govinfo:USCOURTS-ksd-2_25-cv-02305-1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 
 
HERMON REZENE,  
  
 Plaintiff,
  
 v.
  
U.S.D. 500 and MARY STEWART,  
  
 Defendants.
  
 
 
 
 
     Case No. 2:25-cv-02305-HLT-GEB 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 Plaintiff Hermon Rezene, a social worker with  the U.S.D. 500 school district, brings this 
§§ 1983 and 1981 hostile work environment case agains t the district and her former  principal. 
Plaintiff claims another district  employee created a race-based hostile work e nvironment. She 
contends Mary Stewart (the form er principal) is liable for the hostile work environment because 
Stewart failed to prevent or remedy the race-bas ed harassment. And she seeks to hold the school 
district liable based on a municipal liability theory. Both Stewart and the school district moved to 
dismiss. Docs. 5, 12.  
 The Court grants both motions. Stewart is en titled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff 
fails to identify clearly establis hed law that Stewart violated w ith her action or inaction. And the 
school district is entitled to dismissal because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that it had a policy 
or custom that caused Plaintiff’s injury.  
 
 
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I. BACKGROUND 1 
Plaintiff worked as a behavioral health soci al worker at Wyandotte High School. Stewart 
was the principal. Wyandotte High School is part  of U.S.D. 500, a unified public school district 
created by state law. It is a governmental subdiv ision of Kansas. The school district is governed 
by a board of education. 
Plaintiff alleges that Matthew Greenberg, a special education teacher at the school, 
subjected her to a hostile work environment based on her race. Th e school distri ct has a board 
policy prohibiting discrimination, ha rassment, and retaliation. It also maintains a board policy 
allowing for informal and formal complaint procedures. And it has a policy directed at racial and 
disability harassment. 
 Plaintiff filed a grieva nce against Greenberg on May 2, 2022, and sent it to her supervisors, 
including Stewart. Plaintiff and Greenberg met with the vice prin cipal. The meeting ended with 
Greenberg pointing his finger at Plaintiff, stating,  “I’m not here to answer your questions,” and 
storming out. Stewart stoppe d by Plaintiff’s office the next da y and said, “I heard the meeting 
didn’t go so well.” She explained the grievance process to Plaintiff. Stewart told Plaintiff that she 
would meet with Greenberg sepa rately before meeting with th em together to mediate the 
grievance.  
 Stewart met with Greenberg and informed Pl aintiff about the meeting on May 6. Stewart 
told Plaintiff that Greenberg “is really just im mature, and lacks professi onal decorum,” and that 
she would provide him with “some coaching.” Plaint iff explained that she felt unsafe because of 
 
1  The following facts are taken from th e well-pleaded complaint and accepted as true at this stage of the proceedings. 
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
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the hostile work environment created by Greenberg. But Stewart did not take Plaintiff’s concerns 
seriously. Plaintiff asked when the mediation would occur. Stewart said it would be later that week.  
The mediation had not happened by May 23, so Plaintiff followed up with Stewart. Plaintiff 
was summoned to a meeting with Stewart and Greenberg three days later. Six additional teachers 
who were friends and supporters of Greenberg attended the meeting. Stewart said there was a lot 
of tension in the room and everyone needed to get along and work together next year. Plaintiff was 
disappointed with the meeting an d felt attacked. Plaintiff aske d Stewart immediately after the 
meeting when they would meet with Greenberg al one to mediate. Stewart responded that they 
would not be meeting with Greenberg this year and that they would deal with it next school year. 
August 2022 started no better for Plaintiff. Gree nberg continued to create a hostile work 
environment. Another teacher, Michael Rebne, f iled a complaint with the school district in 
September regarding Greenberg’s conduct toward Plaintiff. Rebne described how Greenberg had 
publicly yelled at Plaintiff, ex claiming “I hate you,” acted in an intimidating manner toward 
Plaintiff, and told others how much he hates Plaintiff. Rebne referred to Greenberg’s conduct as 
bullying and said “its ongoing nature makes it feel condoned, especially by white colleagues and 
even building leadership.” The scho ol district sent a le tter to Rebne in Oct ober, stating that his 
complaint was substantiated and Human Resources had addressed his concerns.
2 
Greenberg continued to create a hostile work environment for Plaintiff throughout the fall 
semester. Plaintiff repeatedly asked Stewart when they would mediate her issues with Greenberg. 
 
2  Plaintiff’s allegations blur the line between whether Rebne’s complaint was substantiated or her grievance was 
substantiated. Compare Doc. 1 ¶ 28 with Doc. 1 ¶ 31. It is unc lear whether Plaintiff’s own grievance was 
substantiated or what steps she took beyond trying to schedule mediation. To the extent only Rebne’s complaint 
was substantiated, the Court questions whether Plaintiff has standing to raise a Monell claim about anything tied 
to Rebne’s complaint or the actions taken (or not taken) as  a result of it. Recognizing the rules associated with a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court construes the complaint in her favor and understands her own grievance 
to have been substantiated.  
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Stewart continued to avoid this meeting and told Plaintiff, “It’s time to let this go.” Stewart finally 
agreed to allow Plaintiff to me et with Dr. Canise Salinas-Willi ch in January 2023 to discuss her 
ongoing issues with Greenberg. Salinas-Willich was the school district’s Executive Director of 
Diversity, Equality and Inclusion.  
Plaintiff and Stewart met with Salinas-Will ich on January 13. Salinas-Willich expressed 
surprise that Plaintiff and Gree nberg had not yet mediated. She st ated that she was aware of the 
situation because she was working with Greenberg as part of the outcome of Plaintiff’s grievance. 
Salinas-Willich agreed to facilitate mediation. Sh e also agreed to meet w ith Greenberg first, to 
prepare him for the mediation. The mediation was scheduled for January 20. But again, the 
mediation did not happen.  
Plaintiff went on maternity leav e in February 2023. She returned  to work for the last two 
weeks of the school year in May 2023. Her last day was May 24, 2023. Plaintiff then transferred 
to an elementary school for the next school y ear because of the hostile work environment. 
Greenberg resigned from his job in 2023 when summer school ended. 
II. STANDARD  
A complaint survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss when it contains “sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 
678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A cl aim is plausible if it 
contains sufficient factual content to allow a c ourt “to draw the reasonab le inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The plausibility standard requires “more than 
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted un lawfully,” but it “is not akin to a ‘probability 
requirement.’” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s 
liability, it stops short of the line between possibili ty and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. 
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(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal quotations omitted). A court undertaking this analysis 
accepts as true all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint but need not accept legal conclusions. 
Id. Likewise, conclusory statements are not entitled to the presumption of truth. Id. at 678-79. 
III. ANALYSIS  
Each defendant moves to dismiss on different  grounds. Stewart asserts she is entitled to 
qualified immunity because Plaintiff fails to show the violation of a clearly established statutory 
or constitutional right. The school district contends that Plaintiff fails to plead facts showing it has 
municipal liability based on its employee’s actions. Both also argue that the statute of limitations 
bars the claims, but Stewart abandons that argument and the Court need not reach it for the school 
district.3  
A. Stewart’s Qualified Immunity.  
Stewart asserts qualified imm unity for her actions. Qualifie d immunity protects public 
officials from civil liability provided their conduc t “does not violate clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 
555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “Put simply, qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent 
or those who knowingly violate the law.” Mullenix v. Luna , 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (internal 
quotations omitted). Once an official has raised a qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff bears 
the burden to show that (1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the right 
was “clearly established” at the time of the conduct at issue. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 
735 (2011). The order in which these two prongs are evaluated is within a court’s discretion. But 
 
3  Stewart’s abandonment of the statute-of-limitations defense may be strategic. It appears that the Tenth Circuit 
applies the four-year federal limit to most § 1981 claims rather than borrowing the limit from state statutes as with 
§ 1983 claims. See Smith v. USD 480 Liberal , 682 F. Supp. 3d 980, 987 (D. Kan. 2023) (citing cases including 
Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 614 F.3d 1132, 1152-53 (10th Cir. 2008)).  
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once a defendant asserts qualified immunity, there is a presumption of immunity. Estate of Taylor 
v. Salt Lake City, 16 F.4th 744, 757 (10th Cir. 2021). 
A right is “clearly established” for qualified immunity purposes where it is “sufficiently 
clear that every reasonable official would have understood” his conduct to have violated that right. 
Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 11 (citation and internal quotations omitted). To satisfy this step, courts do 
not require a case “d irectly on point.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. But the pl aintiff must identify 
existing precedent. This may be controlling authority or “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive 
authority.’” Id. at 742. Either way, the authority must place the statutory or constitutional question 
“beyond debate.” Id. at 741. The precedent “must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case” before 
the court. White v. Pauly , 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (noting that c ourts should not define “clearly 
established law” at “a high level of generality”). 
A plaintiff cannot establish supervisory liability merely by alleging that the defendant was 
in charge of a person who committed the alleged violation. Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 
1195 (10th Cir. 2010). A plaint iff must first establish that the s upervisor’s subordinates violated 
the plaintiff’s federal rights. Id. And the plaintiff must also allege an “affirmative link between the 
supervisor and the violation.” Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted). A supervisor may be 
liable for a subordinate’s conduct under § 1983 if she participates in or “consciously acquiesces” 
in racial harassment by an employee. Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver , 186 F.3d 1238, 1250 
(10th Cir. 1999). But there must be a “‘deliber ate’ deprivation of constitutional rights by the 
defendant,” not mere negligence. Id.4 
 
4  Murrell addressed § 1983 claims for violation of constitutional equal protection rights. Plaintiff addresses only 
§ 1981 here. But the Court examines her claims for race-based hostile work environment under the same standard. 
See generally Ramirez v. Dep’t of Corr., Colo., 222 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2000).  
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Plaintiff alleges that Greenberg  violated her federal statutor y right to be free of racial 
harassment. She alleges that Stewart knew of the harassment and de liberately, consciously 
acquiesced in it by fa iling to address the conduct or penalize Greenberg for continuing to harass 
her. The Court questions whether these allegations (as supported by the facts alleged) are sufficient 
to state a § 1981/§ 1983 violation. But, even if they do, Plaintiff fails to establish the second prong 
for qualified immunity. 
Plaintiff must identify clearly established law putting Stewart on not ice that her conduct 
was unlawful. Plaintiff identifies Murrell.5 She also cites Wilson as next friend to W.B. v. USD 290 
Ottawa, 2025 WL 2161143 (D. Kan. 2025). Neither Murrell nor Wilson constitute clearly 
established law that would have put Stewart on notice that her actions in this case were unlawful. 
Murrell involved sexual harassment instead of racial harassment. It also involved student-
on-student harassment instead of employee-on-employee conduct, which is not an entirely 
insignificant difference. But these distinguishing facts alone may not render Murrell so dissimilar 
as to make it inapplicable to this situation. Instead, it is the actual factual details of the underlying 
events in Murrell that make it different. 
Murrell addressed a female special education student (Jones) who was repeatedly sexually 
assaulted at school by a male student (Doe) with known behavioral problems. Teachers were aware 
that Doe engaged in aggressive and sexually in appropriate conduct with Jones. Jones’s mother 
(Murrell) reported to them that Doe had been making harassing phone calls to Jones at home. On 
at least one occasion, Jones told her teachers th at Doe had battered and sexually assaulted her. 
They responded by encouraging J ones not to tell her mother a nd to forget the incident had 
 
5  She cites Ryan v. City of Shawnee , 13 F.3d 345, 349-50 (10th Cir. 1993), as well. But she simply cites Ryan for 
the principle that racial harassment vi olates 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Plaintiff does not appear to claim the 
facts of Ryan put Stewart on notice that her conduct was unlawful. 
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happened at all. On another occasion, a janito r found Doe and Jones in a secluded area of the 
school, where Doe was sexually assaulting Jones. Jones bled and vomited during the assault and 
the janitor returned Jones and Doe to the teache rs and advised them wh ere he found Jones and 
Doe. The teachers did not inform Murrell about th e behavior, and in fact helped Jones hide the 
blood. Jones later started engaging in self-des tructive and suicidal behavior and entered a 
psychiatric hospital. 
Murrell learned of Jones’s treatment while Jone was hospitalized. But the teachers denied 
it happened, told her to send Jone s back to school, and refused further discussion. Murrell called 
the principal and left a message. But the principal did not return Murrell’s call or investigate. Jones 
returned to school, and Doe battered her again. Other students ridiculed Jones about Doe’s earlier 
sexual attacks. Murrell unsuccessfully tried to contact the principal multiple times. She eventually 
learned of a meeting scheduled to discuss Doe’s sexual conduct with Jones. Murrell attended the 
meeting, where the principal suggested the sexual contact may have been consensual. The principal 
knew Jones was incapable of consenting and that Doe had admitted assaulting Jones. The principal 
declined to investigate and suspended Jones but not Doe. 
 Murrell’s facts, which the Tenth Circuit assumed true for purposes of reviewing dismissal 
for failure to state a claim, are not even moderately close to the facts of this case. The teachers and 
principal in Murrell took no action at all to remedy the trea tment of Jones. They knew of Doe’s 
conduct and consciously acquiesced in it and helped hide it from Murrell. Doe’s own mother had 
warned the teachers and principal of the need to keep an eye on him. Yet the school district instead 
appointed him as a janitor’s assistant, which granted him access to uns upervised areas of the 
school. He used these secluded areas to repeatedly sexually assault Jones. 
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In contrast, here Greenberg publicly confro nted Plaintiff about a student who was in 
counseling with Plaintiff instead of in math class. He aggressively marched toward her and shouted 
at her and the student. Plaintiff learned afterward that Greenberg had said on another occasion that 
he hated her. Plaintiff filed a grievance agains t Greenberg. The same day, the vice principal met 
with Plaintiff and Greenberg to discuss th e grievance. Greenberg was disrespectful, 
condescending, and rude toward Plaintiff during the meeting. After Greenberg stormed out, the 
vice principal acknowledged to Plaintiff that he knew race played a role in the situation.  
Stewart talked to Plaintiff the next day. Stewart explained the grievance process, met with 
Greenberg, provided him with coaching, and later conducted a meeting with Plaintiff, Greenberg, 
and other teachers. Stewart eventually agreed to a meeting with Plaintiff and Salinas-Willich, who 
was already aware of the situatio n and had been working with Gree nberg as part of the outcome 
of Plaintiff’s grievance. Stewart’ s actions did not satisfy Plaintiff. But Stewart’s actions are far 
from no action at all. The facts of Murrell are not a reasonable comparison. Murrell would not 
have put Stewart on notice that her handling of Plaintiff’s grievance was unlawful. 
Wilson is also no help to Plaintiff. In Wilson, a student and his pa rent reported racial 
bullying at school at least nine times. They made reports to the school principal, counselor, district 
superintendent, and each indivi dual school board member. They also reported the bullying at 
multiple 504 meetings. Neither the principal nor counselor offered any response or reaction. The 
individual defendants raised qualified immunity. Judge Melgren denied immunity, holding that a 
reasonable defendant would have known that delib erate indifference to the student’s racial 
harassment violated the student’s equal protection rights. Wilson, 2025 WL 2161143, at *4. Like 
Murrell, the response in Wilson was no response at all.  
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A case directly on point is unnecessary to render rights clearly established. Mullenix, 577 
U.S. at 11. It is only necessary that exis ting precedent places the question beyond debate. Id. But 
neither of these cases do that here. They do not constitute clearly established law that put Stewart 
on notice that her actions in response to Plaintif f’s complaints were unlawful. To hold otherwise 
is akin to the overbroad analysis repeatedly rejected by the Supreme C ourt. Plaintiff has not 
rebutted Stewart’s assertion of qualified immunity. 
B. U.S.D. 500’s Municipal Liability.  
The Court next turns to the school district’s liability. A municipality (or in this case, a 
school district) can only be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the acti ons of its employees 
when the action is taken pursuant to the municipality’s “official policy,” Pembaur v. City of 
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)), 
or for acts it has sanctioned or ordered, Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 602 F.3d 
1175, 1188 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480). This is because a municipality 
cannot be held liable simply under a theory of respondeat superior. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 478; see 
also Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Rather, a plaintiff must plead a plausible claim under the following 
elements to sue a municipality under § 1983 for em ployee actions: (1) that there was an official 
policy or custom, (2) that caused a violation of fe derally protected rights, and (3) that the policy 
or custom was enacted or maintained with deliberate indifference toward the potential injury. See 
Hinton v. City of Elwood, Kan., 997 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1993). 
Plaintiff argues that she has plausibly pleaded  a claim against the sc hool district because 
(1) final policymaking authorities (Stewart and Salinas-Willich) “failed to take remedial and 
preventative action reasonably calculated to end the racial harassment” of Plaintiff by Greenberg, 
and (2) the district has “a custom  of failing to take remedial and preventive action reasonably 
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calculated to end the racial harassment of the ot her employees” of the di strict. Doc. 1 at ¶ 39. 
Plaintiff’s first allegation fails to establish liab ility because the board of  education is the final 
decisionmaking authority under Kansas law, and she has not established that the board maintained 
an official policy of deliberate indifference to racial harassment. Ware v. U.S.D. No. 492, 902 F.2d 
816, 818 (10th Cir. 1990). The second allegation fails because it is a conclusory allegation without 
factual support. 
First, Plaintiff tries to avoid the impact of Ware by arguing that the board of education can 
delegate and has delegated its policymaking authority to subordi nates. She alle ges she filed a 
grievance pursuant to the distri ct’s written policies. She then cites the board’s official policy, 
which states, “All District employees share in the responsibility of preventing and responding to 
discrimination, harassment, bullying, and reta liation.” Doc. 6-2 at 4. The policy requires 
appropriate remedial action when there has been  a determination that harassment has occurred 
after investigation. Id. at 9. But Plaintiff contends the pol icy only provides fo r appeal of the 
determination when there has been a policy violation, not for th e decision of what remedies are 
appropriate. Plaintiff thus argue s that the board delegated fi nal policymaking authority for 
remedies to district employees including Stewart.  And it is the lack of an appropriate remedy for 
Greenberg’s conduct that she challenges here. 
Plaintiff’s effort is unavailing. She offers no more than a conclusory allegation that Stewart 
has final policymaking authority. But the law in Kansas is that the board makes policy. Ware, 902 
F.2d at 818. It is of no import that Stewart has th e discretion to make some decisions under that 
policy. The board has policies prohibiting disc rimination (including r ace-based harassment). 
Stewart is bound to follow board-issued policies. And the board ultimately retains the authority to 
review or overturn her decisions. “Delegation does not occur when a s ubordinate’s decisions 
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are . . . subject to review by the authorized policymaker.” Ware, 902 F.2d at 818; see also City of 
St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130 (1988) (“[T]he mere fa ilure to investigate the basis of 
a subordinate’s discretionary decisions does not amount to a delegation of policymaking authority, 
especially where (as here) the wrongfulness of the subordinate’s decision arises from a retaliatory 
motive or other unstated rationale.”). Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that Stewart has final 
policymaking authority such that the school distri ct is liable for her actions. And she has not 
alleged that the board has policies that show deliberate indifference to racial harassment. 
Second, Plaintiff’s allegation that the district has a custom of failing to take remedial and 
preventative action is wholly conclusory. Plaintiff pleads no facts in support of this allegation. It 
is insufficient under Twombly and Iqbal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s case with prej udice. This is generally proper under Rule 
12(b)(6). Plaintiff did not amend as of right or s eek leave to amend as alternative relief. Plaintiff 
chose to stand on her complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15; D. Kan. Rule 15.1; see also Rollins v. 
Wackenhut Servs., Inc. , 703 F.3d 122, 132-33 (D.C. Cir. 2012)  (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) 
(explaining that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally with prejudice unless stated otherwise 
and that opportunities to amend under Rule 15 in response to motions to dismiss provide a fair 
opportunity for a plaintiff to avoid such a result).  This approach also promotes efficiency and 
prevents parties from ta king a “wait-and-see” approach to see what can get by before making 
fulsome efforts to address the challenged issues. C ourts do not exist to give advisory opinions so 
plaintiffs can test the mettle of serial complaints. Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate in this 
case. 
  
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 THE COURT THEREFORE ORDERS that U.S.D.  500’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 5) and  
Stewart’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 12) are GRANTED. The case is closed. 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
 Dated: April 27, 2026    /s/ Holly L. Teeter    
       HOLLY L. TEETER 
       U N I T E D  S T A T E S  D I S T R I C T  J U D G E  
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