that the Court lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. j 1252(g). Section
1252(g) provides that Cdno court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf
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of any alien arising from the decision Or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, Or execute removal orders.'' 8 U.S.C. 5 1252(g). The Supreme Coul't has
explained that while section 1252(g) narrows the federal courts' jurisdiction over immigration-
related claims, it does not impose $1a general jurisdictional limitation,'' but rather covers claims
arising from Gttlzree discrete actions that the Attonzey General may take: her ddecision or action' to
Gcommence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.''' Reno v. Am.-vjrab Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482, 487 (1999) (quoting 8 U.S.C. j 1252(g)). tsgAllthough
'many other decisions or actions' may be Spart of the deportation process,' only claims that arise
from one of the covered actions are excluded from ga court's) review (at least by this provisionl.''
Camarena v. Dir, Immigr. (f' Customs Enfh 988 F.3d 1268, 1272 (1 1th Cir. 2021) (quoting Reno,
525 U.S. at 482). To determine whether j 1252(g) strips the court of jurisdiction to hear a habeas
petition, the Court çtmust focus on the action being challenged.'' Canal A Media Holdings, LL C v.
US. Citizenship (î Immigr. Servs., 964 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2020).
The Coul't finds that Count 11 is not covered by j lzsztgl'sjurisdiction-stripping provision.
In Count II, Petitioner argues that (trbqecause his detention has lasted beyond the six-month
benchmark relied upon by courtsg,l it has become unconstitutionally prolonged'' in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. (D.E. 1 ! 48-49). Ssclaims challenging the fact or
duration of a sentence fall within the çcore' of habeas corpus.'' Vaz v. Skinncr, 634 F. App'x 778,
780 (1 1th Cir. 2014) (citing Nelson v. Campbell, 54 1U.S. 637, 644 (2004); other citations
omitted). Further, the Supreme Court has made clear that federal courts have jurisdiction to
adjudicate Cçstatutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention.'' Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 688. Because Petitioner brings a constitutional challenge to the duration of his post-
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removal-period detention, the Court remains f'ree to hear the Petitioner's claims concerning the
length of his detention.
C.The M erits of Count Il: Petitioner's Constitutional Challenzes to His Continued
Detention
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that the Government shall not
Sldeprivgel'' any Sçperson . . . of . . . liberty without due process of law.'' U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
EsFreedom from imprisonment f'rom government custody, detention, or other fonnns of physical
restraint lies at the heart of the liberty gthe Due Process Clause) protects.'' Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
690. Ultimately, Esthe fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard $at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.''' Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)
(quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965:.
The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that 1CE must remove an alien subject to a
final order of removal within ninety days. See 8 U.S.C. j 123 1(a)(1)(A). The statute further
provides that the removal period begins on the latest date of the following:
(i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final.
(ii) lf the removal order isjudicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal
of the alien, the date of the court's final order.
If the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration process), the date
the alien is released from detention or confinement.
See 28 U.S.C. j 1231(a)(1)(B). However, some aliens çdmay be detained beyond the removal period
and, if released, shall be subject'' to terms of supervision. Id. j 1231(a)(6). The Supreme Court has
held that çdonce a removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer
authorized by gtheq statute.'' Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699 (citation omitted). Zadvydas provides that
ICE may continue to detain a noncitizen under a final order of removal for an additional three
months- creating a presumptively reascmable detention period of 180 days. Id at 701. After the
conclusion of the 180-day removal period, an alien in 1CE custody may challenge his continued
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detention in habeas corpus proceedings on the grounds that there is no signitscant likelihood that
his removal will occur in the f'uture. See id.
i. The Burden ofproof
The parties dispute who bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Petitioner asserts that Respondent bears
the burden under 8 C.F.R. j 241.13 because Petitioner was re-detained upon revocation of his
supervised release. Respondent argues that Petitioner bears the burden of proof and states that
Respondent has no affirmative burden to show that removal is imminent.
In Akinwale v. Ashcrojt, the Eleventh Circuit explained that (Cin order to state a claim under
Zadvydas the alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but
also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.'' 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). Petitioner
notes, however, that Akinwale is inapposite because it was decided in the context of an alien's
initial detainment. Petitioner argues that per federal regulations, the burden is on Respondent
because Petitioner was previously ordered removed while detained, released on supervised release
after his 90-day removal period had expired, was on supervised release between 2009-2025, and
was then re-detained.
Federal regulations were revised to implement administrative review procedures for aliens
detained beyond the removal period, including those who are re-detained upon revocation of their
supervised release. See ContinuedDetention ofAliens Subject to Final Orders ofRemoval, 66 Fed.
Reg. 56977 (Nov. 14, 2001) (codified at 8 C.F.R. j 241.13). çsonce released on an (Order of
Supervisionj under j 24 1.13, ICE may only revoke the (Order of Supervisionj for the reasons
specified in j 241 . 13(i). Revocation under j 241. 13(i) applies only to aliens released under j
241. l3tgl-where 1CE has formally determined that there is no significant likelihood that the alien
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will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable f'uttzre.'' Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-
RUIZ, 2025 Mqw 260573, at *5 (S.D. Fla. September 9, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. j 241.13(i)(1))
(emphasis added). Section 241.4(b)(4) f'urther states that if an alien is released under j 241. 13, and
Stthe Service subsequently determines, because of a change of circumstances, that there is a
significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future to . . . a
third country, the alien shall again be subject to the custody review procedures under this section.''
8 C.F.R. j 241.4(b)(4).
Petitioner's argument falls short, however, because the revised regulations only advise
what 1CE is required to detennine before revoking an Order of Supervision. The regulations do
not provide any instructions as to who bears the burden of proof in federal court on habeas corpus
petition upon re-detainment. See 8 C.F.R. j 241.13(i)(2). Further, the Court is unaware of and
Petitioner does not provide any in-circuit authority suggesting that j 241.13 shifts the burden of
proof to a espondent when a habeas corpus petition involves the re-detention of a Petitioner. As a
matter of text, the Court finds that the burden of proof in this case is as the Eleventh Circuit
explained knAkinwale: the Petitioner çtmust provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there
is no signifcant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.'' 287 F.3d at 1052.
Accordingly, the Coul't tul'ns to the merits of Count 11.
ii. Tlte Lengtlt ofDetention
Under Zadvydas, a petitioner must first show that he has been detained in excess of 180
days. 533 U.S. at 701; see also Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052. Petitioner's removal period began on
May 17, 2025, and his ninety days expired on August 17, 2025. The Government does not dispute
these dates, nor does it dispute that Petitionerhas been detained for longer than 180 days.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the tirst step under Zadvydas has been met.
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iii. Wltetlter Petitioner Has Shown Evidence F/lfz/ There is No Signecant
Likelihood ofRemoval in the Reasonably Foreseeable Future
çsglqn order to state a claim under Zadvydas the alien not only must show post-removal
order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe
that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable f'uttzre.'' Akinwale,
287 F.3d at 1052. In detennining whether a petitioner has met their burden of proot court çtmust
take appropriate account of the greater immigration-related expertise of the Executive Branch, of
the serious administrative needs and concelms inherent in the necessarily extensive glmmigration
and Namralization Servicesq efforts to enforce this complex statute, and the Nation's need to speak
with one voice in immigration matters.'' Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700. Courts f'urther consider
whether the government can present evidence that removal remains reasonably foreseeable,
including the government's çscontact'' with a foreign country, whether the country Ctis accepting
individuals from the United States,'' whether çcflights are regularly being scheduled'' to the country,
and/or whether the country Ccroutinely issues travel documents.'' Lambert v. Garland, 2023 WL
2016841, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2023) (Altman, J.) (quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Vandi
v. Ripa, 2022 'WL 2709109, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 3, 2022) (Ruiz, J.) (tinding çlpetitioner's removal
was treasonably foreseeable''' because Jamaica indicated that it would be issuing travel
documentsl; Vaz v. Skinner, 634 F. App'x 778, 782 (1 1th Cir. 20 15) (noting that a1l receiving
countries in Zadvydas Cteither refused to accept the alien or there was no repatriation treaty').
As evidence of good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in
the foreseeable future, Petitioner notes that (1) after his initial detention in 2000, the Jordanian
Consulate declined to issue a travel document; (2) for approximately sixteen years thereafter, the
Department of Homeland Security was unable to effectuate his removal; and (3) upon his re-
detention, Respondent requested a travel document fzom Palestine to effectuate Petitioner's
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removal to Israel, but Petitioner notes that Cllijt is unclear with whom in Palestine'' the request was
made and diwhy the request . . . was placed with Palestine if Petitioner is a native and citizen of
Jordan'' (D.E. 8 at 4).
Under the spëcific facts and circumstances of this case, the Coul't finds that Petitioner has
satisfed his initial burden. The record demonstrates a prolonged and unsuccessful history of
removal efforts, spanning more than a decade and a half. Such an extended inability to effecmate
removal weighs heavily in favor of concluding that removal is not reasonably foreseeable at this
time. The Government's current efforts do not alter this conclusion. Upon Petitioner's re-detention,
the Department of Homeland Security appears to have shifted its approach by requesting travel
documents from Palestinian authorities in an effort to effectuate Petitioner's removal to Israel. The
record, however, is devoid of critical details regarding that request, including the specific entity
contacted and the legal or factual basis for seeking travel authorization from Palestine for an
individual the Government itself identifies as a native and citizen of Jordan. This lack of clarity
f'urther undermines any assertion that removal is likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.
In essence, the circumstances remain materially unchanged from those that previously
rendered Petitioner's removal impracticable. The only apparent development is the Government's
atlempt to pursue removal through Palestinian-issued travel documents- an effol't that, on this
record, appears speculative at best. In light of the facts presented above by Petitioner, and
considering the ongoing geopolitical conditions in the region, the Coul't finds that such efforts do
not establish a significant likelihood of removal in the foreseeable fumre.
Moreover, at the March 26, 2026 hearing, the Govenunent conceded that there are no
removal flights to Israel in the foreseeable fmure. This concession independently confirms that
Petitioner's removal is not reasonably foreseeable. Accordingly, Respondent has failed to rebut
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Petitioner's showing with evidence demonstrating a significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future. Continued detention without an individualized bond hearing is
therefore no longer authorized under 8 U.S.C. j 123 1(a)(6).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
Assistant Field Offce Director Charles Parra, in his individual capacity, is substituted
as the sole and correct Respondent. All other Respondents are DISMISSED.
Petitioner's Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED IN PART.
Respondent shall afford Petitioner an individualized bond hearing no later than M av
20. 2026.
The clerk is directed to close the case.
f of April 2026.DONE AND ORDEIIED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this#
FEDE CO ORENO
UNITEQ. ATES DISTYCT RJDGE
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
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