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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-00385-GNS

JOHN M. GRIFFIN PLAINTIFF

US BANKRUPTCY COURT – KY , JUDGE et al. DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (DN 58) and Plaintiff’s
Objection (DN 62) to the United States of America ’s Notice of Substitution (DN 57) . The
motion and objection are ripe for adjudication.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2010, Plaintiff John M. Griffin (“Griffin”) was attending training at Fort Benning as an
employee of a civilian defense contractor when he assisted three translators shopping at the U.S.
Calvary Store (“Calvary”). (Am. Compl. 3-4, DN 19). Two Calvary employees purportedly
made defamatory statements about their interaction with Griffin, which resu lted in his
termination. (Am. Compl. 4).
On September 30, 2010, Griffin filed a pro se lawsuit against Calvary and two individuals
in Chattahoochee County Superior Court (Georgia). See In re US Cavalry Store, Inc. , No. 13 -
31315, Griffin’s Response to Liquidating Trustee’s First Omnibus Objection to Claims Order on
Motion 7 -8 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. Mar. 13, 2024) (DN 511). Griffin asserted a single claim for
tortious inference with a contractual/employment relationship against those defendants. See In re
US Cavalry Store, Inc. , No. 13 -31315, Response to Liquidating Trustee’s First Omnibus
Objection to Claims Order on Motion 11-12 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. Mar. 13, 2024) (DN 511).
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On March 28, 2013, Cavalry filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Kentucky, before Judge Alan C. Stout (“Judge
Stout”), the presiding judge. See In re U.S. Calvary Store, Inc., No. 13-31315 (W.D. Ky. Bankr.).
Attorney Sandra Freeburger from Dietz, Shields, & Freeburger, LLP ( jointly, “Freeburger
Defendants”) was debtor’s counsel, and Attorney Lisa K. Bryant from Tilford, Dobbins &
Schmidt, PLLC ( jointly, “Bryant Defendants”) served as a liquidating trustee for the US CA V
Creditor Trust. Griffin was a creditor in the bankruptcy action.
On September 14, 2018, the Chattahoochee County Superior Court dismissed Griffin’s
claims with prejudice. See Griffin v. U.S. Calvary, Inc. , No. 10 -CV-127, Order 31
(Chattahoochee Cnty. Sup. Ct. Sep. 14, 2018), https://www.chattahoocheeclerkofcourt.com/login
/Imaging/ImageViewer.aspx?id=6330a060-8812-47d8-9c0b-53dec23baeb7. Griffin’s subsequent
appeal to the Georgia Court of Appeals was dismissed on April 30, 2019 . See Griffin v. U.S.
Calvary, No. A19A0941, Order 1 (Ga. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.chattahoocheeclerk
ofcourt.com/login/Imaging/ImageViewer.aspx?id=12ed9676-14f0-44b9-8d5f-413fa0091f4e.
In 2023, Griffin retained Attorney James Guilfoyle of the Guilfoyle Firm (collectively,
“Guilfoyle Defendants”) to represent him in the Calvary bankruptcy case. See In re US Cavalry
Store, Inc. , No. 13 -31315, Notice of Appearance (Bankr. W.D. Ky. July 5, 2023) (DN 693).
During that proceeding, Griffin requested to examine Calvary’s personnel records as they related
to his Georgia lawsuit. In a 2024 order, Judge Stout addressed the disposition of a cache of
Calvary’s business records being kept in a stor age facility, summarizing the chronology as
follows:
Over ten years after the filing of this bankruptcy case, on May 3, 2023,
Ms. Bryant filed a Motion to Authorize Destruction of Records wherein she
indicated that the estate was holding business records dating back to 1992. Ms.
Bryant sought authority to destroy these records.
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On May 6, 2023, Mr. Griffin filed a pro se objection to the motion stating
that he needed some of the records in regard to state court litigation in Georgia.
Specifically, he stated that “he would have won his case in Georgia if [his]
lawyer had exercised his rights to collect and process the case-related documents
originally . . . .” From such statement, it appeared that the Georgia state court
case had concluded with a result not in Mr. Griffin’s favor.
The Court conducted a hearing on the motion on June 13, 2023, at which
time the Court passed the hearing to July 11, 2023. As stated above, Mr.
Guilfoyle entered his appearance for Mr. Griffin on July 5, 2023. At the July 11,
2023 hearing, the parties announced to the Court they were working to a
resolution of the motion. Consequently, the Court continued the hearing until
August 10, 2023.
That August hearing was later passed on motion by Ms. Bryant to
September 12, 2023. That hearing, however, was later continued on motion by
Mr. Griffin, wherein he stated that “the parties are working on an agreement to
allow John Griffin to inspect files.” The motion was re -set for hearing on
October 3, 2023.
On September 19, 2023, Mr. Griffin again filed a motion to continue.
Again, Mr. Griffin indicated that the parties were working on an agreement to
allow him to inspect the files. The Court granted that motion to continue and
passed the hearing to November 9, 2023. Due to a scheduling issue, the hearing
was later moved up to November 6, 2023.
At the November 6, 2023 hearing, the Court was again advised that the
parties were working toward a settlement but that one had not yet been reached.
The Court passed the hearing to December 5, 2023, at which time the Court was
again told that the parties were still working toward a resolution. Consequently,
the Court again continued the hearing to February 8, 2024.
At the February 8, 2024 hearing the parties again announced that no
resolution had been reached. Because of the length of time that this motion had
been pending, and because Mr. Griffin had not established that he had any right
to these documents, and because the estate was incurring a cost in storing the
records, the Court decided to grant Ms. Bryant’s motion. On February 9, 2024,
the Court entered its order granting Ms. Bryant’s motion and authorizing the
records to be destroyed.

In re US Cavalry Store, Inc. , No. 13 -31315, Order Denying Emergency Motion/Emergency
Appeal for In Camera Review 2-3 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. Mar. 13, 2024) (DN 757) (alterations in
original). The bankruptcy court denied Griffin’s requests to reconsider its order authorizing
document destruction or to review the documents in camera. See In re US Cavalry Store, Inc. ,
No. 13-31315, Order Denying Emergency Motion/Emergency Appeal for In Camera Review 6
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(Bankr. W.D. Ky. Mar. 13, 2024) (DN 757); In re US Cavalry Store, Inc. , No. 13 -31315, Order
Denying Motion to Reconsider 1 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. Mar. 26, 2024) (DN 768).
On May 6, 2024, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
dismissed Griffin’s appeal as untimely filed. See In re US Cavalry Store, Inc. , No. 24 -8006,
Order (B.A.P. 6th Cir. May 6, 2024) (DN 9). On June 3, 2024, the appellate court denied
Griffin’s motion to reconsider. See In re US Cavalry Store, Inc., No. 24-8006, Order (B.A.P. 6th
Cir. June 3, 2024) (DN 12).
On August 1, 2024, Griffin filed the present pro se action in the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Hampshire. (Compl., DN 1). After denying the motion for a preliminary
injunction, the matter was transferred to this Court due to improper venue, and the case was
opened before this Court on May 24, 2025. (Order, DN 11).
On May 21, 2025, Griffin filed a pro se lawsuit against Freeburger Defendants, Bryant
Defendants, and Guilfoyle Defendants in Jefferson Circuit Court (Kentucky). See Griffin v.
Bryant, No. 25 -CV-004039 (Jefferson Cir. Ct.). On June 2, 2025, Griffin filed an amended
complaint asserting claims of spoliation of evidence, abuse of the discovery process, obstruction
of justice, tampering with evidence, negligence, perjury, fraudulent misrepresentation, slander
and defamation, respondeat superior, violations o f the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
violations of the judicial canons by Judge Stout, and commission of fraud upon the court. (Def.’s
Mot. Dismiss Ex. 4, at 60, DN 36-5).
On August 20, 2025, the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed the claims asserted by Griffin
against Bryant Defendants, and Guilfoyle Defendants with prejudice. (Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Ex.
4, at 1, DN 28 -5; Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Ex. 5, at 2, DN 36 -5). On November 6, 2025, the
Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed the claims against Freeburger Defendants with prejudice,
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which made the orders of dismissal final and appealable. (Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Ex. 2, at 2 -3, DN
27-2). No appeals have been taken to the Kentucky Court of Appeals from those orders.
In the present action , t he United States of America has filed a notice of substitution
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679 as to any state tort claims asserted in the Amended Complaint
against Judge Stout . (Notice Substitution, DN 57). Griffin has objected to that notice. (Pl.’s
Obj., DN 62). Judge Stout and the United States of America have moved to dismiss Griffin’s
claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6). (Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, DN 58).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff’s Objection
The Notice of Substitution filed by the United States of America is based upon the
certification from the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Kentucky that Judge Stout “ was
acting within the scope of his judicial employment with the federal judiciary of the United States
as a judge in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Kentucky at the time
of the conduct alleged in the complaint. ” (Certification 1, DN 57 -1). Griffin has objected to the
substitution. (Pl.’s Obj.1-3).
The Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, also
known as the Westfall Act, “‘accords federal employees absolute immunity from common -law
tort claims arising out of acts they undertake in the course of their official duties.’” Wuterich v.
Murtha, 562 F.3d 375, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Osborn v. Haley , 549 U.S. 225, 229
(2007)). Pursuant to this law, “[u]pon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant
was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which
the claim arose , . . . the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant.” 28 U.S.C. §
2679(d)(1). The Attorney General has delegated her authority to the United States Attorney s to
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provide this certification. See Dolan v. United States , 514 F.3d 587, 592 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
28 C.F.R. § 15.4). The “scope -of-employment certification is subject to judicial review for
purposes of substitution.” Id. at 593 (citing Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno , 515 U.S. 417,
434 (1995)) . Upon certification, substitution is proper “unless and until the district court
determines that the federal officer originally named as defendant was acting outside the scope of
his employment.” Osborn, 549 U.S . at 252. The scope of employment “is governed by the
agency law of the forum state.” Dolan, 514 F.3d at 593 (citing Singleton v. United States , 277
F.3d 864, 870 (6th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Hawver v. United States , 808 F.3d
693 (6th Cir. 2015); Rector v. United States, 243 F. App’x 976, 978-79 (6th Cir. 2007)). Such a
certification “serves as prima facie evidence that an employee acted within the scope of his
employment. Therefore, if the United States substitutes itself as the defen dant and moves to
dismiss, a plaintiff cannot defeat the motion merely by relying upon the factual allegations in his
complaint.” Gilbar v. United States , 108 F. Supp. 2d 812, 816 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (citing
Rutkofske v. Norman, 114 F.3d 1188, 1997 WL 299382, at *4 (6th Cir. June 4, 1997)), aff’d, 229
F.3d 1151 (6th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff must “produce evidence that demonstrates that the
employee was not acting in the scope of employment.” Dolan, 514 F.3d at 593 (quoting
Singleton, 277 F.3d at 871).
In Papa John’ s International, Inc. v. McCoy, 244 S.W.3d 44, 51 (Ky. 2008), the Kentucky
Supreme Court explained that:
An employee acts within the scope of employment when performing work
assigned by the employer or engaging in a course of conduct subject to the
employer’s control. An employee’s act is not within the scope of employment
when it occurs within an independent course of conduct not intended by the
employee to serve any purpose of the employer.

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Id. at 51 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.07 (Am. L. Inst. 2006)). To determine if
Judge Stout’s actions fell within the scope of employment, the Court must determine whether h is
“purpose, however misguided, [was] wholly or in part to further the [employer’s] business.” Id.
at 52 (citation omitted). The focus of this inquiry is on whether the employee acted with an
intent to serve the employer. See id. at 51.
Griffin asserts that Judge Stout’s conduct: (i) was administrative, not judicial; (ii)
involved materials outside the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court; and (iii) was undertaken in
the absence of jurisdiction. (Pl.’s Obj. 2). Griffin’s bare allegations are insufficient. See
Osborn, 549 U.S. at 231 (holding that the United States is substituted as defendant under the
Westfall Act unless “the District Court determines that the employee, in fact, and not simply as
alleged by the plaintiff, engaged in c onduct beyond the scope of his employment.”). These
assertions, however, are essentially the same arguments that Griffin could have raised in a direct
appeal challenging Judge Stout’s order. The order issued by Judge Stout permitting the
destruction of Calvary ’s records was squarely within the scope of his employment as a
bankruptcy judge and was made for the purpose of exercising his legal authority as a judge
presiding over a bankruptcy case following a hearing relating to the destruction of the records in
which Griffin’s counsel was present . No discovery could change that determination.
Accordingly, Griffin’s objection is overruled, and any state law tort claims against Judge Stout
may instead proceed against the United States of America. See Dolan, 514 F.3d at 592.
B. Defendant’s Motion
In their motion, Judge Stout and the United States of America seek dismissal based upon
absolute judicial immunity, sovereign immunity, and the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).
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(Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 5 -23, DN 58). Griffin opposes the motion. 1 (Pl.’s Resp. Defs .’ Mot.
Dismiss 2-5, DN 59).
Generally, threshold challenges to subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) should be decided before any ruling on the merits under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). In most circumstances, a plaintiff bears the burden to
survive Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See id.
Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction come in several varieties. Facial attacks challenge a
plaintiff’s establishment of jurisdiction in the complaint and require the Court to examine the
jurisdictional basis. See United States v. Ritchie , 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994) (citation
omitted). Factual attacks contest the existence of factual prerequisites to jurisdiction. See id. In
such motions, in contrast to motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court is empowered to
resolve the factual disputes affecting any jurisdictional prerequisites. See Rogers v. Stratton
Indus., Inc. , 798 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1986). The plaintiff bears the burden in both these
situations. See Bell, 327 U.S. at 682.
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must construe the complaint in the
light most favorable to [the plaintiff] . . . .” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen ,
500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Courts must also accept all of a plaintiff’s

1 In his response, Griffin asserts the motion should be denied because Judge Stout failed to
respond to Griffin’s discovery requests. (Pl.’s Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 1 -3). As the Court
addressed in a separate order, Griffin’s discovery efforts were premature, and as Defendants’
motion notes, the discovery may have been served prior to Judge Stout being properly served.
(Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 1). Those discovery requests are of no moment in addressing this motion to
dismiss. Griffin also filed a second document (DN 63) in response to the motion to dismiss ,
which was filed after the reply, and the Court disregards this document as an unauthorized sur-
reply filed without leave. See Liberty Legal Found. v. Nat’l Democratic Party of the USA, Inc. ,
875 F. Supp. 2d 791, 797 (W.D. Tenn. 2012) (“As many courts have noted, ‘[s]ur -replies . . . are
highly disfavored, as they usually are a strategic effort by the nonmoving party to have the last
word on a matter.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
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allegations as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Mere “labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action ’s elements” are
insufficient. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, this standard is
satisfied when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(citation omitted).
1. Fed. R. Civ. P . 12(b)(1)
It is well-established that judges generally are immune “from suit, not just from ultimate
assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 526 (1985)); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1116 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Pierson
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553 -54 (1967) (“Few doctrines [are] more solidly established at common
law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their
judicial jurisdiction . . . . ” (citing Bradley v. Fisher , 80 U.S. 335 (1872))). As the Supreme
Court has explained:
It is a judge’s duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that are brought
before him, including controversial cases that arouse the most intense feelings in
the litigants. His errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to
fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or
corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to principled
and fearless decisionmaking but to intimidation.

Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554. Under this broad doctrine, “‘[a] judge will not be deprived of
immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his
authority,’ nor ‘if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural
errors.’” Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1115 (alteration in original) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 356 (1978)). Courts have recognized that absolute judicial immunity can be overcome in
only to situations: (i) when the judge’s actions are “nonjudicial”; or (ii) when the judicial action
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was “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 1116 (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at
11-12). “
While Griffin alleges that Judge Stout lacked subject matter jurisdiction and/or personal
jurisdiction over the matter, the conclusory allegations in the Amended Complaint do not
plausibly support such an assertion to defeat immunity where a bankruptcy court has subject
matter jurisdiction over a Kentucky debtor’s estate, and any allegation of grave procedural errors
likewise do not suffice. (Am. Compl. 2 , 26 , 29 -33); Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (holding that
allegations of malice or corruption do not deprive judicial defendants of immunity) . “[O]nly in
the absence of subject matter jurisdiction are judicial actors devoid of the shield of immunity.
When, however, a court with subject matter jurisdiction acts where [for example] personal
jurisdiction is lacking, judicial and prosecutorial absolute immunity remain intact.” Holloway v.
Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 773 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ( internal citation omitted) (citation omitted) ;
see also Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1112. “Even grave procedural errors or acts taken when no statute
purports to confer on the court the authority purportedly exercised will not deprive a judge of
judicial immunity.” Stern v. Mascio, 262 F.3d 600, 607 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at
359-60)).
“When a debtor files for bankruptcy, it ‘creates an estate ’ that includes virtually all the
debtor’s assets. ” Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L. P . , 603 U.S. 204, 214 (2024) (quoting 11
U.S.C. § 541(a)). In ruling on the request of the trustee to destroy business records
constructively held by the court -appointed liquidating trustee, Judge Stout had subject matter
over the bankruptcy action. Judge Stout had the authority to make decisions relating to the
bankruptcy estate in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, and such decisions were judicial in nature.
See Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1116 (holding that an act is clearly judicial in nature and functions when
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it is done to resolve disputes between parties who have invoked the jurisdiction of the court);
Metzenbaum v. Nugent , 55 F. App ’x 729, 730 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming district court ’s sua
sponte dismissal of complaint against a federal judge based on his rulings in the plaintiff’s earlier
case). In addition, it is “a well-established principle that the bankruptcy court is endowed with in
personam jurisdiction for litigating all matters which arise in bankruptcy. The theory of
minimum contacts upon which pe rsonal jurisdiction is customarily established does not apply in
bankruptcy cases.” Matter of GEX Ky., Inc., 85 B.R. 431, 434 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (internal
citations omitted). Therefore, Griffin’s challenge to absolute judicial immunity based upon
subject matter and personal jurisdiction lacks merit.
For these reasons, Judge Stout is entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Griffin’s claims
against Judge Stout are dismissed.
2. Fed. R. Civ. P . 12(b)(6)
a. Sovereign Immunity
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States and its officials are immune
from suit unless immunity has been expressly waived. See United States v. Mitchell , 463 U.S.
206, 212 (1983); Muniz-Muniz v. U.S. Border Patrol, 741 F.3d 668, 671 (6th Cir. 2013). In the
absence of consent or waiver, federal courts generally lack subject matter jurisdiction over claims
asserted against the United States and its officials. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584,
586-87 (1941).
The Supreme Court has recognized an implied cause of action against federal officials in
three narrow circumstances: (i) searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (ii)
gender discrimination by a member of Congress in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s equal
protection clause; and (iii) deliberate indifference claims against prison officials based upon the
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Eighth Amendment. See Ziglar v. Abbasi , 582 U.S. 120, 130 -31 (2017) (citing Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed . Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)). The Supreme Court has expressed
its belief that recognizing causes of action under Bivens are disfavored and should only be done
after considering special factors where “ a court is not undoubtedly better positioned than
Congress to create a damages action. ” Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 492 (2022). There is an
absence of special factors here because Griffin had the opportunity to appeal the bankruptcy
court’s decision. Allowing such a claim to proceed against Judge Stout would inter fere with the
orderly administration of justice by a judicial officer. See Stump, 435 U.S. 356-64. Defendants’
motion is granted based on sovereign immunity.
b. Immunity under the FTCA
Viewing the pleadings liberally, Griffins’ claims against Judge Stout can be construed as
being state law tort claims. For suits sounding in tort against the United States or its employees
acting within the scope of employment, the exclusive waiver of sovereign immunity is found in
the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), and when an action brought pursuant to the FTCA, the
only proper defendant is the United States. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2679(b)(1). Thus, a
federal agency or a federal official cannot be sued under the FTCA. See Wilburn v. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 771 F. Supp. 3d 950, 961 (E.D. Mich. 2025); see also
Allgeier v. United States, 909 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Failure to name the United States
as defendant in an FTCA suit results in a fatal lack of jurisdiction .” (citations omitted) ).
Accordingly, because this lawsuit is against Judge Stout rather than the United States, the Court
lacks jurisdiction over any state law tort claims against Judge Stout under the FTCA.
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13
In addition, the FTCA requires that certain administrative -exhaustion actions to be taken
before filing an action against the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); see also Wilburn, 771
F. Supp. 3d at 961 (“The purpose of this administrative -exhaustion requirement is to prevent
plaintiffs from filing suit before attempting to settle their claims.” (citation omitted)). Because
Griffin has not alleged that he presented an administrative tort claim before filing this lawsuit, he
has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the FTCA. See Wilburn, 771 F. Supp. 3d
at 961. The motion is granted on this basis.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1. Plaintiff’s Objection (DN 62) is OVERRULED. Plaintiff’s state law tort claims
against Judge Alan C. Stout are DISMISSED, and those claims are asserted against the United
States of America pursuant to the Notice of Substitution.
2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (DN 58) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claims
against Judge Alan C. Stout and the United States of America are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
cc: counsel of record
Plaintiff, pro se
April 29, 2026
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