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govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-1_25-cv-20455-1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 1:25-cv-20455-KMM
LORIN GROSSMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
B&J SERVICES OF MIAMI, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Plaintiff Lorin Grossman’s (“Plaintiff”)
Motion for Entry of Final Default Judgment (“Mot.” or “Motion”). (ECF No. 24). The
Court referred this Motion to Magistrate Judge Marty Fulgueira Elfenbein pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636 to “take all necessary and proper action as required by law and/or to issue a
Report and Recommendation.” (ECF No. 25). Magistrate Judge Elfenbein issued a Report
and Recommendation on December 17, 2025, where she recommends that Plaintiff’s
Motion be granted in part and denied in part. (ECF No. 27) (“R&R”). Neither party has
filed objections to the R&R, and the time to do so has now passed. The matter is now ripe
for review. As set forth below, the Court ADOPTS the R&R.
I. BACKGROUND
1
This case concerns a landlord’s alleged refusal to show or lease property to Plaintiff
based on her physical disability. See generally (ECF No. 1) (“Complaint” or “Compl.”).
1 The facts in this background section come from Plaintiff’s Complaint, (ECF No. 1), as the
Defendants have admitted these facts by defaulting. See Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG
Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Nishimatsu Const. Co. v. Houston
Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)).
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Plaintiff uses a wheelchair for mobility and does not have use of her legs. Id. ¶ 16.
Defendants Carla Rodas (“Rodas”) and B&J Services of Miami, LLC (“B&J Services”)
(together with R odas, “Defendants”) advertised a property for lease using Facebook
Marketplace in January 2024. Id. ¶ 18.
Plaintiff contacted Defendants through this advertisement, and plans were made for
her to tour the property on January 20, 2024. Id. Plaintiff informed Defendants that she
was disabled and used a wheelchair the day before her tour. Id. ¶ 19. Defendants told her
that the property’s stone pathway was not suitable for wheelchairs, but Plaintiff explained
this would not present any issues. Id. Defendants rescheduled the tour to be on January
22, 2024, representing that they would not show the property on January 20, 2024, because
the residents were moving out. Id. On the morning of January 22, 2024, however,
Defendants told Plaintiff that the property had since been rented to someone else. Id. ¶ 20.
Defendants told her again at this point that “the entrance to the apartment is made of stone
and is not suitable for wheelchairs.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made false
representations to her, as they did give tours to “the able-bodied” on January 20, 2024. Id.
¶ 21. Further, Defendants actual ly entered into a lease with a third party on January 20,
2024. Id. ¶ 22.
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants on January 30, 2025. See generally id. She
sued for violating the following: (1) Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (“Count I”);
(2) Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (“Count II”); (3) Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §
3604(c) (“Count III”); (4) Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (“Count IV”); (5) Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) (“Count V”); (6) Florida Fair Housing Act, Fla. Stat.
§ 760.23(1) (“Count VI”); (7) Florida Fair Housing Act, Fla. Stat. § 760.23(2) (“Count
Case 1:25-cv-20455-KMM Document 28 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2026 Page 2 of 11
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VII”); (8) Florida Fair Housing Act, Fla. Stat. § 760.23(3) (“Count VIII”); (9) Florida Fair
Housing Act, Fla. Stat § 760.23(4) (“Count IX”); (10) Florida Fair Housing Act, Fla. Stat.
§ 760.23(7) (“Count X”); and (11) Florida Fair Housing Act, Fla. Stat. § 760.23(8) (“Count
XI”). Compl. ¶¶ 28–106.
Plaintiff served Rodas on February 5, 2025, and served B&J Services via substitute
service on March 6, 2025. (ECF Nos. 7, 14, 16). The Clerk of Court entered Default for
failure to file or serve responsive papers against Rodas on March 4, 2025, and against B&J
Services on April 1, 2025. (ECF Nos. 9, 21). On April 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant
Motion, seeking the entry of final default judgment against both Defendants. See generally
Mot. Plaintiff seeks $134,000 in total damages, which includes $100,000 in punitive
damages, $9,000 in rental savings,
2 and $25,000 in compensatory damages. Id. at 7–10.
She also requests the Court reserve jurisdiction to award reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs following the entry of judgment. Id. at 10.
Now before the Court is Magistrate Judge Elfenbein’s R&R, recommending the
Court: (1) deny entry of default judgment as to Counts I and II; (2) enter default judgment
as to Counts III –XI; (3) grant Plaintiff’s request for $100,000 in punitive damages; (4)
award Plaintiff $32,200 in compensatory damages, including $25,000 for non- economic
injuries and $7,200 in lost rental savings; and (5) reserve jurisdiction to determine and
award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. See generally R&R.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P.
2 Plaintiff also filed an affidavit with her Motion. See (ECF No. 24- 1). Therein, she requests
$7,200 for the rental savings she missed out on, not $9,000, as requested in the Motion. Id. ¶ 15.
Case 1:25-cv-20455-KMM Document 28 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2026 Page 3 of 11
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72(b)(3). The Court “must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition
that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). A de novo review is therefore
required if a party files “a proper, specific objection” to a factual finding contained in the
report. Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App’x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006). “It is critical that
the objection be sufficiently specific and not a general objection to the report” to warrant
de novo review. Id.
Yet when a party has failed to object or has not properly objected to the magistrate
judge’s findings, “the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face
of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” See Keaton v. United States , No.
14-21230-CIV, 2015 WL 12780912, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 4, 2015); see also Lopez v.
Berryhill, No. 17-CV-24263, 2019 WL 2254704, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2019) (stating
that a district judge “evaluate[s] portions of the R & R not objected to unde r a clearly
erroneous standard of review” (citing Davis v. Apfel, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1317 (M.D. Fla.
2000))).
III. DISCUSSION
In this case, where the Parties have not objected to the R&R, the Court need only
review the R&R for clear error. See Keaton, 2015 WL 12780912, at *1.
Magistrate Judge Elfenbein notes that because Plaintiff has already obtained a
Clerk’s default, default judgment is appropriate so long as the Complaint states a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face. R&R at 10 (citations omitted). The Court agrees. She
also finds that the Florida Fair Housing Act “is to be construed consistently with federal
law,” and treats corresponding provisions of the Florida Fair Housing Act and the fede ral
Fair Housing Act interchangeably, where appropriate. Id. The Court adopts the same
approach.
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A. Counts I, II, VI and VII
Magistrate Judge Elfenbein finds that the entry of default judgment is not warranted
as to Counts I and II, but is warranted as to Counts VI and VII. She finds that Counts I and
II seek relief under 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (a), (b), and that these subsections of the Fair Housing
Act do not cover discrimination based on disability. R&R at 10–11. Magistrate Judge
Elfenbein notes Plaintiff alleges she was discriminated against specifically because of her
disability. Id. at 11. Magistrate Judge Elfenbein therefore finds that Counts I and II fail to
state a claim, and so default judgment cannot be entered. Id.
As for Counts VI and VII, Magistrate Judge Elfenbein finds that subsections (1)
and (2) of the Florida Fair Housing Act cover housing discrimination on the basis of
disability. Id. (citing Fla. Stat. § 760.23(1), (2)). She finds that Plaintiff plausibly states a
claim for relief under Count VI, because she alleges Defendants had actual knowledge of
her protected status, that she was qualified, ready, willing, and able to tour and rent the
property, and that Defendants “attempted to dissuade her interest, used subterfuge to delay
and prevent her from viewing the Property, allowed able-bodied prospective renters to view
and lease the Property, and refused Plaintiff that same opportunity because of her
disability.” Id. As for Count VII, Magistrate Judge Elfenbein finds that Plaintiff plausibly
alleges she has a disability, Defendants knew about it, she was qualified and able to rent
the property, and Defendants deprived her of the opportunity to rent on the same terms as
able-bodied renters because of her disability. Id. at 12. Magistrate Judge Elfenbein also
notes that the substance of Count VII speaks to being discriminated against in the “terms,
conditions, or privileges” because of her disability, which is prohibited by § 760.23(2). Id.
Therefore, it is not fatal to Count VII that it cites to § 760.23(1) instead of § 760.23(2) in
its final paragraph. Id.
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The Court finds no clear error in any of Magistrate Judge Elfenbein’s findings as
to Counts I, II, VI, and VII. Therefore, the Court enters default judgment against
Defendants3 as to Counts VI and VII, but not as to Counts I and II.
B. Counts III and VIII
Magistrate Judge Elfenbein finds that the entry of default judgment is warranted as
to Counts III and VIII. R&R at 12–13. She explains first that 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) prohibits
“making, printing, or publishing any notice, statement, or advertisement with respect to the
sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates a preference, limitation, or discrimination based
on protected traits.” Id. at 12. Magistrate Judge Elfenbein also explains that defendants
may be liable under this subsection even if they just contributed to a violation of the Fair
Housing Act’s prohibitions surrounding discrimination in the rental context, even where
the plaintiff fails to prove liability for that particular defendant. Id. Further, she explains
that this subsection covers communications and written statements made by a person
engaged in the rental of a dwelling. Id. (citation omitted). Finally, Magistrate Judge
Elfenbein notes that the provisions in Counts III and VIII can be interpreted together. See
id. at 13.
Magistrate Judge Elfenbein finds that Plaintiff state s a plausible claim for relief,
because Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Carla Rodas’s written communications reflect that
Plaintiff’s disability “was the motivating factor behind Defendants’ refusal to show and
lease the Property to her.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court finds no clear error in any of
3 The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Elfenbein’s findings that the Fair Housing Act provides
for vicarious liability, thereby implicating both Defendants. R&R at 11 n.3 (citing Meyer v. Holley,
537 U.S. 280 (2003)).
Case 1:25-cv-20455-KMM Document 28 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2026 Page 6 of 11
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Magistrate Judge Elfenbein’s findings as to Counts III and VIII. Therefore, the Court
enters default judgment against Defendants as to Counts III and VIII.
C. Counts IV and IX
Magistrate Judge Elfenbein finds that entry of default judgment is warranted as to
Counts IV and IX. Id. She explains that 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) protects the “legal right to
truthful information about available housing.” Id. (citation omitted). She notes that to state
a plausible claim under this subsection, plaintiffs must allege that the defendants made a
misrepresentation regarding the availability of housing, based on plaintiffs’ protected trait.
Id. Magistrate Judge Elfenbein also notes that the provisions in Counts IV and IX can be
interpreted together. Id. Magistrate Judge Elfenbein finds that Plaintiff states a plausible
claim for relief under both Counts IV and IX, because Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
misrepresented to her that the property in question could not be toured on a day where able-
bodied persons were allowed to tour. Id. The Court finds no clear error in any of
Magistrate Judge Elfenbein’s findings as to Counts IV and IX. Therefore, the Court enters
default judgment against Defendants as to Counts IV and IX.
D. Counts V and X
Magistrate Judge Elfenbein finds that entry of default judgment is warranted as to
Counts V and X. Id. at 14. She finds that under both 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) and Fla. Stat.
§ 760.23(7), a plaintiff must allege at least “that [] adverse action was taken because of a
disability and state the facts on which the plaintiff relies to support that claim.” Id. (citation
omitted). Magistrate Judge Elfenbein notes that Plaintiff has alleged both that the subject
property was toured by and rented to renters who were not disabled, and that Defendants
“refused Plaintiff the ability to tour and rent the Property because of her disability. ” Id.
Magistrate Judge Elfenbein finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to plausibly state
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that Defendants’ adverse actions were taken because of Plaintiff’s disability. Id.
Therefore, she finds that default judgment is warranted as to Counts V and X. Id. The
Court finds no clear error in Magistrate Judge Elfenbein’s reasoning as to Counts V and X.
Therefore, the Court enters default judgment against Defendants as to Counts V and X.
E. Count XI
Magistrate Judge Elfenbein finds that entry of default judgment is warranted as to
Count XI. Id. She states that Fla. Stat. § 760.23(8) “ makes it unlawful to discriminate
against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or
in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith because of disability.” Id.
Magistrate Judge Elfenbein finds that Plaintiff’s allegations plausibly support an inference
that, because of her disability, she was denied an equal opportunity to rent the subject
property on the same terms and conditions as were available to able- bodied prospective
renters. Id. This is sufficient to plead a plausible claim pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 760.23(8).
Id. The Court finds no clear error in Magistrate Judge Elfenbein’s findings as to Count XI.
Therefore, the Court enters default judgment against Defendants as to Count XI.
F. Damages
After establishing that default judgment should be entered as to Counts III –XI,
Magistrate Judge Elfenbein moved on to calculati ng actual and punitive damages. Id. at
15–19. She correctly notes that, on default judgment, the amount of damages are not
admitted by virtu e of Defendants’ default, and that courts “ determine[] the amount and
character of damages to be awarded.” Id. at 15 (quoting Miller v. Paradise of Port Richey,
Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 1999)). She also notes that both the federal and
Florida Fair Housing Acts authorize awards of actual and punitive damages, as well as
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at 16.
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Magistrate Judge Elfenbein finds that Plaintiff relies on the incorrect provision of
Florida law in requesting damages, as Plaintiff seeks damages under Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5),
which is the damages provision of the Florida Civil Right s Act, r ather than Fla. Stat. §
760.35, the damages provision of the Florida Fair Housing Act. Id. at 16–17. Because the
Florida Fair Housing Act is intended to operate in harmony with the federal Fair Housing
Act, and because these acts authorize the same for ms of damages, Magistrate Judge
Elfenbein treated Plaintiff’s citation to the Florida Civil Rights Act as a non -substantive
mistake. Id. at 17. As such, she analyzes damages under Fla. Stat. § 760.35 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 3613(c). The Court agrees with this approach.
As for punitive dama ges, Magistrate Judge Elfenbein recommends awarding
$100,000 to punish and deter willful dis ability discrimination in housing. Id. at 18. I n
reaching this recommendation, Magistrate Judge Elfenbein relies on Plaintiff’ s sworn
affidavit describing intentional disability-based exclusion, and on the fact that Defendants
offered no contrary evidence as to willfulness or as to their financial status, which could
militate against the requested punitive damages amount of $100,000. Id.
As for actual damages, Magistrate Judge Elfenbein recommends awarding $25,000
for emotional distress, humiliation, and loss of dignity, as well as $7,200 in increased rent
Plaintiff paid as a result of being forced to remain in her old apartment after she was unable
to rent the subject property . Id. at 18–20. Magistrate Judge Elfenbein finds that actual
damages based in emotional distress, humiliation, and embarrassment are awardable, even
if not susceptible to exact measurement, as they may be inferred from the circumstances or
proved by testimony. Id. at 19. She states that Eleventh Circuit caselaw also supports
awarding damages based on humiliation and related harms, even without physical
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symptoms or publicity. Id. (citing Banai v. Sec’y, U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev. on
Behalf of Times, 102 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 1997)). Magistrate Judge Elfenbein finds
that Plaintiff’s sworn declaration supports awarding her $25,000 in damages for emotional
distress, loss of dignity, and humiliation. Id. She further finds that this award is reasonable
in light of comparable Eleventh Circuit cases. Id. at 19–20 (collecting ca ses). As for
Plaintiff’s lost rental savings, Magistrate Judge Elfenbein recommends awarding $7,2 00,
representing the additional $120 in rent Plaintiff swore she has paid each month for five
years as a result of not being allowed to lease the subject property. Id. at 20.
The Court finds no clear error in Ma gistrate Judge El fenbein’s findings as to
damages. As such, the Court agrees that Plaintiff shall b e awarded $132,200 in damages
($100,000 in punitive damages, $7,200 in lost rental savings, and $25,000 in other actual
damages for emotional distress). Finally, Magistrate Judge Elfenbein recommends that the
Court grant Plaintiff’s request to reserve juris diction to award reasonable attorney ’s fees
and costs following the entry of judgment. Id. The Court agrees.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, UPON CONSIDERATION of the Motion, the R&R, the pertinent
portions of the record, and being otherwise advised in the premises, it is hereby ORDERED
AND ADJUDGED that:
1. Magistrate Judge Elfenbein’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No.
27) is ADOPTED.
2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 24) is GRANTED
IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter final default judgment
against Defendants as to Counts III–XI, but not as to Counts I and II.
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4. Plaintiff is awarded $132,200, including $100,000 in punitive damages
and $32,200 in actual damages.
5. Plaintiff’s counsel is DIRECTED to file a supplemental affidavit on
the amount of attorney’s fees and costs, including all necessary
information to support a lodestar analysis, with supporting timesheets.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this _____ day of Febr uary,
2026.
K. MICHAEL MOORE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
c: All counsel of record
9th
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