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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 24-CV-80738-ROSENBERG

JANE DOE (E.W.),

Plaintiff,

CLASSICA CRUISE OPERATOR LTD.
d/b/a MARGARITAVILLE AT SEA,
WYNDHAM HOTELS AND RESORTS, LLC,
TMH WORLDWIDE, LLC,
WHG CARIBBEAN HOLDINGS, INC.,
CLUB VIVA INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
BARBARY BEACH DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
d/b/a VIVA FORTUNA BEACH BY WYNDHAM,
XYZ DEFENDANT(S),
and ASSAILANT 1,

Defendants.
________________________________ _________/

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant Wyndham Hotels and Resorts, LLC’s
(“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss [DE 21] Plaintiff Jane Doe (E.W.)’s Amended Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial [DE 14]. The Court has reviewed the Motion, Plaintiff’s Response [DE
28], Defendant’s Reply [DE 32], and the record and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.
For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART insofar as this case is DISMISSED for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 2, 2024, Plaintiff Jane Doe (E.W.) (“Plaintiff”) filed her Amended Complaint
against Defendants, alleging claims sounding in tort. See DE 14. The claims arise from an alleged
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rape or sexual assault that Plaintiff suff ered wh en she was a guest at Viva Fortuna Beach by
Wyndham (the “Resort”) in the Bahamas during a stopover on Plaintiff’s round-trip cruise from
West Palm Beach, Florida to the Bahamas aboard the Margaritaville at Sea Paradise ship
(“Margaritaville”). See id. ¶¶ 15–21. Plaintiff asserts causes of action “aris[ing] under the General
Maritime Law of the United States and Florida law, to the extent there is no conflict with General
Maritime Law” against Defendants. Id. ¶ 12.
Plaintiff asserts that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case based on
diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and, alternatively, based on admiralty
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333. Id. ¶ 11. Defendant argues for dismissal pursuant to the
forum non conveniens doctrine and, alternatively, as an impermissible shotgun pleading. 1 See
DE 21.
A federal court must have subject matter jurisdiction to decide cases before it, and a federal
court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.
Univ. of S. Alabama v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). The Court thus first
addresses whether this case arises under admiralty jurisdiction.
II. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
A federal court has an independent duty to ensure admiralty jurisdiction exists before
applying admiralty law. Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc. , 394 F.3d 891, 900 (11th Cir. 2004) . A
party seeking to invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction over a tort claim must satisfy a two -prong
test. See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995).
First, the activity from which the claim arises must satisfy a condition of location—that is, the tort

1 The Court rejects Defendant’s shotgun-pleading argument and concludes that no discussion on
the topic is necessary.
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must have occurred on navigable water, or the injury suffered on land must have been caused by
a vessel on navigable water. In the Matter of the Complaint for Exoneration from or Limitation of
Liability by Heritage Oaks , No. 23- CV-81197, 2013 WL 1663333 (S.D . Fla. Feb. 8, 2024)
(hereinafter Heritage Oaks) (citing Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534). Second, the activity must have a
sufficient connection with maritime activity , meaning that the general features of the incident
involved have a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce and that the general character
of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime
activity. Doe, 394 F.3d at 900 (quoting Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534).
In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff describes the events from which her claims arise as
follows. DE 14. Plaintiff was a paying passenger on the Margaritaville at Sea Paradise cruise ship,
which was a round- trip cruise between West Palm Beach, Florida and th e Bahamas that was
operated by Defendant Classica Cruise Operator Ltd. (“Classica”). Id. ¶¶ 15–18. As part of
Plaintiff’s cruise, Plaintiff alleges that Classica made shoreside hotel arrangements for Plaintiff to
stay at the Resort in the Bahamas. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff alleges that during her stay at the Resort, a
Resort employee
. . . tracked Plaintiff while she was a guest at the Resort, using his special status as
a security provider of the Resort, and when Plaintiff left her room at night to get a
drink of water, ASSAILANT 1 used his status as a security provider at the Resort
to force Plaintiff into the control room for the Resort’s theatre, locked the door, and
then raped the Plaintiff.

Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff argues that her “allegations satisfy the [admiralty] location test because this case
concerns, in part, a cruise operator’s (i.e. Classica) obligations to its passengers with respect to a
scheduled port of call.” DE 28 at 4. In support of her argument, Plaintiff principally relies on a
quotation from Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 394 F.3d 891 (11th Cir. 2004) , that reads, “Where
a passenger or cruise vessel puts into numerous ports in the course of a cruise, these stopovers are
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the sine qua non of the cruise.” Id. Plaintiff therefore argues that, pursuant to Doe, her stay at the
Resort should be considered part of her cruise over water— a basis for admiralty jurisdiction.
This Court is familiar with Doe , and it has previously explained that “ Doe involved an
extreme set of facts ,” particularly given the Eleventh Circuit’s clarification that Doe represented
“the outer boundaries of admiralty jurisdiction.” Heritage Oaks, No. 23-CV-81197 (quoting Doe,
394 F.3d at 901). In Doe, which concerned a sexual assault at a cruise’s scheduled port-of-call,
the incident passed the location test for admiralty jurisdiction because the incident “effectively
began and ended aboard the cruise ship.” 394 F.3d at 901. The Doe plaintiff had sued the cruise-
line defendants in tort, including on theories of negligence. Id. at 894. The plaintiff was a cruise-
ship passenger who asked a crewmember, assigned to wait on her table every night for the duration
of her cruise, for suggestions on a place to visit in Bermuda during a scheduled port-of-call. Id. at
897. The crewmember suggested a nearby club where cruise ship passengers and crew members
routinely socialized. Id. The crewmember and the passenger visited the club together, and after
their visit to the club, the passenger agreed to the crewmember’s offer to escort her back to the
ship, trusting him due to his status as an employee of the cruise ship. Id. at 898. On the walk back
to the ship, the crewmember sexually assaulted the passenger. Id. The Eleventh Circuit explained
in detail why the specific facts of the case passed the location test for admiralty jurisdiction:
The sexual battery occurred very close to the docked ship, and neither the victim
passenger nor the crew member left th e port-of-call or traveled any real distance
from the ship. As demonstrated by the facts of this case, when docked at the port -
of-call, the cruise ship allowed passengers to come and go from the ship as they
elected; consequently, there was little practical difference between the port-of-call
and other parts of the ship—they were, at all times, equally accessible to
passengers. Indeed, the ship literally cast a long shadow; it was close by and visible
from the [club]. It is thus not surprising that passengers and crew members routinely
went back and forth between the [club] and the ship, and routinely socialized
together at the [club].

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The necessary precursors for this sexual battery occurred while the ship was on
navigable waters; that is, it would not have occurred if the ship had not assigned
[the crewmember] to be [the passenger]’s waiter or if [the crewmember] had not
directed [the passenger]’s group to attend this particular bar within eyeshot of the
ship on that fateful night. And the incident did not end until [the crewmember] and
[the passenger] returned to the ship and parted ways.

Id. at 901–02 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff argues that her allegations satisfy the location test “because this case concerns, in
part, a cruise operator’s (i.e. Classica) obligations to its passengers with respect to a scheduled port
of call.” DE 28 at 4. But if this Court were to accept Plaintiff’s argument, virtually every activity
in a port of call would easily qualify for admiralty jurisdiction; moreover, Doe should have been
decided as an easy case. But Doe was not easily decided —the Eleventh Circuit went to great
lengths to explain why the unique, case-specific facts in Doe qualified for admiralty jurisdiction.
Here, unlike in Doe, the necessary precursors giving rise to the tort did not begin
2 aboard
a vessel on navigable waters. Doe, 394 F.3d at 901; see also Grubart , 513 U.S. at 527 (requiring
that an injury suffered on land be caused by a vessel on navigable water for admiralty jurisdiction
to lie). The underlying incident giving rise to Plaintiff’s cause of action was an alleged assault
committed on a Bahamian res ort, by a Bahamian employee of that resort , while Plaintiff was a
guest staying at that resor t. See DE 14. Plaintiff has alleged no facts indicating that, like Doe ,
“there was little practical difference between the port-of-call and other parts of the ship.” Doe, 394
F.3d at 901. Plaintiff has alleged no facts indicating that the alleged assailant had any connection
to Classica or the Margaritaville cruise. See DE 14. Plaintiff has alleged no facts indicating that
the cruise exercised any control over the Resort or the alleged assailant. Id. Plaintiff’s only

2 Plaintiff purchased and paid for her stay at the Resort while she was on land, prior to boarding,
as part of a package purchase with her ship’s ticket—not while she was over water. DE 14 ¶¶ 15–
19.
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allegations connecting the Resort to the cruise concern the fact that the cruise operator, Classica,
arranged for Plaintiff’s accommodations at the Resort as part of Plaintiff’s cruise package. Id. ¶ 19.
Pursuant to this Court’s reading of Doe, that is not sufficient.
The Court addresses one final matter on this subject. Plaintiff cites to Balaschak v. Royal
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 09- 21196-CIV, 2009 WL 8659594 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 2009), in
support of her argument that “courts have typically found that injuries suffered by cruise ship
passengers while on shore excursions are sufficient to satisfy the Grubart test and invoke admiralty
jurisdiction.” DE 28 at 4. In Balaschak, a cruise-ship-passenger plaintiff was injured in an auto
accident on a shore excursion. Balaschak, 2009 WL 8659594 at *1. Utilizing a broad reading of
Doe, the district court found that the crash on land satisfied the admiralty location test because the
shore excursion (which ultimately resulted in the crash) had been purchased by the plaintiff when
she was on the ship. See id. at *4.
But by that reasoning, almost every conceivable injury a passenger incurs on shore would
qualify for admiralty jurisdiction, and this Court does not read Doe that broadly. Instead, the
Eleventh Circuit rationalized its reasoning in Doe on the principle that “the standard of care that
governs when a cruise line’s crew member assaults a passenger should be uniform and not vary
from port to port on a single cruise,” and it was therefore important to the Eleventh Circuit that the
injury had been inflicted by a crew member, and not by some other person such as a citizen of the
country of the port of call. See Doe, 394 F.3d at 902. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit treated the
location of the injury in Doe as being on the ship itself , stating that “there was little practical
difference between the port -of-call and other parts of the ship . . . .” Id. at 901. This Court does
not view the Resort in the instant case as “being on the ship itself” and, unlike the trial court in
Balaschak, this Court does not r ead Doe so broadly as to encompass any injury that flows from
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the decision to leave the ship. Stated differently, if the assault by a crew member on land in Doe
did, in the Eleventh Circuit’s own words, “represent the outer boundaries of admiralty jurisdiction
over torts,” the assault in this case is outside of those boundaries. Id.
Because her claim does not satisfy the location test, Plaintiff has not met her burden as the
party seeking to invoke jurisdiction, and admiralty jurisdiction does not apply. This Court next
addresses the question of diversity jurisdiction.
III. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
Because admiralty jurisdiction does not apply, diversity of citizenship is the sole basis for
federal subject matter jurisdiction in this case. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). “Diversity jurisdiction
requires complete diversity; every plaintiff must be diverse from every defendant.” Triggs v. John
Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998). To determine diversity jurisdiction,
“a limited liability company is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a
citizen.” Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th
Cir. 2004). A corporation is considered a citizen of every state in which it has been incorporated
and where it has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); Flintlock Const. Servs.,
LLC v. Well-Come Holdings, LLC, 710 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2013).
Here, Plaintiff has sued Defendant TMH Worldwide, LLC (“TMH”), which Plaintiff states
“is a business entity incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in N ew Jersey
. . . .” DE 14 ¶ 5. Because TMH is a limited liability company and because Plaintiff has made no
allegations concerning the citizenship of each of TMH’s members, Plaintiff has not adequately
pled complete diversity.
Because neither admiralty nor diversity jurisdiction have been adequately pled, this Court
orders this case dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) due to lack of subject matter
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jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED AND AD JUDGED that Defendant
Wyndham Hotel and Resorts, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss [DE 21] is GRANTED IN PART insofar
as Plaintiff Jane Doe (E.W.)’s Amended Complaint [DE 14] is DISMISSED for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. All other requests for relief in the Motion [DE 21] are DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE and all other pending motions to dismiss [DE 37, 38] are DENIED AS MOOT.
Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint on or before September 23, 2024. To the extent
multiple Defendants elect to respond to the amended complaint with a motion in lieu of an answer,
the Defendants must confer and file a single, consolidated motion. The Court also requires that in
any future motion to dismiss or motion to transfer based on forum non conveniens, the movant(s)
must fully brief the implications of Plaintiff’s forum selection clause with Classica on the other
Defendants and in the forum non conveniens analysis.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers , West Palm Beach , Florida, this 16th day of
September, 2024.

_______________________________
ROBIN L. ROSENBERG
Copies furnished to Counsel of Record UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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