govinfo:USCOURTS-laed-2_25-cr-00088-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CRIMINAL ACTION  
  
VERSUS NO. 25-88 
  
LUCINTO FUENTES SECTION: “P” (5) 
 
ORDER AND REASONS 
 
  Before the C ourt is the Government’s Emergency Motion and Incorporated Memorandum 
to Stay Defendant ’s Release and Set Expedited Briefing Schedule, 1 the Government ’s 
Memorandum in Support to Stay Defendant’s Release,2 the Defendant’s Preliminary Response to 
the Government’s Ex Parte Stay Motion, 3 and the Defendant ’s Re sponse in Opposition to the 
Government’s Motion for a Stay. 4 For the reasons that follow, IT IS ORDERED that the 
Government’s motion to stay Defendant’s release is DENIED.   
I. BACKGROUND 
This case has an unusual procedural history. On March 6, 2025, Defendant Lucito Fuentes5 
was named in a criminal complaint for being a felon in possession of a firearm and an illegal alien 
in possession of a firea rm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 922(g)(5).6 The complaint 
alleges that Louisiana State Police troopers were patrolling near a Mardi Gras parade when they 
observed Mr. Fuentes walking through the crowd gripping what they recognized as the handle of 
a pistol .7 The pistol was allegedly partially concealed in Mr. Fuentes’s waistband with the 
 
1 R. Doc. 54. 
2 R. Doc. 62. 
3 R. Doc. 57. 
4 R. Doc. 63. 
5 In an unrelated motion filed by the defendant, the defendant informed the Cour t that the Indictment misspells his 
first name as “Lucinto,” resulting in an erroneous spelling on the docket.  The correct spelling of Mr. Fuentes ’s first 
name is “Lucito.” R. Doc. 39 at 1 n.1.  
6 R. Doc. 1. 
7 Id. at 3. 
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magazine plate visible. 8 After conducting a frisk of Mr. Fuentes and recovering a handgun, a 
computer inquiry revealed that Mr. Fuentes was convicted in 2023 of simple burglary under 
Louisiana law—a felony.9 Another record check revealed that Mr. Fuentes is a Belizean national.10 
 On March 10, 2025, a Pretrial Bail Report was filed.11 On March 13, 2025, the pre siding 
criminal duty magistrate judge, Chief Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld , held a detention 
hearing.12 At the March 13 hearing, Mr. Fuentes stipulated to detention, reserving his right to 
reopen should circumstances permit .13 Consequently, Mr. Fuentes was remanded to the custody 
of the United States Marshal.14 
 On April 11, 2025, Mr. Fuentes was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8).15 Then, in February 2026, Mr. Fuentes moved 
to dismiss the April 11 indictment.16 He also moved to suppress “all evidence discovered through 
and as a result of law enforcement’s unlawful stop, seizure, and questioning in this case.”17  
Soon after, on March 11, 2026, Mr. Fuentes filed a motion to reopen the issue of detention 
and for an order of release on conditions of bond.18 In the motion to reopen detention, Mr. Fuentes 
explained that circumstances had changed substantially since his stipulation of de tention.19 First, 
Mr. Fuentes was subject to a state probation hold that would have barred his release at the time of 
the detention stipulation. After the stipulation, however, Mr. Fuentes’s original state court attorney 
 
8 Id. at 4. 
9 Id.  
10 Id. 
11 R. Doc. 10. 
12 R. Doc. 15. The detention hearing was originally set for March 10, 2025, but was continued until March 12, 2025, 
at the request of defense counsel. R. Doc. 12. The March 12 hearing, which lasted 25 minutes, was then continued to 
March 13. R. Doc. 13. 
13 R. Docs. 15, 16. 
14 R. Doc. 15. 
15 R. Doc. 19. 
16 R. Doc. 39. 
17 R. Doc. 38. 
18 R. Doc. 42. 
19 Id. at 2. 
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filed a motion to vacate Mr. Fuentes ’s simple burglary conviction because Mr. Fuentes was not 
advised of his immigration consequences before entering his guilty plea.20 Mr. Fuentes was then 
allowed to withdraw that plea and instead pled guilty to the lesser offense of misdemeanor criminal 
damage to property.21 The state sentence was fully discharged, and thus Mr. Fuentes was no longer 
subject to the state probation hold.22 Second, Mr. Fuentes was also subject to an immigration hold 
at the time of the detention stipulation .23 But, between the time of the stipulation and the time of 
the filing of the motion to reopen detention, the law applicable to the immigration hold had 
evolved, and Mr. Fuentes’s counsel was advised that Mr. Fuentes “now has a pathway to a bond 
determination.”24  
The Government filed an opposition in response  to Mr. Fuentes ’s motion to reopen 
detention.25 Eight days later, a Superseding Indictment was filed. 26 In addition to the felon- in-
possession charge, the Superseding Indictment charges Mr. Fuentes with being an alien in 
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5)(A) and 924(a)(8).  
 On March 27, 2026, Judge van Meerveld held a hearing on Mr. Fuentes’s motion to reopen 
detention.
27 After the 2-hour-and-15-minute hearing, Mr. Fuentes’s motion to reopen detention 
and request for bond were granted. 28 Judge van Meerveld released Mr. Fuentes  on a $5,000 
unsecured appearance bond and imposed additional conditions on Mr. Fuentes’s release, one being 
a third-party custodian named Jesy Arzu.
29 Three days later, on March 30, 2026, the Government 
 
20 Id.  
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 1–2. 
24 Id. at 3. 
25 R. Doc. 46. 
26 R. Doc. 48. 
27 R. Doc. 59. 
28 Id. 
29 R. Doc. 59-1. 
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filed its emergency motion to stay Mr. Fuentes’s release.30 That same day, the undersigned stayed 
Mr. Fuentes’s release, and the Court set a telephone status conference for that afternoon to discuss 
the Government’s motion, namely whether the stay should be maintained.31 In anticipation of the 
telephone conference, Mr. Fuentes filed a preliminary response to the Government’s motion.32 A 
minute order follow ed the conference, setting oral argument  on the motion for April 1, 2026. 33 
The minute order also provided the parties a further opportunity to brief the Government’ s 
motion.34 Shortly after receiving the parties additional briefing, the Court heard oral argument on 
the motion.35 
Meanwhile, when this Court preliminarily stayed Mr. Fuentes’s release, Mr. Fuentes was, 
reportedly, scheduled to be transported to the Central Louisiana ICE Processing Center in Jena, 
Louisiana.36 Pursuant to the  Court’s March 30 order, Mr. Fuentes was transferred back to the 
custody of the U.S. Marshal.37 
II. DISCUSSION 
In the instant motion, the Government  requests that the Court stay the pre trial release of 
Mr. Fuentes pending the Government’s appeal of the magistrate judge’s order of release  to the 
Court.38 The motion also requests the Court to set an expedited briefing schedule for the 
Government’s appeal of Mr. Fuentes’s release on bond pending trial.39 The Government’s request 
for expedited briefing was addressed at oral argument and is formally addressed in the conclusion 
 
30 R. Doc. 54.  Before filing the emergency moti on to stay , the Government asked Judge van M eerveld to stay Mr. 
Fuentes’s release pending appeal of that order to the undersigned. That request was denied. Id. at 1. 
31 R. Doc. 55. 
32 R. Doc. 57. 
33 R. Doc. 58. 
34 Id. 
35 R. Doc. 65. 
36 R. Doc. 54 at 3. 
37 R. Doc. 55. 
38 Id. 
39 R. Doc. 54 at 3. 
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of this opinion. The gravamen of the Government’s motion—its request for a stay—is addressed 
below. But before addressing the merits of the stay, the Court addresses the question underlying 
the merits of the stay : whether the Court even has authority to issue a stay here. Although the 
parties do not dispute the Court’s authority to stay the magistrate judge’s release order, the Court 
briefly addresses the issue before turning to the merits of the Government’s motion. 
A. Fifth Circuit case law authorizes the district court to stay a release order 
issued under the Bail Reform Act pending the court’s review of that order. 
The Bail Reform Act governs whether a criminal defendant should be released or detained 
pending trial.40 The BRA mandates a defendant’s release unless the person is a flight risk or danger 
to the community. 41  Even if the presiding judicial officer determines that  release “will not 
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any other 
person or the community,” the judicial officer shall nonetheless impose the least restrictive 
condition or combination of conditions necessary to assure the person’s appearance or safety of 
the community.42 In other words, pretrial detention is warranted only where “ the judicial officer 
finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the 
person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.”43  
When a magistrate judge or other judicial officer order s release of a defendant, the BRA 
permits an attorney for the Government to file “with the court having original jurisdiction over the 
offense” a motion revoking the order of release or a motion amending the conditions of release.44 
Put simply, the BRA authorizes the district court to review a magistrate judge’s or other non-
 
40 18 U.S.C. § 3142.  It also governs the release or detention of a criminal defendant pending sentence or appeal. 
Id. § 3143. 
41 United States v. Baltazar-Sebastian, 990 F.3d 939, 944 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)). 
42 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c). 
43 Id. § 3142(e)(1). 
44 Id. § 3145(a). 
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district-judge judicial officer’s order of release. 45 Yet the BRA does not expressly authorize the 
district court to stay that order of release pending the district court’s review. “[T]he absence of 
stay authority” in this situation, however, “could render the district court’s power illusory.”46 Thus, 
the district court has power to stay a release order.47 Accordingly, this Court was acting within its 
authority when it entered a stay of Mr. Fuentes’s release ordered by the magistrate judge. The next 
question then is whether the Court should maintain the stay of  Mr. Fuentes’s release by granting 
the Government’s motion. To answer that question, the Court must first determine the applicable 
legal standard. 
B. To be granted a stay, the Government must show a likelihood of success on 
the merits, not a “substantial case.” 
The applicable legal standard for issuing a stay here is a point of contention. Both parties 
agree, and it is well established  in the case law,  that the Government as the party requesting the 
stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify issuing a stay.48 But there is some 
dispute (or at least some non-consensus) regarding the weight of that burden. 
The Government draws its  stay standard from Woodfox v. Cain, a 2008 unpublished U.S. 
Court of Appeals for t he Fifth Circuit opinion involving a stay of the release of a habeas corpus 
petitioner.49 Relying on Woodfox, the Government maintains that it must show a likelihood of 
success on the merits “or can at least ‘demonstrate a substantial case on the merits’ and [sic] other 
factors militate against release.’”50 Under Woodfox, the other factors include whether the applicant 
will be irreparably injured absent a stay, whether the issuance of the stay w ill substantially injure 
 
45 United States v. Brigham, 569 F.3d 220, 229 (5th Cir. 2009). 
46 Id. at 230. 
47 Id. (collecting cases). 
48 R. Doc. 62 at 4; R. Doc. 63 at 12; Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433–34 (2009) (citing two Supreme Court cases). 
49 R. Doc. 62 at 4 (citing Woodfox v. Cain, 305 F. App’x 179, 181 (5th Cir. 2008)). 
50 R. Doc. 62 at 4. 
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the other parties interested in the proceeding, and where the public interest lies, as well as whether 
the defendant poses a risk to the community.51  
Mr. Fuentes asserts that Woodfox is the incorrect standard here  and instead applie s the 
traditional four-factor standard outlined in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Nken v. Holder: 
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed 
on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay;  
(3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested 
in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.52 
 
Under the Nken test, the first two factors are the most critical.53 Once an applicant satisfies the first 
two factors, the stay inquiry call s for assessing the harm to the opposing party and weighing the 
public interest.54  
 Thus, the finer points of contention are (1) whether the Government must make a “strong 
showing” that it is likely to succeed or may meet the lesser standard of showing only a “substantial 
case” and (2) the relative weight of the other factors, particularly the irreparable -harm factor. A 
“movant need only present a substantial case on the merits when a serious legal question is 
involved and show that the balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of granting the stay.”55 
As Mr. Fuentes points out, the Government has not pointed to a “ serious legal question” in this 
case.56 In fact, the Government does not even mention “substantial case” in its analysis. Instead, it 
 
51 Woodfox, 305 F. App’x at 181. 
52 R. Doc. 63 (citing Nken, 556 U.S. at 426 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). 
53 Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. 
54 Id. at 435.  The Court also finds merit  in Mr. Fuentes’s argument  that Woodfox and Nken b oth draw their stay 
standards from Hilton v. Braunskill but that, because Nken post-dates both Hilton and Woodfox, it governs. R. Doc. 
63 at 18–19. 
55 Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 565 (5th Cir. 1981). 
56 R. Doc. 63 at 18–19. 
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uses “likelihood of success” language and appears to apply Nken’s likelihood-of-success standard 
under the first prong of the analysis.57  
But even if Woodfox were to govern, the Government would have to show that the balance 
of equities  ( i.e., consideration of the other factors) weighs heavily in favor of a stay for the 
substantial-case standard to apply: “Of course, if the balance of equities . . . is not heavily tilted in 
the movant’s favor, the movant must then make a more substantial showing of likelihood of 
success on the merits in order to obtain a stay pending appeal.” 58 And, as explained below, th e 
other factors do not “heavily tilt” in the Government’s favor. Accordingly, to obtain a stay here, 
the Government must meet the likelihood-of-success standard. 
C. The Government has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits under 
the Bail Reform Act. 
 Because the Government is seeking a stay pending its appeal of the magistrate judge ’s 
order of release issued pursuant to the B ail Reform Act, the Government must show that it will 
likely succeed on the merits of its appeal. To put another way, the Government must show that it 
will likely over come the presumption of release and meet  its burdens under the BR A as to Mr. 
Fuentes.   
“When the district court . . . acts on a motion to revoke or amend a magistrate ’s pretrial 
detention order, the court acts de novo and makes an independent determination of the proper 
pretrial detention or conditions for release.” 59 “Reviewing a transcript of the detention hearing is 
an appropriate procedure to comply with that obligation.” 60 When drafting this order , however, 
 
57 See R. Doc. 62 at 5 (“Whether the Government can show a likelihood of success on the merits requires the Court . . . . 
Therefore, a stay of a release order is only proper if the Government i s able to show a likelihood of success . . . . ) 
(titling first section of analysis as “Likelihood of Success”).  
58 Ruiz, 650 F.2d at 565–66. 
59 United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 249 (5th Cir. 1985). 
60 United States v. Faulkner , No. CRIM. 3:09 -CR-249-D2, 2010 WL 1541355 , at *1 n.2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2010)  
(citing United States v. Farguson, 721 F.Supp. 128, 129 n.1 (N.D. Tex. 1989)). 
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this Court did not have access t o the transcript  of Mr. Fuentes ’s detention hearing before the 
magistrate judge. Thus, the Court must find a likelihood of success on the merits with the evidence 
in the record and the undisputed facts before it. 
To recall, pretrial release is the default under the BRA.61 Detention is warranted only when 
a court finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure his appearance 
as required and the safety of any other person and the community.62 “[W]ith respect to the “safety 
of any other person and the community,” the [BRA] specifically requires that the ‘facts the judicial 
officers uses to support ’ this finding ‘shall be supported by clear and convincing evidence .’”63 
That is, the Government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant presents 
an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community.64 
Clear and convincing evidence is that weight of proof which produces in the mind 
of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought 
to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable 
the fact finder to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the 
precise facts of the case.65 
 
That is a high burden. 
The BRA, however, is silent on the burden of proof required to dem onstrate lack of 
reasonable assurance for a defendant ’s appearance. 66 So in making this determination, the Fifth 
Circuit has applied “the simple preponderance standard.”67 That is, “that it is more likely than not 
that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the accused’s appearance.”68 
 
61 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b). 
62 Id. § 3142(e). 
63 United States v. Good , No. CR 25 -196, 2025 WL 2613628, at *5  (E.D. La. Sept. 10, 2025)  (Fallon, J.) (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 3142(f)) (internal citation omitted). 
64 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987). 
65 United States v. Jackson, 19 F.3d 1003, 1007 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted) (cleaned up). 
66 Good, 2025 WL 2613628, at *5. 
67 United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 250 (5th Cir. 1985). 
68 Id. (citations omitted). 
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Here, the Government seeks a  stay of Mr. Fuentes ’s release on bo th grounds—that Mr. Fuentes 
presents a risk of flight and that he poses a danger to the community.69 
When determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the 
appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community, the 
BRA provides factors the court must c onsider, including (1) the nature and circumstances of the 
offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence or involves a firearm; (2) the 
weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the person; and (4) 
the nature and seriousness of the danger to the community pose d by the person’s release.70 The 
Court will address each factor in turn. 
1. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense Charged 
 The Superseding Indictment charges Mr. Fuentes with being a felon in possession of a 
firearm and being an alien in possession of a firearm based on the same offense. T he nature and 
circumstances of that offense are described in the affidavit attached to the complaint and are 
described above.71 Although the offense involved a firearm, and there is  always some inherent 
danger in carrying a loaded firearm in a crowd , courts in other circuits have f ound that being a 
felon in possession of a firearm is not a crime of violence  under the BRA 72 and have noted that 
“ex-felons have the same motives as lawful possessors to possess a firearm . . . .”73 
 
69 R. Doc. 62 at 5. 
70 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). 
71 R. Doc. 1. 
72 See, e.g., United States v. Lane, 252 F.3d 905, 906–08 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ingle, 454 F.3d 1082, 1086 
(10th Cir. 2006) ; United States v. Singleton , 182 F.3d 7 , 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999) . But see United States v. Dillard , 214 
F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding illegal possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon  to be a crime of 
violence). If felon-in-possession is not treated as a crime of violence, the same reasoning applies with equal force to 
alien-in-possession. Both are possession offenses that are defined by the defendant’s prohibited status, and alien status 
is no more inherently associated with dangerousness than felon status. 
73 Lane, 252 F.3d at 906. 
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Specifically, Mr. Fuentes’s conduct throughout the offense was not  violent nor posed a  
danger to any person involved.74 For instance, there is no evidence that he brandished the firearm 
or threatened someone with it. While he was gripping the handle of the firearm, it appears that it 
remained tucked in the waistband of his pants until the state tro opers obtained it in the stop-and-
frisk. And Mr. Fuentes’s conduct does not indicate that he is a flight risk. The complaint provides 
no indication that he resisted the state troopers or tried to flee from them.  
In its memorandum, the Government contends that Mr. Fuentes initially lied  to the state 
troopers about his name and why he was holding the firearm.75 Not only did these facts not make 
their way into the complaint, but the initial verbal “ lies,” alone, do not actually demonstrate that 
Mr. Fuentes poses a danger to the community or is a flight risk .76 In short, while the offense 
charged is serious, the underlying facts and circumstances do not support a finding that Mr. Fuentes 
is a danger to the community, nor do they support a finding that Mr. Fuentes is a flight risk. 
2. Weight of the Evidence 
The weight of the evidence against the defendant is the least important factor  in the 
detention determination.77 And, here, it likely tips slightly against release. The facts in the affidavit 
attached to the complaint, if true, are damning and strongly support a finding that Mr. Fuentes 
 
74 Cf. United States v. Good, No. CR 25-196, 2025 WL 2613628, at *6 (E.D. La. Sept. 10, 2025) (finding that nature 
and circumstances of offense charged w eighed in favor of detention where defendant was charged  with a crime of 
violence for assault on a federal officer and faced enhanced penalty because he allegedly inflicted bodily injury on the 
officer); United States v. Jubert, No. 1:23-CR-104-TBM, 2023 WL 5831098, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 7, 2023) (finding 
that the nature and circumstances of offense charged supported that Government was likely to be successful in showing 
that the defendant posed a danger to a prospective witness where the offense charged involved threats on social media 
with the intent to kill, injure, harass, intimidate another person); United States v. Salazar -Andujo, 599 F. Supp. 3d 
491, 496 (W.D. Tex. 2022)  (finding that defendant accused of dealing firearms without a license and conspiring to 
smuggle weapons from United States to Mexico show that Government would likely succeed in showing that 
defendant creates a danger to the community) ; United States v. Kent , 496 F. Supp. 3d 500, 506  (D.D.C. 
2020), aff'd (Nov. 5, 2020) (finding defendant with loaded firearm on his person while apparently under the influence 
of a controlled substance posed danger to community). 
75 R. Doc. 62 at 6–7. 
76 Additionally, Mr. Fuentes asserts that although his legal name is Lucito Fuentes, “he has always gone by Jay Arzu,” 
the name he allegedly told the state troopers. R. Doc. 63 at 4. 
77 United States v. Stanford, 630 F. Supp. 2d 751, 755 (S.D. Tex.), aff'd, 341 F. App'x 979 (5th Cir. 2009). 
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committed the charged offenses.78 But notably, Mr. Fuentes has filed a motion to suppress, which, 
if granted, would appear to suppress nearly all, if not all, the evidence the Government has against 
Mr. Fuentes in this case.79 He has also filed a motion to dismiss the indictment.80 And as explained 
under the first factor, the facts underlying the evidence do not, standing alone, demonstrate that 
Mr. Fuentes  is a flight risk or poses a danger to the community. 
3. History and Characteristics of the Person 
The third factor requires the court to consider the history and c haracteristics of the 
defendant, includi ng his character ; physical and mental condition; family ties ; employment; 
financial resources; length of residence in the community; community ties; past conduct; history 
relating to drug or alcohol abuse ; criminal history ; record concerning appearance at court 
proceedings; and whether at the time of the current offense, the defendant was on probation for an 
offense under federal, state, or local law.81 This factor complicates the detention analysis and cuts 
both ways. 
Preliminarily, Mr. Fuentes was placed in ICE custody immediately after his release from 
the custody of the U.S. Marshal ,82 and i t is this Court ’s understanding that ICE will again 
immediately place Mr. Fuentes in ICE custody if the Court lifts the stay.  But the Fifth Circuit 
recently held that the existence of an ICE detainer and threat of potential removal , alone, are not 
sufficient to deny BRA release. 83 That is, even in a case like this one  where the defendant would 
go from the U.S. Marshal ’s custody into I CE custody and thus as a practical matter  cannot flee, 
 
78 “To be clear, the Court only conducts this analysis to evaluate whether the Government carried its burden to show 
that Defendant presents a risk of flight and/or a danger to the community that cannot be remedied by any condition or 
set of conditions—not to impose preverdict incarceration. ” Good, 2025 WL 2613628, at *6. 
79 R. Doc. 38. 
80 R. Doc. 39. 
81 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3). 
82 R. Doc. 54 at 3. 
83 United States v. Esquivel-Bataz, 155 F.4th 491, 493 (5th Cir. 2025) (citing United States v. Soriano Nunez, 928 F.3d 
240, 245 n.4 (3d Cir. 2019)). 
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the Court must conduct an individualized evaluation of Mr. Fuentes under the BRA factors and 
find him to be a flight risk. 84 Accordingly, pursuant to the  Fifth Circuit’s instruction, the Court 
proceeds by addressing Mr. Fuentes’s history and characteristics, many of which are in dispute.  
First, a defendant ’s ties to the community and the l ocality, including family ties, are 
especially pertinent in determining whether the defendant poses a serious flight risk.85 Both parties 
agree that Mr. Fuentes came to the United States from his home country of Belize when he was 15 
and that he was granted deferred removal proceedings .86 But their agreement as to Mr. Fuentes’s 
immigration status and ties to the U.S. largely ends there. The Government asserts that Mr. Fuentes 
does not have any status to remain in the U.S.,87 while Mr. Fuentes argues that he has been granted 
“Special Immigration Juvenile Status.”88 The Government also claims that Mr. Fuentes “has strong 
ties to Belize.” 89 Mr. Fuent es, however, portrays  his life in Belize  as rife with trauma ,90 and 
although he agrees that his deferred deportation has been revoked, he claims he was working 
toward permanent residency at the time of his arrest in this case. 91 Even if Mr. Fuentes is not 
immediately detained by ICE upon his release from the custody of the U.S. Marshal, his allegations 
about his childhood and life in Belize raise substantial questions regarding his ties there. 
Mr. Fuentes claims strong ties to his third -party custodian and alleged de facto mother, 
Jesy Arzu, whom the Government concedes is a legal permanent resident of the United States .92 
 
84 Esquivel-Bataz, 155 F.4th at 493. 
85 See United States v. Rueben, 974 F.2d 580, 586–87 (5th Cir. 1992). 
86 R. Doc. 62 at 5; R. Doc. 63 at 3, 5. 
87 R. Doc. 62 at 5. 
88 R. Doc. 63 at 5.  This Court is not familiar with Special Immigrant Juvenile Status and what it means f or Mr. 
Fuentes’s immigration status. The parties have failed to fully address this issue,  but there appears to be more nuance 
to Mr. Fuentes’s immigration status, if what alleged is true, than what the Government portrays. See Special Immigrant 
Juveniles, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV., https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-US/eb4/SIJ (last visited Apr. 8, 
2026) (explaining that an SIJ classification may qualify the immigrant for lawful permanent residency). 
89 R. Doc. 62 at 6. 
90 R. Doc. 63 at 3–6. 
91 Id.  
92 R. Doc. 54 at 2. 
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If Mr. Fuentes is as close to Ms. Arzu as he claims to be, that is, that she is in fact like a mother to 
him, then his ties to the U.S. would appear to be stronger than his ties to Belize, where he claims 
he practically has no family. Moreso, Ms. Arzu appears to likely be a reliable third-party custodian. 
By the Government’s own admission, she requested the state court to revoke Mr . Fuentes’s state 
bond, claiming Mr. Fuentes was “on drugs.”93 And Mr. Fuentes alleges that she attended many of 
the state court dates he missed and asked the court to force him to attend school. 94 The Court has 
some concern, however, regarding her availability as a third-party custodian because of her work 
schedule.95  
The parties disagree over Ms. Arzu ’s continued status as  Mr. Fuentes ’s third -party 
custodian. The Government asserts that it learned during the detention hearing that Ms. Arzu may 
be a government witness, rendering it “impossible” for Ms. Arzu to be Mr . Fuentes’s third-party 
custodian.96 Mr. Fuentes, however, maintains that there are other conditions that can mitigate the 
problem posed by Ms. Arzu’s being a government witness, such as prohibiting discussion of the 
case or substituting the third-party custodian condition for GPS monitoring.97  
Second, the Court considers Mr. Fuentes’s past conduct, particularly his criminal history, 
record concerning appearance at court proceedings, and whether at the time of the current offense, 
he was on probation for another offense. The Government asserts, and Mr. Fuentes concedes, that 
he missed several court dates .98 Though, Mr. Fuentes blames his mental health on the missed 
 
93 R. Doc. 62 at 3. 
94 R. Doc. 63 at 7. 
95 R. Doc. 62 at 4 (“Arzu works five days a week as a bartender at night and testified at the detention hearing that her 
neighbors would assist her in supervising the defendant  when she was not at home.  One of those neighbor s is heard 
on recorded jail calls telling the defendant . . . he would have purchased a firearm for the defendant if the defendant 
did not do so himself.”). 
96 R. Doc. 62 at 7–8. 
97 R. Doc. 63 at 23. The parties even disagree about the U.S. Probation Officer’s recommendation regarding Ms. Arzu 
being a government witness. Compare R. Doc. 62 at 8 with R. Doc. 63 at 23. 
98 R. Doc. 62 at 6; R. Doc. 63 at 20–21. 
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hearings and alleges that “he since has been treated and is doing well.” 99 The Government also 
asserts that Mr. Fuentes was on probation for the state offense when he committed the instant 
offense, that he failed multiple drug tests while on probation, that he placed phone calls while in 
jail indicating he would obtain another firearm  once released , and that he was involved in a 
domestic disturbance with Ms. Arzu.100 Mr. Fuentes does not dispute these allegations, and, to be 
sure, these allegations cut sharply against release.101 But Mr. Fuentes challenges the Government’s 
allegation that he gave his probation officer an inc orrect address multiple times .102 Mr. Fuentes 
contends the inaccuracies were due to paperwork errors and not an attempt to mislead the probation 
officer.103 
The facts surrounding Mr. Fuentes ’s criminal his tory are interesting. Besides the state 
offense for simple burglary, Mr. Fuentes has no prior criminal convictions.104 And as explained 
above, the simple burglary conviction was vacated by the state c ourt after Mr. Fuentes withdrew 
his guilty plea  because he was no t advised of the immigration consequences of his plea. 105 Mr. 
Fuentes instead pled guilty to a misdemeanor, so , currently, his only prior conviction is a 
misdemeanor. 
Given the number of factual disputes and the extent to which many of the established facts 
cut in more than one direction, especially regarding one of his familial and local ties and condition 
of his release—Ms. A rzu—Mr. Fuentes ’s history and characteristics, at this interim stage, do not 
weigh definitively in either direction as to whether he is a flight risk or a danger to the community. 
 
99 R. Doc. 63 at 21. 
100 R. Doc. 62 at 6. 
101 See United States v. Flores, 53 F.4th 313, 316 (5th Cir. 2022) (finding that district court did not abuse its discretion 
in concluding that defendant presented a flight risk when, along with drug offense charge and prior evasion of arrest , 
he had violated probation conditions in the past). 
102 R. Doc. 62 at 6. 
103 R. Doc. 63 at 21 n.8. 
104 Id. at 6. 
105 Id. at 6–7. 
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4. Nature and Seriousness of Danger Posed by Person’s Release 
The fourth factor commands the Court to consider the “nature and seriousness of the danger 
to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release.”106 Under this section, 
courts may contemplate the effectiveness of any bonds set, including considering whether the bond 
will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance.107 Mr. Fuentes is currently released on a $5,000 
unsecured bond. But, at this interim stage, the Court does not have sufficient information regarding 
Mr. Fuentes’s financial status to determine whether the bond is merely illusory.108 
But what is more telling is  Mr. Fuentes ’s lack of violent history. His limited criminal 
history is nonviolent, and besides the Government’s domestic disturbance allegation regarding Ms. 
Arzu, the record, at this stage, does not reveal any history of violence by Mr. F uentes. The 
Government makes much of the fact that Mr. Fuentes indicated on a jail call that he would attempt 
to “find another firearm to replace the one that officers se ized.”109 To be clear, the fact that Mr. 
Fuentes was allegedly recorded stating he intended to obtain a firearm after being arrested for 
possessing one is certainly relevant. But at the same time, it does not show that he would threaten 
anyone with a firearm, brandish a firearm, carry a firearm in connection with another crime, plan 
violence, or even use a f irearm. And there is little to no  evidence from his past to infer that he 
would do any of those actions. Thus, this factor likely weighs in favor of release. 
5. Weighing the Bail Reform Act Factors 
In sum, at least two of the four factors likely weigh in favor of release, and one factor does 
not tip decidedly in either direction. Although the Court has some concerns regarding the capacity 
 
106 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(4). 
107 Id. 
108 See United States v. Good, No. CR 25 -196, 2025 WL 2613628, at *8  (E.D. La. Sept. 10, 2025)  (finding $50,000 
bond to be illusory where defendant was foreign national with no ties to the United States and had no money or 
property within the court’s reachable powers). 
109 R. Doc. 62 at 8. 
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and availability of Ms. Arzu as Mr. Fue ntes’s third-party custodian and Mr. Fuentes ’s behavior 
while on probation for his state offense, many of those facts and the context surrounding them are 
in dispute. The Court must also consider—and Mr. Fuentes argues—that there are conditions, such 
as location monitoring, that could mitigate these concerns. Accordingly, at this stage, the Court 
finds that the Government is unlikely to succeed in establishing that it is more likely than not that 
no condition or combination of conditions could reasonably assure Mr. Fuentes ’s appearance at 
future court proceedings  and that by clear and convi ncing evidence that no conditions will 
reasonably assure the safety of others. Thus, w here pretrial detention is the “ carefully limited 
exception” and not the norm, the Court finds that  the Government is unlikely to suc ceed in 
establishing success on the merits of its appeal of Mr. Fuentes’s release order.110  
D. The Government’s argument that it will be irreparably harmed by the 
defendant’s deportation is not persuasive. 
The second factor under the four-factor stay standard requires the party seeking the stay to 
show that it will be irreparably injured ab sent a stay. 111 “[S]imply showing some ‘possibility of 
irreparable injury’ fails to satisfy the second factor.”112 The Government asserts that it would be 
irreparably harmed if Mr. Fuentes were to flee or other wise be removed to Belize. 113 Having 
already found that, at this stage , the Government is unlikely t o prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Mr. Fuentes is a flight risk, the remaining alleged irreparable injury is Mr. Fuentes’s 
removal or deportation by ICE. Mr. Fuentes argues that the Government’s alleged irreparable harm 
of removal is self-inflicted.114 
 
110 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
111 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009). 
112 Id. at 434–35. 
113 R. Doc. 62 at 8. 
114 R. Doc. 63 at 26. 
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The Court recognizes the merit in both arguments. “[T]he Court is mindful of the Catch -
22 created when one Executive Branch ’s decision, i.e. the Department of Homeland S ecurity’s 
decision to issue an ICE detainer, factors into a favorable decision for another arm of the Executive 
Branch, i.e. the Department of Justice’s ability to secure its requested pretrial detention.”115 After 
all, “[i]t is the Executive Branch ’s decision that places the Government in this predica ment.”116 
But Mr. Fuentes ’s argument that the Government ’s potential irreparable harm is self -inflicted 
ignores the practical reality of the situation.  
Because, at the same time, there is “the very real experience of seeing a defendant released, 
ICE immediately deporting the defendant, the defendant trying to come to the United States so he 
can appear in court, and the United St ates Attorney’s Office not being able to do anything about 
the situation.”117 Thus, removal or deportation by ICE would certainly frustrate or effectively moot 
the U.S. Attorney’s ability to secure Mr. Fuentes’s appearance for future criminal proceedings. 
  But even if the Court accepts the Government ’s ICE-removal-equals-irreparable-harm 
argument, it has been provided with only speculation regarding the timeline of Mr. Fuentes ’s 
removal or whether he will even be rem oved. The Government’s memorandum states that Mr. 
Fuentes “will remain in immigration custody if he is to be released . . . as he is processed through 
his pending removal proceedings.”118 But counsel for both parties have indicated that they do not 
know how long those removal proceedings may last (i.e., days, weeks, or months). The hearing on 
the Government’s appeal is about one week away, and trial in this case is currently a little over a 
month away.119  So, while there is a possibility Mr. Fuentes will be removed in the week leading 
 
115 United States v. Good, No. CR 25-196, 2025 WL 2613628, at *7 (E.D. La. Sept. 10, 2025). 
116 United States v. Abrego, 788 F. Supp. 3d 937, 948 (M.D. Tenn. 2025). 
117 United States v. Vencomo-Reyes, No. CR 11-2563 JB, 2011 WL 6013546, at *11 (D.N.M. Nov. 28, 2011); see also 
United States v. Baltazar -Sebastian, 990 F.3d 939, 945  (5th Cir. 2021) (agreeing with six other circuits that pretrial 
release under the BRA does not preclude pre-removal detention under the Immigration and Nationality Act). 
118 R. Doc. 62 at 8. 
119 R. Doc. 68. 
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up to the appeal or in the month before trial, there is also a possibility that Mr. Fuentes ’s release 
will be revoked on appeal and that he again will be in the U.S. Marshal’s custody—in as short as 
one week. Also, the record suggests that removal may not be as immediate  or inevitable as the 
Government implies . In his motion to reopen detention, Mr. Fuentes indicate d that he has a 
potential avenue to seek a bond determination with respect to his immigration hold , which may 
introduce additional proceedings that bear on the timing on any removal. 120 This is coupled with 
the issue of his Special Immigrant Juvenile Status and what this means for Mr. Fuentes’s status as 
an immigrant and deportation. Thus, it cannot be said that the Government will be irreparably 
injured if the Court does not stay the magistrate judge’s release order. Instead, the harm—removal 
by ICE—is more of a possibility  in the current timeframe, rather than an imminent injury.121 
The Government stresses that Mr. Fuentes will be detained by ICE at an ICE processing 
center in Jena, Louisiana, which is nearly four hour s away. But counsel for Mr. Fuentes , whose 
office has had clients in ICE custody in the past, stated that, even if in Jena, the Government is 
required to bring Mr. Fuentes t o court proceedings while in their custody. It also bears recalling 
that Fifth Circuit precedent precludes a district court from finding possible depor tation, alone, 
justifies detention under the BRA.122 Although that rule applies in the BRA context, it only further 
cuts against finding possible ICE removal to be a standalone irreparable harm. Accordingly, the 
Court finds that this factor weighs against granting a stay of the magistrate judge’s release order. 
E. The remaining factors do not tip the balance toward a stay. 
Although the Government failed to show that the first two facto rs support the issuance of 
a stay, the Court briefly considers the third and fourth factors out of an abundance of caution. As 
 
120 R. Doc. 42 at 3. 
121 Nken v. Holder , 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009) ( “[T]he ‘possibility standard is too lenient. ’” (quoting Winter v. Nat. 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)). 
122 United States v. Esquivel-Bataz, 155 F.4th 491, 493 (5th Cir. 2025). 
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to the third factor, the Government argues that staying the magistrate judge ’s order will not 
“prejudice the defendant that would overc ome the other factors  present here,” because he likely 
will not be released from immigration custody even if he is released from detention in this case.123 
As to the fourth f actor, the Government asserts that a stay  would serve the public ’s interest “in 
reducing potential danger to the community.” 124 As Mr. Fuentes points out, however, the 
Government’s arguments in support of each factor contra dict one other: the Government a rgues 
that a stay is necessary because Mr. Fuentes poses a danger to the community but also claims that 
Mr. Fuentes will not be harmed by the stay because he will be detained by ICE anyway.  Mr. 
Fuentes cannot be a danger to the community if he is detained. 
Separately, though, while  the public ha s a legitimate interest in reducing danger to the 
community, the Court has found, under the first stay factor, that detention is not warranted on that 
basis. Also, Mr. Fuentes has a “strong interest in liberty,”125 and the public has an interest in this 
Court properly adhering to the requirements of the BRA. 126 Accordingly, neither of these factors 
tip the balance in favor of a stay. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, th e Government’ s Emergency  Motion and Incorporated 
Memorandum to Stay Defendant’s Release and Set Expedited Briefing Schedule (R. Doc. 54) is 
DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART. 
IT IS ORDERED that the Government’s motion to stay the magistrate judge’s release of 
the defendant, Lucito Fuentes, pending the Government ’s appeal of said order  to this Court  is 
 
123 R. Doc. 62 at 8. 
124 Id. 
125 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987). 
126 United States v. Abrego, 788 F. Supp. 3d 937, 949 (M.D. Tenn. 2025). 
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DENIED. The defendant, Lucito Fuentes, shall be released from the custody of the U.S. Marshal 
pursuant to Judge van Meerveld’s order of release. 
 IT IS FURTHER  ORDERED that the Government ’s request for an expedit ed briefing 
schedule to appeal the magistrate judge’s order of release is GRANTED. The Government’s brief 
must be filed on or before April 9, 2026. The Government’s brief must include notice of the 
evidence it intends to introduce at the hearing. Defendant’s brief must be filed on or before April 
13, 2026. The Government’s reply, if any, must be filed on or before 5:00 p.m. on April 14, 
2026. The Court will hold a de novo hearing on the appeal on April 15, 2026, at 9: 30 a.m. in 
Courtroom C551, 500 Poydras Street, New Orleans, Louisiana.127 
 New Orleans, Louisiana, this 8th day of April 2026. 
 
__________________________________________ 
DARREL JAMES PAPILLION 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 
127 Most of these dates were the same dates provided to counsel during the oral argument on the instant motion.  
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