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govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-01116-1
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FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DUEWARD W. CRANFORD, II, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, et
al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 25-1116 (EGS)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
Dueward W. Cranford, II; Jon Colburn; William Braun; and
the Citizens for Equal Rights Alliance (“CERA”) (collectively
“Plaintiffs”) sue the U.S. Department of the Interior
(“Interior”); U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs; the National Indian
Gaming Commission; the U.S. Department of Justice; Dough Burgum,
Secretary of the Interior; William Doffermyre, Solicitor, U.S.
Department of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor; Eric
Shepard, Associate Solicitor, Indian Affairs, U.S. Department of
the Interior; Bryan Mercier, Director, U.S. Bureau of Indian
Affairs, Office of the Solicitor; Ryan Hunter, Acting Regional
Director, Pacific Southwest Regional Office, U.S. Bureau of
Indian Affairs, and Head of the California Fee to Trust
Consortium; Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General; Adam R.F.
Gustafson, Acting Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice
Case 1:25-cv-01116-EGS Document 70 Filed 05/04/26 Page 1 of 13
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Environment and Natural Resources Division; Gina Allery,
Director, Office of Tribal Justice, U.S. Department of Justice;
and the Acting Director, Tribal Resources Section, U.S.
Department of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources
Division (collectively, “Defendants”).
1 See Compl., ECF No. 1.2
Plaintiffs sue the individual Defendants in both their official
and individual capacities. See id. Plaintiffs state the
following claims for relief: (1) violations of the Federal
Recognition Tribal List Act, see id. at 34; (2) the Ione Band is
not eligible under the Indian Reorganization Act and/or the
Indian Consolidation Act to acquire land; (3) violations of the
“property/territory” clause of the U.S. Constitution and the
Tenth Amendment, see id. at 55; and (4) Conspiracy under 42
U.S.C. § 1985, see id. at 67.
Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on September
15, 2025, see Mot. for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 17; Mem. of Law in
Support (collectively “MPI”), ECF No. 17-1; which the Court
denied on February 10, 2026, see Mem. Op., ECF No. 55. The Court
1 William Doffermyre was confirmed as the Solicitor of the
Department of the Interior on September 18, 2025. Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 25(d), he is
automatically substituted for Acting Solicitor Gregory Zerzan.
Acting Regional Director Ryan Hunter is substituted for his
predecessor, Amy Dutschke pursuant to Rule 25(d).
2 When citing electronic filings throughout this opinion, the
Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the original page
number of the filed document.
Case 1:25-cv-01116-EGS Document 70 Filed 05/04/26 Page 2 of 13
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incorporates the detailed factual background of this matter from
its prior Memorandum Opinion denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Preliminary Injunction. See id.
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Limited
Expedited Jurisdictional Discovery. See Pls.’ Mot. for Limited
Expedited Jurisdictional Disc., ECF No. 60; Mem. of Law Supp.
Pls.’ Mot. for Limited Expedited Jurisdictional Disc.,
(collectively, “Pls.’ Mot.”) ECF No. 60-1. Plaintiffs argue that
the written and oral discovery sought is “proportional and
narrowly tailored to support their forthcoming Opposition to
Defendants’ forthcoming Motions to Dismiss.” Id. at 7. Upon
careful consideration of Plaintiffs’ motion, the Defendants’
oppositions, the reply, and sur-reply
3 thereto; the applicable
law; and for the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES
Plaintiffs’ motion.
II. Legal Standard
Plaintiffs ask the Court to grant them expedited
jurisdictional discovery to obtain information to support their
opposition to the Defendants’ anticipated Motion to Dismiss. See
Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 60-1 at 11. In doing so, however, Plaintiffs
3 Defendants request leave to file a sur-reply to address new
matters raised in Plaintiff’s Reply. Mot. for Leave to File Sur-
Reply, ECF No. 66. The Court therefore GRANTS the motion over
Plaintiffs’ objection. As discussed in this Memorandum Opinion,
Plaintiffs raise new arguments in support of their motion for
jurisdictional discovery in their Reply briefing.
Case 1:25-cv-01116-EGS Document 70 Filed 05/04/26 Page 3 of 13
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ask the Court to apply the incorrect legal standard for
jurisdictional discovery.
Plaintiffs do not seek expedited general discovery,
requests for which courts in this District evaluate under a
five-factor reasonableness test. See Attkisson v. Holder, 113 F.
Supp. 3d 156, 162 (D.D.C. 2015) (explaining reasonableness, or
“good-cause” standard for expedited discovery). However, in
cases “where issues arise as to jurisdiction ... discovery is
available to ascertain the facts bearing on such issues.”
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, n. 13
(1978). “[I]f a party demonstrates that it can supplement its
jurisdictional allegations through discovery, then
jurisdictional discovery is justified.” GTE New Media Servs.
Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
“Whether to permit jurisdictional discovery rests in the
discretion of the district court.” In re Papst Licensing GMBH &
Co. KG Litig., 590 F.Supp.2d 94, 101 (D.D.C. 2008); see also FC
Inv. Grp. v. IFX Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1093 (D.C. Cir.
2008). As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) has made clear, “in order to
get jurisdictional discovery a plaintiff must have at least a
good faith belief that such discovery will enable it to show
that the court has personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.” Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless
Case 1:25-cv-01116-EGS Document 70 Filed 05/04/26 Page 4 of 13
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P.L.C., 148 F.3d 1080, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing cases). The
D.C. Circuit “allow[s] jurisdictional discovery and factfinding
if allegations indicate its likely utility.” Nat. Res. Def.
Council v. Pena, 147 F.3d 1012, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Furthermore, when requesting jurisdictional discovery, “a
plaintiff must make a ‘detailed showing’ of what discovery it
wishes to conduct or what results it thinks such discovery would
produce.’” Atlantigas Corp. v. Nisource, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d
34, 53 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting United States v. Philip Morris
Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 116, 130 (D.D.C. 2000)). Discovery is not
warranted “where a plaintiff ‘simply wants to conduct a fishing
expedition in the hopes of discovering some basis
of jurisdiction.’” In re Papst, 590 F. Supp. 2d at
101 (quoting Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC Novokuznetsky
Aluminum Factory, 283 F.3d 208, 215 n. 3 (4th Cir. 2002)).
As with any type of discovery, the district court's
discretion is “cabined by Rule 26(b)’s general limitations.”
Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, 964 F.3d 1203, 1207 (D.C. Cir.
2020). Pursuant to Rule 26(b), discovery must be relevant and
proportional to the needs of the case. F
ED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
III. Analysis
A. Jurisdictional Discovery is Premature
“To obtain jurisdictional discovery a plaintiff must
request discovery in a detailed manner ‘at an appropriate stage
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in the course of litigation.’” Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for
President, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 158, 187 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting
City of Moundridge v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 244 F.R.D. 10, 14
(D.D.C. 2007)). The “appropriate time to request jurisdictional
discovery is in opposition to the defendant's motion—whether a
plaintiff files a separate motion for jurisdictional discovery
or puts the Court on notice by requesting jurisdictional
discovery in a detailed manner in the opposition to the motion
to dismiss.” Id. at 187; City of Moundridge, 244 F.R.D. at 14
and n.8 (finding discovery not warranted where party only sought
it after an adverse result on a motion to dismiss and requested
it a year and a half after the opposition was filed); Second
Amend. Found. v. U.S. Conf. of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 525 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (finding no error where district court dismissed
request for jurisdictional discovery where plaintiff failed to
request discovery in opposition to the motion to dismiss).
As the docket in this case reflects, there are no pending
motions to dismiss. See generally Dkt. in Case No. 1: :25-cv-
01116. Therefore, the proper time for Plaintiffs to seek
jurisdictional discovery is after Defendants move to dismiss.
B. Even if it is Timely, Plaintiffs’ Request is
Speculative and Does not Hinge on Jurisdictional
Issues
Plaintiffs argue that jurisdictional discovery is necessary
to rebut Defendants’ “likely motions to dismiss on subject
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matter jurisdiction grounds on the basis of claim and issue
preclusion” and the applicable statute of limitations. Pls.
Mot., ECF No. 60-1 at 8, 12-15.
To obtain jurisdictional discovery, “a plaintiff must have
at least a good faith belief that such discovery will enable it
to show that the court has [] jurisdiction over the defendant.”
Caribbean Broad. Sys., 148 F.3d at 1090. A request for
jurisdictional discovery cannot be based on “speculation.”
Bastin v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 104 F.3d 1392, 1396 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
At this juncture, Plaintiffs can only speculate that
Defendants will raise certain arguments in a motion to dismiss—
they claim that such reasons for dismissal are “likely” claims
based on prior preliminary injunction briefing. Pls.’ Mot., ECF
No. 60-1 at 8, 12-15. However, only one of the Plaintiffs’
anticipated reasons for dismissal—sovereign immunity—is a
jurisdictional defense.
First, the defense of res judicata, or claim preclusion,
while having a “somewhat jurisdictional character,” SBC Commc'ns
Inc. v. FCC, 407 F.3d 1223, 1229–30 (D.C. Cir. 2005), does not
affect the jurisdiction of the district court. See Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005)
(“Preclusion, of course, is not a jurisdictional matter”)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)); N.Y. Shipping Ass'n v. Fed. Mar.
Case 1:25-cv-01116-EGS Document 70 Filed 05/04/26 Page 7 of 13
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Comm'n, 854 F.2d 1338, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that claim
and issue preclusion are a defense to prevent fragmented
litigation but are not a “jurisdictional bar”). And while
“[s]tatute of limitations defenses may affect the success of a
plaintiff's claim for relief, [] they do not deprive a court of
subject matter jurisdiction.” Reynolds v. Sheet Metal Workers,
Loc. 102, 702 F.2d 221, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
In addition to arguing that claim preclusion, issue
preclusion, and the statute of limitations bar Plaintiffs’
claims, Defendants previously argued in their Opposition to
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction that “the
Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to federal action under color
of federal law, that Plaintiffs failed to allege violations
under the Fifth and Tenth Amendments and Property Clause, that
the Thirteenth Amendment did not provide a private right of
action and that Plaintiffs failed to allege an ultra vires
claim.” Defs.’ Sur-Reply, ECF No. 66-1 at 5. In their Reply,
Plaintiffs raise, for the first time, the argument that
jurisdictional discovery is needed to defend against Defendant’s
anticipated dismissal arguments regarding sovereign immunity,
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Thirteenth Amendment. Pls.’
Reply, ECF No. 64 at 6. Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants
“impliedly argued” in their Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Preliminary Injunction that the Court lacks subject matter
Case 1:25-cv-01116-EGS Document 70 Filed 05/04/26 Page 8 of 13
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jurisdiction by arguing that Plaintiffs failed to allege
violations of the Tenth Amendment, the Property Clause, the
Fifth Amendment, or to state an ultra vires claim. Pls.’ Reply,
ECF No. 64 at 8.
These potential defenses, as Defendants point out in their
sur-reply, concern merits issues and whether Plaintiffs can
state a claim, not whether the Court has jurisdiction to hear
them. Defs.’ Sur-Reply, ECF No. 66-1 at 5. In arguing that the
Fourteenth and Thirteenth Amendments do not apply to the federal
government, Defendants did not assert that the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction with respect to these claims;
rather, they argued that neither of these amendments apply to
the federal government. See Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim.
Inj., ECF No. 32 at 25, 28-29; see Chang v. United States, No.
22-352, 2023 WL 8697831, at *20 n. 16 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2023),
aff'd, No. 24-5005, 2024 WL 3299620 (D.C. Cir. July 2, 2024)
(dismissing Fourteenth Amendment claim via 12(b)(6) motion)).
Defendants more explicitly argued that plaintiffs fail to allege
violations of the Tenth Amendment, Property Clause, Fifth
Amendment, and ultra vires claims—not that the Court lacks
jurisdiction to hear them. See generally Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for
Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 32.
Jurisdictional discovery is justified if “a party
demonstrates that it can supplement its jurisdictional
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allegations through discovery.” App Dynamic ehf v. Vignisson, 87
F. Supp. 3d 322, 329 (D.D.C. 2015). Preclusion and statute of
limitations are not “jurisdictional allegations” and thus do not
affect the Court’s jurisdictional analysis. Id. Nor did
Defendants indicate in their Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Preliminary Injunction that they seek to frame their
constitutional arguments as jurisdictional. See Opp’n to Pls.’
Mot. for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 32 at 25, 28-29. Thus, discovery
sought on the basis of the above justifications would not have a
“likely utility” to the Court in resolving a factual dispute
that impacts the Court’s jurisdiction over this matter. Pena,
147 F.3d at 1024.
C. Plaintiffs Fail to Show how Jurisdictional Discovery
Regarding Sovereign Immunity Would Impact the Court’s
Jurisdictional Analysis
Sovereign immunity is thus the only remaining potential
defense that Defendants could raise on a Motion to Dismiss that
would impact the Court’s jurisdiction over the Defendants. See
Hulley Enters. Ltd. v. Russian Fed'n, 149 F.4th 682, 691 (D.C.
Cir. 2025) (stating that “sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional
issue”); Howard v. United States, 949 F. Supp. 2d 54, 56 (D.D.C.
2013), aff'd sub nom. In re Howard, No. 13-5261, 2014 WL 4628254
(D.C. Cir. July 14, 2014) (“sovereign immunity…is a
jurisdictional basis for dismissal”). Because sovereign immunity
is only available to the “government itself and to any federal
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official sued in his or her official capacity,” jurisdictional
discovery would not be available with respect to Defendants sued
in their individual capacities. Smith v. Scalia, 44 F. Supp. 3d
28, 38 (D.D.C. 2014), aff'd, No. 14-5180, 2015 WL 13710107 (D.C.
Cir. Jan. 14, 2015). Courts have also recognized that
“‘jurisdictional discovery should be carefully controlled and
limited’ to avoid burdening a sovereign who may be immune from
suit.” See Davis v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 3d 106, 121
(D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Phoenix Consulting Inc. v. Republic of
Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
In the instant motion, Plaintiffs do not dispute that
sovereign immunity applies to the federal government or federal
government officials sued in their official capacity. See
generally Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 64. Plaintiffs argue in their
Reply that the federal Defendants’ “arguments supported by
extrinsic caselaw evidence expressly asserting the court’s lack
of subject matter jurisdiction qualify as a ‘factual attack’ on
the truth of the jurisdictional facts alleged in the Complaint.”
Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 64 at 6. But it is unclear, and Plaintiffs
do not explain, how this is a factual issue. Nor do Plaintiffs
explain how the requested discovery would impact the Court’s
jurisdictional analysis as it relates to sovereign immunity.
Defendants simply argued in their Opposition to Plaintiffs’
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and this Court found in its
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Memorandum Opinion, that Section 1981, Section 1983, and Section
1985 do not waive the sovereign immunity of the United States,
and therefore the Court would not have jurisdiction over claims
brought under those statutes. See Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for
Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 32 at 15-17; Mem. Op., ECF No. 55 at 22-
24.
The applicability of sovereign immunity here is a question
of law, not fact. See Hawkins v. Washington Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 311 F. Supp. 3d 94, 103 (D.D.C. 2018) (rejecting
plaintiffs’ suggestion that “sovereign immunity is a question of
fact…when it is a quintessential question of law”). Indeed,
there are no additional facts that could affect the Court’s
analysis of sovereign immunity, and “[w]here there is no showing
of how jurisdictional discovery would help plaintiff discover
anything new, ‘it [is] inappropriate to subject [defendants] to
the burden and expense of discovery.’” Vignisson, 87 F. Supp. 3d
at 329 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Atlantigas Corp., 290 F. Supp. 2d
at 53). The Court will thus not grant requests “irrelevant to
the threshold jurisdictional question at issue.” Davis, 196 F.
Supp. 3d at 122.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Expedited Jurisdictional Discovery, ECF No. 60, is DENIED. An
appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
May 4, 2026
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