govinfo:USCOURTS-ncmd-1_25-cv-01039-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
ABBIE BYRD, et al. )  
 
Plaintiffs, 
) 
) 
 
 )  
v. )  
 ) 1:25-cv-1039 
TITLEMAX OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 
INC. and TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, 
INC.,  
 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
Defendants. ) 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
Lindsey A. Freeman, United States District Judge 
This is one of 22 cases involving a dispute about high interest loan transactions 
between a series of borrowers and “TitleMax” entities.  Most of these cases have 
proceeded by mass action and individual arbitration.  Defendants now want to change 
that practice.  In their view, the 87 Plaintiffs here were improperly joined, and they should 
file separate individual actions.  The Court disagrees.  Plaintiffs meet the requirements of 
permissive joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20, and the Court declines to 
sever pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21.  For the reasons stated below, 
Defendants’ motion is DENIED. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 Plaintiffs are 87 North Carolina residents who filed a complaint in the North 
Carolina Superior Court against TitleMax of Virginia, Inc. and TitleMax of South 
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Carolina, Inc. (“Defendants”) on October 9, 2025.  Dkt. 4 ¶ 1.  Shortly thereafter, they 
amended their complaint, which is the operative complaint.  Dkt. 9 (“ Amended 
Complaint”).   
Plaintiffs allege in their Amended Complaint that certain car title loan transactions 
between them and the Defendants violated North Carolina law.  Dkt. 9 ¶¶ 1, 25-38.  They 
argue that (1) Defendants violated the North Carolina Consumer Finance Act (“CFA”), 
N.C. Gen Stat. § 53-190, by charging Plaintiffs an annual percentage rate (“ APR”) 
exceeding the maximum allowed under the CFA, Dkt. 9 ¶¶ 25-30; and (2) Defendants 
used “unfair and deceptive trade practices” in or affecting commerce in violation of the 
North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“UDTPA”), N.C. Gen Stat. § 75-
1.1, Dkt. 9 ¶¶ 31-38.   
Defendants seek to arbitrate the claims by enforcing an arbitration agreement 
contained in the loan contracts.  Id. ¶¶ 44-45.  Defendants removed the case to this Court 
on November 14, 2025.  Dkt. 1 (Notice of Removal).  On the same day, Defendants filed a 
motion to sever Plaintiffs’ claims and dismiss all Plaintiffs without prejudice except for 
the first named Plaintiff—Abbie Byrd—for misjoinder pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 20 and 21.  Dkt. 4 (the “Motion”).  The parties have briefed the merits of the 
Motion.  See Dkts. 5 (Memorandum in Support); 20 (Response in Opposition); 22 (Reply 
in Support). 
 
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ANALYSIS 
 The Court is well within its discretion to permit joinder here.  Each Plaintiff is a 
North Carolina resident who borrowed from at least one of the two TitleMax Defendants 
through the same type of alleged high-interest title lending scheme that Plaintiffs claim 
violates North Carolina law.  Moreover, spliĴing this case into 87 individual actions to 
determine the same threshold issues before considering whether to send the cases to 
arbitration is an unnecessary, administrative nightmare.  Joinder will not only be 
convenient to the Court, but it will also “expedite the final determination of [these] 
disputes.”  Saval, v. BL Ltd., 710 F.2d 1027, 1031 (4th Cir. 1983) (internal quotations 
omiĴed). 
The Rules of Civil Procedure dictate the result here.  First, permissive joinder 
under Rule 20 is appropriate because Plaintiffs’ right to relief arises out of the same series 
of transactions or occurrences, and questions of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will 
arise in the action.  See infra at Section I.  Second, the Court is not persuaded that either 
prejudice or administrative concerns warrant exercising its discretion to sever pursuant 
to Rule 21.  See infra at Section II. 
I. Plaintiffs Meet the Requirements for Permissive Joinder Under Rule 20. 
Pursuant to its “wide discretion over permissive joinder,” Sakthivel v. Jaddou, No. 
21-1207, 2023 WL 2888565, at *5 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 2023), the Court finds the 87 Plaintiffs 
in this action were properly joined in this case.  Rule 20 states, 
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[p]ersons may join in one action as plaintiffs if: (A) they assert 
any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with 
respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, 
or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question 
of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1).  While both requirements must be met for permissive joinder to 
be proper, the transaction and common-question requirements are not “rigid tests.”  7 
Charles Alan Wright, et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1653 (3d ed. 2026).  The Court finds both 
requirements are met here. 
A. Plaintiffs’ “right to relief” arises out of the same transaction or 
occurrence.  
Plaintiffs meet the first prong of Rule 20(a)(1) because their “right to relief … 
arise[es] out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or 
occurrences.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1).  While a right to relief is easily understood—
essentially a plaintiff’s claim for relief, see Saval, 710 F.2d at 1031 (equating right to relief 
with claim for relief)—“transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences” 
depends heavily on the nuances of each case.  Cf. Slep-Tone Ent. Corp. v. Mainville, No. 
3:11-cv-122, 2011 WL 4713230, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 6, 2011) (transaction requirement 
generally analyzed on a “case by case basis”) (internal quotations omiĴed). 
Plaintiffs’ claims here all stem from the same alleged high-interest title lending 
scheme and unfair trade practices and thus are logically related to the same transaction 
or occurrence.  “Two claims arise from the same transaction — and therefore can be joined 
in the same action — when there is a ‘logical relationship’ between them.”  Courthouse 
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News Serv. v. Schaefer, 2 F.4th 318, 325 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotations omiĴed); see also 
Moore v. N.Y. CoĴon Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926).  Thus, “all ‘logically related’ events 
entitling a person to institute a legal action against another generally are regarded as 
comprising a transaction or occurrence.”  Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 
(8th Cir. 1974).  There are two steps to the analysis: (1) determining the scope of the 
transaction by referring to the claims; and (2) determining whether the claim-related 
events of the joining plaintiffs generally fit within the scope of the transaction.1 
Plaintiffs’ claims2 concern North Carolina’s public policy protecting North 
Carolina residents from (1) out-of-state, exceedingly high-interest, low-value loans (the 
CFA claim), and (2) unfair and deceptive commercial practices associated with those 
loans (the UDTPA claim).  Thus, according to Plaintiffs’ allegations in the Amended 
Complaint, the scope of the transaction is a title loan lending scheme that violates North 
 
1 An overview of Fourth Circuit case law confirms these two steps.  In both Hinson v. 
Norwest Fin. S.C., Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 618–19 (4th Cir. 2001) and Saval, 710 F.2d at 1031, the 
Court looked to the claims asserted to determine the scope of the transaction before 
analyzing whether the joining plaintiffs’ conduct was part of the same transaction.   
   Additionally, the Fourth Circuit recognizes that “[a]bsolute identity of all events is 
unnecessary” for joinder.  Schaefer, 2 F.4th at 325 (quoting Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1333).  
Rather, “Rule 20 permits joinder of “all reasonably related claims for relief by or against 
different parties.”  Id.; see also Hinson, 239 F.3d at 613 (finding transaction where the 
joining plaintiffs alleged “similar loans,” with “the same or similar types of violations,” 
even though there were some factual differences between joining plaintiffs and original 
plaintiffs.) 
2 Plaintiffs also assert two additional claims for relief: (1) punitive damages; and (2) a 
motion to compel arbitration.  Id. ¶¶ 39-45.  However, both claims are not independent 
causes of action but rather are dependent on the first two claims for relief. 
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Carolina law.  To effectuate this alleged scheme, Defendants, among other things, (1) 
solicited residents of North Carolina to travel to another state (namely, Virginia or South 
Carolina) to enter into a loan transaction with them that was subject to an exceedingly 
high interest rate, see Dkt. 9 ¶¶ 1-3, 9, 13, 18-20, 26, and (2) as collateral, secured liens on 
the North Carolina residents’ vehicles.  Id. ¶ 23. 
Plaintiffs have also sufficiently alleged claim-related events that generally fit 
within the scope of the transaction in this case.  Plaintiffs allege that Defendants (1) 
charged all Plaintiffs annual interest rates far3 exceeding the CFA limit, Dkt. 9, ¶ 26; (2) 
engaged in at least one of the contractual activities listed in Section 190(a) of the CFA 
within the state of North Carolina for each plaintiff, id. ¶ 27; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-
190(a); and (3) used possibly unfair or deceptive practices under the UDTPA, such as 
Defendants’ failure to disclose that North Carolina law prohibits these loans, and their 
illegal use of notaries to notarize documents outside the presence of the signer, place liens 
on their titles, and enter the state to wrongly convert Plaintiffs' vehicles, Dkt. 9 ¶ 33.4  
These facts are each logically related to Plaintiffs’ claims. 
 
3 Although the rates differ, this is largely irrelevant.  What maĴers to the CFA claim is 
that the rate exceeds the amount permissible under the CFA. 
4 Plaintiffs additionally allege that violations of the CFA in the same manner alleged here 
constitutes unfair and deceptive trade practices under the UDTPA.  See Wall v. AutoMoney, 
877 S.E.2d 37, 49 (N.C. Ct. App. 2022). 
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The logic of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hinson confirms Plaintiffs’ claims here 
are logically related, such that their right to relief arises out of the same transaction.  See 
generally Hinson v. Norwest Fin. S.C., Inc., 239 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2001).  In Hinson, the 
plaintiffs borrowed money from the defendant secured by a mortgage on their homes.  
See id. at 613.  Among other things, they claimed the defendant failed to inform them of 
their right to counsel of their choosing.  Id.  The plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint 
to add seven new plaintiff borrowers who, unlike the original plaintiffs, received some 
aĴorney preference information from the defendant, but who still alleged the notice, and 
other actions taken by Norwest, did not comply with state law.  Id. at 614.  The Fourth 
Circuit found the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the joining 
plaintiffs to proceed in the same action because they “participated in the same kind of 
transaction” as the original plaintiffs, namely (1) all transactions involved similar loans 
from the defendant, and (2) the joining plaintiffs “alleged the same or similar types of 
violations commiĴed by [defendant] in these transactions.”  Id. at 618.  These same 
characteristics are present here.  All Plaintiffs participated in the same kind of alleged 
transaction: similar high-risk, high-rate title loans from the TitleMax defendants.  All 
Plaintiffs alleged the same or similar types of violations commiĴed by the Defendants in 
these transactions. 
This “paĴern” or “common scheme” of similar violative conduct by Defendants, 
as alleged in this case, further supports finding Plaintiffs’ claims arose out of the same 
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transaction.  Compare Stacy v. Jennmar Corp. of Virginia, Inc., 342 F.R.D. 215, 225 (W.D. Va. 
2022) (finding transaction where plaintiffs alleged a “common enterprise” of 22 principal, 
subsidiary, or affiliate defendant entities who followed the same policies “in violation of 
federal law”) and Pontones v. Los Tres Magueyes, Inc., No. 5:18-cv-87, 2020 WL 12839920, at 
*2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 2020) (alleging common enterprise and permiĴing joinder where 
newly added defendants who owned and operated twelve restaurant locations including 
two where plaintiff was employed deprived Plaintiff and other employees of wages 
earned in violation of federal law) with Slep-Tone, 2011 WL 4713230 at *2, *4 (denying 
joinder of karaoke jockeys who independently engaged in “similar yet separately 
occurring acts” to violate the same trademark, where none of them knew of each other’s 
trademark violations). 
Defendants point to several factual differences, but most are not logically relevant 
to Plaintiffs’ claims.  For instance, Defendants allege that the loan transactions took place 
“at different times, in different places, with different contractual terms, involving 
different witnesses, for different amounts, and at different interest rates.”  Dkt. 5 at 10.  
However, “absolute identity of all events is unnecessary.”  Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1333.  What 
maĴers is how these differences are relevant to either claim, which Defendants fail to 
demonstrate.   
Take the following illustration.  Your friend asks you if you went to the game that 
one Friday, claiming that the game “was crazy.”  It may be hard for you to readily identify 
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the “game” your friend is referencing.  You might start by asking her what type of game 
she meant.  After all, baseball and Parcheesi are not similar, even though both are types 
of games.  When you find out it was a baseball game, you might home in on game-specific 
details, like whether it was a minor league game or her son’s liĴle league game and 
whether you are thinking of the same Friday.  What is not relevant is the section of the 
stadium where she may have sat or the vendors who brought her food.  While they might 
have affected her experience at the game, they ultimately do not pertain to the central 
determination of whether you and your friend aĴended the same Friday baseball game.   
Defendants’ arguments largely focus on irrelevant differences or fail to 
demonstrate how these differences affect the disposition of Plaintiffs’ claims.  Some of 
these differences are almost entirely irrelevant (like different witnesses).  Others are 
relevant, but only to the degree they impact the disposition of individual claims (such as 
the different times—to the extent they impact statute-of-limitations arguments, different 
interest rates, loan amounts, and contractual terms).  From the Court’s reading of the 
Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs essentially alleged they all aĴended the same 
metaphorical baseball game.  The minor differences that Defendants identify do not 
substantively undermine that Plaintiffs’ claims arose out of the same transaction or 
occurrence. 
The lender-borrower and insurance cases cited by Defendants are distinguishable.  
The claim-related conduct in those cases is different from the parties here because no 
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common scheme was present.  In Kalie, for instance, the plaintiffs alleged 26 types of 
wrongful conduct—some of which were completely unrelated—and did not indicate 
which misconduct applied to which plaintiff, defendant, or loan transaction.  See Kalie v. 
Bank of Am. Corp., 297 F.R.D. 552, 555, 557-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  The plaintiffs in Abraham 
asserted more than a dozen claims against dozens of mortgage originators and servicers 
with unsupported assertions that “[d]efendants were involved in a common scheme or 
plan.”  See Abraham v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 222, 226, 230 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal quotation omiĴed).  In Visendi, the interactions between the 
plaintiffs and the wide array of more than two dozen defendant lending companies “were 
not uniform,” and included “[f]actual disparities” of too great a magnitude to support 
permissive joinder.  See Visendi v. Bank of Am., N.A., 733 F.3d 863, 866, 870 (9th Cir. 2013).  
And in Grennell, individual insurance agents separately induced over 1,000 plaintiffs to 
purchase insurance policies using different strategies by different misrepresentations, 
and none of the plaintiffs “had contact with any of the individual defendants.”  See 
Grennell v. W. S. Life Ins. Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 390, 392-93, 397-400 (S.D.W. Va. 2004).  
These “vague,” “amorphous,” and disconnected events, see Kalie, 297 F.R.D. at 558, 
are far from the common scheme alleged here.  This is one of 22 cases currently before 
the Court (16 of which are mass actions filed by North Carolina plaintiffs) with various 
TitleMax entities from various states that allege roughly the same facts.  At least part of 
the alleged business scheme hinges upon high risk, high interest car title loans, which 
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may be lawful in some states but not in North Carolina, and potentially deceptive trade 
practices.  Plaintiffs have met the first requirement of permissive joinder. 
B. All Plaintiffs share a common question of law or fact. 
The common question of law or fact prong requires only that “at least one common 
question of law or fact” be raised by all plaintiffs.  Stephens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of 
the Mid-Atl. States, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 2d 375, 384 (D. Md. 2011) (internal quotation omiĴed 
and citation modified).  Plaintiffs have done so here.   
In their briefing, both parties construe the common question of law or fact too 
narrowly.  Cf. Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1334 (using the parallel requirement under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23(a) to guide construction of the common question required by Rule 
20 and finding a “permissive application so that common questions have been found to 
exist in a wide range of context”).  Defendants focus heavily on venue, personal 
jurisdiction, and arbitrability.  See Dkt. 5 at 14-17.  Plaintiffs implicitly argue the common 
question of law is arbitrability of the claims.  Dkt. 9 ¶¶ 10-11.5  Courts, however, generally 
focus on the substantive issues that apply to the plaintiffs’ central claims, rather than 
adjacent issues like jurisdiction, procedure, or arbitrability.  See Hinson, 239 F.3d at 618-
19 (common question about common violations of same state substantive law); Mosley, 
 
5 Additionally, Plaintiffs complain that Defendants “continue[] to refuse to provide [their 
contracts].”  Dkt. Entry 20 at 2.  Yet, Plaintiffs have made no formal request seeking these 
contracts since the cases have been referred to the undersigned.  To the extent Plaintiffs 
imply they are making such a request here, it is not appropriately raised or briefed. 
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497 F.2d at 1334 (common question about discrimination based on federal substantive 
law); see also 7 Wright, et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1653 (identifying the substantive issues 
which would be required for each plaintiff in a case that “thoroughly discussed the 
common-question requirement” between the similar New York joinder provision). 
 There are a lot of common questions of fact in this case.  Questions of fact include 
“the who, what, when, where, and how of every legal dispute[.]”  Randall H. Warner, All 
Mixed Up About Mixed Questions, 7 J. App. Prac. & Process 101, 105 (2005).  Common 
questions of fact among all Plaintiffs that will arise in this action include whether: (1) the 
amount of their loan exceeds $25,000, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-190(a) (loans made outside 
the state exceeding $25,000 do not apply); (2) the annual interest rate exceeds the 
percentages listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-176; (3) the installment loan is repayable 
between 12 and 96 months, see id.; and (4) Defendants engaged in at least one of the 
activities under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-190(a) within North Carolina for each loan 
transaction.   
 There are also common questions of law.  A question of law involves “the creation 
of rules or the interpretation of existing rules.”  Warner, supra, at 105.  Common questions 
of law in this case will include whether: (1) North Carolina public policy can apply to 
defeat a contractual choice of law clause; (2) Defendants’ conduct constitutes unfair and 
deceptive practices under the UDTPA; and (3) Defendants’ out-of-state lending scheme 
violates the CFA.  As in Hinson, “similar principles of law” will apply to each Plaintiff.  
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239 F.3d at 618–19 (finding a common question of law where “similar principles” of South 
Carolina law “would have been applicable to both the original plaintiffs and the joined 
plaintiffs”). 
Because Plaintiffs meet both requirements for permissive joinder under Rule 20, 
joinder is warranted.  Cf. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) 
(“Under the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of 
action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is 
strongly encouraged.”). 
II. The Court Declines to Sever Plaintiffs’ Claims Because Joinder Allows the Court 
to Expeditiously Resolve Issues, and the Court Finds No Prejudice Warranting 
Severance. 
The Court finds severance unnecessary here because joinder will ameliorate 
administrative concerns, and the Court can determine threshold issues without 
prejudicing Defendants.  Under Rule 21, a Court has discretion to deny joinder, even if 
the joining parties meet the requirements of Rule 20, if it will “result in prejudice, expense, 
or delay.”  Aleman v. Chugach Support Servs., Inc., 485 F.3d 206, 218 n.5 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(internal quotation omiĴed).  None of these concerns are present here.  Thus, “consistent 
with fairness to the parties,” the Court declines to sever the parties under Rule 21.  See 
Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724. 
 
 
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A. Even with Plaintiffs joined, the Court can determine threshold issues without 
prejudicing Defendants. 
The Court is confident not only that joinder is appropriate,6 but also that it is the 
best course of action.  Moreover, Defendants are not prejudiced by it.  Case proceedings 
in the other TitleMax cases, some of which have been pending in this Court since 2019, 
have not resulted in prejudice.  However, if that should ever change, the Court retains 
authority to sever “at any time” it becomes warranted.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.  That time 
is not now.   
Defendants claim that joinder at this scale “obscures and confuses” threshold 
issues, such as personal jurisdiction, venue, and Plaintiffs’ demands for arbitration.  Dkt. 
5 at 19-20.  However, as Plaintiffs have pointed out, this Court has addressed these issues 
using jurisdictional discovery in a similar case with Defendants.  See, e.g., Moreno v. 
Titlemax of Va., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 3d 645, 651-52 (M.D.N.C. 2024) (“Moreno I”); Moreno v. 
TitleMax of Va., Inc., No. 1:23-cv-589, 2024 WL 4187938, at *1, *5 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 13, 2024) 
(“Moreno II”).  For instance, Moreno I covered three mass actions against more defendants 
 
6  The Court recognizes that Plaintiffs are “the master of the complaint,” and therefore 
control much about the contours of their suit.  Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 
604 U.S. 22, 35 (2025) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1987)).  
While the Court exercises “wide discretion over permissive joinder,” see Sakthivel, 2023 
WL 2888565, at *5, the Court does not believe negating Plaintiffs’ litigation decisions in 
this case, at least as to who the Plaintiffs should be, is necessary. 
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(seven), from more states (at least four), with more Plaintiffs with similar claims.7  See 
Moreno I, 735 F. Supp. 3d at 649-51.  Jurisdictional discovery furnished the personal 
jurisdiction-specific conduct for each defendant in relation to each plaintiff, see id. at 655, 
and the Court was able to adequately address the requirements for both personal 
jurisdiction and venue, see id. at 655-660 (holding personal jurisdiction over the 
defendants comported with state and constitutional requirements and denying motion 
to transfer venue because, among other things, “judicial efficiency would be significantly 
harmed by transferring the venue of [p]laintiffs’ claims in piecemeal fashion”). 
The cases cited by Defendants in support of their argument for severance based 
on prejudice are distinguishable because the numerous claims in those cases varied 
significantly by the group of plaintiffs and defendants.8  Thus, resolution of those cases 
 
7 The Motion to Dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction was limited to “claims by 
Plaintiffs who were not subject to repossession.”  Moreno I, 735 F. Supp. 3d at 651-52.  The 
defendants in that case (which included entities other than the Defendants here) did not 
move to dismiss Plaintiffs whose vehicles were subject to repossession.  According to the 
provided exhibits, 92 plaintiffs were subject to the Motion to Dismiss from the three cases: 
(Moreno: 45 plaintiffs, see Pls.’ Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 55-49 at 1-2, Moreno 
I, 1:23-cv-589 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 27, 2024); Johnson: 36 plaintiffs, Pls.’ Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. 
to Dismiss, Dkt. 30-42 at 1-2, see Johnson v. TitleMax of Virginia, Inc., 1:23-cv-807 (M.D.N.C. 
Mar. 27, 2024); McClendon: 11 plaintiffs, see Pls.’ Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 
30-17 at 1, McClendon v. Titlemax of Virginia, Inc., 1:23-cv-865 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 26, 2024)).   
8 Each of those cases involved a wide slew of defects with independent real estate 
transactions with mostly unrelated defendants, claims that varied significantly by the 
various groups of plaintiffs and each defendant, and significantly fewer relevant 
similarities than this case.  See Kalie, 297 F.R.D. at 555, 557-58; Carter v. Bank of Am., N.A., 
No. 1:11-cv-326, 2012 WL 2090530,  at *1-3 (W.D.N.C. June 11, 2012); Abatemarco v. Legasus 
of N.C., LLC, No. 1:11-cv-23, 2012 WL 13001550, *1, *3-4 (W.D.N.C. June 1, 2012). 
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would have necessarily required an extraordinary number of “mini-trial[s].”  Abatemarco 
v. Legasus of N.C., LLC, No. 1:11-cv-23, 2012 WL 13001550, at *3 (W.D.N.C. June 1, 2012).  
Here, on the other hand, (1) these claims may be adjudicated individually by arbitrators 
if they are subject to arbitration agreements; and (2) the common scheme of these high-
risk, high-interest loans includes much more logically related similarities than the cases 
cited by Defendants. 
Joinder here is the best course of action because it comports with Rule 20, and it is 
more expeditious than the alternative.  Additionally, this Court can resolve any threshold 
issues without prejudice to the Defendants.  And, if “at any time” severance is warranted, 
the Court of course retains the discretion to sever.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. 
B. Administrative concerns weigh heavily in favor of joinder, rather than 
severance. 
Administrative concerns also support joinder.  For instance, there will likely be 
some overlap in witnesses, documentary proof, and common issues for the threshold 
determinations.  See Kehr ex rel. Kehr v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 596 F. Supp. 2d 821, 
828 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  And if, as Plaintiffs argue, many of the Plaintiffs’ actions are 
arbitrable, the substantive issues likely will not be addressed by this Court unless raised 
after arbitration has concluded.9 
 
9 This matches the paĴern from other TitleMax cases. 
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While the Court appreciates Defendants’ arguments about filing fees, filing 
statistics, and the Court’s resources, see Dkt. 5 at 20-22, Defendants’ proposed severance 
exacerbates, rather than alleviates, the Court’s administrative concerns.  There are already 
22 similar cases involving similar TitleMax entities before this Court.  Severing the 
Defendants and having them refile individual actions would require significantly more 
time for the Court as it manages each docket and resolves many of the same issues that 
could be addressed by a single text filing, opinion, or order.  And if severance in the way 
Defendants described became a regular practice for future cases, the Court would not be 
surprised if these cases consumed most of its time and resources. 
In any event, the Court “has broad discretion in ruling on a requested severance.”  
Carbon Fuel Co. v. USX Corp., 867 F. Supp. 414, 419 (S.D.W. Va. 1994) (permiĴing joinder 
of third-party defendants and declining to sever claims “[g]iven the expediency” of trying 
the claims together, even though the facts between the claims were not “precisely 
identical”).  The Court highlights and relies on this discretion to decline severance here. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court is not a for-profit entity.  It exists to administer justice equitably and 
expeditiously.  Joinder here does so and serves its intended purpose: “to promote trial 
convenience and expedite the final determination of disputes, thereby preventing 
multiple lawsuits.”  Saval, 710 F.2d at 103 (internal quotation omiĴed).  Thus, the Court 
Case 1:25-cv-01039-LAF-JEP     Document 28     Filed 05/04/26     Page 17 of 18
18 
 
declines to sever pursuant to Rule 21.  For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion 
to Sever, Dkt. 4, is DENIED.   
It is SO ORDERED. 
This the 4th day of May, 2026. 
 
     __________________________________ 
     LINDSEY A. FREEMAN 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
Case 1:25-cv-01039-LAF-JEP     Document 28     Filed 05/04/26     Page 18 of 18

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