govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-1_25-cv-22154-1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO. 25-22154-CV-WILLIAMS 
 
RAZIEL OFER, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
 Defendant. 
_______________________________/  
 
ORDER 
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Ellen F. D’Angelo’s 
Report and Recommendations (DE 44) (“Report”) on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff’s Initial Complaint (DE 20)  (“Motion”). In the Report, Judge D’Angelo  
recommends granting the Motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (DE 44  at 12, 
19). Plaintiff filed objections to the report (DE 47 ) (“Objections”)1 to which Defendant 
responded (DE 53), and Plaintiff replied (DE 55). For the reasons set forth below, Judge 
D’Angelo’s Report is AFFIRMED IN PART. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This lawsuit is one of several matters instituted by Plaintiff in this Court. 2 (DE 44 
 
1 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s 68-page objection to the Report violates  S.D. Fla. Mag. 
J. R. 4, which states, “no party shall file any objections or responses to another party’s 
objections exceeding twenty pages in length.” S.D. Fla. Mag. J. R. 4(a)(1). 
 
2 Plaintiff presently has six pending cases in this district. See Ofer v. 1434 Collins, LLC et 
al., No. 26-CV-20561 (S.D. Fla. Jan 27, 2026); Ofer v. Miami Dade Property Appraiser’s 
Off. et al., No. 26-CV-20292 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2026) ; Ofer v. Scales, III et al ., No. 25-
CV-26133, (S.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2025); Ofer v. Ruiz, No. 25-CV-26134 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 
2025); Ofer v. Attorney Gen. for the United States of America, No. 25 -CV-22154 (S.D. 
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at n.7) (noting Plaintiff’s open cases in this dis trict and the contents of a show cause 
order issued by the Florida Third District Court of Appeal which resulted in Plaintiff being 
barred from filing in the Third DCA absent review and signature of a member in good 
standing of the Florida bar). In this suit, Plaintiff names United States Bankruptcy Judge 
Laurel Isicoff (“Bankruptcy Judge”) and sues the United States as her employer. (DE 
1 “Complaint”). Plaintiff asserts three causes of action: Negligence (C ount I), Civil 
Rights Violations of Title VI (Count II), and Negligent Retention (Count III).  
The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is the subject of litigation in Florida due to his 
real estate business and several third parties  moving to enforce alleged liens and 
encumbrances against his properties. ( Id. at ¶ 3 ). As a result of the mounting suits, 
Plaintiff filed petitions for reorganization of two entities in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the Southern District of Florida. (Id. at 4–6). Plaintiff alleges that “several private 
actors . . . conspired to cause the appointment of a very specific judge to become 
appointed to preside over the matters in the bankruptcy court prior to the petitions being 
filed.” (Id. at 7). Plaintiff further alleges that the Bankruptcy Judge conspired with Barry 
S. Mukamal “to cause the loss of property through conduct which was based upon the 
race, ethnicity and religion of the Plaintiff as he is Jewish.” (Id. at 9–10). The Complaint 
states that the Bankruptcy Judge was presented with antisemitic affidavits and a voice 
recording discussing the Bankruptcy Judge’s appointment over the bankruptcy matters, 
which were allegedly ignored by the Bankruptcy Judge. ( Id. ¶¶ 12 –15). Moreover, as 
part of the alleged conspiracy, Plaintiff accuses the Bankruptcy Judge  of receiving a 
“$2M bribe for her role in this criminal conspiracy.” (Id. ¶ 20).  
 
Fla. May 8, 2025); Ofer v. Isicoff, No. 23-CV-24738 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2023). 
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Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint , arguing that the Court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction and Plaintiff failed to state a claim . (DE 20). Upon careful review of 
the Report, the Objections, the record, and applicable law, the Motion is now ripe for 
resolution. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
“In order to challenge the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge, 
a party must file written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the 
proposed findings and recommendation to which objection is made and the specific 
basis for objection.” Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App’x 781, 783 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(cleaned up). Under the Southern District of Florida Local Rules, objections must also 
cite to the relevant supporting legal authority. S.D. Fla. Mag. J. R. 4( a). When a party 
timely objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district judge 
“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed 
findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 
“Attacks on subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) comes in two 
forms.” Lawrence v. Dunbar , 919 F.2d 1525, 1528- 29 (11th Cir. 1990). Facial attacks 
require the court to consider whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of 
subject matter jurisdiction, “and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the 
purposes of the m otion.” Id. at 1529. Conversely, “factual attacks” challenge “the 
existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters 
outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits, are considered.” Id. (quotations 
omitted). 
“To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain 
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sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Pleadings must contain “more than labels and conclusions, 
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). Indeed, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for 
relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 
556). 
III. DISCUSSION  
Although Plaintiff timely filed objections to the Report
3, they do not set forth specific 
matters in dispute and are not  supported by “ statutory, rule, or case authority ” as 
required by the Southern District of Florida Magistrate Judge Rules. S.D. Fla. Mag. J. R. 
4(a). The Objections merely rehash the allegations of the Complaint, arguing that “[t]he 
Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate [ Judge] should be denied” on two 
grounds: (1) “the recording of the conversation between ROIV 4 and Kalb is a genuine 
recording, and Plaintiff has submitted a copy of the recording with the Clerk of the Court, 
to be filed;” and (2) “Plaintiff has moved for leave to amend the complaint to further clarify 
the positions that he raises.” (DE 47 at 3).  
The Court is required to “make a de novo determination of those portions of the 
report . . . or recommendations to which objection is made ;” however, Plaintiff’s 
 
3 Plaintiff did not seek leave of Court to file his 68- page Objections in violation of the 
Southern District of Florida Magistrate R ules, which limit s a party’s objections and 
responses to twenty pages. See S.D. Fla. Mag. J. R. 4(a)(1). 
 
4 Throughout the Objections, Plaintiff identifies Mr. Roniel Rodriguez IV as “ROIV.” (DE 
47 at 2). ROIV is the Bankruptcy Judge’s alleged partner in the “hate crime” against 
Plaintiff. (Id.)  
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objections do not specifically address the deficiencies identified in the Report. 28 U.S.C. 
¶ 636 (emphasis added); see also Taylor v. Acting Comm’r, 761 Fed. App’x. 966, 969 n. 
1 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting that “failure to object to the magistrate’s factual findings after 
notice precludes a later attack on these findings ”) (citing Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 
738 (11th Cir. 1988) ) (quotations omitted). “District Courts in the Eleventh Circuit have 
reviewed those portions of a magistrate’s report and recommendation to which no 
objection has been made for clear error.” Lombardo v. U.S., 222 F. Dupp. 2d 1367, 1369 
(S.D. Fla. 2002) (emphasis added). 
The Report analyzed four  arguments advanced by Defendant.  (DE 20; DE 44). 
First, Defendant argued that the Complaint is “frivolous and fantastical.” (DE 20 at 2–4). 
Second, Defendant maintained that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 
Plaintiff’s Title VI claim, or in the alternative, Plaintiff failed to state a violation of Title VI. 
(Id. at 4–6). Third, Defendant argued that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 
Plaintiff’s tort claims (Count I and III). (Id. at 6–8). And fourth, Defendant urged the Court 
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for negligence (Count I) and negligent 
retention (Count III). ( Id. at 8 –10). Based on these assertions, Judge D’ Angelo 
recommended (1) “that Count two be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1);” and (2) “that Counts One and Three be 
DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1).” (DE 44 at 12, 19) (emphasis in original).  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)  
and S.D. Fla. Mag. J. R. 4(a), the Court reviews each recommendation below and “shall 
set aside any portion of the Magistrate Judge’s order found to be clearly erroneous or 
contrary to law.” S.D. Fla. Mag. J. R. 4(a). 
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A. The Report recommends dismissal of Count II. 
The Report recommends dismissal of Count II because the Court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000d et seq .. (DE 44 at 11 –12). The Court finds Magistrate Judge D’Angelo’s 
recommendation to dismiss Count II sound and consistent with the law. The Report  
correctly noted that “[s]overeign immunity is jurisdictional in nature” because, without an 
explicit waiver, the Federal Government and its agencies are immune from suit. F.D.I.C. 
v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).  
Title VI does not contain an explicit waiver of the federal government’s sovereign 
immunity, and Plaintiff does not allege facts to the contrary. See Dorsey v. U.S. Dept. of 
Labor, 41 F.3d 1551, 1554– 55 (“Even if there is an implied right of action for damages 
under Title VI, . . . it cannot exist as against the federal government. The federal 
government’s waiver of sovereign immunity must be “unequivocally expressed” and the 
statutory provision containing the expression must ‘ establish unambiguously that the 
waiver extends to monetary claims.’”) (citing United States v. Nodic Village, Inc. 503 U.S. 
30, 33 (1992)); see, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 390uu (expressly waiving sovereign immunity and 
noting, “[t]he United States, when a party to any suit, shall be deemed to have waived 
any right to plead that it is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and shall 
be subject to judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction . . . in the 
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances”); 
see also 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (“The United States may be named as a party defendant in 
a civil action under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the 
United States claims an interest, other than a security interest or water rights. ”). 
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Therefore, where Defendant has not expressly waived sovereign immunity, the Court 
lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s Title VI claim. Accordingly, the Court adopts 
Magistrate Judge D’Angelo’s recommendation and dismisses Count II of the Complaint 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
B.  The Report recommends dismissal of Counts I and III. 
Next, t he Report recommends dismissing  Counts I and III for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction because the Complaint does not establish negligence or negligent 
retention under Florida law. The Report relies on  the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) 
and concludes that “where no cognizable state law tort claim could be sustained against 
a private individual in like circumstances, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 
Plaintiff’s claim under the FTCA.” (DE 44 at 16).  
As noted by the Report, Plaintiff’s response to the motion to dismiss argued that 
jurisdiction is proper before this Court because Defendant purportedly “waived its 
sovereign immunity under two related sections of the FTCA:” Sections 1346(b) and 
2674. (DE 20 at 10). However, Sections  1346(b) and 2674  similarly explain that the 
United States may only be liable for a tort if a private person would similarly be liable 
under applicable state law. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1) , 2674. Specifically, Section 
1346(b)(1) states: 
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, 
together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal 
Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands,  shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money 
damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of 
property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act 
or omission of any employee of the Government while acting wi thin the 
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the 
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in 
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission 
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occurred. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (emphasis added). Likewise, Section 2674 provides, in relevant 
part: 
The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title 
relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a 
private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for 
interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (emphasis added).  
 Therefore, the Court only has jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims if an analogous 
cause of action under Florida law exists. See Zelaya v. U.S., 781 F.3d 1315, 1323 (11th 
Cir. 2015) (“[B]oth §§ 1346(b)(1)  and 2674 preclude liability of the federal government 
absent a showing by the plaintiff that a private individual who had acted as did the federal 
employee, in like circumstances, would be liable for the particular tort under governing 
state law where the tort occurred. ”). To be sure, “the question is not whether plaintiff 
sufficiently alleges all elements of the underlying cause of action, but whether state tort 
law imposes an analogous duty on private individuals in similar circumstances.” Guillermo 
Antonio De Leon Serrabi v. U.S.A., et al., No. 3:24-cv-1212-JEP-LLL, 2026 WL 642365, 
at *7 (M.D. Fla. Jan 8, 2026). 
 As it relates to Count 1 (Negligence), Plaintiff asserts that the United States “owed 
a duty of care to Plaintiff for its employee and agent not to take actions which violate his 
civil rights and engage in conduct which is based upon his race, ethnicity or religion as a 
person of Jewish origin.” (DE 1 ¶ 26).  The correct inquiry here is “whether [Florida] tort 
law imposes an analogous duty on private individuals in similar circumstances.” Serrabi, 
2026 WL 642365, at *7. Plaintiff fails to identify a single Florida analogous cause of action 
where a third party  must come to the aid of another to prevent a civil rights violation. 
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Indeed, the two Florida statutes identified by Plaintiff do not suffice as analogous state 
claims to create tort liability under the FTCA. (Id. at 16–17) (explaining that Florida Statute 
Sections 768.28 and 760.01 are the Florida equivalent of FTCA and Title VI, respectively, 
and do not create tort liability). Moreover,  Under Florida law, “[n]o common law duty 
exists, absent special relationship, for one person to come to the aid of another or to 
intervene in the misconduct of a third person to prevent the possibility of harm to another.” 
Laskey v. Martin Co. Sheriff’s Dept., 708 So. 2d 1013, 1014 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). As 
noted in the Report, Magistrate Judge D’Angelo concluded, “[p]laintiff does not allege the 
existence of any special relationship that would give rise to a legal duty establishing tort 
liability.” Accordingly, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear Count I 
and adopts the Report’s recommendation of dismissal.
5 
As to  Count III (Negligent Retention), Florida recognizes a cause of action for 
negligent hiring, training, retention, supervision, or entrustment . See Jones v. Vasilias , 
359 So. 3d 10, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2023) (recognizing that a claim for negligent training, 
retention, supervision, or entrustment can be asserted against a supervisor individually 
or a corporate employer ). Therefore, a private person could be subjected to liability for 
common law negligent retention of an employee.  However, the Court constr ues 
Defendant’s arguments and the Report’s analysis as being focused on Plaintiff’s failure 
to state a claim. Compare (DE 20 at 9) (“Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to maintain 
 
5 Plaintiff’s failure to plead an analogous cause of action under Florida law is also a basis 
for dismissal under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. See Zelaya v. U. S., 781 F.3d 1315, 1325 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(“Unless Plaintiffs can identify corresponding state law duties, they have, at the least, 
failed to state a claim, and arguably their lapse deprives the court of even subject matter 
jurisdiction over the action.”). However, “[w]here dismissal can be based on lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, the court should dismiss on only the 
jurisdictional grounds.” Boda v. U.S., 698 F.2d 1174, 1177 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1983). 
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a negligent retention Claim.”), with (DE 44 at 19 n. 10) (“ To the extent the deficiencies 
identified herein do not implicate the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it is respectfully 
recommended that those deficiencies warrant dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). ”); see also 
Serrabi, et al., 2026 WL 642365, at *8 (recognizing that Florida has a false imprisonment 
cause of action and that “[t]he United States’ arguments concerning false imprisonment 
[were] more aptly characterized as failure to state a claim under Fed. R. 12(b)(6)” where 
the plaintiff asserted false imprisonment under the FTCA). 
To state a claim for negligent retention, a plaintiff must plead facts to establish that 
the employer should have “foreseen, based on its employees’ work history, that they 
would commit the current tort.” Bello v. Johnson, 442 F. App’x 477, 480 (11th Cir. 2011). 
The underlying wrong committed by the employee “must be a common law tort.” Gutman 
v. Quest Diagnostics Laboratories, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1331–32 (S.D. Fla. 2010); 
see also Scelta v. Delicatessen Support Servs., Inc., 57 F. Supp. 1327, 1348 (M.D. Fla. 
1999) (“Under Florida law, the underlying wrong allegedly committed by an employee in 
a negligent supervision or negligent retention claim must be based on an injury resulting 
from a tort which is recognized under common law.”).  
Here, the point of contention is whether Plaintiff adequately alleged an underlying 
tort. The Complaint specifically alleges that the United States failed to protect him from 
antisemitic conduct while the Bankruptcy Judge performed her official duties . (DE 1 ¶¶ 
40–45). Specifically, Plaintiff states: (1) Defendant “owes a duty of care to Plaintiff for its 
employee and agent not to take actions which violate his civil rights and engage in 
conduct which is based upon his race, ethnicity or religion as a person of Jewish origin; ” 
(2) “[t]his duty of care was not to deprive the Plaintiff of the various protections afforded 
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him under the constitution an laws of the United States;” (3) “Defendant failed in that duty 
to protect the Plaintiff from those harms in the antisemitic conduct while performing her 
official duties” as Defendant’s employee; and (4) Defendant “became aware” of the 
problems with the Bankruptcy Judge’s “unfitness to hold office” and failed to take action, 
causing harm to Plaintiff.  (DE 1 ¶¶ 40–46). 
The Report found that the allegations sound in discrimination as they allude to 
“discriminatory conduct as the basis for Defendant’s alleged negligent retention of its 
employee.” (DE 44 at 18). Certainly, P laintiff insists that “[t]his matter is a case or 
controversy where the Plaintiff has suffered a manifest injustice and grave deprivation of 
his civil rights . . . at the hand of antisemitic conduct of an employee”  and agent of the 
United States. (DE 47 at 2). The Court agrees with regard to the character ization of the 
count sounding in discrimination and does not find this determination to be a clear error 
where Plaintiff alleges that the Bankruptcy Judge discriminated against him because he 
is “a person of Jewish origin.” (DE 1 ¶ 40; DE 53 at 2).  A s noted by the Report,  
discrimination is not recognized as a tort that can sustain a negligent retention claim under 
Florida law. (DE 44 at 14); see also Mighty v. Genesis Eldercare Rehab. Servs., Inc., No. 
18-CIV-80440, 2018 WL 5113965, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 24, 2018) (“Harassment and 
discrimination are not recognized under Florida law as torts that can support a claim for 
negligent supervision and retention”). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege 
an actionable claim for negligent retention. Accordingly, the Court overrules Magistrate 
Judge D’Angelo’s recommendation as to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
and instead dismisses Count III for failure to state a claim.  
C. The Report concludes that future amendments will be futile. 
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As an initial matter, Plaintiff is well beyond his deadline to amend the Complaint 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) as Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss on 
August 28, 2025, giving Plaintiff until September 18, 2025, to Amend the Complaint as  
a matter of course. See Ofer v. Isicoff, No. 24 -11542, 2025 WL 2466579, at 1– 2 (11th 
Cir. 2025) (noting that despite the Court’s “serious doubt that amendment would save 
[Ofer’s] claims, . . . Ofer is entitled to amend once as a matter of course” because the 
motion to dismiss was granted before the twenty -one-day clock started ticking) 
(emphasis added). Unlike that Ofer case, 2025 WL 2466579, Plaintiff here is beyond the 
twenty-one-day period to amend under rule 15(a).  Therefore, Plaintiff may only amend 
the Complaint with leave of Court. 
The Report finds that future amendment to the Complaint would be futile because 
the Complaint is so “devoid of legal merit, such that even if Plaintiff incorporated the 
more detailed allegations from his Opposition into the Complaint,” the Complaint would 
still fail to establish subject matter jurisdiction  over Counts I and II; and Count III would 
still fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (DE 44  at 21). The Court 
agrees. Amendment is futile “if an amended complaint would still fail at the motion- to-
dismiss or summary- judgement stage.” L.S. ex rel. Hernandez v. Peterson, 982 F.3d 
1323,1332 (11th Cir. 2020).  Here, Count II (Title VI) wou ld fail, despite amendment, 
because Defendant is immune from suit as Title VI does not include an express waiver 
of sovereign immunity . Likewise, Count I (Negligence) would continue to fail at the 
dismissal stage because Plaintiff cannot identify an analogous cause of action under 
Florida law. And lastly, amendment to Count III (Negligent Retention) would be futile 
because Plaintiff’s claim is grounded in discrimination which cannot support a negligent 
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retention cause of action.  
Moreover, the Report found, and the Court  agrees, that Plaintiff’s claims are 
frivolous and unsupported as the affidavits submitted with the Complaint do not mention 
the Bankruptcy Judge nor do they establish her participation in the alleged conspiracy. 
(DE 1 at 13 –14; DE 44 at 8). Similarly, the purported  recording of a conversation 
discussing the conspiracy is unavailing. (DE 52; DE 44 at 8). As the Court noted in a 
separate litigation by Plaintiff against the Bankruptcy Judge, the Complaint “presents no 
support for these fantastical conspiracy accusations.” Ofer v. Isicoff, No. 23-CIV-24738, 
DE 25 at 4–5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2024); see also Ofer v. Isicoff, 2025 WL 2466579, at 2 
(expressing “serious doubt” that amendment would save Ofer’s claims). Accordingly, the 
Court finds that leave to amend would be futile. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:  
1. Judge D’Angelo’s Report (DE 44) is ADOPTED IN PART. 
2. Counts I and II of the Complaint are  DISMISSED. Plaintiff is NOT 
GRANTED leave to amend Count I and II as any amendment would be 
futile.6 
 
6 Because Counts I and II were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court 
can only dismiss without prejudice. See Boda , 698 F.2d at 1177 n. 4. (“Where dismissal 
can be based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, the court 
should dismiss on only the jurisdictional grounds. This dismissal is without prejudice. ); 
see also Woodson v. Eleventh Jud. Cir. in and for Miami Dade Cnty, Fla, 791 F. App’x 
116, 119 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting that the plaintiff’s “claim should have been dismissed 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which is without prejudice, rather than failure to state 
a claim, which is with prejudice”). However, as Judge D’Angelo and the Court concludes, 
amendment would be futile.  See Woodson, 791 F’ Appx. at 119 –20 (recognizing that 
although plaintiff’s claim was dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, the Court did not find “that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing 
[the] complaint without leave to amend, since . . . [the] proposed amendment . . .  was 
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3. Count III of the Complaint is  DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as Plaintiff 
failed to state a claim and amendment would be futile. 
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Miami, Florida, on this 18th day 
of March, 2026. 
 
futile.”).  
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