govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-1_24-cv-21925-3

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO. 24-21925-CV-WILLIAMS 
 
GEORGE FITZGERALD II, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
DEFENDANT 1, et al., 
 
 Defendants. 
      / 
 
ORDER 
THIS MATTER is before the Court on former Chief Magistrate Judge Jonathan 
Goodman’s Report and Recommendations (DE 62) (“Report”) on Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Final Default Judgment (DE 60) (“Motion ”). Plaintiff, George Edward Fitzgerald, II  
(“Plaintiff”) timely objected to the Report  (DE 63) (“Objections”). After careful review, 
Plaintiff’s objections are sustained, and Judge Goodman’s Report is overruled.  
I. BACKGROUND 
On May 17, 2024, Plaintif f filed a complaint alleging  that several unnamed 
defendants, including Defendant 1,  victimized Plaintiff in a “pig -butchering” 
cryptocurrency scam. (DE 1 ¶¶ 7–8, 13). The purported scam involved convincing Plaintiff 
that a successful cryptocurrency trader would help him learn to trade if he transferred his 
assets to a designated trading exchange platform. (Id. ¶¶ 19–24). Plaintiff later discovered 
that the platform was fake, its dashboard mimicking market movements, causing Plaintiff 
to transfer $180,000 worth of his cryptocurrency-assets, as well as $37,000 in cash, to 
fraudulent cryptocurrency wallets and accounts. (Id. ¶¶ 25–37, 46). After the unnamed 
defendants disappeared, Plaintiff hired a forensic cryptocurrency tracing firm to trace his 
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stolen assets on the blockchain. 1 (Id. ¶¶ 44–45). The firm identified the cryptocurrency 
wallet that received Plaintiff’s stolen assets, and thereafter, Plaintiff filed a  four-count 
complaint, claiming conversion, unjust enrichment, imposition of constructive trust, and 
conspiracy. (Id. at 8–11).  
Subsequent to filing the complaint , Judge Goodman granted Plaintiff’s request to 
serve the unnamed defendants via crypto wallet addresses, Telegram direct messages, 
and web postings by  transferring non-fungible tokens containing links to service 
documents. (DE 27 at 7). The unnamed defendants failed to respond to the complaint, 
and after entry of default, Plaintiff filed his initial motion for default judgment. (DE 39). 
Judge Goodman recommended that the Court deny Plaintiff’s initial motion for default 
judgment without prejudice, finding that Plaintiff had (1) “assert[ed] multiple claims against 
multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which 
acts or omission, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against”; and ( 2) pled 
“multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing 
each successive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination 
of the entire complaint.” (DE 41 at 6 (quoting Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sherriff’s Off., 
792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th  Cir. 2015) )). The Court agreed, dismissed the complaint 
without prejudice, and gave Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. (DE 46 at 3).  
On March 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed the operative Corrected First Amended Complaint 
(DE 53) (“Amended Complaint”). Having conducted additional discovery into the crypto-
 
1 A blockchain is a database containing information that can be simultaneously used and 
shared within a publicly accessible network. See Blockchain, Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/blockchain (last visited Feb. 24, 
2026). 
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currency wallets which received his stolen assets, Plaintiff narrowed his Amended 
Complaint to one defendant, Teh Yong Hing  (“Defendant”), the owner of th e wallet in 
question. (DE 53 ¶¶ 1 , 46 –47). Plaintiff also reduced his  claims to three—conversion 
(Count I); unjust enrichment (Count II); and imposition of constructive trust (Count III). 
(DE 53 at 8 –10). Though Plaintiff eliminated the first issue Judge Goodman identified, 
Plaintiff failed to correct the issue where each cause of action adopted and realleged the 
allegations of each preceding count. ( Id. ¶ 58 (“Plaintiff adopts and realleges the 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 57 above. ”); id. ¶ 63 (“Plaintiff adopts and 
realleges the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 62 above. ”)). After Defendant 
was served again by publication and again failed to respond, (DE 56; DE 57; DE 58; DE 
59), Plaintiff filed the instant  Motion for Final Default Judgment (DE 60). The Court 
referred the Motion to Judge Goodman. (DE 61). 
In the Report, Judge Goodman recommends that the Motion be denied without 
prejudice as a shotgun pleading. (DE 62 at 6). The Report finds  that, although the 
Amended Complaint “cur[es] the ‘relatively rare sin of asserting multiple claims against 
multiple defendants without’” specification, (id. at 6 (quoting Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1223)), 
“each count [still] adopts the allegations of all preceding counts .” (Id. at 6). Plaintiff filed 
Objections (DE 63) , arguing that  “[w]hile the Amended Complaint contains standard 
incorporation-by-reference language, each count is individually pled, identifies a single 
and discrete cause of action, and clearly delineates the specific fac ts supporting each 
element of the cause at issue,” so the Amended Complaint provides sufficient notice of 
the claims’ substance to avoid characterization as  a shotgun pleading. (DE 63 at 6). 
Based on the foregoing, the Court will cond uct an independent inquiry to determine (1) 
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whether Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is indeed a shotgun pleading; and (2) whether 
Plaintiff is entitled to a final default judgment. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) states that “[w]hen a party against whom a 
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that 
failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 55(a). A party may then apply to the District Court for a default final judgment. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). But a court may not enter a default final judgment based solely 
on the existence of a clerk’s default. Alfa Corp. v. Alfa Mortg. Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 
1174 (M.D. Ala. 2008) . Instead, a court is required to examine the allegations to see if 
they are well-pleaded and present a sufficient basis to support a default judgment on the 
causes of action. Id. (citing Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 
1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)
2); see also Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, 
Inc., 561 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th  Cir. 2009) (“A defendant, by his default, admits the 
plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on those facts by the judgment, 
and is barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established. A default judgment is 
unassailable on the merits, but only so far as it is supported by well -pleaded allegations. 
A default defendant may, on appeal, challenge the sufficiency of the complaint, even if he 
may not challenge the sufficiency of the proof.”) (cleaned up).   
The decision to enter a default judgment “is committed to the discretion of the 
district court.” Hamm v. DeKalb Cty. , 774 F.2d 1567, 1576 (11th Cir. 1985). Default 
 
2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981), the Eleventh Circuit  held 
that all Fifth Circuit decisions issued before the end of business on September 30, 1981 
would become binding precedent in the circuit. 
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judgments are “generally disfavored” because the Eleventh Circuit has a “strong policy of 
determining cases on their merits.” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found. , 789 F.3d 1239, 
1244–45 (11th Cir. 2015). In addition to assessing whether the complaint adequately sets 
forth facts to support a  plaintiff’s claims, a court considering the entry of a valid default 
judgment must “have subject -matter jurisdiction over the claims and have personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.” Osborn v. Whites & Assocs. Inc. , No. 1 :20-cv-02528, 
2021 WL 3493164, at *2 (N.D. Ga. May 20, 2021) (citing Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia 
Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1215 n.13 (11th Cir. 2009)).3  
When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the 
Court must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified 
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” Range v. U.S. 
Postmaster Gen. , No. 22- 12380, 2023 WL 5045056, at *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 2023) 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)); see also BNY Mellon Cap. Mkts., LLC v. Paone, No. 19-
cv-81412, 2020 WL 1692011, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2020) (“When a magistrate judge’s 
‘disposition’ has been properly objected to, district courts must review the disposition de 
novo. However, when no party has timely objected, ‘the court need only satisfy itself that 
there is no clear error on the face of the record to accept the recommendation.’”) (quoting 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3)).  
 
3 A court may conduct a hearing on a motion for default judgment when, in order “to enter 
or effectuate judgment, it needs to: (A) conduct an accounting; (B) determine the amount 
of damages; (C) establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or (D) inves tigate any 
other matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); see also Tara Prods., Inc. v. Hollywood Gadgets, 
Inc., 449 F. App’x 908, 911– 12 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that Rule 55(b)(2) “leaves the 
decision to hold an evidentiary hearing to the court’s discretion”). 
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III. DISCUSSION 
The Court begins by assessing whether the Amended Complaint’s incorporation-
by-reference language, alone, warrants its dismissal as a shotgun pleading. Next, the 
Court will determine whether it has jurisdiction to enter a judgment on behalf of Plaintiff. 
See Tissone v. Osco Food Servs., LLC, No. 19-CV-61358, 2021 WL 1529915, at *2 (S.D. 
Fla. Feb. 10, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 19- 61358-CIV, 2021 WL 
870526 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2021) (citing Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206) (“[B]efore entering 
a default judgment, the Court must ensure that it has jurisdiction over the claims and there 
must be a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered.”). The Court will then 
decide whether the Amended Complaint establishes Defendant’s liability. And finally, the 
Court must determine Plaintiff’s damages.  
A. The incorporation- by-reference language does not doom the Amended 
Complaint.  
 
The Report recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s Amended C omplaint without 
prejudice because each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts. (DE 62 at 
6). Plaintiff argues that dismissal is not warranted because “each count is individually 
pled, identifies a single and discrete cause of action, and clearly delineates the specific 
facts supporting each element of the cause at issue.” (DE 63 at 6). Plaintiff also argues 
that the risk of confusion is not present beca use there is only a single Defendant in this 
case. Id. The Court agrees with Plaintiff.  
A shotgun pleading is one that fails “to give defendants adequate  notice of the 
claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland , 792 F.3d 
at 1323. Dismissal of a shotgun pleading is appropriate “where ‘it is virtually impossible 
to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.’” Id. at 
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1325 (emphasis in original) (quoting Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trustee of Cent. Fl. Comm. 
Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996)). Therefore, the crux of the Court’s determination 
is “whether the [Amended Complaint] gave [Defendant] fair ‘notice of the specific claims 
against [him] and the factual allegations to support those claims.’” Charles v. GEO Group 
Inc., No. 22-13891, 2024 WL 1619911, at *2  (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Weiland, 792 F.3d 
at 1235).  
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is not  such a defective shotgun pleading as it 
adequately gives the sole Defendant notice of the specific claims against him  and the 
factual basis Plaintiff uses to support those claims. Each count of the Amended Complaint 
is separately identifiable and independently supported by several paragraphs of factual 
allegations. (See generally Am. Compl.). While the Report admonishes Plaintiff’s adoption 
and incorporation of allegations in the preceding counts (DE 62 at 6) , Plaintiff’s 
incorporation-by-reference does not undermine the Court’s understanding of the 
Amended Complaint, especially where, like here, the claims and factual allegations are 
“brief and easy to comprehend.” Charles, 2024 WL 1619911 at *3. Moreover, although 
Plaintiff initially asserted hi s claims against several unknown defendants, the Amended 
Complaint is now tailored to one identifiable  Defendant—Teh Yong Hing —and asserts 
only three claim s, each of which are supported by factual allegations. Accordingly, the 
Court does not find it “virtually impossible” to know which allegations of fact are intended 
to support whi ch claims, and therefore, the Court does not find that the Amended 
Complaint is a shotgun pleading. Id.  
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B. Jurisdiction is Properly Established. 
Finding that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint survives scrutiny, the Court now turns 
to jurisdiction. “In order to enter a valid default judgment, a court must have subject-matter 
jurisdiction over the claims and have personal jurisdiction over the defendants.” Pharmacy 
Co. of Am. v . Royal Mgmt. Co. LLC , No. 24-60662, 2024 WL 5159816, at *2  (S.D. Fla. 
Oct. 18, 2024) (citing Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1215 & n.13 
(11th Cir. 2009)). Therefore, before reaching the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court first 
assesses whether Plaintiff established subject -matter jurisdiction over the action and 
personal jurisdiction over Defendant Teh Yong Hing. 
1. The Court has Subject-Matter Jurisdiction. 
“Federal Courts are Courts of limited jurisdiction.” Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
McKinnon Motors, LLC , 329 F.3d 805, 807 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). 
To invoke a federal court’s diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must establish complete 
diversity between litigants and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 
28 U.S.C. § 1332. The amount in controversy is satisfied where a plaintiff claims a 
sufficient sum in good faith. Id. 
Here, Plaintiff alleges that this Court has subject -matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1332. (DE 53 ¶ 4). The Amended Complaint establishes complete diversity 
amongst the parties because Plaintiff is a resident and citizen of Florida, and Defendant 
is alleged to be a “Malaysian citizen located in Malaysia.” (Id. ¶ 6–7). Additionally, Plaintiff 
establishes the requisite amount in controversy. Plaintiff alleges  that the stolen 
cryptocurrency is now valued at $266,867.94, which is well over the $75,000 jurisdictional 
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threshold. (Id. ¶ 1). Accordingly, taken as true, these allegations establish subject-matter 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
2. The Court has Personal Jurisdiction over Defendant. 
This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Personal jurisdiction is the 
Court’s power to exercise control over the parties, and it must be established before a 
court has power to render a judgment. See Strange v. Nescio , No. 20-80947, 2021 WL 
8945480, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar . 29, 2021). “A defendant may defeat subsequent 
enforcement of a default judgment in another forum by demonstrating that the judgment 
issued from a court lacking personal jurisdiction even if the court entering the default 
determined that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Rash v. Rash, 173 F.3d 
1376, 1381 (11th Cir. 1999).  Therefore, when deciding a motion for default judgment, the 
Court has an affirmative duty to evaluate personal jurisdiction. Strange, 2021 WL 
8945480, at *1. 
Two requirements must be satisfied to establish personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant: (1) the operative complaint must allege sufficient jurisdictional facts 
to bring the action within the state’s longarm statute; and (2) the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that sufficient minimum contacts exist between the non-resident defendant and the State 
to satisfy due process requirements. Pharmacy Co. of Am., 2024 WL 5159816 at *4 (citing 
Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989)).  
Plaintiff satisfies the first prong required to establish personal jurisdiction over a 
non-resident defendant because Florida’s longarm statute confer s jurisdiction over a 
defendant who commits a tortious act within Florida  or causes injury to persons within 
Florida arising out of an act or omission by the d efendant where the defendant was 
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engaged in solicitation within Florida. See Fla. Stat. 48.193(1)(a). Here, Plaintiff alleges 
that Defendant “lured” Plaintiff into transferring cryptocurrency to Defendant’s fraudulent 
platform. (DE 53 ¶¶  21–28). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant “directs business 
activities toward and conducts business with consumers throughout the United States, 
including within the State of Florida and this district” through a fraudulent website that is 
accessible in Florida. (DE 53 ¶ 10). These allegations, accepted as true, satisfy Florida’s 
longarm statute. Fru Veg Marketing, Inc. v. Vegfruitworld Corp. , 896 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 
1181 (S.D. Fla. 2012).  
Plaintiff also satisfies the second prong of the test to comport with due process. 
Jurisdiction may be constitutionally asserted under the “minimum contacts” prong 
whenever a defendant by its own purposeful conduct created a “substantial connection 
with the forum state.” (Id.) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 
S. Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)). “The court has made it clear, however, that so long 
as it creates a substantial connection with the forum, even a single act can support 
jurisdiction.” Fru Veg Marketing, Inc. , 896  F. Supp. 2d at 1181. (internal quotations 
omitted). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s fraudulent website is accessible in Florida and 
can be accessed on the internet through smartphones. (DE 53 ¶ 10). Indeed, users who 
access the fraudulent web site “believe they are trading in an authentic exchange 
platform,” but are in fact only placing simulated trades while Defendant deceitfully diverts 
the user’s funds. ( Id. ¶ 26). Defendant’s purposeful conduct of creating a fraudulent 
trading platform directed to,  and accessible by , Florida residents create a substantial 
connection with Florida. See  Fru Veg Marketing, Inc. , 896 F. Supp. 2d at 1181. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations sufficiently allege Defendant’s minimum contacts with 
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Florida such that the Amended Complaint establishes personal jurisdiction over 
Defendant.  
C. The Amended Complaint Establishes Liability. 
At the outset, the Court must determine which law applies to Plaintiff’s claims. A 
federal district court sitting in diversity applies t he substantive state law  in which it sits. 
See Palm Beach Golf Center-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., 781 F.3d 1245, 
1259 (11th Cir. 2015). The Eleventh Circuit has determined that, “at least as to tort claims, 
the Florida Supreme Court applies the ‘most significant relationship’ test set forth in 
Section 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict Laws (‘the Restatement’).” 
Bandyopadhyay v. Defendant 1 , No. 22-cv-22907, 2023 WL 2263552, at *3  (S.D. Fla. 
Feb. 28, 2023) (citing Trumpet Vine Invs., N.V. v. Union Cap. Partners I, Inc., F.3d 1110, 
1115 (11th Cir. 1996)). Here, Plaintiff is a citizen of Florida, and Plaintiff was present in 
Florida at the time Defendant converted Plaintiff’s cryptocurrency. (DE 60 at 5). Therefore, 
Florida has the most significant relationship to Plaintiff’s claims. See Bowen v. Li, No. 23-
cv-20399, 2023 WL 4623594, at *5 (S.D. Fla. July 18, 2023) (“ Plaintiff was a citizen of 
California, where he was located when Defendant converted his cryptocurrency.  
Therefore, because the injury occurred in California, California law applies to Plaintiff's 
conversion claim.”) (cleaned up). 
1. Conversion (Count I) is Adequately Pleaded.  
Under Florida law, “[t]o state a claim for conversion, one must allege facts sufficient 
to show ownership of the subject property and facts that the other  party wrongfully 
asserted dominion over that property.” Batista v. Rodriguez, 388 So. 3d 1098, 1101 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2024). The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff owned 3.54877 BTC 
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(Bitcoin) and 49,340.45 USDC (USD Coin)  and that Defendant deceived Plaintiff  by 
unlawfully transferring Plaintiff’s cryptocurrency from his crypto.com account to a 
purportedly fraudulent trading exchange named ETX. (DE 53 ¶¶ 1, 25–37). The Amended 
Complaint also alleges that Plaintiff  “suffered damages as a direct and proximate result 
of Defendant’s conversion.” (Id. ¶ 57).  Taken together, these allegations adequately 
establish a claim for conversion.  
2. Unjust Enrichment (Count II) is Adequately Pleaded. 
To establish unjust enrichment, Plaintiff must allege : “(1) plaintiff has conferred 
benefit on the defendant, who has knowledge thereof; (2)  defendant voluntarily accepts 
and retains the benefit conferred; and (3) the circumstances are such that it would be 
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying the value thereof to the 
plaintiff.”  CFLB Partnership, LLC v. Diamond Blue Int., Inc., 352 So. 3d 357, 359 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2022). The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant convinced Plaintiff to invest 
using a fraudulent cryptocurrency exchange that mimicked real -time market movements 
and depicted false profit gains. (DE 53 ¶  26). In reliance on Defendant’s 
misrepresentations, Plaintiff made multiple transfers from his crypto.com and CashApp 
accounts to Defendant’s fraudulent platform. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 28, 34,37).  Forensic tracking of 
Plaintiff’s cryptocurrency revealed that Defendant moved Plaintiff’s cryptocurrency to 
Binance wallets possessed and controlled by Defendant. ( Id. ¶¶ 42 –57). Plaintiff 
conferred a benefit upon Defendant in the form of cryptocurrency, and Defendant 
knowingly and voluntarily accepted and retained the benefit by moving the cryptocurrency 
to his own wallet. (Id. ¶¶ 45–47). Therefore, Plaintiff satisfactorily alleges a claim for unjust 
enrichment. 
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3. Imposition of a Constructive Trust (Count III) is Adequately Pleaded. 
“In order to impose a constructive trust[,] the court must find the following: (1) the 
existence of a promise express or implied, (2) transfer of the property and reliance 
thereon, (3) the existence of a confidential relationship, and (4) unjust enrichment.” Silva 
v. de la Noval , 307 So. 3d 131, 134 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). “A confidential relationship is 
found where confidence is reposed by one party and a trust accepted by the other.” 
Hutson v. Brooks, 646 So. 2d 276, 277 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).  “Courts impose constructive 
trusts either upon property acquired by fraud, or when it is against equity that someone 
who acquired property without fraud should continue to retain possession.” Silva, 307 So. 
3d 131, 134 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (quotations omitted). 
Plaintiff adequately establishes a claim for imposition of a constructive trust. 
Defendant was entrusted with Plaintiff’s cryptocurrency and promised that “she would 
teach Plaintiff how to become a successful cryptocurrency trader.” (DE 53 ¶¶ 20, 27, 34, 
37). As Plaintiff’s trusted instructor , Defendant assisted Plaintiff with accessing and 
registering for a fraudulent trading account. ( Id. ¶ 24).  Plaintiff relied on Defendant’s 
representations and invested significant funds into the fraudulent account at Defendant’s 
request. (Id. ¶ 32). And as a result of several improper transfers, Defendant benefited 
significantly by moving Plaintiff’s cryptocurrency to a Binance wallet possessed and 
controlled by Defendant. (Id. ¶ 45). Accordingly, the Court exercises its equitable powers 
to impose a constructive trust.  
D. Plaintiff’s Requested Relief  
1. Damages and Disgorgement of Property 
Plaintiff declares that Defendant converted 3.54877 Bitcoin (BTC)  and 49,340.45 
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USD Coin (USDC). (60 -1 ¶ 4 “Declaration”; DE 53 ¶ 1). Plaintiff’s representations are 
supported by an investigation report that traces twenty -four (24) transactions. (DE 53-1 
at 7) (“Investigation Report”). The sum of the transactions “is approximately equivalent 
to the US dollar amount of $145,715. ” (Id.). According to the Investigation Report, the 
following chart contains the pertinent transactions between Plaintiff and Defendant: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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(Investigation Report at 18-20). 
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The above transactions reflect a total deprivation of 3.5488 BTC (Bitcoin) and 
49,340.45 USDC (USD Coin) . Plaintiff represents that the combined value of the stolen 
cryptocurrency at the time of the theft was approximately $180,000. (DE 60- 1 ¶ 5). 
However, Plaintiff also states that “the value of Bitcoin has increased since the theft,” and 
the “present-day value of the cryptocurrency assets” combined is $439,239.41 (USD). (Id. 
¶ 6,8). The combined value was determined on or about June 12, 2025 when Plaintiff filed 
the instant Motion. Seeing that the value cryptocurrency fluctuates, Plaintiff’s “present -
day” value will need to be redetermined. Therefore, the Court is unable to ascertain 
Plaintiff’s actual damages at this juncture. Plaintiff must provide the Court with an updated 
damages calculation for final default judgment to be entered on damages. 
2. Preliminary Injunction 
Finally, Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction on public policy grounds. (DE 60 at 
9, n.7) (citing Chanel, Inc. v. besumart.com, 240 F. Supp 3d 1283, 1291 (S.D. Fla. 2016)). 
A district court’s decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act of equitable 
discretion. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). Permanent 
injunctive relief is available when a plaintiff demonstrates that: (1)  it has suffered an 
irreparable injury; (2) remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) considering the balance of hardships 
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) the public 
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. (Id.). 
As noted above, Plaintiff  seeks monetary damages based on the current market 
value of the stolen cryptocurrency. Plaintiff does not allege that monetary damages would 
be inadequate compensation, nor does the Amended Complaint identify any other harms 
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that flowed from Defendant’s theft of Plaintiff’s cryptocurrency. “Accordingly, Plaintiff has 
an adequate remedy at law, so a permanent injunction is unavailable in this action.” 
Bowen, 2023 WL 4623594, at *7. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, and upon careful  review of the Report, the 
Motion, the record, and the applicable law, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:  
1. Judge Goodman’s Report (DE 62) is OVERRULED. 
2. Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Default Final Judgment (DE 60) is 
GRANTED IN PART. The Motion is granted as to liability. 
3. Plaintiff shall file evidence of the monetary value of Bitcoin and USD Coin 
that supports Plaintiff’s present -day damages calculation by March 31, 
2026. 
4. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a), the Court will separately 
issue a default final judgment. 
5. All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT. All hearings and deadlines are 
CANCELED. This case is CLOSED. 
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Miami, Florida on this 2 nd day of March, 
2026. 
 
 
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