govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-1_24-cv-20888-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
 
Case No. 1:24-cv-20888-KMM 
 
RAZIEL OFER, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
STEPHEN T. MILLAN, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
                                                                               / 
 
ORDER 
 
 THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon  the following motions: (1) Defendants Steven 
E. Gurian (“Gurian”), Marin, Eljaiek, Lopez & Martinez, P.L. (“Marin Law Firm”), Eric Schigiel 
(“Schigiel”), and Opustone’s Motion to Dismiss (“Gurian Motion”) (ECF No. 88); (2) Defendants 
AJAR Holdings, LLC (“AJAR Holdings”), Stuart R. Kalb (“Kalb”), Stephen T. Millan (“Millan”), 
Millan Law Firm PA ( “Millan Law Firm”), Roniel Rodriguez IV (“Rodriguez”), and  Roniel 
Rodriguez IV, PA (“Rodriguez Law Firm”)’s Motion to Dismiss (“First Rodriguez Motion”) (ECF 
No. 93); (3) AJAR Holdings, Kalb,  Millan, the Millan Law Firm, Rodriguez, and the Rodriguez 
Law Firm’s Second Motion to Dismiss (“Second Rodriguez Motion”) (ECF No. 95); (4) Defendant 
Santiago Eljaiek, III (“Eljaiek”)’s Motion to Dismiss ( “Eljaiek Motion”) (ECF No. 100); and (5) 
Pro se Plaintiff Raziel Ofer’s Motion Requesting Hearing or, Alternatively, a Report and 
Recommendation (“Motion for Hearing”)  (ECF No. 119).  The Court referred the matter to  the 
Honorable Marty Fulgueira Elfenbein, who issued a Report and Recommendation recommending 
that the Gurian Motion, First Rodriguez Motion, and Eljaiek Motion be GRANTED, the Second 
Rodriguez Motion be DENIE D, and the Motion for Hearing be DENIED AS MOOT.  (“R&R”) 
(ECF No. 121).  Plaintiff filed Objections to the R&R.   (“Objs.”) (ECF No. 126).  Defendants 
Gurian, Marin Law Firm, Schigiel, and Opustone filed a joint Response to the Objections.  (ECF 
No. 129).  Defendants AJAR Holdings, Kalb, Rodriguez, and Rodriguez Law Firm also filed a 
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joint Response to the Objections.  (ECF No. 130).  The matter is now ripe for review.  As set forth 
below, the Court ADOPTS the R&R. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This case stems from the allegedly improper sale and resulting contested ownership of two 
buildings in Miami Beach  located at 1560 and 1568 Drexel Avenue (the “Drexel Buildings ”).  
R&R at 3; (“SAC”) (ECF No. 76) at 4–5.  Prior to March 2021, the Drexel Buildings were owned 
by corporate entity(ies) of which Plaintiff owned or was a member of.1  See R&R at 3; SAC at 23–
27.  In March 2021, pursuant to a Fl orida state court order,  the Miami -Dade County Sheriff 
conducted a judicial sale (“Sheriff’s Sale”) of Plaintiff’s membership interests in the corporate 
entity(ies) that owned the Drexel Buildings, which were purchased by Defendant AJAR Holdings 
for $5.00.  See R&R at 32, 36, 41; SAC at 16–17.  Plaintiff alleges that the Drexel Buildings are 
valued at over $40 million  and that the y were wrongly taken from him by Defendant AJAR  
Holdings along with the other Defendants.  R&R at 3; SAC at 4.  
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that beginning in March 2019, all the Defendants “conspired 
to knowingly and intentionally commit extrinsic fraud” . . . “in order to obtain a money judgment 
against Plaint iff O fer which Defendant (s) then utilized to steal [the Drexe l Buildings] ” from 
Plaintiff.  SAC at 4–5.  Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants intentionally violated the terms 
of an April 8, 2021  settlement agreement regarding a related state court lawsuit , in an effort to 
further deprive Plaintiff of the Drexel Buildings and their monetary benefits.  R&R at 3.   
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that he still owns a construction lien and a leasehold interest on the 
 
1 As Magistrate Judge Elfenbein notes, based on conflicting allegations in the SAC, it is uncle ar 
exactly which corporate entity(ies) owned the Drexel Buildings  at this time .  R&R at 32, n. 7.   
Plaintiff alleges that on November 3, 2020 , ownership of the Drexel Buildings was transferred 
from 1560/1568 Drexel LLC to DRO 15R LLC.  SAC at 24.  Next, Plaintiff alleges that by March 
2021, ownership of the Drexel Buildings had been transferred from 1560/1568 Drexel LLC  to 
3003 Indian Creek LLC.  Id. at 27.  Next, Plaintiff alleges that in March 2021, 1560/1568 Drexel 
LLC still owned the Drexel Buildings.  Id. at 28.   
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Drexel Buildings, and Defendants AJAR Holdings, Kalb, Rodriguez, and Rodriguez Law Firm 
have failed to pay Plaintiff anything toward what he is owed.  Id.   
On March 6, 2024, Plaintiff initiated the instant Action, see (ECF No. 1), and on August 
15, 2024, Plaintiff filed his pro se Second Amended Complaint (Corrected).  See generally SAC.  
The SAC asserts six claims: (1) conversion (Count I); unjust enrichment (Count II); theft (Count 
III); leasehold enforcement (Count IV); ejectment (Count V); and breach of contract (count VI).   
See id. at 27–41.  Plaintiff brings Counts I, II, and III against all eleven Defendants based on their 
alleged theft of the Drexel Buildings from Plaintiff .  Id. at 27–33.  Plaintiff brings Counts IV, V, 
and VI against Defendants AJAR Holdings, Kalb, Rodriguez, and Rodriguez Law Firm  based on 
Defendants allegedly failing to pay Plaintiff what he is owed on the construction lien and leasehold 
interest on the Drexel Buildings, in addition to failing to deliver Plaintiff possession of the Drexel 
Buildings.  Id.    
 In response, Defendants filed the Gurian Motion, First Rodriguez Motion, Eljaiek Motion, 
and the Second Rodriguez Motion  (collectively, the “Motions to Dismiss”) seeking dismissal of 
all counts in the SAC.  The Gurian Motion and Eljaiek Motion seek dismissal for failure to state a 
claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) , the First Rodriguez Motion seeks 
dismissal for lack of standing pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure 
to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil P rocedure 12(b)(6), and the Second Rodriguez 
Motion seeks dismissal based on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine .  See (ECF Nos. 88, 93, 95, 
100).    
On January 15, 2025, Magistrate Judge Elfenbein issued an R&R on Defendants’ Motions 
to Dismiss and Plaintiff’s Motion for Hearing, recommending that the Court: (1) grant the Gurian 
Motion, First Rodriguez Motion, and Eljaiek Motion; (2) deny the Second Rodriguez Motion; and 
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(3) deny as moot Plaintiff’s Motion  for Hearing .  See generally  R&R.  Plaintiff objects to 
Magistrate Judge Elfenbein’s findings.  See generally Objs.   
II. LEGAL STANDARD  
The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.  28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).  
The Court “must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been 
properly objected to.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).  A de novo review is therefore required if a party 
files “a proper, specific objection” to a factual finding contained in the report.  Macort v. Prem, 
Inc., 208 F. App’x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006) .  “It is critical that the objection be sufficiently 
specific and not a general objection to the report” to warrant de novo review.  Id. 
Yet when a party has failed to object or has not properly objected to the magistrate judge’s 
findings, “the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the re cord in 
order to accept the recommendation.”  See Keaton v. United States, No. 14-21230-CIV, 2015 WL 
12780912, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 4, 2015); see also Lopez v. Berryhill, No. 17-CV-24263, 2019 WL 
2254704, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2019) (stating that a dis trict judge “evaluate[s] portions of the 
R & R not objected to under a clearly erroneous standard of review” (citing Davis v. Apfel, 93 F. 
Supp. 2d 1313, 1317 (M.D. Fla. 2000))). 
III. DISCUSSION  
As set forth in  the R&R, Magistrate Judge Elfenbein finds that th e claims against 
Defendants should be dismissed because: (1) Plaintiff does not have standing to bring his claims; 
(2) even if Plaintiff has standing, the equitable doctrines of Rooker-Feldman and issue preclusion 
bar the claims as to Defendants; (3) e ven if Plaintiff has standing and the equitable doctrines of 
Rooker-Feldman and issue preclusion do not apply, Plaintiff fails to properly plead claims upon 
which relief can be granted.  R&R at 32–43.  
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 First, Magistrate Judge Elfenbein finds that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring his 
claims because Plaintiff has not suffered the kind of concrete injury required to establish Article 
III standing.  See id. at 32–35.  Specifically, Magistrate Judge Elfenbein finds that Plaintiff does 
not have standing to bring his conversion (Count I), unjust enrichment (Count II), and theft (Count 
III) claims against Defendants because: (1) corporate entity(ies), not Plaintiff, owned the Drexel 
Buildings when they were sold, and as such, Plaintiff did not suffer an injury based on the Sheriff’s 
Sale of the Drexel Buildings; and (2) Plaintiff, as an alleged shareholder of the entity (ies) that 
owned the Drexel Buildings,  has failed to allege an injury that would support standing for a 
derivative claim on behalf o f the corporate entity(ies).  Id. at 32–33.  Further, Magistrate Judge 
Elfenbein finds that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring his leasehold enforcement (Count 
IV), ejectment (Count V) , and breach of contract (count VI)  claims against Defendants AJAR 
Holdings, Kalb, Rodriguez, and Rodriguez Law Firm  because: (1) as with Counts I, II, and III, 
Plaintiff did not suffer an inj ury when the Drexel Buildings were sold because Plaintiff did not 
own the Drexel Buildings then and does not own them now; and (2) Plaintiff’s other arguable basis 
for standing to bring his claims , based on his allegation s that he owns a construction lien and 
leasehold interest on the Drexel Buildings, has already been conclusively decided against him  in 
Plaintiff’s 2022 federal bankruptcy action.  Id. at 33–35; see In re DRO 15R LLC , 649 B.R. 216, 
233–36 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2022).   
 Plaintiff generally objects to Magistrate Judge Elfenbein’s findings that Plaintiff does not 
have standing to bring Counts I, II, and III against all Defendants, and Counts IV, V, and VI against 
Defendants AJAR Holdings, Kalb, Rodriguez, and Rodriguez Law Firm.  See Objs. 2–7.  As best 
the Court can tell, Plaintiff raises one specific, primary objection to the R&R’s recommendation 
that the claims against Defendants should be dismissed because Plaintiff lacks standing.  See id.  
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 Plaintiff co ntends that Magis trate Judge Elfenbein failed to appreciate that Plaintiff’s 
claims are “separate and distinct from the entities which owned the [Drexel Buildings]” at the time 
of the Sheriff’s Sale.2  Id. at 6.  Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that he “suffered an injury separate 
and distinct from the entities which owned the [Drexel Buildings]” because Plaintiff personally 
has a “multitude of liens . . . recorded against the [Drexel Buildings] ” to recoup the “millions of 
dollars in renovation funds and the funds he personally invested” in the property.  Id.  Additionally, 
Plaintiff states that he  has personal “assignments of the right to collect income from the [Drexel 
Buildings].”  Id.  However, Plaintiff’s objection disregards Magistrate Judge Elfenbein’s detailed 
consideration of Plaintiff’s alleged personal construction lien and leasehold interest on the Drexel 
Buildings.  See R&R at 34–35. 
Magistrate Judge Elfenbein explains that the issue of whether Plaintiff owns a valid lien or 
leasehold interest on the Drexel Buildings was already adjudicated against  Plaintiff by Ju dge 
Isicoff in Plaintiff’s 2022 federal bankruptcy action .  See id.; In re DRO 15R LLC , 649 B.R. at 
233.  As Magistrate Judge Elfenbein explains, Judge Isicoff held that “the construction contract 
that purportedly supported the lien and granted the leasehold was ‘not a legitimate document’ and 
was instead ‘manufactured.’”  Id. at 34 (quoting  In re DRO 15R LLC , 649 B.R. at 233).  
Additionally, Judge Isicoff hel d that “as evidenced by documents executed by Plaintiff or his 
corporate entity’s authorized agent, ‘all claims of lien against the ’ Drexel [B]uildings ‘had been 
satisfied.’”  Id. (quoting In re DRO 15R LLC, 649 B.R. at 233–34).  As Magistrate Judge Elfenbein 
explains, the Court must give conclusive effect to these holdings based on the equitable doctrine 
of issue preclusion, and accordingly, Plaintiff “has not been injured by a deprivation of a lien or 
 
2 Plaintiff acknowledges that corporate entity(ies), not him, owned the Drexel Buildings at the time 
of the Sheriff’s Sale and does not allege that he is attempting to bring a derivative action on the 
corporate entity(ies) behalf.  Id. at 6.  
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leasehold interest in a way that confers standing .”  Id. (citing B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis 
Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 147 (2015)).3   
Upon independent review, t he Court agrees with  Magistrate Judge Elfenbein ’s well -
reasoned analysis that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring the six claims alleged in the SAC, 
and therefore, the Gurian Motion, First Rodriguez Motion, and Eljaiek Motion’s must be granted, 
and Plaintiff’s claims must be dis missed.  Additionally, the Court notes that the R&R provides a 
thorough, comprehensive analysis of why , i f the Court f ound that Plaintiff d id have standing, 
Plaintiff’s claims must still be dismissed based on the equitable doctrines of Rooker-Feldman and 
issue preclusion  and because Plaintiff fails to properly plead claims upon which relief can be 
granted.  See R&R at 35–43.  However, because the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Elfenbein 
that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring his claims, the Court need not address these additional grounds 
for dismissal.  See Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1977).  
Regarding the Second Rodriguez Motion, Magistrate Judge Elfenbein recommends that it 
be denied.  R&R at 39–40.  In the Second Rodriguez Motion, Defendants AJAR Holdings, Kalb, 
Millan, Millan Law Firm, Rodriguez, and Rodriguez Law Firm argue that Plaintiff’s SAC should 
be dismissed based on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.  Id. at 8.  Defendants AJAR Holdings, 
Kalb, Millan, Millan Law Firm, Rodriguez, and Rodriguez Law Firm filed the Second Rodriguez 
Motion on the same day, but separately from, the First Rodriguez Motion.  Id. at 8; (ECF Nos. 93, 
95).  Magistrate Judge Elfenbein explains that pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g), 
a party that has previously filed a motion to dismiss is prohibited “‘from filing a second pre-answer 
motion to dismiss raising an omitted defense that could have been presented in the first motion to 
 
3 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Objections are filled with various conspiracy theories regarding 
Judge Isicoff, but Plaintiff fails to raise any cognizable arguments as to how Plaintiff’s “multitude 
of liens” and “assignments” confer standing giv en Judge Isicoff’s findings in Plaintiff ’s federal 
bankruptcy action.  See id. at 6–7.  
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dismiss.’”  R &R at 39 ( quoting Skrtich v. Thornton , 280 F.3d 1295, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002), 
overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)).   
Here, Magistrate Judge Elfenbein explains that because Defendants AJAR Holdings, Kalb, 
Millan, Millan Law Firm, Rodriguez, and Rodriguez Law Firm  could have raised their fugitive 
disentitlement doctrine argument in the First Rodriguez Motion  and because the argument does 
not fall into one of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(2) or (3) exceptions, the Court cannot 
consider the  Second Rodriguez Motion.  Id. at 39 –40; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (g), (h)(2)-(3).  
Defendants AJAR Holdings, Kalb, Millan, Millan Law Firm, Rodriguez, and Rodriguez Law Firm 
did not object to the R&R.  The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Elfenbein’s recommendation 
that the Second Rodriguez Motion be denied.  
Accordingly, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Elfenbein’s thorough and well -reasoned 
R&R.  Additionally, dismissal with prejudice is warranted here as Plaintiff has already been given 
two opportunities to amend his complaint, and any further amendment would be futile given that 
Plaintiff did not own the Drexel Buildings at the time of the Sheriff’s Sale and the issue of whether 
Plaintiff held a valid construction lien or le asehold interest on the Drexel Buildings has already 
been conclusively decided against him .  See Cornelius v. Bank of Am., NA , 585 Fed. Appx. 996, 
1000 (11th Cir. 2014).     
IV. CONCLUSION 
UPON CONSIDERATION of the R&R , the Objections,  the Motion s to Dismiss , the 
pertinent portions of th e record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the R&R (ECF No. 121) is ADOPTED.  The Gurian Motion, 
First Rodriguez Motion, and Eljaiek Motion are GRANTED.  (ECF Nos. 88, 93, 100).  The Second 
Rodriguez Motion is DENIED.  (ECF No. 95).   Plaintiff’s Motion for Hearing is DENIED AS 
MOOT.  (ECF No. 119).   Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Corrected) (ECF No. 76) is 
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DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.  All other pending motions  are DENIED AS MOOT.   The 
Clerk of Court is INSTRUCTED to CLOSE this case.     
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this ___ ___ day of February, 
2025. 
K. MICHAEL MOORE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
c: All counsel of record 
Raziel Ofer, PRO SE 
3701 Degarmo Ln 
Miami, FL 33133 
646-431-7934
Raz.Ofer2@gmail.com
26th
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