govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_25-cv-01213-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
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[INITIAL REVIEW 
ORDER] 
 
3:25-CV-1213 (VDO) 
JOHN CHACHO, JR., 
 
Plaintiff, 
    
-against- 
 
MAUREEN PLATT, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
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VERNON D. OLIVER, United States District Judge: 
Plaintiff John Chacho, Jr., an in mate incarcerated at Ches hire Correctional Institution 
in the custody of the Connecticut Department of Correction (“DOC”),1 filed this action pro se 
and in forma pauperis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 Plaintiff names twenty-two Defendants, which 
include two state attorneys, a crime scene t echnician, two Connecticut judges, a private 
attorney, a private citizen, and fifteen law enforcement officers with different positions in the 
Waterbury Police Department (“WPD”). 3 Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his 
constitutional rights in connection with his 2023 state court conviction for Attempted Assault 
 
1 The Court may “take judici al notice of relevant ma tters of public record.” Giraldo v. Kessler , 
694 F.3d 161, 164 (2d Cir. 2012). The Connecticut DOC website reflects that Plaintiff was 
admitted to the DOC on November 30, 2023, and was sentenced on September 7, 2023, to a term 
of eight years’  imprisonment. See Connecticut DOC, 
https://www.ctinmateinfo.state.ct.us/detailsupv.asp?id_inmt_num=392797 (las t visited May 1, 
2026).  
2 Plaintiff filed a Complaint on the District of Connecticut complaint form, ECF No. 1, as well as 
a Supplemental Complaint, ECF No. 1-1. 
3 Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1-5, 7-8.  
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in the First Degree. 4 Plaintiff states that he sues Defend ants in their individual and official 
capacities, but he solely seeks monetary damages.5  
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts review complaints 
brought by prisoners seeking relief against a gov ernmental entity or officer or employee of a 
governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Upon review, the Court must dismiss the 
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b). The Court has thoroughly reviewed 
all factual allegations in the complaint and conducted an initial review of the allegations therein 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.  
I. BACKGROUND 
While the Court does not set forth all the facts alleged in  Plaintiff’s complaint, it 
summarizes the basic factual allegations here to give context to its rulings below.  
Plaintiff brings this suit against the following Defendants: Waterbury State’s Attorneys 
Maureen Platt and Catherine B. Austin; C onnecticut Superior Court Judges Joseph B. 
Schwartz and Maureen M. Keegan; private c ounsel Daniel Thibodeau ; and private citizen 
 
4 The Court may take judicial notice of state court records. Velasco v. Gonclavez, No. 21-CV-1573 
(MPS), 2022 WL 19340, at *2, n.2 (D. Conn. Jan. 3, 2022); Scherer v. Equitable Life Assurance 
Soc’y, 347 F.3d 394, 402 (2d Cir. 2003) . The Court has reviewed th e Connecticut State Court 
records to provide context to Plaintiff’s claims . Plaintiff has a pending  habeas action in the 
Connecticut Superior Court. See Supp. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 181; see also Chacho #392797 v. 
Comm’r of Corr., No. TSR-CV24-5001781-S. On April 10, 2026, Plaintiff filed a third amended 
habeas corpus petition,  stating that on Septem ber 7, 2023, in the Waterbury Superior Court, he 
pled guilty to Attempted Assault in the First Degree in Docket No. UWY-CR20-0228619-T, and 
he admitted to a Violation of Probation charge in Docket No. UWY-CR20-0228619-0. See Third 
Am. Pet., Chacho, No. TSR-CV24-5001781-S. (Oct. 21, 2025), Entry No. 120.00 at 3. 
5 Compl. ECF No. 1 at 10; Supp. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 45. 
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George Vassallo.6 He also sues the following members of the Waterbury Police Department: 
Officers Anthony P. Ciminera, B. O’Toole, and Validimir Brito; Sergeants Desmond, Torres, 
Harvey, and Kereak; Lieutenants Knapp an d Rainone; Chief Fernando Spagnolo; Deputy 
Chief John D. Napiello; Assistant Deputy Chie f Edward Apicella; De tectives John Doe #1, 
John Doe #2, and John Doe #3; and Crime Scene Technician Se rgey Babakov (collectively, 
the “WPD Defendants”).  
On the morning of January 15, 2022, Plai ntiff and his girlfriend, Chelsea Chacho 
(“Chelsea”), were arrested by the Waterbury Police Department, 7 while Plaintiff and Chelsea 
were at Chelsea’s grandmother’s house. 8 Plaintiff and Chelsea were placed in handcuffs and 
placed in the back of police cars while the police searched the grandmother’s house after 
obtaining consent from an individual inside the house.9 Plaintiff and Chelsea were both driven 
to the Waterbury Police Department in the back of the police cars, and Plaintiff claims that at 
no time were they told they were under arrest.10 Plaintiff alleges that Officer Brito and Officer 
Ciminera were involved in his arrest.11 
 
6 Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1-5, 7-8. 
7 In Plaintiff’s Third Amended St ate Habeas Petition, Pl aintiff states that “[f]actually, the State 
contended that, on January 15, 2022, [Plaintiff] got into an alterc ation with an individual and 
sometime after this altercation the [Plaintiff] pulled out a firearm and fired one shot into the car of 
this individual.” See Third Am. Pet., Chacho, No. TSR-CV24-5001781-S. (Oct. 21, 2025), Entry 
No. 120.00 at 3. 
8 Supp. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 2, 39-60. 
9 Id. ¶¶ 59-62. 
10 Id. ¶ 63. 
11 Id. ¶¶ 59-60, 62. 
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After Plaintiff arrived at the WPD,  he was placed in a holding cell. 12 Detective John 
Doe #1 came and spoke with Plaintiff and told h im that he had been arrested because he had 
shot someone.13 Plaintiff was processed and booked, then he called Chelsea, who had already 
been released. 14 During Plaintiff’s phone call with Ch elsea, she told him that the police 
required her to sign a photograph of Plaintiff and “an electronic pinpad.”15 Plaintiff claims that 
Detectives John Doe #2 and #3 were involved in speaking with Chelsea prior to her release.16 
Plaintiff’s phone call with Chelsea ended, and he was placed back in his cell. 17 On 
January 18, 2022, Plaintiff was arraigned at Waterbury GA4, given a $250,000 bond, and 
charged with attempt to commit assault first degree, unlawful discharge of a firearm, reckless 
endangerment first degree, criminal mischief th ird degree, breach of  peace second degree, 
criminal possession of a firearm, violation of a pistol permit, and illegal possession of a weapon 
in a motor vehicle.18 Plaintiff bonded out on February 6, 2022, and his next court date was set 
for February 10, 2022.19  
On February 22, 2022, Plaintiff was issued a violation of probation warrant because of 
his arrest and the nature of his charges, and his bond was set at $100,000.20 Plaintiff then turned 
 
12 Id. ¶¶ 64-67. 
13 Id. ¶¶ 69-75. 
14 Id. ¶¶ 80-81. 
15 Id. ¶¶ 82-89. 
16 Id. ¶ 79. 
17 Id. ¶ 92. 
18 Id. ¶ 93. 
19 Id. ¶¶ 94-95. 
20 Id. ¶¶ 96-97. 
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himself in to the Naugatuck Police Station, and he was able to satisfy the bond amount.21 On 
April 6, 2022, Plaintiff had a court date in New Haven GA23, for the violation of probation 
charge, and the matter was continued.22 
Plaintiff retained an attorney who had Plaintiff’s violation of probation case transferred 
to Waterbury GA4, with Plaintiff’s most serious charges. 23 In Spring of 2023, Plaintiff and 
Chelsea met with Plaintiff’s counsel, Daniel Thibodeau, to review discovery.24 Plaintiff claims 
to have found a statement from Chelsea that the Waterbury Police allegedly fabricated, but 
Counsel Thibodeau was disinterested in the notion that the statement was fabricated.25 On May 
31, 2023, Plaintiff was arrested on unrelated charges and could not post bond.26  
In August 2023, Plaintiff had a conversation with Attorney Thibodeau pertaining to an 
alleged plea offer from State’s A ttorney Platt and Judge Schwartz. 27 On September 7, 2023, 
Plaintiff appeared in court and Thibodeau told Plaintiff that he was be ing offered a six-year 
sentence in exchange for pleading guilty to assault in the first degree and domestic and 
violation of probation charges. 28 Plaintiff went before Judge Sc hwartz and was told that the 
offer was 15 years suspended after 10 year s to serve, followed by 3 years’ probation. 29 
 
21 Id. ¶¶ 98-99 
22 Id. ¶ 101. 
23 Id. ¶¶ 102-04. 
24 Id. ¶ 105. 
25 Id. ¶¶ 105-14. 
26 Id. ¶ 114. 
27 Id. ¶ 119. 
28 Id. ¶¶ 120-22. 
29 Id. ¶ 124. 
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Thibodeau told Plaintiff he could receive up to a 22-year sentence if he went to trial, so Plaintiff 
claims he pleaded guilty because he felt coerced and he felt as if he had no other option. 30 
Plaintiff states he was under the influence of drugs at the time.31 
Plaintiff alleges that after Plaintiff pleaded guilty, his mother went to the courthouse to 
view his criminal files and fo und a statement from a private citizen, George Vassallo. 32 
Plaintiff also requested body camera footage from Sgt. Keroack at the records division of the 
WPD.33 Plaintiff then received the body camera f ootage, and claims he found information 
which caused him to believe his arrest, as well as the search and seizure, was illegal.34 Plaintiff 
alleges that he then sent certified letters to Judge Schwartz and State’s Attorney Platt seeking 
to withdraw his guilty plea,35 but Judge Schwartz denied Plaintiff’s motions to vacate his plea. 
The plea was not withdrawn.36 On November 30, 2023, Plaintiff was sentenced.37 
Plaintiff claims that State’s Attorneys Platt and Austin committed Brady violations, 38 
and that State’s Attorneys Platt and Austin and Judge Schwartz de liberately maintained 
prosecution against him “despite a fundamental lack of any evidence that [he] committed these 
crimes. . . .”39 Plaintiff further alleges that WPD me mbers Austin, Keroack, Ciminera, Brito, 
 
30 Id. ¶¶ 130-32. 
31 Id. ¶¶ 126-128, 132. 
32 Id. ¶¶ 135-36. 
33 Id. ¶ 137. 
34 Id. ¶¶ 138-41. 
35 Id. ¶ 142. 
36 Id. ¶ 148. 
37 Id. ¶¶ 146, 162. 
38 Id. ¶¶ 142-43, 149, 162, 165 
39 Id. ¶¶ 159, 170. 
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Knapp, O’Toole, Harvey, Apicella, Napiello, Babakov, Rainone, Torres, Spangolo, and John 
Does #1, #2, and #3 falsified police reports and witness statements and withheld exculpatory 
evidence, such as body camera footage of Plaintiff’s arrest.40  
Plaintiff also filed grievances with the Statewide Grievance Committee against Counsel 
Thibodeau because, as Plaintiff alleges, he was ineffective in failing to investigate exculpatory 
evidence and in allowing Plaintiff to plead guilty while he was under the influence of 
substances.41 Plaintiff alleges that George Vassallo made false statements  to the police in 
regards to Plaintiff shooting at his vehicle,42 and Plaintiff states that Judge Keegan signed the 
probable cause affidavit.43 Plaintiff claims that he is not challenging his sentence in this action, 
but instead, solely seeking monetary damages.44  
II. LEGAL STANDARD  
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, courts must review  prisoner civil complaints in which a 
prisoner seeks redress from a go vernmental entity and dismi ss any portion that “(1) is 
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon  which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks 
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-
(2).   
Although highly detailed allegations are not required, the complaint must “contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘s tate a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 
 
40 Id. ¶¶ 140, 143, 149-50, 162-65, 171, 175-78. 
41 Id. ¶¶ 144, 151-53, 155, 158-59, 162, 165-66. 
42 Id. ¶¶ 172-73. 
43 Id. ¶ 179. 
44 Id. ¶ 181. 
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 
allows the Court to draw th e reasonable inference that th e defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This plausibility standard is not a “probability 
requirement” but imposes a standard higher than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 
unlawfully.” Id.  
In undertaking this analysis, the court must  “draw all reasonable inferences in [the 
plaintiff’s] favor, assume all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and determine whether 
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Faber v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 
104 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks o mitted). However, the court is “not bound to 
accept conclusory allegations or legal conclu sions masquerading as factual conclusions,” id., 
and “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 
678.   
With respect to pro se litigants, it is well-established th at “[p]ro se submissions are 
reviewed with special solicitude, and ‘must be c onstrued liberally and interpreted to raise the 
strongest arguments that they suggest.’” Matheson v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. , 706 F. 
App’x 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-
75 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)). However, pro se litigants are still required to comply with 
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 
79 n.11 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he basic requirements of Rule 8 apply to self-represented and 
counseled plaintiffs alike.”). Rule 8 require s that a complaint contain “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), 
and provide “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 
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550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in original). A statement of claim that is not short and direct places 
“an unjustified burden on the court and the party who must respond to it because they are 
forced to select the relevant ma terial from a mass of verbiage.’” Harden v. Doe, No. 19-CV-
3839, 2019 WL 2578157, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2019) (quoting Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 
F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
III. DISCUSSION 
Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants for violations of hi s rights under the Equal 
Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, 
Fourth Amendment for illegal search and seizure, Sixth Amendment for ineffective assistance 
of counsel, and malicious prosecution.45  
A. Official Capacity Claims 
As an initial matter, Plaintiff states that he brings this suit against Defendants in their 
official and individual capacities, but he solely  seeks monetary damages and does not seek 
injunctive or declaratory relief.  The Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from holding 
Department of Correction employees liable in their official capacity for money damages. See 
Kelly v. New York State Unified Ct. Sys. , 2022 WL 1210665, at *1 (2d Cir. 2022). Plaintiff 
may seek official capacity relief  against a state official only to  the extent that he alleges an 
ongoing violation of the constitutional rights for wh ich a federal court ma y enter an order of 
prospective relief against that official in his official capacity. See, e.g., Va. Office for Prot. & 
Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 254 (2011) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)); 
Silva v. Farrish, 47 F.4th 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2022). Because Pl aintiff is solely seeking monetary 
 
45 Id. at 45. 
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damages against Defendants, his official capac ity claims against Defendants are dismissed. 
See e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). 
B.  Individual Capacity Claims for Monetary Damages 
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not comply with  Rule 8 of the Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure. Plaintiff’s Complaint and Supplemen tal Complaint comprise fifty-six pages and 
181 paragraphs and the scope of his allegations are somewhat unclear. Nevertheless, the Court 
dismisses Plaintiff’s individual capacity clai ms for monetary damages on the grounds that 
Plaintiff’s claims against Defend ants are either barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity, 
prosecutorial immunity, or the precedent set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), 
or because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  
1. Connecticut Superior Court Judges Keegan & Schwartz 
Plaintiff brings claims against Connect icut Superior Court Judges Keegan and 
Schwartz. Plaintiff claims that he sent certifie d letters to Judge Schwartz explaining that he 
wished to withdraw his guilty plea because hi s attorney had not repr esented him effectively 
and there were “multiple Brady violations” that his attorney did not investigate.46 Plaintiff also 
alleges that Judge Schwartz denied Plainti ff’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea with no 
acknowledgement or response.47 He claims that Judge Keegan  “is responsible for signing the 
‘probable cause affidavit’ as the Defendants of the Waterbur y Police Department employed 
inaccurate, falsified, and improper reports . . . .” 48 Plaintiff alleges that both Judges Keegan 
and Schwartz “deliberately and intentionally maintained prosec ution against [him] despite a 
 
46 Id. ¶ 142. 
47 Id. ¶ 149. 
48 Id. ¶ 179. 
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fundamental lack of any evidence th at [he] committed these crimes. . . .” 49 To the extent 
Plaintiff asserts claims of constitutional violations against Connecticut Superior Court Judges 
Keegan and Schwartz, these claims are barred by judicial immunity. 
“It is well settled that judges generally have  absolute immunity from suits for money 
damages for their judicial actions,” Bliven v. Hunt , 579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 
2009) (citing Mireles v. Waco , 502 U.S. 9, 9–10 (1991)), whet her they are sued in their 
individual or official capacities, Szymonik v. Connecticut , No. 18-CV-263 (MPS), 2019 WL 
203117, at *7 (D. Conn. Jan. 15, 2019), aff’d, 807 F. App’x 97 (2d Cir. 
2020). Judicial immunity applies “unless the conduct alleged is non-judicial or is in the clear 
absence of jurisdiction.” Manhattan King David Rest., Inc. v. Blackshear, 101 F.3d 685, 1996 
WL 280538, at *1 (2d Cir. 1996). Acts “arising out  of, or related to, individual cases before 
the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210. Judicial immunity “is 
conferred in order to insure ‘tha t a judicial officer, in exercisi ng the authority vested in him, 
shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences 
to himself.’” Id. at 209 (internal citation omitted). Therefore, “even allegations of bad faith or 
malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Id. 
Here, Plaintiff does not plead any allegations about Judges Keegan and Schwartz, other 
than their involvement in his prosecution, and a ccordingly, his claims against Judges Keegan 
and Schwartz pertain only to their judicial acts. See Owens v. Connecticut , No. 24-CV-79 
(VDO), 2024 WL 1576779, at *4 (D. Conn. Apr. 11, 2024) (dismissing claims against state 
court judges as barred by judicial immunity because plaintiff’s only allegations against judges 
 
49 Id. ¶ 159. 
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were their involvement in plaintiff’s prosecution); Nicholson v. Lenczewski, 356 F. Supp. 2d 
157, 163 (D. Conn. 2005) (dismissing damages claims against state court judges who presided 
over plaintiff’s criminal case where plaintiff a lleged there was insufficient cause to support 
charges against him, but judges requir ed him to plead and stand trial); Collin v. Connecticut 
Jud. Branch, No. 16-CV-1390 (SRU), 2016 WL 63044 34, at *3 (D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2016). 
Accordingly, all claims against Judges Keegan and Schwartz are barred by judicial immunity 
and dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 
2. State’s Attorneys Catherine B. Austin & Maureen Platt 
Plaintiff also brings claims against Defend ants State’s Attorneys Austin and Platt. A 
prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity from a section 1983 action for prosecutorial acts 
such as: determining which offenses and which defendants to charge, initiating a prosecution, 
evaluating and organizing evidence to be presented at trial or a grand jury, presenting evidence 
and witness testimony at trial an d “for virtually all acts, regard less of motivation, associated 
with his [or her] function as an advocate.” Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994); see 
also Simon v. City of New York, 727 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2013) (“A prosecutor acting in the 
role of an advocate in  connection with a judicial procee ding is entitled to absolute immunity 
for all acts intimately associated with the judici al phase of the crimina l process.”) (citation 
modified)). Plaintiff claims that State’s A ttorneys Austin and Platt “deliberately and 
intentionally maintained prosecution against [h im][,] despite a fundament al lack of evidence 
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that [he] committed these crimes.”50 Plaintiff also claims that State Attorneys Austin and Platt 
withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).51  
Aside from Plaintiff’s allegations being vague , conclusory, and speculative, there are 
no allegations that the conduct of State’s Attorneys Austin and Platt were anything other than 
prosecutorial acts which are pr otected by prosecutorial immunity. See Imbler v. Pachtman , 
424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976) (gran ting prosecutor’s absolute imm unity for their conduct “in 
presenting the state’s case,” including permitting an expert to give false testimony, suppressing 
important evidence, and introducing a misle ading artist’s sketch into evidence); Warney v. 
Monroe County, 587 F.3d 113, 125 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that prosecutor’s decision not to 
disclose exculpatory evidence to defendant ’s counsel was entitled to absolute immunity 
because “disclosure of evidence to opposing c ounsel is an advocacy function”) (citation 
omitted). Thus, State’s Attorneys Austin and Platt are immune from suit and all claims against 
these Defendants are dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 
3. Counsel Thibodeau  
Next, Plaintiff brings claims against his private defense counsel Daniel Thibodeau. 
Plaintiff alleges that his counsel knew that he was under the influence of drugs when he pleaded 
guilty to his criminal charges and that there were multiple Brady violations, but Counsel 
Thibodeau did not inves tigate his case thoroughly. 52 In essence, Plaintiff brings claims for 
ineffective assistance of counsel and seeks monetary damages against counsel Thibodeau.53 
 
50 Id. ¶ 159. 
51 Id. ¶¶ 142-43. 
52 Id. ¶¶ 132, 142. 
53 Id. ¶ 142. 
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“Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action against any person who, acting under 
color of state law, deprives another of his federal rights.” Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 
(1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Accordingly, a plaintiff must show a violation of a federally 
protected constitutional or statutory right which was the result of state action, or action “under 
color of law.” See Pitchell v. Callan,  13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994). But neither a public 
defender appointed by the court nor a private attorney retained to represent a client in a criminal 
or habeas matter is considered a state actor for purposes of section 1983, and so, Plaintiff 
cannot state a cognizable claim under section 1983 against Counsel Thibodeau. See Fine v. 
City of New York, 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 197 5) (private attorney retained by defendant was 
not a state actor).  
Nevertheless, although any private attorney would not generally be liable under section 
1983, the Court considers whether Plaintiff may bring his claims against a private party on the 
basis of any alleged conduct that may be considered state action. See United States v. Int’l 
Brotherhood of Teamsters , 941 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Because the United States 
Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties, a litig ant claiming that his 
constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that the challenged conduct 
constitutes ‘state action.’”). To show that the actions of a privat e party may be attributable to 
the state, thereby making the private party subject to liability under section 1983, the plaintiff 
must show: “(1) the State compelled the conduct, (2) there is a sufficiently close nexus between 
the State and the private conduct, or (3) the private conduct consisted of activity that has 
traditionally been the exclusiv e prerogative of the State.” Hogan v. A.O. Fox Mem’l Hosp. , 
346 F. App’x 627, 629 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Sybalski v. Indep. Grp. Home Living Program, 
Inc., 546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 2008)). “The fundamental question under each test is whether 
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the private entity’s challenged actions ar e ‘fairly attributable’ to the state.” Fabrikant v. 
French, 691 F.3d 193, 207 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 
(1982)). 
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to show that Counsel Thibodeau engaged in conduct 
that could be considered fairly attributable to the state. No allegation suggests that Plaintiff’s 
privately retained counsel was compelled by the State to take the actions or inactions of which 
Plaintiff complains; that there was a sufficiently close nexus between the State and conduct by 
Counsel Thibodeau; or that the conduct consisted of activity that has traditionally been the 
exclusive prerogative of the State. See Hogan, 346 F. App’x at 629. Likewise, Plaintiff has not 
alleged facts to indicate that Counsel Thibodeau engaged in a conspiracy with state actors so 
as to support a claim of state action for a section 1983 claim. See Storck v. Suffolk Cnty. Dep’t 
of Soc. Servs., 62 F. Supp. 2d 927, 940 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (plaintiff must “allege with at least 
some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in wh ich were reasonably 
related to the promotion of the alleged conspiracy.”).  
Finally, because Plaintiff has failed to assert  or plead facts to establish that Counsel 
Thibodeau is a state actor for pur poses of § 1983, to the extent th at Plaintiff is attempting to 
bring a claim against Counsel Thibodeau for a violation of the Sixth or Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims. See Parker v. Bowdren , No. 24-CV-
00184(VAB), 2024 WL 4201899, at *3 (D. Conn. Aug. 21, 2024), R. & R. Adopted, 2024 WL 
4524099 (D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024) (recommending dismissal of plaintiff’s Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment claims because plaintiff failed to show private attorney was a state 
actor). Accordingly, all claims for damages under section 1983 against Counsel Thibodeau are 
dismissed as not cognizable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 
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4. Private Citizen George Vassallo 
Plaintiff claims that George Vassallo, who is a private party, falsely accused him of a 
crime,54 but the details surrounding Ge orge Vassallo’s role in Plaintiff’s criminal case are 
somewhat difficult to discern. Even so, for the same reasons Plaintiff’s claims against Counsel 
Thibodeau are not cognizable, Plaintiff’s cla ims against George Vassallo are also not 
cognizable. 
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to show that George Vassallo engaged in conduct that 
could be considered fairly attributable to the state. See French, 691 F.3d at 207. Moreover, 
Plaintiff has not alleged facts to indicate that George Vassallo engaged in a conspiracy with 
state actors so as to support a claim of state action for a section 1983 claim. See Storck, 62 F. 
Supp. 2d 927, 940. And even assuming that George Vassallo was a victim of Plaintiff’s crime 
or crimes, or falsely accused Plaintiff of the crime or crimes for which he was convicted, this 
would not make George Vassallo a state actor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Sentementes v. 
Town of Bethel , No. 20-CV-580 (MPS), 2020 WL 5994950, at *5 (D. Conn. Oct. 9, 2020) 
(concluding defendant could not be considered a state actor under § 1983 based on defendant’s 
calling the police or seeking a protective order); see Adebiyi v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-
480, 2014 WL 4922888, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (noting “provision of information to 
a police officer — even if that information is fa lse or results in the of ficer taking affirmative 
action — is insufficient to constitute ‘joint ac tion’ with state actors for purposes of § 1983.”) 
(citation modified); see also Bravo v. Bexar Cty. Tex.,  No. 12-CV-4009, 2014 WL 1155302, 
at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2014). Because Plain tiff has not shown that George Vassallo was a 
 
54 Id. ¶ 169. 
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state actor under section 1983, Plaintiff’s claims against George Vassallo are dismissed as not 
plausible under § 1915A(b). 
5. Challenge to Validity of Conviction  
The remaining Defendants are members of the Waterbury Police Department. 
Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants include claims for fabrication of police reports, 
withholding exculpatory evidence,  and illegal search and seizure.
55 A litigant may not seek 
money damages for an alleged improper or ille gal conviction until the conviction has been 
overturned or invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme 
Court held: 
[T]o recover damages for [an] alle gedly unconstitutional conviction or 
imprisonment, or for any other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness 
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that 
the conviction or sentence has been re versed on direct a ppeal, expunged by 
executive order, declared invalid . . ., or called into question by a federal court’s 
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. . . . 
 
Id. at 486-87. There are no facts here to suggest that Plaintiff’s criminal conviction has been 
overturned or invalidated. As such, all of Pl aintiff’s claims against the members of the 
Waterbury Police Department implicating and challenging the circumstances surrounding his 
arrest and conviction are barred by Heck. The Court addresses each of Plaintiff’s claims in 
turn. 
Plaintiff claims that the members of the WPD engaged in an illegal search and seizure, 
and as best as can be discerned, it appears that officers from the WPD retrieved a firearm from 
Plaintiff’s girlfriend’s grandmother’s house, which the WPD used as evidence to charge 
 
55 Id. ¶¶ 163, 171, 175, 177. 
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Plaintiff with the crimes of which he was convicted.56 “Courts applying the Heck doctrine with 
respect to allegedly unlawful searches must as sess ‘whether a prisoner’s victory in a § 1983 
suit would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his convi ction or sentence. . . .’” Cox v. 
Aversa, No. 18-CV-3898, 2020 WL 815476, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2020) (quoting 
McKithen v. Brown , 481 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original)). Under 
exceptionally rare circumstances “a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable 
search may lie even if the challe nged search produced evidence that . . .  result[ed] in the § 
1983 plaintiff’s still-outstanding conviction.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7. These circumstances, 
which are exceptions to the general rule, include the independent source, inevitable discovery, 
and harmless error doctrines because actions involving those doctrines “would not necessarily 
imply that the plaintiff’s conviction was unlawful.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
Here, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any of these exceptions apply. In fact, 
“District courts have found th at, when a § 1983 action target s a single episode involving a 
single search, such a case would necessarily de monstrate the invalidity of a conviction based 
on that search.” Cox, 2020 WL 815476, at *3 (citing El v. City of New York, No. 14-CV-9055-
GHW, 2015 WL 1873099, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2015) (collecting cases)). Plaintiff appears 
to challenge the search of his girlfriend’s grandmother’s house and the seizure of a firearm, 
and the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s convictio n involve him getting “into an 
altercation with an individual and sometime after this alterca tion the [Plaintiff] pulled out a 
firearm and fired one shot into the car of this individual.”57  
 
56 See id. ¶¶ 58, 62, 140.  
57 See Third Am. Pet., Chacho, No. TSR-CV24-5001781-S. (Oct. 21, 2025), Entry No. 120.00 at 
3. 
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Because Plaintiff’s challenge to the search  of his wife’s grandmother’s house and 
seizure of a firearm may invalidate his conviction, his claim is barred by Heck. See Pennyman 
v. Desena, No. 25-CV-40 (SVN), 2026 WL 892276, at *5 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2026) (finding 
plaintiff’s claim challenging search and seizure barred by Heck); see also Knight v. Cerejo , 
No. 13-CV-1882 (JAM), 2015 WL 893421, at *5 (D. Conn. Mar. 2, 2015) (finding Fourth 
Amendment claim barred by Heck where the conviction and sent ence were based entirely on 
drugs found during the allegedly illegal search). 
Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff claims that members of the WPD fabricated police 
reports or other evidence, his claim is barred by Heck. “The Supreme Court has also held that 
Heck applies to cases alleging fabricated evidence.” Zografidis v. Richards , No. 22-CV-631 
(TOF), 2022 WL 21756775, at *8 (D. Conn. July 6, 2022), R. & R. Adopted  (Oct. 7, 2022), 
aff’d, No. 22-3197, 2023 WL 7538211 (2d Cir. Nov. 14, 2023) (citing McDonough v. Smith, 
139 S.Ct. 2149, 2156-57 (2019)); see also Warren v. Fischl , 674 F. App’x 71, 72 (2d Cir. 
2017) (summary order) (applying Heck to preclude prisoner’s claim against police officers 
and prosecutors for unreasonable search and seizure and fabrication of evidence); Roberites v. 
Huff, No. 11-CV-0521, 2012 WL 1113479, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar.  30, 2012) (dismissing as 
premature, pursuant to Heck, due process, conspiracy to  prosecute, obstruction of 
justice, fabrication of evidence, and equal protection claims related to the plaintiff’s conviction 
where the plaintiff was convicted  of the underlying criminal char ges and his appeal was still 
pending).  
Plaintiff may not seek damages for his allegedly unlawful conviction based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, judicial misconduct, fabrication of 
evidence, malicious prosecution, and claims challenge the search and seizure of evidence used 
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in relation to his criminal convictions. See Collin v. Connecticut Jud. Branch, No. 16-CV-1390 
(SRU), 2016 WL 6304434, at *5 (D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2016). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff 
brings these claims against the WPD Defendants , these claims are dismissed pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 
6. False Arrest & Malicious Prosecution  
Plaintiff also appears to bring claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution. Under 
Connecticut law, to state a claim for malicious prosecution and false arrest, the criminal 
proceeding must have terminated in the Plaintiff’s favor. See Roberts v. Babkiewicz, 582 F.3d 
418, 420 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting McHale v. W.B.S. Corp. , 187 Conn. 444, 446 (1982)); see 
also Lopes v. Farmer, 286 Conn. 384, 389 (2008) (“one of the elements of the tort of malicious 
prosecution is favorable termination of the underlying action”); Miles v. City of Hartford, 445 
F. App’x 379, 382–83 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting favorable termination is an element of a section 
1983 claim “sounding in false imprisonment or false arrest” under Connecticut law). Plaintiff 
was convicted of the crime he no w seeks to challenge, and thus he cannot sustain a claim for 
malicious prosecution or false arrest.  
There are no facts to suggest that Plaintiff’s criminal conviction has been overturned or 
invalidated. Thus, Plaintiff may not seek dama ges for his allegedly un lawful conviction, and 
so, Plaintiff’s claims against the WPD for false arrest and malicious prosecution are dismissed 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 
7. Miscellaneous Claims 
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff claims th at Defendants subjected him to cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and violated  his rights under the Equal 
Protection Clause or Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff has failed to 
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plead plausible claims.  First, it is not clear in  what context Plaintiff is claiming Defendants 
violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. The cruel and unusual punishment clause of 
the Eighth Amendment is all enco mpassing and includes claims such as excessive force and 
deliberate indifference to medical needs. There is no indication here that Defendants violated 
Plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth Amendment.  
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall ... de prive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects both a right to “substantive” due process 
and “procedural” due process. County of Sacramento v. Lewis , 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998). 
Having determined that the Judge and State Attorney Defendants are immune from suit and 
dismissing the Defendants who were not state actors, it is also unclear how any of the 
remaining WPD Defendants deprived Plaintiff of due process. The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is also all encompassing and covers a wide range of claims. Plaintiff 
has not indicated how his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights were violated, 
nor has he pleaded any allegations for the Court to liberally construe any of his claims as a 
potential due process violation. Plaintiff’s only  mention of an Equal Protection claim is 
regarding Counsel Thibodeau; 58 however, because the Court has already determined that 
Counsel Thibodeau is not a state actor for purposes of section 1983, Plaintiff cannot bring an 
Equal Protection claim against Counsel Thibodeau. 
Finally, although Rule 15(a)(2) of provides that “[t]he co urt should freely give leave 
[to amend] when justice so requires[,]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), leave to amend may properly 
 
58 Supp. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 168. 
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be denied for multiple reasons, including, “futility of amendment.” Ruotolo v. City of New 
York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2 008) (internal quotations omitte d). Plaintiff’s claims are 
dismissed either because they are barred by im munity doctrines, certain  Defendants are not 
state actors, or because his conviction has not been invalidated. Here, there is no possibility at 
this juncture that an amendment will be succe ssfully pleaded, and thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint 
is dismissed without leave to amend. 
IV. CONCLUSION  
For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint is  dismissed without prejudice and without 
leave to amend.  
The Clerk of Court respectfully to close this case. 
SO ORDERED. 
 
 
Hartford, Connecticut 
May 4, 2026 
 
/s/Vernon D. Oliver  
VERNON D. OLIVER 
United States District Judge  
 
 
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