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govinfo:USCOURTS-laed-2_24-cv-02306-0
1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CHRISTOPHER DIER
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 2:24-cv-2306
JEFFERY MARTIN LANDRY, et al.
SECTION: T (5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 41) and Plaintiff’s Motion
for Preliminary Injunction or, i n the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 47).
Having reviewed the record, the briefs, and the applicable law, the Court will GRANT
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and DENY AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction/Summary Judgment for the following reasons. Additionally, Plaintiff’s Motion to
Expedite Consideration (R. Doc. 86) is DENIED AS MOOT.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This action stems from the passage of La. R.S. § 17:2124 (“H.B. 71” or “the Act”), which
“require[es] the display of the Ten Commandments, subject to minimum requirements and school
boards’ discretion, in public school classrooms.” R. Doc. 41-1, p. 8. H.B. 71 contains three main
statutory directives, delineating (1) the placement and dimensions of an appropriate H.B. 71
display, (2) the specific Ten Commandments language to be featured on such a display, and (3) an
accompanying context statement. La. R.S. § 17:2124(B)(1)-(3).
First, the Act dictates:
No later than January 1, 2025, each public school governing authority shall display
the Ten Commandments in each classroom in each school under its jurisdiction.
The nature of the display shall be determined by each governing authority with a
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minimum requirement that the Ten Commandments shall be displayed on a poster
or framed document that is at least eleven inches by fourteen inches. The text of the
Ten Commandments shall be the central focus of the poster or framed document
and shall be printed in a large, easily readable font.
La. R.S. § 17:2124(B)(1). Next, the Act provides that each H.B. 71 display shall use the following
version of the Ten Commandments:
1
“The Ten Commandments
I AM the Lord thy God.
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven images.
Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain.
Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy.
Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long upon the land which
the Lord thy God giveth thee.
Thou shalt not kill.
Thou shalt not commit adultery.
Thou shalt not steal.
Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant,
nor his cattle, nor anything that is thy neighbor's.”
Id. at (B)(2). Third, the Act requires that each H.B. 71 display include a prewritten “context
statement,” which details the history of the Ten Commandments’ use in public education. Id. at
(B)(3).
The remaining provisions permit a school governing authority to display other historical
documents, including the Mayflower Compact, the Declaration of Independence, and the
Northwest Ordinance, along with the Ten Commandments in an H.B. 71 display, id. at (B)(4);
clarify that the Act “shall not require a public school governing authority to spend its funds to
purchase displays,” as they shall either accept donated funds to purchase displays or accept donated
displays, id. at (B)(5); direct the State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education to adopt
1 The Act notes that “[t]he text of the Ten Commandments set forth in Subsection B of this Section is identical to the
text of the Ten Commandments monument that was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in Van Orden
v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 688 (2005).” La. R.S. § 17:2124(A)(6).
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implementation rules and to identify and post online free resources to assist school boards in
complying with the act, id. at (B)(6).
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, Christopher Dier, is a history teacher at Benjamin Franklin High School, a public
school in New Orleans, Louisiana. R. Doc. 1, p. 1. On September 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed this suit
against Governor of Louisiana Jeffrey Landry, Attorney General of Louisiana Liz Murrill,
Louisiana State Superintendent of Education Cade Brumley, and eleven members of the Louisiana
State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (“LSBESE”)
2 (collectively, “Defendants”).
Id. at pp. 4-6. Plaintiff puts forward a pre -enforcement challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
argues that the Act violates three provisions of the First Amendment: the Establishment Clause
(Count I), the Free Exercise Clause (Count II), and the Free Speech Clause (Count III). Id. at pp.
16-17.
Plaintiff first asserts that H.B. 71 discriminates against other faiths and people who are not
religious. He alleges that the Act “endorses [] a Protestant Version of the Ten Commandments.”
See R. Doc. 1 at pp. 10 -14. Plaintiff puts forward statements and sources claiming that Jews,
Catholics, and other Christians either do not accept this version or object to promoting the
Commandments in a classroom setting. Id. at pp. 10-13. He includes “people in Louisiana [who]
are not religious,” as he claims they do not necessarily adhere to these tenets . Id. at pp. 11-12.
Plaintiff additionally finds using a particular Protestant Christian translation personally
objectionable. R. Doc. 47-2, p. 5; R. Doc. 1, pp. 12-14.
Next, Plaintiff alleges that H.B. 71 imposes a requirement for “teachers . . . to post” and
2 The additional named defendants are Conrad Appel, Judy Armstrong, Kevin Berken, Preston Castille, Simone
Champagne, Sharon Latten-Clark, Lance Harris, Paul Hollis, Sandy Holloway, Stacey Melerine, and Ronnie Morris.
R. Doc. 1, p. 5.
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“display” the Commandments . R. Doc. 1, pp. 3 -4, 8- 9, 14- 15; R. Doc. 47- 2, p. 16- 18. The
remainder of Plaintiff’s allegations are best summarized as objections to exposure —the
requirement that Plaintiff must see the Ten Commandments in an H.B. 71 display, daily in his
classroom. See R. Doc. 1, pp. 14-15. He alleges H.B. 71 displays coerce or pressure him and his
students to “venerate”, “proselytize”, “adopt”, or otherwise accept religious doctrine. Id. at pp. 3,
14. Plaintiff requests declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin Defendants from “(i) implementing
rules and regulations in accordance with the Act, (ii) otherwise seeking to enforce the Act, and (iii)
requiring him to display the Ten Commandments in any public-school classroom.” Id. at p. 3.
On October 8, 2024, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s
Complaint both for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and on the merits under Rule 12(b)(6). R. Doc. 41. Specifically, Defendants argue that
this Court lacks jurisdiction be cause Plaintiff’s claims are not ripe, Plaintiff lacks Article III
standing, and Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity. R. Doc. 41, pp. 4-11. They also argue
that Plaintiff’s claims under the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Free
Speech Clause all fail on the pleadings. Id. at pp. 12-25. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to
Defendants’ Motion, R. Doc. 57, and Defendants filed a reply in support, R. Doc. 58.
On October 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction or, in the
Alternative, Summary Judgment. R. Doc. 47. Plaintiff’s Motion seeks either (1) a “preliminary
injunction preventing the enforcement of” H.B. 71 or “summary judgment and a permanent
injunction preventing the enforcement of H.B. 71 at Benjamin Franklin High School.” Id. at p. 1.
Defendants filed a response in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion, R. Doc. 65, and Plaintiff filed a
reply in support, R. Doc. 69.
Meanwhile, the Middle District of Louisiana considered a case with similar issues. In
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Roake v. Brumley , several parents, as individuals and on behalf of their minor children, sued
Superintendent Brumley, members of the LSBESE in their official capacities, and five parish
school boards, seeking to enjoin enforcement of H.B. 71 and arguing that the statute i s facially
unconstitutional under both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. 756 F. Supp.
3d 93, 112-14, 119-23 (M.D. La. 2024), vacated by No. 24-30706, 2026 WL 482555 (5th Cir. Feb.
20, 2026) (en banc) (per curiam). As here, the district court had before it a motion for a preliminary
injunction filed by the plaintiffs and motions to dismiss filed by the defendants. Id. at 112-13. After
reviewing First Amendment precedent , the Middle District concluded that H.B. 71 is facially
unconstitutional, denied the motions to dismiss , and grant ed the motion for a preliminary
injunction. Id. at 218-19. The Middle District’s injunction prevented defendants and their agents
from “(1) enforcing H.B. 71; (2) adopting rules or regulations for the enforcement of H.B. 71; and
(3) requiring that the Ten Commandments be posted in every public-school classroom in Louisiana
in accordance with H.B. 71.” Id. at 219.
The Roake defendants appealed the Middle District’s entry of a preliminary injunction and
denial of their motions to dismiss.
3 Roake v. Brumley (Roake Panel), 141 F.4th 614, 629 (5th Cir.
2025), vacated on reh’g en banc, 154 F.4th 329 (5th Cir. 2025). A panel of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Id. at 626. The Fifth Circuit
subsequently voted to rehear the case en banc and vacated the panel opinion. Roake v. Brumley,
154 F.4th 329, 332 (5th Cir. 2025). Finding that “the parents’ challenge turns on unresolved factual
and contextual questions,” the en banc court held that “equitable relief was premature” and
therefore vacated the prelimi nary injunction and remanded for further proceedings . Roake v.
3 The Roake defendants also appealed the Middle District’s decision to deny their motion to exclude plaintiffs’ expert
testimony. Roake v. Brumley, 141 F.4th 614, 629 (5th Cir. 2025). Because that issue is beyond the scope of the present
motion, it is omitted from the Court’s discussion of Roake.
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Brumley (Roake En Banc), 170 F.4th 292, 297 (5th Cir. 2026) (en banc) (per curiam).
On August 19, 2025, the Court stayed the instant matter pending the culmination of appeals
in Roake. R. Doc. 82. After the Fifth Circuit issued its en banc Roake decision, the Court ordered
additional briefing from the parties discussing the applicability of that decision to a resolution in
the instant case. R. Doc. 83. Defendants submitted their briefing on March 11, 2026, arguing that
the en banc Fifth Circuit’s decision in Roake compels denial of Plaintiff’s Motion and dismissal
of this suit because, as in Roake , Plaintiff’s challenge is “premature,” and his claims are
“nonjusticiable.” R. Doc. 84, p. 2 (citing Roake En Banc, 170 F.4th at 297, 300). Plaintiff submitted
a response on March 18, 2026, arguing that Roake does not control the outcome of this case
because his “claims are materially different from those of the plaintiffs in Roake and arise in a
distinct posture.” R. Doc. 85, p. 5. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that a different result is
warranted because (1) unlike the plaintiffs in Roake, who “were parents and students who objected
to the religious effects of their anticipated exposure to H.B. 71 displays,” he is a teacher who “must
comply with [H.B. 71’s] mandate or face professional discipline,” thus altering the ripeness
analysis, and (2) he also brings a compelled speech claim that was not raised by the plaintiffs in
Roake nor evaluated for ripeness by the Fifth Circuit. R. Doc. 85, pp. 5-13. Plaintiff has also filed
an ex parte motion to expedite consideration of his pending motion. R. Doc. 86.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
a. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 41)
Defendants seek dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
R. Doc. 41, p. 1. Rule 12(b)(1) allows a defendant to seek dismissal based on the court’s lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), while the basis for dismissal of a complaint
under Rule 12(b)(6) is its “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” Fed. R. Civ.
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P. 12(b)(6).
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; therefore, they have the power to
adjudicate claims only when jurisdiction is conferred by statute or the Constitution. See Kokkonen
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994); Stockman
v. Federal Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). Under Rule 12(b)(1), “[a] case is
properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “Lack of subject -matter
jurisdiction may be found in the complaint alone, the complaint supplemented by the undisputed
facts as evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by the undisputed facts plus the
court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss.,
143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). The court should determine whether subject matter
jurisdiction is present before addressing any other issues, Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158,
161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Hitt v. Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)), and
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, id. (citing Menchaca v.
Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980)).
“To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The Court
must “take the well -pled factual allegations of the complaint as true and view them in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.” Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing In
re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)). It resolves any ambiguities
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in the current controlling substantive law in plaintiff’s favor. Lewis v. Fresne, 252 F.3d 352, 357
(5th Cir. 2001) (citing Burchett v. Cargill, Inc., 48 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1995)). A court however
“do[es] not accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal
conclusions.” Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff’s Complaint “is a facial challenge to H.B. 71” and “presents the question whether
the requirements of H.B. 71 are consistent with the Establishment Clause, regardless of how it is
implemented.” R. Doc. 57, p. 13. “Even in the First Amendment context, facial challenges are
disfavored.” Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 744 (2024). “To successfully mount a facial
challenge, [a] plaintiff[] must show that there is no set of circumstances under which [the
challenged policy] is constitutional.” Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157, 164 (5th Cir. 2010). Only if the
plaintiff can establish the policy “to be unconstitutional in every application,” will it be “struck
down as invalid.” Id.
The Court will first consider Defendants’ arguments for dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Article III of the United States Constitution “limits federal courts to resolving ‘Cases’
and ‘Controversies.’” E.g., Roake En Banc, 170 F.4th at 297 (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). This
limitation gives rise to “justiciability doctrines of standing, mootness, political question, and
ripeness.” Choice Inc. of Texas v. Greenstein, 691 F.3d 710, 715 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006)). “The ripeness doctrine’s ‘basic
rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements.” Id. (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148
(1967)). As summarized by the Fifth Circuit:
A court should dismiss a case for lack of ripeness when the case is abstract or
hypothetical. The key considerations are the fitness of the issues for judicial
decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. A case
is generally ripe if any remaining questions are purely legal ones; conversely, a case
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is not ripe if further factual development is required. However, even where an issue
presents purely legal questions, the plaintiff must show some hardship in order to
establish ripeness.
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See also Book People, Inc. v. Wong, 91 F.4th
318, 333-34 (5th Cir. 2024) (holding claims ripe where “[n]o other factual or legal developments
are required for us to decide this case”); Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm’n, 70 F.4th 914, 931-32 (5th Cir. 2023) (same, where “no more factual detail is required to
resolve the claims,” despite defendant’s argument that “further factual development” would
“significantly advance” the court’s ability to resolve claims, because defendant failed to offer
specific facts that would assist the court); United Transp. Union v. Foster , 205 F.3d 851, 857-58
(5th Cir. 2000) (holding pre-enforcement review of Louisiana statute not ripe because “challenge
sits atop a mountain of conjecture and speculation”); Texas v. United States , 523 U.S. 296, 300
(1998) (“A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not
occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.”) (int ernal citation and quotation marks
omitted).
In support of their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that the en banc Fifth Circuit cases
of Staley v. Harris County, 485 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc), and Roake v. Brumley, 2026
WL 482555, are analogous and instructive. In Staley, the Fifth Circuit considered “whether, in the
factual context presented, the display of a Bible in a monument dedicated to a philanthropic citizen
and located on the grounds of [a courthouse], violates the Establishment Clause.” Staley, 485 F.3d
at 307. Days before oral argument in the case, the defendant, Harris County, removed the
monument and placed it in storage as the Courthouse and its grounds underwent renovation. Id. at
307-08. Though the County asserted that it would display the monument again after renovations
were complete, it “emphasize[d] that no decision ha[d] been made regarding when, where, or under
what circumstances the monument [would] be displayed again in the future.” Id. Recognizing
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“[t]he importance of facts and context” in Establishment Clause cases, the Court held that “any
dispute over a probable redisplay of the [] monument is not ripe because there are no facts before
us to determine whether such a display might violate the Establishment Clause.” Id. at 308-09
(citing McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 944, 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry , 545
U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“While the Court’s prior tests provide useful
guideposts . . . no exact formula can dictate a resolution to such fact-intensive cases.”)).
Here, Defendants argue that Staley is analogous because Plaintiff “challenges only some
unspecified future H.B. 71 display that he presumes may violate his rights at some unspecified
future point in time.” R. Doc. 41- 1, p. 12. While Defendants contend that “Plaintiff has no way
around Staley,” R. Doc. 58, p. 6, Plaintiff instead contends that (1) “Staley is inapposite” because
the location, timing, and circumstances of the H.B. 71 displays are all known and (2) because he
brings a facial challenge to H.B. 71, “no additional information about the where, when, or how of
H.B. 71 is required,” R. Doc. 57, pp. 12- 13. Regarding the first argument, Plaintiff contends that
because the Act states the minimum requirements of an H.B. 71 display, “[n]o further facts are
needed to decide [his] claims.” Id. at p. 13. Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s argument here is
unfounded because he “can only claim to know the ‘dimensions’ and ‘central’ feature of an H.B.
71 display,” whereas the Staley court knew much more about the monument in question and still
found that it lacked the necessary facts and context surrounding a future redisplay of the monument
to adjudicate its constitutionality. R. Doc. 58, pp. 6- 7 (citing R. Doc. 57, p. 4; Staley v. Harris
Cnty., 461 F.3d 504, 506- 07 (5th Cir. 2006); Staley , 485 F.3d at 309). Specifically, Defendants
note that at the panel stage in Staley , the record contained the monuments dimensions, its
engraving, its shape, its central feature, the dimensions of the Bible featured, the lighting
surrounding the Bible, the yearly cost the government paid to illuminate the monument, and the
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practice of turning pages of the Bible. Id. at p. 6 (citing Staley, 461 F.3d at 506-07). On the other
hand, “neither [Plaintiff] nor the Court (nor even Defendants) know how any given school will
implement H.B. 71.” Id. at pp. 6-7.
The Court agrees with Defendants and finds Plaintiff’s arguments to distinguish Staley
unavailing. First, Plaintiff’s contention that Staley is distinguishable because the location, timing,
and circumstances of any H.B. 71 display are all known overstates what the Act actually
establishes. While H.B. 71 does specify minimum requirements and mandates a particular text, it
expressly vests each school governing authority with discretion to determine “the nature of the
display.” La. R.S. § 17:2124(B)(1). Thus, as in Staley , neither this Court nor the parties can
determine at this time how any particular school governing authority will implement its H.B. 71
displays. Lacking the facts and context of the implemented displays, the Court cannot, on the
present record, determine whether any display would violate the Establishment Clause. Second,
Plaintiff’s attempt to frame his suit as a facial challenge does not obviate the need for a well-
developed factual record. While facial challenges under the First Amendment do not require proof
of an unconstitutional application in every instance, the plaintiff still must demonstrate that “a
substantial number of [the law’s] applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the
statute’s plainly legitimate sweep,” Moody , 603 U.S. at 723 (quoting Americans for Prosperity
Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 615 (2021)) (alteration in original), and courts must assess the full
scope of a law’s applications before adjudicating such a challenge, id. at 717-19, 724-25. That
assessment requires a thoroughly-developed factual record. See, e.g., Washington State Grange v.
Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450-51 (stressing need for “judicial restraint in
a facial challenge” and reasoning that facial challenges are disfavored due to “risk of premature
interpretation of statutes on the basis of factually barebones records”).
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Next, the Court finds t he Fifth Circuit’s recent en banc decision in Roake v. Brumley ,
holding that claims materially similar to Plaintiff’s were not yet ripe for adjudication, to be
particularly instructive. In Roake , the Fifth Circuit noted that the Ten Commandments’ “dual
character” of having both religious and historical significance “forecloses any categorical rule
against their display on public property” and that the constitutionality of such a display “turns on
‘the context of the display’ and ‘how the text is used.’” Roake En Banc, 170 F.4th at 297-98 (citing
and quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701 (2005) (emphasis in original)). The Court then
concluded that at this point, “we do not yet know —and cannot yet know —how the text will be
used” in the context of an H.B. 71 display because the Act sets “certain ‘minimum requirement[s]’
regarding the text, size, and accompanying ‘context statement’” but “leaves ‘[t]he nature of the
display’ entirely to the discretion of local school boards.” Id. at 298 (quoting La. R.S.
§ 17:2124(B)(1)-(3)). Thus, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, “numerous essential questions,” including
“how prominently the displays will appear, what other materials might accompany them, or how—
if at all—teachers will reference them during instruction ,” remain unanswered. Id.
For these reasons , the Court held that this “evidentiary gap” forecloses both the
Establishment Clause claims and the Free Exercise Clause claims brought by the Roake plaintiffs
because it prevents “‘the fact -intensive and context -specific analysis required by’ the Supreme
Court’s Ten Commandments cases.”
4 Id. (quoting Staley v. Harris Cnty., 485 F.3d 305, 309 (5th
Cir. 2007) (en banc)). Weighing the lack of fitness of the issues for judicial decision against the
hardship to the parties of withholding consideration, the Fifth Circuit found that “the plaintiffs
4 The Fifth Circuit also held that this lack of evidence “forecloses the parents’ Free Exercise claims because ‘the
question whether a law “substantially interfere[es] with the religious development” of a child will always be fact-
intensive,’ requiring courts to ‘consider the specific context in which the instruction or materials at issue are
presented.” Roake En Banc , 170 F. 4th at 298 (quoting Mahmoud v. Taylor , 606 U.S. 522, 550 (2025) (quoting
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972))) (alteration in original).
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suffer no concrete harm from the challenged policy itself, which does not require them to ‘do
anything or to refrain from doing anything.’” Id. (quoting Trump v. New York, 592 U.S. 125, 134
(2020) (quoting Ohio Forestry Ass’n., Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998))). For these
reasons, the Court held that the issues were not ripe for judgment and that rendering a decision on
the claims would require forbidden “substitution of speculation for adjudication” and “exceed the
judicial function.” Id. at 299.
The Supreme Court has long articulated that a purported religious display’s
constitutionality depends heavily on context and facts. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S.
844, 867-68 (2005) (citing Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter , 492 U.S.
573, 595, (1989)) (“[T]he question is what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the
display. That inquiry, of necessity, turns upon the context in which the contested object appears.”)
(emphasis added); Van Orden v. Perry , 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)
5 (in
religious display cases, courts “must take account of context”). In this case, the Court finds Roake
to be particularly instructive because, like the plaintiffs in Roake , Plaintiff challenges H.B. 71 as
“facially unconstitutional under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment” before any H.B. 71 displays have been placed on classroom walls. This holding
defeats Plaintiff’s argument that “[n]o additional information” about implementation of the H.B.
71 displays is required to decide his claims. See R. Doc. 57, p. 13.
Plaintiff attempts to avoid Roake ’s holding by arguing that, unlike the parent and student
plaintiffs in Roake, who are not required “to do anything or to refrain from doing anything,” he is
a public school teacher personally subjected to H.B. 71’s mandate to display the Ten
Commandments in his classroom. R. Doc. 85, pp. 5, 7-12. He further contends that “because [his]
5 The Fifth Circuit found Justice Breyer’s concurrence the controlling opinion in Van Orden. Staley v. Harris Cnty.,
Tex., 485 F.3d 305, 308 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2007).
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injury arises from his role in implementing the statute—not merely from observing any particular
display—Roake ’s ripeness analysis does not apply.” Id. at p. 12. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that
Roake is distinguishable because he raises a compelled-speech claim that the Roake plaintiffs did
not assert. Id. at 12-13. The Court is not persuaded.
First, Roake’s ripeness holding is not, as Plaintiff contends, limited to claims brought by
parents and students as “mere bystander[s] or observer[s].” Rather, the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning
rests on the nature of the constitutional inquiry required by pre-enforcement challenges to H.B. 71.
The en banc Court held that H.B. 71’s minimum statutory requirements do not supply a sufficient
factual record to permit judicial review because the Act’s delegation of elements of the displays to
local school boards leaves unresolved questions that are critical for adjudication, including “how
prominently the displays will appear, what other materials might accompany them, or how —if at
all—teachers will reference them during instruction.” Roake En Banc, 170 F.4th at 298. That same
logic applies here with equal force because, like the plaintiffs in Roake, Plaintiff asks this Court to
declare H.B. 71 unconstitutional before an y display has been implemented in his classroom and
before development of a full factual record concerning the manner in which Benjamin Franklin
High School or its governing authority will comply with the Act.
Second, Plaintiff’s effort to distinguish Roake on the ground that he is personally required
to “display” the Ten Commandments is not supported by the statutory text. Specifically, Plaintiff
alleges that H.B. 71 imposes a requirement for “teachers . . . to post” and “display” the Ten
Commandments. R. Doc. 1, pp. 3-4, 8-9, 14-15; R. Doc. 47-2, p. 16-18. In support of this claim,
he misreads or ignores the Act’s text, which plainly mandates that “each public school governing
authority shall display the Ten Commandments,” La. R.S. § 17:2124(B)(1), rather than requiring
public school teachers themselves to post or display the H.B. 71 displays, as Plaintiff alleges.
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Whether a particular teacher will be required to physically post, display, or otherwise interact with
an H.B. 71 display, or whether that task will fall to administrators or other staff, is left fully to the
discretion of each governing authority. In this respect, the ripeness of Plaintiff’s claims is even
weaker than that of the claims in Roake, where plaintiffs at least faced the certainty of exposure to
a display as students and parents in the classroom. Here, Plaintiff faces no statutory obligation of
any kind, and his alleged injury from being personally “required to display” the Ten
Commandments rests on a chain of assumptions about how Benjamin Franklin High School’s
governing authority will choose to implement the Act. Thus, the alleged injury has no basis in the
statutory text and no support in the present record.
6
This also renders Plaintiff’s compelled-speech theory especially speculative at this point.
Whether H.B. 71 will compel Plaintiff to engage in any expressive act, let alone one that could
plausibly be characterized as his own speech, depends entirely on i mplementation decisions that
have not yet been made. These decisions will shape the constitutional question in ways that cannot
be anticipated on the bare record presently before the Court. Until those facts are known, any ruling
by this Court on any of Pl aintiff’s claims, including the compelled-speech claim, would rest on
6 The Court also notes that the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Nathan v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist., ___ F.4th
___, No. 25-50695, 2026 WL 1078691 (5th Cir. Apr. 21, 2026), reinforces its decision. In Nathan, the en banc Fifth
Circuit considered whether a similar yet distinct Texas law , S.B. 10, violated the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause. Id. at *2-3. Before conducting its First Amendment analysis, the Court noted that the plaintiffs’ pre-
enforcement facial challenge to S.B. 10, unlike those against H.B. 71, was ripe because “[e]verything needed to resolve
their claims is in the statutory text. ” Id. at *11. The Court went on to describe why challenges to S.B. 10 are ripe but
challenges to H.B. 71 are not:
Louisiana’s statute differs from Texas’s in three key w ays. First, Louisiana requires the “nature of
the display” to “be determined by each governing authority.” Texas, by contrast, delegates no local
discretion for any of the display’s components. Second, Louisiana specifies that local displays may
(or may not) incorporate other historical documents, such as “ the Mayf lower Compac t, the
Declaration of Independence, and the Northwest Ordinance. ” Texas, by contrast, mandates that
displays “include only” the provided text of the Commandments. Third, Louisiana law does not
specify where displays must appear, whereas Texas requires posting them in a “conspicuous place”
so they can be easily read. So, while the Louisiana law lets local governing authorities shape the
displays’ critical contextual details, the Texas law settles those details in the statute.
Id. at *12-13 (internal citations omitted).
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nothing more than conjecture, which is precisely the “substitution of speculation for adjudication”
that Roake forbids. Roake En Banc, 170 F.4th at 299.
Because all three of Plaintiff’s claims, as in Roake , turn on unresolved factual and
contextual questions regarding the H.B. 71 displays, which are required for a proper First
Amendment analysis, the Court finds that the claims are not ripe for adjudication. Therefore, the
Court will GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 41) and dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
against all Defendants without prejudice.
b. Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction / Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 47)
The Court next turns to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction or, in the Alternative,
Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 47). Granting a preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and
drastic remedy.” SO Apartments, L.L.C. v. City of San Antonio, Texas, 109 F.4th 343, 348 (5th Cir.
2024). Courts do not grant relief unless there is “(1) a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will
prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the
injunction is not granted, (3) that the threatened injury to plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm
the injunction may do to defendant, and (4) that granting the preliminary injunction will not
disserve the public interest.” Anibowei v. Morgan, 70 F.4th 898, 902 (5th Cir. 2023) (citation
omitted). Having granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the underlying claims, the Court need not
proceed with this analysis and will deny Plaintiff’s motion, as well as his motion for expedited
consideration, as moot.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 41) is GRANTED, and
that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction or
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Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 47) is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion for Expedited
Consideration (R. Doc. 86) is DENIED AS MOOT.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 22nd day of April, 2026.
GREG GERARD GUIDRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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