govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_11-cr-00306-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
PEDRO ALEJANDRO RUBIO-PEREZ, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
Criminal Action No. 11-306 
 
Judge Beryl A. Howell 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Pending before the Court is defendant Pedro Alejandro Rubio- Perez’s Motion for 
Compassionate Release (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 154, pursuant to amendments made by the First 
Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”) to federal courts’ compassionate release authority, as codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).  See Pub. L. No. 115-391, title VI, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239-41.  
Defendant suffers from “an amalgam of serious and life -threatening conditions” for which he 
contends the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) cannot “provide the necessary level of specialized care,” 
in part because defendant speaks only “ extremely limited English” and BOP no longer  provides 
interpreters for medical appointments , compounded by the continued risk to his health posed by 
his post -release detention in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ ICE”).  
Def.’s Mot. at 1; Def.’s Reply in Support of Mot. for Compassionate Release (“Def.’s Reply”) at 
3, ECF No. 161.  He argues that this confluence of circumstances constitutes an “extraordinary 
and compelling reason[]” for release under the FSA prior to his scheduled July 25, 2026, release 
date and that early release would be consistent with the factors outline d in 18 U.S.C. § 3553, 
because he is not being provided access to appropriate medical care due to the lack of interpretation 
services, will be released into the custody of immigration authorities for deportation, where he is 
likely to be held for an unknown additional period of time with questionable medical attention, 
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and, due to this immigration detention and his voluntary exit from the drug trade prior to his arrest, 
would pose no danger to the public upon release.  Def.’s Mot. at 3 -4.  The Government opposes 
early release.  Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Compassionate Release (“Gov’t’s Opp’n”), ECF 
No. 156.  For the reasons discussed, defendant’s motion is GRANTED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The offense conduct, based on the statement of facts agreed to by defendant in support of 
his plea agreement, Statement of Facts  (“SOF”), ECF No. 73, along with factual findings from 
sentencing, is briefly summarized below, followed by discussion of the  procedural history of the 
case and, finally, of the facts relevant to defendant’s compassionate release motion. 
A. Defendant’s Crimes 
Between 1999 and 2009, defendant participated in a conspiracy with other members of a 
drug trafficking organization (“DTO”) to acquire, manufacture, and transport cocaine and 
marijuana from Mexico to the United States.  SOF ¶ 3.  For example, the DTO used hidden 
compartments in tractor trailers to ship hundreds of kilograms of cocaine and several  tons of 
marijuana across the border.  Id.  Recorded phone calls captured by the U.S. government showed 
defendant coordinating these shipments, id. ¶ 4, and from at least 2004 to 2006, defendant was a 
leader in the DTO, Minute Order (Dec. 11, 2018) (announcing factual finding of defendant’s 
leadership after evidentiary hearing for sentencing).  In all, he was directly responsible for the 
shipment of at least four hundred and fifty kilograms of cocaine and forty-five thousand kilograms 
(nearly 50 tons) of marijuana into the United States.  SOF ¶¶ 9-10.  Defendant left the conspiracy 
in 2009, four years prior to his 2013 arrest by Mexican authorities, to lead a law -abiding life, and 
the government at no point alleged that he participated in any criminal conduct after that.  Gov’t’s 
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Mem. in Aid of Sentencing (“Gov’t’s Sentencing Mem.”) at 4, ECF No. 80; Def.’s Mem. in Aid 
of Sentencing (“Def.’s Sentencing Mem.”) at 3, 10, ECF No. 96.    
B. Procedural History 
On April 3, 2018, after being extradited to the United States, defendant pled guilty to the 
indictment’s sole count of Conspiring to Distribute Five Kilograms or More of Cocaine and 1000 
Kilograms or More of Marijuana for Importation into the U.S., and Aiding and Abetting, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 959(a), 960(b)(1)(B)(ii), (b)(1)(H), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(G), 963, and 18 
U.S.C. § 2.  Plea Agreement, ECF No. 72; Minute Entry (Apr. 3, 2018); see also Indictment, ECF 
No. 3.  He was thereafter sentenced to 180 months of incarceration and 60 months of supervised 
release.  See Judgment & Commitment, ECF No. 145.  This sentence fell below guidelines range 
of 292 to 365 months, and was imposed because, among other things, defendant voluntarily 
extricated himself from the drug trade several years before his arrest, which was a mitigating factor 
as to both his culpability and the continued risk he posed to the public, and because defendant is a 
deportable person following his sentence, meaning that he is ineligible to reduce his time in prison 
through end -of-sentence reentry programs such as home confinement .  (Sealed) Statement of 
Reasons (“SOR”) at 5, ECF No. 146 (citing United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1994)); 
Def.’s Sentencing Mem. at 3, 9-10 (explaining implications of defendant’s immigration status and 
that he exited the drug trade after his father was killed in cartel -related violence ); Gov’t’s 
Sentencing Mem. at 4 (acknowledging that the offense conduct ended in 2009).  Defendant ha s 
been incarcerated since his arrest in Mexico in 2013 and subsequent extradition in 2015.
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1  In January 2024, defendant moved to apply retroactively amended sentencing guidelines pertaining to crack 
cocaine offenses, see Def.’s Mot. for Retroactive Application of Sentencing Guidelines to Crack Cocaine Offense, 
ECF No. 149 , which  motion was opposed by the government, see Gov’t’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot . for 
Retroactive Application, ECF No. 150 .  This motion was  denied because defendant did not satisfy multiple criteria 
required, under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1, for retroactive application of these amended rules.  Minute Order (Apr. 4, 2024).   
 
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Defendant is now scheduled for release on July 25, 2026, and, since he is subject to an 
immigration detainer, will be then transferred to ICE custody for deportation.  Def.’s Mot. at 2.  
On March 8, 2026, defendant filed the instant motion for compassionate release.  See Def.’s Mot.  
Briefing for this motion was completed on April 20, 2026, see Gov’t’s Opp’n; Def.’s Reply, after 
defendant’s request for an extension was granted, Def.’s Unopposed Mot. for Ext. of Time to File 
Reply, ECF No. 159; Minute Order (Apr. 14, 2026).  
C. Defendant’s Medical Conditions 
Defendant is 61 years old and incarcerated at the Federal Medical Center Rochester (“FMC 
Rochester”), though he is not housed in a medical unit there.  Def.’s Mot. at 10; Gov’t’s Opp’n at 
2.  On June 30, 2025, he reported to the BOP health services unit  that he had been experiencing 
abdominal pain, although to the nurse practitioner’s understanding, this  pain occurred “only . . . 
when running or doing abdominal exercises.”  Gov’t’s Opp’n, Ex. B, Rubio-Perez Clinical Notes 
(“Clinical Notes”) at 1, ECF No. 158.  The nurse practitioner recommended taking a break from 
running and posited that the pain was “most likely musculoskeletal  . . . since [defendant] denied 
any pain at rest.”  Id.  Importantly, at that visit and all subsequent medical appointments, defendant 
“was not offered any language interpretation services.”   Def.’s Reply at 2.  Defendant attributes 
the lack of interpreter services, in part, to the March 1, 2025, revocation of Executive Order 13166, 
which had directed federal agencies to improve access to their federally conducted programs and 
activities for individuals for whom English is a second language.  Def.’s Reply at 1-2; Exec. Order 
14224, Designating English as the Official Language of the United States, 90 Fed. Reg. 11363 
(Mar. 1, 2025)  (revoking Exec. Order 13166, Improving Access to Services for Persons with 
Limited English Proficiency,  65 Fed. Reg. 50121 (Aug. 11, 2000) ).  After this revocation, the 
Department of Justice, of which BOP is a component, issued guidance instructing agencies to 
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“consider English- only services . . . where allowed by law.”  Mem. from Att’y Gen. to 
All Fed. Agencies at 3 (July 14, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/ag/media/1407776/dl 
[https://perma.cc/6F7C-UFQ7] (capitalization altered).  BOP has not amended any formal 
regulations in response to these directives and neither party cites to BOP regulations regarding 
interpretation during medical visits, but whatever the cause, defendant did not receive interpreter 
services during critical medical appointments. 
Approximately two months after this initial appointment, on September 4, 2025, he 
received a regular preventative health screening  and was recorded as presenting  “no current 
complaints.”  Clinical Notes at 4.  On September 23, 2025, he returned to the health services unit  
with complaints of itching, jaundice, and dark urine, at which point the health services unit ordered 
blood tests and a follow -up appointment two days later.  Id.  at 6 -7.  When the blood tests  
“suggest[ed] cholestatic liver injury,” id. at 9, and he continued to complain of the same symptoms 
along with abdominal pain, id. at 11, he was sent to the emergency department in the Mayo Clinic 
on September 25, 2025, where he was diagnosed with acute pancreatitis and obstruction of a bile 
duct, and underwent multiple surgeries, including one that removed his gallbladder, id. at 15.  To 
repeat, defendant was not provided with an interpreter at the hospital, and “[t]o this day . . . is not 
entirely clear on what type of surgery was performed on him.”  Def.’s Reply at 2-3.  While at the 
hospital, he also received a CT scan of his chest, which identified nodules in his lungs  measuring 
approximately 6 millimeters, which can be a warning sign for lung cancer .  Def.’s Mot. at 7.  He 
remained in the hospital for several days due to post -surgery complications.  Id. at 6.  After his 
October 5, 2025, release from the hospital, the health services unit  ordered additional lab testing 
recommended by the hospital, Clinical Notes at 16-17, and on March 2, 2026, completed a follow 
up CT scan that showed that the nodules in his lungs remained stable in size, id. at 27.  On March 
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10, 2026, defendant attended a chronic care appointment with the health services unit where a 
doctor reviewed with him the results of blood tests taken on February 9, 2026.  Id. at 19.    
Defendant proffers an expert report by Dr. Linda M. Graves, M.D., a physician, whose 
qualifications are not challenged by the government, see generally Gov’t’s Opp’n, and who 
reviewed BOP medical records and offered her opinions on what further care defendant requires.  
See Def.’s Mot., Ex. 2, Dr. Linda M. Graves, M.D., Professional Evaluation of Medical Records 
of Def.  (“Graves Report”), ECF No. 154- 2.  In addition to the information highlighted in the 
parties’ briefing and the BOP clinical notes provided by the government, Dr. Graves notes that 
defendant has been diagnosed with “hyperlipidemia, peripheral vertigo, nocturnal polyuria, 
chronic rhinitis, lower back pain, . . . latent tuberculosis infection[,] . . . and dizziness.”  Id. at 10.  
Dr. Graves emphasizes that, due to defendant’s recent surgery, he should receive follow ups “at 
monthly intervals for monitoring of his laboratory studies for at least one year,” and that there 
should be a “low threshold for hospital evaluation should he develop abdominal pain.”  Id. at 11.  
As to his lung nodules, Dr. Graves recommends “a repeat CT scan of the chest in three to six 
months” following the initial diagnosis in September 2025, as well as a “follow up with a private 
pulmonologist every three months.”  Id. at 11-12. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
“Federal courts are forbidden, as a general matter, to ‘modify a term of imprisonment once 
it has been imposed,’ but the rule of finality is subject to a few narrow exceptions. ”  Freeman v. 
United States, 564 U.S. 522, 526 (2011)  (plurality opinion) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)).  One 
such exception, created by the First Step Act of 2018, authorizes the court to “modify a term of 
imprisonment once it has been imposed . . . in any case” when a defendant files a motion for 
compassionate release “after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal 
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a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 
days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is 
earlier.”  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Wilson, 77 F.4th 837, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2023). 
Upon satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement, a defendant’s term of imprisonment may 
be reduced when the court, “after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent 
that they are applicable,” finds, firs t, that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a 
reduction,” and, second, “that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements 
issued by the Sentencing Commission.”  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 2  The Sentencing 
Commission has promulgated a policy statement on reduction in terms of imprisonment ( i.e., 
compassionate release) under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).  See  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (“policy 
statement”).3  The policy statement incorporates the FSA’s statutory requirements for 
compassionate release, including that the court consider the § 3553(a) factors and find 
extraordinary and compelling reasons  for release , id. at § 1B1.13(a), (a)(1)(A), and adds the 
 
2 As an alternative to showing “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate release, a defendant 
may instead show that he “is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison  . . .  for the offense or 
offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a determination has been made by the Director of 
the Bureau of Prisons that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii).  This provision is inapplicable here due to defendant’s age and time served, so is not discussed.  
 
3  Defendant asserts that “§ 1B1.13 is not binding on defendant -filed motions,” citing United States v. Long , 
997 F.3d 342, 345 (D.C. Cir. 2021), but argues that “district courts may nonetheless rely on the policy statement and 
its commentary as persuasive authority,” and relies heavily on the policy statement.  Def.’s Mot. at 4.  The D.C. Circuit 
held in Long that the FSA requires courts to “apply any ‘applicable policy statements’ issued by the Sentencing 
Commission” but that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 as then written was “not ‘applicable’ to defendant -filed motions for 
compassionate release under the First Step Act.”  997 F.3d at 355.  At the time, “[b]y its terms, the policy statement 
applie[d] only to motion s for compassionate release filed by the Bureau of Prisons, not by defendants,” and the 
Sentencing Commission had “never suggested that its existing policy statement applies to defendant motions under 
the First Step Act” and “ha [d] issued no policy statement applicable to the First Step Act because it has lacked a 
quorum since shortly after that Act’s passage.”  Id.  In 2023, however, the Sentencing Commission revised § 1B1.13 
to apply to motions “of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons or the defendant pursuant to [the First Step Act],” thereby 
making this policy statement applicable to defendant-filed motions for compassionate release.  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a); 
U.S.S.G. amend. 814 (Nov. 1, 2023) .  Although the D.C. Circuit has not revisited § 1B1.13 since the revision, the 
plain text of the FSA counsels that compassionate release motions must be granted only if consistent with applicable 
Sentencing Commission policy statements, and the 2023 revision rendered § 1B1.13 applicable to defendant -filed 
motions.  Consistency with § 1B1.13 is therefore a prerequisite to compassionate release.   
 
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requirement that the defendant must “not [be] a danger to the safety of any other person or to the 
community,” id. § B1B.13(a)(2).  Finally, the policy statement provides detailed guidance on 
certain possible “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for release, such as medical conditions,  
id. § B1B.13(b)(1), family circumstances, id.  § B1B.13(b)(3), or abuse while incarcerated, 
§ B1B.13(b)(4), while also including a catchall provision, which dictates that extraordinary and 
compelling reasons may exist when “any other circumstance or combination of circumstances that, 
when considered by themselves or together with any of the reasons described in [the policy 
statement], are similar in gravity to those described in [the policy statement],” id. § B1B.13(b)(5); 
see United States v. Carroll , No. 20-cr-16 (JEB), 2025 WL 2061669, *4 (D.D.C. July 23, 2025)  
(noting that “catchall” provision can encompass circumstances not otherwise enumerated).   
III. DISCUSSION 
Here, the parties do not dispute that defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies, 
since he sent a letter more than 30 days ago to the warden of FMC Rochester  requesting 
compassionate release but received no response.  See Gov’t’s Opp’n at 4 (“The Government does 
not dispute that Rubio Perez has exhausted his administrative  remedies.”).  The parties disagree, 
however, about whether defendant’s medical conditions constitute extraordinary and compelling 
reasons for a reduction of sentence, in a manner consistent with the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 
policy statement on compassionate release, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, and about whether the § 3553(a) 
factors counsel release.  Additionally, defendant contends that he “is not a danger to the safety of 
any other person or to the community,” id. § B1B.13(a)(2); see also Def.’s Mot. at 13, an issue the 
government does not address.  Since findings that (1) extraordinary and compelling reasons justify 
release, (2) the § 3553 factors favor early release, and (3) the defendant does not pose a danger to 
others, are each required to grant defendant’s motion, each is considered in turn. 
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A. Extraordinary and Compelling Circumstances 
Defendant argues that his medical conditions, including acute pancreatitis , recovery from 
gallbladder removal, lung nodules, and various other conditions, constitute extraordinary and 
compelling reasons for an early release, while the government disputes that these medical 
conditions justify such action.  See Def.’s Mot. at 5; Gov’t’s Opp’n at 5-6.  The policy statement 
specifies that, in some cases, medical conditions may constitute extraordinary and compelling 
reasons for reduction of a sentence .  Id. § B 1B.13(b)(1).  Relied upon here by defendant, 
extraordinary and compelling reasons exist where the  “defendant is suffering from a medical 
condition that requires long-term or specialized medical care that is not being provided and without 
which the defendant is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death.”  Id. § B1B.13(b)(1)(C).
4   
This provision of the policy statement  encompasses three elements: (1) that defendant 
identify a medical condition requiring long-term or specialized care; (2) that such care is not being 
provided; and (3) that the lack of care risks the defendant’s health or death.  The government does 
not appear to dispute that acute pancreatitis or lung nodules, along with defendant’s other 
conditions, are medical conditions requiring long-term or specialized care, or that his life or health 
may be in danger if such care is not provided.  See Gov’t’s Opp’n at 7-9.  Instead, the government 
argues that defendant has not shown that such care “is not being provided.”  Id.   
 Defendant has produced evidence of serious gaps in the medical care he has received while 
incarcerated.  Most significantly, he “was not offered any language interpretation services” at 
medical visits, limiting his ability to communicate his symptoms to medical staff, to understand 
 
4  Defendant also invokes the provision of the policy statement that medical conditions may be an extraordinary 
and compelling reason for release when the “defendant is . . . suffering from a serious physical or medical condition 
. . . that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self -care within the environment of a 
correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover .”  Id. § B1B.13(b)(1)(B).  Since the 
defendant’s lack of access to care justifies compassionate release, this provision is not considered.   
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the treatment options or even to understand precisely what treatment he received or may need in 
the future.  See Def.’s Reply at 2.  His abdominal pain then went untreated for three months, until 
he was experiencing severe additional symptoms like jaundice and dark urine and returned lab 
tests indicating “cholestatic liver injury.”  Id.; see Clinical Notes at 1, 9.  The health services unit 
attributed his initial abdominal pain to “musculoskeletal” issues because he “denied  any pain at 
rest,” Clinical Notes  at 1, but given that the appointment was conducted without language 
interpretation services, this characterization of his symptoms may be inaccurate or incomplete, 
especially given that within three months he required surgery  to remove his gallbladder, Def.’s 
Mot. at 6.  Due to the risk of reoccurrence of defendant’s pancreatitis, Dr. Graves recommends, 
among other things, that there be a “low threshold for hospital evaluation” if defendant begins 
experiencing symptoms again, Graves Report at 11, but defendant has produced sufficient 
evidence that BOP staff, including those at the health services unit, may be unable effectively to 
understand and act on complaints from defendant.  For instance, in addition to the BOP’s long 
timeline for providing serious evaluation of defendant’s abdominal pain, defendant also reports 
that “no language interpretation services were provided” at the hospital prior to his surgery, such 
that “emergency medical services were given without obtaining any informed consent” and “[t]o 
this day,” defendant “is not entirely clear on what type of surgery was performed on him,” leaving 
a foot-long scar on his abdomen.  Def.’s Reply at 2-3.  Defendant is rightly concerned that he will 
not receive the care he needs to avoid death or serious deterioration of his health—or have the 
opportunity to decide what care he wants —due to the BOP’s refusal to provide him with 
interpretation services.  That, combined with the risk of relapse of his acute pancreatitis and his 
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age, constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons to expedite his release from BOP custody by 
twelve weeks.5 
B. Factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553 
Even when defendant has shown an extraordinary and compelling reason for early release, 
the FSA directs that compassionate release may be granted only after consideration of the 
sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).  These factors include: (1) 
“the nature and circumstances of the offense”;  (2) “ the history and characteristics of the 
defendant”; (3) “the need for the sentence imposed ” to “reflect the seriousness of the offense, to 
promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense ,” “afford adequate 
deterrence to criminal conduct ,” “protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,”  and 
“provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other 
correctional treatment in the most effective manner”; (4) “the kinds of sentence and the sentencing 
range established for . . . the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category 
of defendant as set forth in the guidelines . . . issued by the Sentencing Commission”; (5) and “the 
need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have 
been found guilty of similar conduct.”  Id. § 3553(a).   
Certainly, the nature of the offense was serious, involving tonnage quantities of marijuana 
and hundreds of kilograms of cocaine, and defendant was the leader of a DTO responsible for this 
trafficking.  See supra Part I.A.  Notably to his personal characteristics, however, he extricated 
himself from drug trafficking years prior to his arrest, id., and this suggests that he has made strides 
toward a law -abiding life and reasons to be optimistic about his continued law -abiding conduct 
 
5  Defendant’s acute pancreatitis, under the conditions discussed, alone provides an extraordinary and 
compelling reason to justify his release.  Defendant also points to his lung condition, despite which he has never “been 
evaluated by a pulmonologist,” nor has “a pulmonology evaluation even been recommended.”  Def.’s Mot. at 7 -8.  
This concern bolsters defendant’s claim for compassionate release. 
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after release, despite the seriousness of his crimes.  Immediately prior to his arrest in Mexico, he 
was “gainfully employed as a rancher and farmer,” Def.’s Mot. at 10, and upon his release he plans 
to “secure employment as an accountant working with his wife,” with whom he has stayed in 
touch, along with his children, id. at 14.   
Turning to the need for punishment, deterrence, alignment with the Sentencing Guidelines, 
and to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, defendant has less than  twelve weeks left of 
incarceration.  Def.’s Mot. at 2.  Any effect on deterrence—specific or general —or the 
appropriateness of punishment would be minimal, given that defendant was arrested more than a 
decade ago and has been incarcerated ever since.  See  Arrest of Def.  To the extent this slightly 
early release would create sentencing disparities, these are not “unwarranted” because defendant’s 
health and lack of access to interpretation services make the remaining twelve  weeks of 
incarceration riskier to his health and well-being than for others.  Significantly, after release from 
BOP custody, he “will be transferred to the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and 
will be subject to mandatory deportation to Mexico.”  Def.’s Mot. at 14.  Any period of ICE 
detention following his release from BOP custody is not counted toward his sentence, and risks 
further prolonging his lack of access to appropriate medical care where he can fully communicate 
with medical providers.   
Finally, the “need . . . to provide the defendant with . . .  medical care . . .  in the most 
effective manner” also counsels for release, for the reasons discussed supra in Part III.A. 
C. Danger to Others or the Community 
Finally, the policy statement requires that compassionate release be granted only if 
defendant “is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g),” U.S.S.G. § B1B.13(a)(2), which lays out factors for evaluating 
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dangerousness including, as relevant here, “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” “the 
history and characteristics of the person,” and the “nature and seriousness of the danger to any 
person or the community that would be posed by the person’s rele ase,” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).  
Defendant argues that “[e]very one of these factors weighs against a finding of dangerousness,” 
Def.’s Mem. at 13, and the government offers no response, see generally Gov’t’s Opp’n.   
For much the same reasons that the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) cut in favor of 
release, § 3142(g) cuts against a finding of dangerousness.  Most significantly, defendant left the 
drug trade years before his arrest, reducing the likelihood that he would return to criminal activity 
upon release.  He is also in poor health and has a loving family waiting to help him reintegrate.  
Def.’s Mot. at 14.  These factors, too, reduce the  chances that defendant would again involve 
himself in the dangerous drug industry. 
* * * 
 In sum, defendant has shown that extraordinary and compelling reasons justify his release; 
that the § 3553(a) factors support release; and that he poses no danger to the community or to any 
other person.  BOP’s failure to provide interpretation services during medical appointments, while 
concerning, alone would not justify compassionate release; rather, compassionate release is 
appropriate here due to the specific risks posed to defendant by his medical conditions and inability 
to communicate with medical staff, his cessation of offense conduct prior to arrest, the very short 
remaining time in his sentence, and the variety of factors that reduce the risk that he will pose a 
danger to others.  These circumstances,  taken together, warrant grant of his motion for 
compassionate release. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s Motion for Compassionate Release, ECF No. 154, 
is GRANTED and the Bureau of Prisons is DIRECTED to release defendant from BOP custody 
promptly.  An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be published 
contemporaneously.   
Date:  May 4, 2026 
__________________________ 
BERYL A. HOWELL 
United States District Judge 
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