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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
DANIEL SIMONS, 
Defendant. 
 
 Case No.:  3:25-cr-02444-JAH 
 
ORDER ON THE PARTIES’ 
MOTIONS IN LIMINE  
 
ECF Nos. 33, 34, 38, 39, 43, 44 
 
Before the Court are the Parties’ motions in limine, filed pur suant to the above -
captioned case. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
There is no express authority in either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 
or the Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) for motions in limine , but such motions are 
recognized in practice and in case law.  See Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758 n.3 
(2000); United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1186 (9th Cir. 1979).  Authority for these 
motions may also be implied through “the court’s inherent power to manage the course of 
trials.”  Luce v. United States,  469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984).  A motion in limine  is “any 
motion, whether made before or during trial, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence 
before the evidence is actually offered.”  Id.  at 40 n.2.  The purpose of a motion in limine 
is to avoid the futile attempt to “unring the bell” when highly prejudicial evidence is offered 
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and then stricken at trial.  See McEwen v. City of Norman,  Okla., 926 F.2d 1539, 1548 
(10th Cir. 1991).  The trial court has broad discretion to grant or  deny motions in limine 
and the decision is rarely disturbed on appeal.  See United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948, 
955 (9th Cir. 1996); Galindo v. Tist, 971 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th Cir. 1992).  A decision on 
a motion in limine is not binding on the trial judge; the decision may be altered based on 
evidence presented at trial.  See Ohler, 529 U.S. at 758.   Thus, an objection may be 
made, or the evidence may be offered, at trial even if it falls within the scope of the 
court’s in limine ruling.  See United States v. Connelly, 874 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 
1989). 
DISCUSSION 
I. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
1. Admit Coconspirator Statements 
i. Unidentified Coconspirator Statements 
The Government seeks to admit statements from Defendant’s coconspirators —
Knack Media, True Help, William Leonard, and Terry  Patton— pursuant to FRE 
801(d)(2)(E) as opposing party statements.  USA MILs  at 8.  With one exception, the 
Government does not specifically identify the statements it seeks to admit, and the parties 
AGREE the Court should DEFER ruling on the admission of unidentified coconspirator 
statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) until the statements are identified.   
But, as the Government suggests, a “district  court need not make a determination, 
prior to the introduction of the statement, [on] whether the proposed statement complies 
with Rule 801(d)(2)(E).”  United States v. Rocha , 916 F.2d  219, 239 (5th Cir. 1990).   
Rather, district courts may exercise their discretion to allow the government to introduce 
coconspirator statements and wait until the United States’ case  is complete before 
determining the admissibility of such statements. See United States v. Arbelaez, 719 F.2d 
1453, 1460 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bourjaily, 781 F.2d 539, 542 (6th Cir. 1986), 
aff’d, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). 
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Accordingly, the Court will allow the Government to introduce coconspirator 
statements at trial from the four named coconspirators— Knack Media, True Help, William 
Leonard, and Terry  Patton— but RESERVES ruling on the admissibility of those 
statements until the Government concludes its case-in-chief.  The Court also RESERVES 
ruling on any specific objections to coconspirator statements.   The Court may permit a 
witness to testify related to any statements made by alleged coconspirators on the condition 
that the Government ultimately establishes the existence of a c onspiracy, and subject to 
Rule 106, if applicable. 
ii. February 26, 2020 Messages between Defendant and Terry Patton 
As to the excerpts of a February 26, 2020, text conversation between Defendant and 
Terry Patton in which Defendant states “Only 2 for 1 ,” the Court AGREES with the 
Government that the statements are admissible as coconspirator statements under Rule 
801(d)(2)(E).  USA MILs  at 8.  The Court REJECTS Defendant’s argument, pursuant to 
Rules 403 and 106 , that the messages are  likely to mislead the jury because 
“contemporaneous records clearly show that [Defendant] declined to accept the patient at 
all.”  Def. Opp’n at 8-9.  Even if Defendant’s facility did not accept a particular patient due 
to criteria important to Defendant, such as the patient having a certain insurance policy, the 
evidence is being offered to show how Defendant tracked the number of patients referred 
to him by coconspirators based upon quotas that depended on the type of insurance policy 
and the oral agreements with the coconspirators .  Thus, the Court finds the evidence 
relevant and probative of the Government’s theory of the case. 
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS  the Government’s motion to admit the excerpts 
of the February 26, 2020, text conversation between Defendant and Terry Patton pursuant 
to Rule 801(d)(2)(E), subject to the Government having presented a full transcript of the 
text communication to Defendant. 
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2. Admit Properly Noticed Expert Evidence from SSA Stewart1 
The Government seeks to offer expert testimony from FBI Supervisory Special 
Agent William Stuart “concerning the modus operandi of substance use disorder treatment 
operators paying kickbacks to [coconspirators]  for their efforts to find, recruit, and refer  
patients.”  USA MILs at 11.  According to the Government, this testimony is necessary to 
help the jury decide whether Defendant’s conduct, which “may seem fairly run-of-the-mill 
in the business world,” was meant to “conceal his illegal conduct.”  ECF No. 43 (“USA 
Reply”) at 3.  The Government argues SSA Stuart is qualified under Rule 702 to provide 
such testimony based on his training and experience “with a variety of schemes involving 
the payment of kickbacks to body brokers” through his “expertise on the modus operandi 
of such schemes.”  USA MILs at 10.   
Defendant objects generally to expert testimony from SSA Stewart in its entirety, 
arguing that, under the facts of the instant case, the Government has not established a need 
for expert testimony to explain how criminal body broker schemes work, nor articulated a 
sufficient basis, under Rule 702, for the Court to find SSA Stewart’s testimony is reliable.  
Def. Opp’n at 9 -12.
2  Alternatively, Defendant has also moved to limit SSA Stewart’s 
testimony based on specific objections to portions of SSA Stewart’s testimony.  Id.; see 
also Def. MILs at 9-18.   
i. Exclusion of SSA Stewart’s Expert Testimony in Its Entirety 
As an initial matter, the Court rejects Defendant’s general arguments seeking to 
exclude expert testimony from SSA Stewart in its entirety.  It is well-established under 
Ninth Circuit caselaw that for modus operandi experts, “reliability depends heavily on the 
knowledge and experience of the expert, rather than the methodology or theory behind it.”  
 
1 For the reasons discussed infra, the Court DENIES Defendant’s first motion in limine 
which seeks to limit SSA Stewart’s expert testimony.  
2 Defendant incorporates by reference the arguments and objections in his first motion in 
limine moving to limit SSA Stewart’s testimony.  See Def. MILs at 9-18. 
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United States v. Hankey , 203 F.3d 1160, 1169  (9th Cir. 2000) .  Here, SSA Stewart’s 
training and experience includes, inter alia, 11 years of experience “work[ing] on criminal 
investigations involving healthcare fraud and related offenses,” his specialization from 
2014 to 2021 “in investigations involving addiction treatment facilities, in particular those 
involving anti-kickback violations and violations of EKRA” and the  modus operandi of 
such schemes, and “serv[ing] as a lead case agent for investigations [in]  at least 80 such 
facilities” and “assist[ing] in a wide variety of other investigations, targeting several drug 
addiction treatment facilities and body brokers.”  Id. 9-10.  The Court finds such training 
and experience is both relevant, under the facts of this case, and sufficiently reliable “ to 
provide a reliable basis for [SSA Stewart’s] expert opinions” as to the modus operandi of 
schemes involving the payment of kickbacks to coconspirators, such as those alleged here.   
Hankey, 203 F.3d at 1168.  
The Court also finds the Government has presented a sufficient basis, under the facts 
of this case, to admit testimony regarding the “ modus operandi of substance use disorder 
treatment operators paying kickbacks to [coconspirators] for their efforts to find, recruit, 
and refer  patients.”  As the Government argues, the Ninth Circuit has long held that 
“government agents or similar persons may testify as to the general practices of criminals 
to establish the defendants’ modus operandi.”  United States v. Johnson, 735 F.2d 1200, 
1202 (9th Cir. 1984).  Such testimony “alerts [the jury] to the possibility that combinations 
of seemingly innocuous events may indicate criminal behavior.”  United States v. 
Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 1997).  Here, the Court agrees that modus 
operandi testimony is proper to help the jury decide whether Defendant’s conduct was 
“fairly run-of-the-mill in the business world” or meant to “conceal his illegal conduct.”  
USA Reply at 3.  Specifically, as the Government argues, SSA Stuart’s testimony will help 
the jury determine whether: 
[Defendant] entered into what appeared  to be facially valid contracts for 
marketing and consulting services with his co -conspirators, where he 
agreed to pay them a flat rate of thousands of dollars per month.  But those 
payments were instead contingent on a [separate] verbal agreement setting 
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a minimum number of “units” of patients that his co-conspirators sent him 
based on an assessment by the  conspirators of the value of such patients’ 
insurance coverage. 
Id.  Moreover, that SSA Stewart was not a case agent in this case alleviates any 
concerns that arise in other cases where a case agent presents dual testimony as both a fact 
witness and an expert witness.  See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 901-06 
(9th Cir. 2007) (discussing concerns regarding a case agent presenting dual testimony as 
both a fact witness and an expert witness on drug jargon). 
Accordingly, the Court REJECTS Defendant’s arguments seeking to exclude SSA 
Stewart’s testimony in its entirety and GRANTS the Government’s motion to admit SSA 
Stewart’s expert testimony, subject to objections by Defendant at trial once the testimony 
is offered.  The Court will also permit Defendant, if he so chooses, to cross-examine SSA 
Stewart at trial on the issue of reli ability before the jury prior to the Court declaring SSA 
Stewart as an expert witness.  
ii. Defendant’s Motion to Limit SSA Stewart’s Expert Testimony 
Defendant’s first motion in limine also seeks to limit the majority of SSA Stewart’s 
expert testimony based on specific objections to portions of the proffered testimony.  Def. 
MILs at 9 -21.  Defendant describes the challenged evidence as falling into three broad 
categories— “generalized testimony concerning knowledge and intent of individuals 
engaged in EKRA schemes and modus operandi to avoid law enforcement detection;” 
“Generalized testimony concerning insurance reimbursement structure;” an d 
impermissible legal opinions—and  objects to the challenged testimony being inadmissible 
as irrelevant, unhelpful to the jury, unreliable, and unfairly prejudicial.  Id.  
First the Court rejects Defendant’s primary objection that the challenged testimony 
is inadmissible under Rule 702.   
Here, Defendant argues that the challenged testimony usurps the role of the jury 
because it invites the jury to infer guilt by matching the evidence to a generalized scheme 
narrative, and offers legal conclusions and unfairly prejudicial characterizations.  Id.   
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Specifically, Defendant argues that presenting testimony as to the “supposed hallmarks of 
kickback schemes— such as verbal agreements that differ from written contracts, tracking 
of patient referrals, and reconciling payments based on patient value” — in a manner that 
mirrors the government’s theory of the case “ effectively instructs the jury on how to 
interpret ordinary evidence  and encourages an improper  guilt-by-pattern inference.”  Id.  
Defendant also argues that SSA Stewart’s characterization of payments as “kickbacks” and 
of industry participants as “corrupt” constitutes improper legal conclusions and prejudicial 
labels.  Id.   
However, Defendant asserts his objections based on cases with facts not present 
here.  For example, Defendant cites to United States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 901 -06 
(9th Cir. 2007), which involved concerns about a case agent presenting dual testimony as 
both a fact witness and an expert witness on drug jargon.  But such is not the case here as 
SSA Stewart is neither a dual fact and expert witness, nor the case agent testifying as to the 
facts at issue in this case.  Similarly, Defendant’s reliance on United States v. Mejia, 545 
F.3d 179, 191 -96 (2d. Cir. 2008) , is also misplaced, as that case involved an expert’s 
improper summation of the facts at issue in that case.  Moreover, neither of those cases 
addresses expert modus operandi testimony.  Thus, the Court REJECTS Defendant’s 
argument that the proffered testimony by SSA Stewart risks improperly usurping the role 
of the jury. 
Next, Defendant argues the challenged testimony is inadmissible under Rule 702 
because it is unreliable and not based on sufficient facts or data.  Def. MILs at 13-15.  Here, 
the Court adopts its reasoning rejecting Defendant’s general objections on the same 
grounds.  In addition, Defendant’s reliance on United States v. Valencia-Lopez, 971 F.3d 
891, 900 (9th Cir. 2020) is inapplicable here for two reasons.  First, Valencia-Lopez took 
issue with a drug trafficking modus operandi expert’s previously un-notic ed opinion 
testimony that the chance a drug cartel would use a coerced courier was “[a]lmost nil, 
almost none.”  Here, as Defendant has noted, SSA Stewart’s proffered testimony does not 
address how frequently such practices occur, only that they represent a common industry 
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pattern.  Def. MILs at 14.  Second, and more importantly, the ruling in Valencia-Lopez was 
premised on the trial court failing to make any  reliability findings at all.  Id.  at 898-99 
(“Here, the district court made no reliability findings about [the agent’s]  testimony. . . . 
Nothing was said about reliability.”).  As discussed, here, the Court makes express findings 
that SSA Stewart’s training and experience is both relevant, under the facts of this case, 
and sufficiently reliable “to provide a reliable basis for [SSA Stewart’s] expert opinions” 
as to the modus operandi of schemes involving the payment of kickbacks to body brokers, 
such as those alleged here. 
Defendant also challenges portions of SSA Stewart’s proffered testimony as 
irrelevant under Rules 401 and 402.   
As to SSA Stewart’s statement that “[s]uch activity was already prohibited under 
certain state’s laws” prior  to the enactment of EKRA, the Court finds the statement is 
relevant to provide context and background to help the jury to understand the breadth of 
SSA Stewart’s training and experience informing his opinions.  In other words, SSA 
Stewart’s training and experience investigating conduct prohibited by EKRA began prior 
to the enactment of EKRA in 2018 because such conduct was already illegal under certain 
state’s laws. That experience, and the lessons learned from it, is directly relevant to his 
testimony on the modus operandi of criminals who engage in such kickback schemes.  
Defendant also objects to Agent Stewart’s  proffered testimony that “treatment 
facilities involved in kickback schemes sometimes conceal payments by disguising them 
as payments for ‘consulting’ services through sham contracts or invoices” because the 
Indictment does not allege sham consulting contracts.  Def. MILs at 16.  However, as the 
Government argues, Defendant cites no case law for the proposition that the scope of 
modus operandi testimony must be limited, precisely, to the contours of the charged 
violations in the case at issue. Moreover, the Court AGREES the Indictment’s charges that 
“Defendant [] contracted with entities associated with body brokers to purportedly provide 
marketing services for La Jolla Recovery, Inc .” is sufficient basis to find evidence and 
testimony as to “sham contracts or invoices” relevant under the facts of this case.  ECF No. 
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1 at 4-5.   
Accordingly, the Court FINDS the challenged testimony is admissible pursuant to 
Rules 401 and 402.  
Finally, Defendant seeks to exclude portions of SSA Stewart’s testimony as unduly 
prejudicial under Rule 403.   
As the Court has already discussed, SSA Stewart will not offer any opinion about 
the facts at issue in this case.  Thus, the Court finds no basis for Defendant’s arguments 
that SSA Stew art’s proffered testimony will risk usurping the role of the jury, that the 
challenged testimony describing modus operandi schemes amounts to improper 
“summarizing” of the facts at issue in this case, or that expert testimony as to modus 
operandi is unnecessary to assist the jury understand the facts at issue in this case such that 
the minimal probative value of such testimony is substantially outweighed by the risk of 
unfair prejudice. 
Defendant challenges SSA Stewart’s expert testimony to the extent he will use “use 
terms that carry strong pejorative connotations or that contain contested legal conclusions, 
which invite the jury to adopt the government’s characterization before it determines what 
the evidence shows.”  Def. MILs at 34.  According to Defendant, “these labels have little 
(if any) probative value beyond what nonpejorative language it would convey, but create a 
substantial risk of unfair prejudice and confusion.”  Id.   
Relatedly, Defendant’s second motion in limine also seeks to exclude use of the term 
“body broker.” The Court will address each of the challenged terms in turn. 
As to the term “ Kickback,” the Court rejects Defendant’s request to exclude the 
term given that term appears in the statute Defendant is charged with violating.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 220(a)(2) (“Except as provided in subsection (b), whoever, . . . knowingly and 
willfully . . . pays or offers any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate). 
As to the term “Body Broker” the Court rejects Defendant’s request to exclude the 
term under the facts of this case.  As discussed in the Government’s motion to admit 
evidence of body broker articles, Defendant himself, both in his statements and in 
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conversations with others, repeatedly used or referred to the phrase “body broker.”  His use 
of the term bears directly on the Government’s theory that Defendant knew of the unlawful 
industry practices and knew federal law enforcement were investigating the crimes.  Thus, 
the Court finds the danger of any undue prejudice from the term is substantially outweighed 
by the probative value of the evidence.  
As to the terms “Corrupt treatment center facility operators” and “Schemes to 
Defraud Healthcare Benefit Programs,  the Court finds that use of such terms are not 
improper legal conclusions or improper summations of the facts at issue in this case.  This 
is especially true here given that SSA Stewart will only testify as to the general operations 
of facility operators illegally involved in kickback schemes contrary to EKRA and not the 
facts at issue in this case.  Although true that the  terms may invite the jury to view 
seemingly innocuous facts through a lens of criminality, such a result is consistent with the 
purpose and scope of offering modus operandi testimony.   United States v. Figueroa -
Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining modus operandi testimony “alerts 
[the jury] to the possibility that combinations of seemingly innocuous events may indicate 
criminal behavior”).  Ultimately, it will be up to the jury to decide whether Defendant’s 
conduct amounted to the same. 
Accordingly, the Court FINDS the challenged testimony is admissible under Rule 
403.  
For the reasons discussed above , the Court DENIES Defendant’s first motion in 
limine seeking to limit SSA Stewart’s expert testimony.  To the extent Defendant’s second 
motion in limine also seeks to limit SSA Stewart’s expert testimony by precluding his use 
of the term “body broker,” the motion is DENIED for the same reasons.   
3. Admit Appropriate Lay Witness Evidence 
The Government  seeks to admit lay witness testimony from FBI agents and 
employees, along with “summary exhibits . . . derived from admitted financial records . . .  
and kickback payments to the body brokers,” pursuant to Rule 702 in its case -in chief.  
USA MILs at 14 -15.  The Government represents that any summary exhibits will be 
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provided to Defendant by the Court’s deadline for noticing trial exhibits.  Id.   
Defendant objects that the Government’s motion is premature because the 
Government has not specifically identified the opinion of any witness that it seeks to admit.  
Def. Opp’n at 12.   In response, t he Government represents it anticipates agreeing to a 
stipulation as to “evidence regarding the extraction and parsing of certain data ( such as 
certain cell phones and from Defendant’s iCloud account)” and that it does not oppose the 
Court deferring a ruling on the admissibility of any lay witness evidence pursuant to Rule 
701 until the Government provides more detail regarding the scope of such evidence.  USA 
Reply at 4. 
Accordingly, the Court RESERVES ruling on the motion.  
4. Admit Certified Business Records Under Rule 902(11) 
The Government broadly seeks to admit “ records of regularly conducted activities 
pursuant to a written declaration of their custodian or other qualified person,” pursuant to 
Rules 902(11) and 803(6), such as medical and financial records .  USA MILs at 15.  The 
Government represents “all such declarations have or soon will be provided to Defendant, 
and the exhibits whose admission will rely on such declarations will  be identified in the 
United States’ exhibit list.”  Id.   
Although Defendant objects that the Government’s motion is premature because the 
Government has not specifically identified or notice d the records it seeks to admit , 
Defendant has no objection to the admission of records under Rule 902(11) once the 
Government complies with the threshold requirements of Rule 902(11).  
Accordingly, the Court tentatively GRANTS  the Government’s motion, subject to 
the Government providing specific notice  and complying with the threshold requirement 
of Rule 902(11), of the records it seeks to admit by the Court’s deadline of May 7, 2026.   
5. Admit Intrinsic Evidence of Recorded Meeting with Defendant (i.e. Intrinsic 
Evidence of Conspiracy) 
The Government seeks to admit witness testimony and excerpts of a recorded 
conversation between Defendant and coconspirator William Leonard in which the y 
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allegedly agreed “to restart working together under the same verbal requirement” as the 
charged conspiracy where “Knack Media was required to send [Defendant]  one out-of-
network patient and 4 in-network patients each month to earn payment from Defendant.”   
USA MILs at 16-19.   
Although Defendant objects because the  recording falls outside the charged 
conspiracy in that  the conversation occurred approximately eight (8) months after the 
charged conspiracy period,3 the Government argues the evidence is admissible as direct 
evidence of the conspiracy  and as inextricably intertwined evidence exempt from Rule 
404(b)’s requirements.  Def. Opp’n at n3; USA MILs at 18-19.  The Government also 
argues “ the evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) as evidence of  Defendant’s 
knowledge/intent that a requirement for Knack Media to receive payments from Defendant 
was to meet his verbally required minimum number of referrals per month.”  Id. at n.14.   
Defendant also objects that the Government “has not identified the portions of such 
testimony it intends to use at trial,” without which Defendant cannot assert specific 
objections to the proffered evidence.  Def. Opp’n at 15.  In response, the Government 
represents “it has identified at least most of the portions of the recording it intends to play 
to the jury in its case-in-chief.”  USA Reply at nn.3-4. 
Here, the Court agrees with the Government that the conversation is direct evidence 
of the charged conspiracy because it shows the unlawful agreement between Defendant 
and Patton existed during the conspiracy period.  The Court also agrees the evidence is 
otherwise admissible as inextricably intertwined evidence because it is circumstantial 
evidence of the general nature of the Defendant’s business activity with Knack Media and 
explains the context in which Defendant’s transactions with Knack Media took place.  See 
United States v. Anderson, 741 F.3d 938, 949 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that “evidence 
 
3 The recorded conversation occurred in May 2024, approximately eight (8) months after 
the charged conspiracy period which spanned from August 2019 through September 2023. 
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that is necessary to permit the prosecutor to offer a coherent and comprehensible story 
regarding the commission of the crime” is inextricably intertwined “because the jury 
cannot be expected to make its decision in a void— without knowledge of the time, place, 
and circumstances of the acts which form the basis of the charge”). 
Thus, the Court RESERVES ruling on this motion to permit the Defendant to 
determine whether he has specific Rule 106 or 403 objections to the recording.  To facilitate 
the Defendant’s review, the Government shall produce the entire transcript of the recording 
to Defendant and the Court and identify the portions of the recording it intends to offer at 
trial no later than May 11, 2026.  This ruling does not apply to the testimony of the witness. 
6. Admit Summary Charts of Voluminous Records 
Defendant objects to the Government’s motion as premature because it seeks to 
admit unspecified “summary charts summarizing financial records demonstrating kickback 
payments from Defendant (or his proxys) to the coconspirators” pursuant to Rule 1006.  
Def. Opp’n at 15; USA MILs at 19 -20.  The Government represents it will produce the 
charts to Defendant “by the Court’s deadline for noticing trial exhibits” and does not 
oppose the Court deferring a ruling on the motion.  USA Reply at 6. 
Accordingly, the Court RESERVES ruling on the  motion until the Government 
produces its summary charts to Defendant, by no later than May 7, 2026, and Defendant 
has the opportunity to make any specific objections upon review thereof. 
7. Exclude Evidence or Argument That Insurance Plans Were Negligent 
Consistent with the parties’ representations that such evidence will not be introduced 
at trial, the Court DENIES the motion as moot.  See USA MILs at n.16 (recommending 
the Court denying the motion as moot) , Def. Opp’n at 15- 16 (agreeing such evidence 
should not be admissible); USA Reply at 6 (same). 
8. Exclude Evidence or Argument Regarding Other Acts of Legitimate 
Provision of SUD Treatment or Claims to Insurers, or Other Good Acts 
The Government seeks to preclude argument and evidence of specific acts of good 
conduct, including evidence that (1) La Jolla Recovery provided legitimate substance use 
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disorder (“SUD”) treatment and (2) some insurance claims were legitimate.  USA MILs at 
16.  The Government argues that such evidence is not probative of D efendant’s alleged 
crimes and would constitute inadmissible character  evidence under Rules 401 and 
404(a)(1).  Id.  Defendant objects that  
It is we ll-established that “a defendant cannot establish his innocence  of crime by 
showing that he did not commit similar crimes on other occasions,” such  “evidence [is] 
properly excluded as immaterial.”  Herzog v. United States, 226 F.2d 561,  565 (9th Cir. 
1955).  The AGREES with the Government that whether a Defendant engaged in legal, 
honest conduct some of the time has no relevance to whether the defendant engaged in, or 
had knowledge of, criminally charged conduct.  See, e.g., United States v. Ifediba, 46 F.4th 
1225, 1238 (11th Cir. 2022).  
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Government’s motion. 
9. Exclude Evidence or Argument Regarding Others’ Culpability 
The Government moves to preclude Defendant from offering evidence or argument 
that others should have been charged with,  or instead of , him or that others are  more 
culpable than he.  USA MILs at 23.   
In response, Defendant represents he does not intend to challenge the Government’s 
charging decisions but objects that the motion improperly seeks to “exclude an amorphous 
category of evidence without specifically identifying any item of evidence or testimony it 
seeks to exclude.”  Def. Opp’n at 19-20.  Defendant also argues this motion should be 
denied “to the extent” it seeks to preclude him from impeaching the investigation.  Id.   
Accordingly, consistent with the parties’ representations,  the Court GRANTS the 
Government’s motion.  To avoid ambiguity, the Court clarifies that Defendant may 
challenge the reliability of the Government’s investigation by introducing evidence or 
argument that questions: 
• “whether the government missed important details or failed to  pursue leads 
pointing away from [defendant],” United States v. Chang, No. 5:16-cr-00047, 
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2025 WL 2145076, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 29, 2025); 
• The thoroughness of the investigation, see, e.g., Fontenot v. Allbaugh, 402 F. 
Supp. 3d 1110, 1177 (E.D. Okla. 2019); 
• Whether the investigation was biased in choosing which leads to pursue, see, 
e.g., Keenan v. Bagley, No. 1:01 CV 2139, 2012 WL 1424751, at *39 (N.D. 
Ohio Apr. 24, 2012); or, 
• Impeach[es] law enforcement witnesses by highlighting mistakes made  
during the investigation, see, e.g., United States v. Guanghua, No. CR 23-091-
2, 2026 WL 893968, at *47 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2026). 
See generally Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 446 (1995). 
10. Exclude the Use of Law Enforcement Summaries for Impeachment 
Purposes 
The Government move s to preclude Defendant from using law enforcement 
interview summaries to impeach other witnesses based on prior inconsistent statements of 
other witnesses, arguing that, absent the witness’ review and adoption of the summaries, 
the statements are not ones made by the witnesses.  USA MILs at 23- 25.  For  similar 
reasons, the Government argues Defendant should not be allowed to publish or introduce 
the contents of such summaries under Rule 613(b).  Id.   
Although Defendant does not dispute the Government’s request, Defendant objects 
the motion is premature, lacks the requisite specificity , and is so broad that it include s 
permissible uses of law enforcement reports, such as  impeaching a law enforcement 
witness based on their own report or impeaching a witness if the witness adopts the 
statement memorialized in the report.  Def. Opp’n at 20-21.   
Thus, consistent with the parties representations, Court GRANTS the Government’s 
motion. 
11. Admit Evidence That Defendant Refused to Cooperate with a Court Order 
to Unlock His Phone 
On June 20, 2025, a Magistrate Judge signed an order sealing a search warrant for 
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Defendant’s iPhone and ordering “law enforcement agents executing the attached search 
warrant to compel [ Defendant] to unlock any electronic devices that require biometric 
access subject to seizure pursuant to this warrant, including finger/thumb, facial, or iris 
recognition features.”  USA MILs at 25- 27 (citing 25mj3461, ECF No. 2 ).  The w arrant 
was authorized in association with Defendant’s arrest on the charges at issue in this case 
and, as a threshold matter, is presumptively valid given that Defendant did not file a motion 
challenging the validity of the w arrant, or otherwise seeking to suppress any evidence 
obtained therefrom.  
Thus, at issue here is the Government’s motion to admit testimony that, on the day 
of his arrest, Defendant refused to allow officers to unlock his phone using facial 
recognition.  After a FBI Agent informed Defendant of the warrant, including the order to 
unlock his phone through biometric features, and showed him an electronic copy of such 
warrant, USA MILs at 25-27, the Government contends that the agent’s testimony showing 
that “[Defendant] would not allow agents to scan his face [by]  looking away and closing 
his eyes” is admissible to show consciousness of guilt and the Court may properly “instruct 
the jury while such conduct at the time of arrest is not sufficient in itself to establish guilt, 
it may be considered by the jury, in light of all the other evidence in the case, in determining 
the guilt or innocence of that person.”  Id. (citing United States v. Wright, 392 F.3d 1269, 
1277-79 (11th Cir. 2004)).  Moreover, because the events occurred during the post-arrest 
period, the Government argues such conduct is not an “other act” under Rule 404(b) but is 
intrinsic/inextricably intertwined with the charged offenses.  See United States v. Weathers, 
293 F. App’x 502 (9th Cir. 2008). 
Defendant’s objections in opposition were premised on his understanding that the 
Government sought to introduce the video recording of  Defendant’s conduct during the 
post-arrest period captured on the agent ’s body-camera footage.  See ECF No. 39 at 15.  
And, in essence, Defendant objects he did not refuse to comply with the warrant because 
officers failed to explain why Defendant was being arrested, failed to disclose to Defendant 
that officers had a valid warrant authorizing the use of biometric data to search his phone, 
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and failed to initially show Defendant the warrant upon request.  Id. 
Defendant contends he requested to see a warrant and the agent indicated she did not 
have a copy but there was one on site.  Defendant was uncooperative in that he avoided 
screenshots of his facial features. 
In its Reply, the Government represents t he agent left Defendant in the patrol 
vehicle, retrieved an electronic copy of the w arrant and showed it to Defendant.  The 
warrant presented to Defendant included the Ma gistrate Judge ’s order stating the 
Defendant was to allow a federal agent executing the w arrant to compel Defendant to 
unlock any electronic device that required electronic biometric access subject to seizure 
per the w arrant, including finger, thumb, facial, or iris recognition features.  Defendant 
would not allow the agent to scan his face as he was looking around and closing his eyes  
after his review of the search warrant.  The Government  does not intend to offer into 
evidence body-cam footage of Defendant’s refusal to cooperate prior to his review of the 
warrant unless Defendant opens the door to its need to do so, and intends instead to offer 
only the agent’s testimony regarding Defendant’s failure to cooperate once Defendant was 
made aware of the warrant.  USA Reply at 9.  The Government also clarifies it only seeks 
to admit witness testimony of Defendant’s conduct during the post-arrest period after the 
officers turned off their body-camera recordings.  Id. 
Here, the Court finds that after the arrest was accomplished, an FBI Agent attempted 
to unlock Defendant’s cellphone by holding the phone up to his face  pursuant to the 
warrant, but the phone did not unlock. 
Given that “[i]t is today universally conceded that the fact of an accused’s . . . 
resistance to arrest . . . and related conduct, are admissible as evidence of consciousness of 
guilt, and thus of guilt itself,” Marcoux v. United States, 405 F.2d 719, 721 (9th Cir. 1968) 
(cited with approval by United States v. Greiser, 502 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 1974), the 
Court AGREES that evidence supporting Defendant’s refusal to cooperate with the court 
Order to unlock his phone at the time of his arrest is admissible to show consciousness of 
guilt. 
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Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED. 
12. Admit Evidence of Body Broker Articles 
The Government seeks to admit three articles viewed and reproduced by Defendant 
which concern healthcare and insurance fraud, incl uding schemes related to drug and  
alcohol rehabilitation centers paying “kickbacks” to “body brokers” who “send them 
clients with health insurance.”  USA MILs at 28.  Defendant objects that the articles are 
irrelevant and therefore inadmissible under Rule 403.  Def. MILs at 26-28. 
Because Defendant viewed and reproduced the articles and the e vidence was 
obtained directly from Defendant’s iPhone and iCloud account, the Court AGREES the 
articles tend to show Defendant knew of the unlawful industry practices and knew federal 
law enforcement were investigating the crimes. 
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Government’s motion, subject to any specific 
objections offered by Defendant at trial.   The Court will issue a limiting instruction as to 
how the jury should consider the evidence.  The parties should submit proposed limiting 
instructions in addition to other proposed jury instructions.  
II. Defendant’s Motions In Limine 
1. Limit Expert Testimony of FBI SA William Stewart 
Defendant’s first motion in limine also seeks to limit SSA Stewart’s expert testimony 
based on specific objections to portions of the proffered testimony.  Def. MILs at 9 -21.  
This issue was resolved by the Court’s ruling on the Government’s second motion in 
limine.  Thus, the Court DENIES Defendant’s first motion to limit SSA Stewart’s expert 
testimony for the same reasons the Court granted the Government’s motion.   
To the extent Defendant’s second motion in limine also seeks to limit SSA Stewart’s 
expert testimony by precluding his use of the term “body broker,” the motion is DENIED 
for the same reasons. 
2. Exclude Use of the Term “Body Broker” 
This issue was resolved by the Court’s ruling on the Government’s second motion 
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in limine.  Consistent with the Court’s ruling on the Government’s second motion in limine 
and Defendant’s first motion in limine relating to the testimony of SSA Stewart, the Court 
DENIES Defendant’s motion to exclude use of the term “body broker.” 
3. Exclude Expert Legal Opinion Offered By Co-Conspirator 
The Government seeks to offer testimony of Terry Patton, a fact witness and alleged 
co-conspirator, relating to Patton’s “[undisclosed] acts covering up [Patton’s] violations of 
EKRA based on [Patton’s] understandings of the law.”  ECF No. 38 (“USA Opp’n”) at 12.  
The Government argues the testimony is relevant to “a sham contract” allegedly created 
by Patton and Defendant “for services that were never performed and where payment was 
instead based solely on the number and quality of patients … that Mr. Patton referred to 
Defendant.”  Id.   The Government confirms that Patton is a fact witness, not an expert 
witness, and that his testimony will “likely include Mr. Patton testifying that he told owners 
of rehabilitation facilities ( like Defendant) of his understanding of arrangements that 
[legally] violate EKRA.”  Id. 
Defendant objects that such testimony constitutes impermissible lay testimony under 
Rule 701(c) because it requires specialized legal knowledge and Patton has not been 
designated as an expert.  Def. MILs at 21 -23.  Defendant also objects that the proposed 
testimony, which Defendant argues is legally incorrect, violates Rule 403 because it is 
likely to confuse the issues and cause unfair prejudice.  Id. 
Defendant also objects that the Government has not identified any “acts” Patton took 
“covering up his violations of EKRA” and that the Government has not produced any 
document or good faith basis for Patton’s proffered testimony.  According to Defendant, 
the Government has had six substantive communications with Patton regarding his actions: 
five interviews and one letter Patton wrote describing True Help and his own conduct.  
Defendant represents that in four of those communications, Patton asserts he believed his 
conduct was legal at the time he was marketing for facilities.  In one of those 
communications, Patton opined that, with the benefit of hindsight, his conduct was not 
compliant with EKRA, and in one interview the Government did not ask him about t he 
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topic.  Thus, Defendant argues: 
Patton has consistently told the government that he believed he was not 
violating EKRA at the time of the conduct at issue, and he has never told 
the government that he attempted to cover anything up. If he believed at 
the time of his conduct that he was in compliance, he would have had no 
reason to take any actions covering up his conduct. It is unclear what basis 
the government has to now claim that he will testify that he ever attempted 
to cover up anything. 
ECF No. 44 (“Def. Reply”) at 10. 
Because Patton is a fact witness, the Court AGREES with Defendant that, under 
Rule 701(c), Patton is not qualified to provide any legal conclusions, regardless of whether 
that knowledge is accurate.  As a named coconspirator and fact witness, Patton can on ly 
testify as to the nature of any conspiratorial agreement with Defendant and any admissible 
evidence relating thereto.  It is neither proper nor sufficient for the Government to rely on 
a limiting instruction from the Court or the Court’s jury instructions to avoid Defendant’s 
Rule 403 concerns that such testimony would confuse the jury and to ensure that the jury 
properly understands the relevant law. 
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion, pursuant to Rules 701(c) and 
403, to prevent Patton from offering lay witness testimony relating to his understanding of 
the law. 
4. Exclude Evidence of Other Acts By Co-Conspirators 
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to exclude evidence of other acts by 
coconspirators to the extent Defendant’s motion is c onsistent with the parties’ 
representations and agreement that plea agreements can come in on direct examination to 
impeach, but not to prove Defendant’s guilt. 
5. Exclude Cross-Examination as to Unproven Prior Conduct 
If Defendant chooses to testify at trial, the Government seeks to introduce evidence 
of unspecified allegations of fraud against Defendant to impeach Defendant’s character for 
truthfulness.  
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The Court  RESERVES ruling on Defendant’s motion until trial to determine 
whether the Defendant’s testimony has opened the door to such cross-examination. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 
1. The Court RESERVES ruling on the  Government’s Motion to Admit Coconspirator 
Statements. 
2. The Government ’s Motion to Admit Properly Noticed Expert Evidence from SSA 
Stewart is GRANTED. 
3. The Court RESERVES ruling on the Government’s Motion to Admit Appropriate Lay 
Witness Evidence. 
4. The Government’s Motion to Admit Certified Business Records Under Rule 902(11) is 
GRANTED. 
5. The Government ’s Motion to Admit Intrinsic Evidence of Recorded Meeting with 
Defendant is GRANTED. 
6. The Court RESERVES ruling on the Government’s Motion to Admit Summary Charts 
of Voluminous Records. 
7. The Government’s Motion to Exclude Evidence or Argument that Insurance Plans were 
Negligent is DENIED. 
8. The Government’s Motion to Exclude Evidence or Argument Regarding Other Acts of 
Legitimate Provision of SUD Treatment or Claims to Insurers, or Other Good Acts is 
GRANTED. 
9. The Government ’s Motion to Exclude Evidence or Argument Regarding Others’ 
Culpability is GRANTED. 
10.  The Government’s Motion to Exclude the Use of Law Enforcement Summaries for 
Impeachment Purposes is GRANTED. 
11.  The Government’s Motion to Admit Evidence that Defendant Refused to Cooperate 
with a Court Order to Unlock His Phone is GRANTED. 
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12.  The Government’s Motion to Admit Evidence of Body Broker Articles is GRANTED. 
13.  Defendant’s Motion to Limit Expert Testimony of FBI SA William Stewart  is 
DENIED. 
14.  Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Use of the Term “Body Broker” is DENIED. 
15. Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Expert Legal Opinion Offered By Co -Conspirator is 
GRANTED. 
16.  Defendant’s Motion to  Exclude Evidence of Other Acts By Co-Conspirators is 
GRANTED. 
17.  The Court RESERVES ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Cross-Examination 
as to Unproven Prior Conduct.  
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: May 1, 2026 
_________________________________ 
JOHN A. HOUSTON 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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