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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 24-CV-80395-ROSENBERG

GREENFLIGHT VENTURE
CORPORATION & JEFFREY
D. ISAACS, MD,

Plaintiffs,

GOOGLE LLC,

Defendant.
/

ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at docket entry
62. The Motion has been fully briefed. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.
I. INTRODUCTION
To better explain its ruling to the parties and to provide a good record for appellate review,
the Court commonly begins lengthy orders with an introduction. The purpose of the introduction
is to generally answer the question: What is this case about? Here , the answer to that question is
somewhat complicated. Briefly stated, this case is about a web developer alleging that Google—
the Defendant—has violated federal antitrust laws. But in the C ourt’s judgment, the best way to
introduce its decision is to attempt a narrative summary of the events that gave rise to this case,
even though the events may initially seem irrelevant.
Plaintiff Jeffrey Isaacs initiated this case pro se, and the Complaint contained a detailed
summary of the historical events in Mr. Isaacs’s life. Mr. Isaacs previously studied in the field of
medicine, but at some point he lost the ability to pursue a career in that field. DE 1 at 1. Why Mr.
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Isaacs was prevented from pursuing medicine is unclear in the pleadings, but Mr. Isaacs describes
the basis as including “false disciplinary records” at a California universit y, and he also cites to
prior federal litigation on that topic. Id. at 5; DE 61 at 19. In that federal litigation, 1 Mr. Isaacs
alleged that the dean of his school of medicine was corrupt. Isaacs v. USC Keck School of
Medicine, No. 19-CV-8000, DE 1 at 2 (C.D. Cal. Se pt. 16, 2019). Accord ing to Mr. Isaacs,
litigation over those allegations of corruption spanned almost two decades and resulted in a
settlement agreement. DE 1 at 5; DE 61 at 19 . Mr. Isaacs subsequently alleged in federal court
that the university violated th e settlement agreement by leaking the details of his eventual
expulsion to third parties. Isaacs v. USC Keck School of Medicine, 846 F. App’x 519, 520 (2021).
The district court dismissed Mr. Isaacs’ claims against the university (and his related claims against
the board of medicine) and awarded attorn ey’s fees and costs to the defendants. Isaacs, 19-CV-
8000 at DE 93, 112. Mr. Isaacs app ealed to the Ninth Circuit, a nd the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Isaacs, 846 F. App’x at 520.
How does prior litigation connect to the case before the Court? In this case, Mr. Isaacs
alleges that Google learned about the litigation surrounding his inability to practice medicine. DE
1 at 6-7; DE 61 at 21. He also alleges th at Google used that knowledge to harm him. Id. The
Court will discuss the allegations and claims pertaining to Google in greater detail below, but the
Court first turns to what Mr. Isaacs did (pursuan t to his own allegations) after discontinuing his
pursuit of a career in medicine.

1 For the purposes of providing back ground information, the Court takes j udicial notice of the cases Mr. Isaacs
references in his original Complaint and operative Second Amended Complaint, Isaacs v. USC Keck School of
Medicine, 846 F. App’x 519 (2021) and Isaacs v. USC Keck School of Medicine , No. 19-CV-8000 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
16, 2019). See, e.g., Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc. , 187 F.3d 1271, 1276-78 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that courts may
take judicial notice at the motion to dismiss stage); Reed v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1354
(S.D. Fla. 2022) (noting that a court may consider documents referenced in a complaint).
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Mr. Isaacs turned to the fiel d of internet technology. DE 1 at 6; DE 62 at 20. He invented
a “corona virus tracking app.” Id. When Mr. Isaacs submitted th e app to Apple for sale, Apple
rejected it on the grounds that any application involving COVI D-19 had to be authored by a
recognized health entity or medical institution. Id.; Isaacs v. Apple, Inc. , No. 21-CV-5567 at 3
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2021). In response, Mr. Isaacs filed a federal antitrust lawsuit against Apple.
Id. The trial judge dismissed the first complaint with pr ejudice and also denied leave to amend,
noting that Mr. Isaacs’ counsel (who is also counsel in the case before this Court) had filed at least
eight similar complaints against Apple across various jurisdictions. Isaacs, 21-CV-5567, DE 85.
Mr. Isaacs appealed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Isaacs v. Apple, Inc., 85 F.4th 948 (2023).
Like the litigation about Mr. Isaacs’ medical credentials, Mr. Isaacs alleges in the case
before this Court that Google le arned about the litigation with A pple, and that Google used that
information to harm him. DE 61 at 20. In th e Court’s recounting of th e narrative underpinning
this case, however, it is still not time to talk about Google. Instead, the Court turns to Mr. Isaacs’
other activities in the field of internet technology.
Mr. Isaacs obtained a patent for “reverse phone search technology.” Id. at 2. As the Court
understands it, Mr. Isaacs’ patent allowed for a us er to input a phone numbe r into an application
and learn the identity of the caller. See id. at 2-3. After Mr. Isaacs contended that another reverse
phone search company—Whitepages—was infringing upon his patent, Whitep ages filed suit to
invalidate Mr. Isaacs’ patent. Whitepages, Inc. v. Isaacs, No. 16-CV-175 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2016).
The trial court agreed, granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of Whitepages, and invalidated
Mr. Isaacs’ patent. Id. at DE 48. Mr. Isaacs appealed, and the Federal Circuit affirmed.
Whitepages, Inc. v. Greenflight Venture Corp., 698 F. App’x 613, 614 (2017). Mr. Isaacs initially
filed his suit in this Court on the premise that Google was infringing upon his invalidated patent
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and upon claims that the United States Patent and Trademark Office refused to reissue. See DE 16
at 13. After this Court twice dismissed Mr. Is aacs’ patent infringement claims, however, Mr.
Isaacs abandoned the claims. DE 61. One final topic remains before the Court turns to a discussion
of Mr. Isaacs’ remaining, active claims against Google: how the case before this Court (as a matter
of procedural history) came to be.
Mr. Isaacs recently entered into a c ontract to sell his home in Florida. Isaacs v. Keller
Williams Realty, Inc. , 23-CV-81393 at page 2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2024). Mr. Isaacs refused to
close on the sale, however, “due to the war in Ukraine.” Id. In light of the failure to close, Mr.
Isaacs’ realtor sued for commissi on in Florida state court. Id. In response to that lawsuit, Mr.
Isaacs filed a lawsuit in federal court, assigned to the undersigned, where he sued his realtor for
violating the Racketeer Influenced Corrupting Organization Act, or RICO. Id. at DE 1. However,
Mr. Isaacs issued a subpoena (through his current c ounsel) not to the realtor or any party related
to the real estate transaction, but to Google. Isaacs v. Keller Williams Realty, Inc., 24-MC-80086
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 2024). Mr. Isaacs’ basis for the subpoena was that he was forced to keep his
home (and not sell) because Google had wronged him. See 23-CV-81393 at DE 117, page 2.
Google filed a motion to quash the subpoena in California federal court, which was in turn
transferred to this District and assigned to the undersigned. While litigation over the propriety of
the subpoena was pending, Mr. Isaacs filed the suit before this Court against Google, alleging that
Google was infringing upon his patent. DE 1.
While Mr. Isaacs was litigating the validity of his patent pro se in this case, two things
happened to fundamentally alter the litigation. First, Google put Mr. Isaacs on notice that the only
party with standing to sue over the patent was Mr. Isaacs’ solely owned entity—Greenflight
Venture Corporation—and that a corporation can only be represented by counsel. Second, Google
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lost (at the trial level) in an anti trust case brought by the United States. United States v. Google
LLC, No. 20-CV-03010, DE 1033 at 6-7 (D.C. Aug. 5, 2024).2 As a result, Mr. Isaacs retained the
same counsel he used in prior litigation, and that counsel filed antitrust claims against Google on
behalf of Greenflight, citing the United States v. Google case as precedent and calling his claims
“verbatim” copies of that litiga tion. Because Mr. Isaacs later abandoned his patent claims,
however, this case is limited to antitrust. The Court now turns to Mr. Isaacs’ allegations against
Google.
Around the time Mr. Isaacs obtained his patent but before the patent was invalidated, Mr.
Isaacs created the website “OkCaller.” DE 61 at 10-20. OkCaller used the technology described
in the patent—it allowed users to reverse lookup phone numbers. Id. During the early years of its
inception, OkCaller received millions of views. Id. at 15-16. At some point in the year 2017,
OkCaller’s views began to decline. Id. at 15. In late 2022, OkCaller’ s views dropped to zero, or
near zero. See id. at 17.
Mr. Isaacs attributes this pr ecipitous drop in views to G oogle learning about his medical
license litigation and his litigation with Apple. Id. at 20. Once Google obtained that knowledge,
Mr. Isaacs alleges, Google felt threatened and used its monopolistic power to retaliate against Mr.
Isaacs by reducing the flow of internet traffic to OkCaller. See id. at 19-22.
This is therefore an ant itrust case, brought by a reve rse phone number lookup website
against Google. But to bring an antitrust claim against one of the largest internet companies in the
world is no small thing. As the Court explained in a prior order of dismissal, case law limits who
can bring antitrust claims. DE 53 at 2-4. Broadly summarized, because the Plaintiffs (both

2 It is of course possible that it is a coincidence that Google lost an antitrust case eight days before Mr. Isaacs brought
his own antitrust claims against Google.
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Greenflight and Mr. Isaacs) did not plausibly allege that Greenflight was a competitor3 to Google,
the Court previously dismissed the Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims. See id. at 19.
This Order analyzes the lega l sufficiency of Gr eenflight’s final am ended pleading, the
Second Amended Complaint. The central questi on is whether OkCaller—which is owned by
Greenflight—can bring an antitrust claim against Google, with Mr. Isaacs’ litigious past serving
as the backdrop to substantiate Google’s intent to harm. The Court answers that question in the
negative; for the same reasons th e Court dismissed Greenflight’s an titrust claims in the past, the
Court does so again.
II. ANALYSIS
The Court begins its analysis with (A) a procedural ruling on the content of Greenflight’s
response to Google’s motion to dismiss. The C ourt subsequently analyzes Google’s motion to
dismiss on a count-by-count basis (B) – (F). The Court then enters (G) an order to show cause to
Mr. Isaacs and addresses (H) its denial of further leave to amend.
For ease of discussion in this Order, the Court considers Greenf light to be synonymous
with OkCaller.
A. Greenflight’s Response to the Motion to Dismiss
The Court has entered three prior orders dismis sing Plaintiffs’ claims in this case, giving
the Court sufficient opportunity to review substantial motion practice. DE 26, 53, 58. Based upon
that review, the Court makes one broad observation. Google consistently makes focused, targeted
arguments on what Google contends are legal insufficiencies in the Plaintiffs’ pleadings.

3 To clarify, this is not an antitrust case about a customer of Google. Instead, this is a case about an alleged competitor
of Google. Greenflight repeatedly refe rs to itself as a competitor (using the word 28 times in the Second Amended
Complaint) and it also relies upon a recent antitrust case that focused on Google’s competitors. E.g., DE 63 at 8 (“The
SAC alleges that OkCaller is not merely a passive recipien t of traffic, but a prospective or nascent competitor in
general search if provided fair access to indexing data.”). Recent cases in other courts have highlighted how difficult
it would be for customers of Google search (which is free) to bring antitrust claims. See Arcell v. Google LLC , No.
22-CV-02499 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2024).
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Greenflight’s response to Google’s focused arguments is consistently an incoherent collection of
technical jargon and legal phrases.4 In the Court’s opinion, Greenflight’s response is so incoherent
that Greenflight has failed to meet its obligation to respond to the cogent points raised in Google’s
motion. Under the Local Rules of this District, a failure to refute means that the respondent has
waived a defense. See Carter v. BPCL Mgmt. , No. 19-cv-60887, 2021 WL 7502562, at *1 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 22, 2021) (holding that failure to refu te opposing arguments “ope rates as a waiver of
those arguments and is akin to a failure to respond”); Sanz v. Am. Soc’y of Composers &
Publishers, No. 18-cv-24504, 2019 WL 13237013, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2019) (finding that a
plaintiff “effectively conceded” a claim when he “chose not to address” the defendant’s arguments
on that claim in a motion to dismiss). Below, the Court sets forth a concrete example of
Greenflight’s failure to respond.
As will be discussed in greater detail, Googl e argues that Greenflight has failed to plead
that it competes in the same market as Googl e—the general sear ch services market. The Court
would expect that Greenflight, in its response, would either (i) concede it has not pled the same or
(ii) identify where, in its pleading, that it has alleged it directly competes with Google. Greenflight
does neither. Instead, Greenflight responds in part with the following argument:
Plaintiffs, as direct users of Google’ s Webmaster Tools (GWT) and overall GSE
services, plead that they have no meaningf ul alternative for distribution, making
them effectively consumers of Google’s platform. Even if they are not themselves
offering general search querying, they suffe r inextricably intertwined injury from
Google’s alleged manipulation and self-p referencing. Because market power in
GSE allows Google to withhold or de grade distribution, the alleged harm—
OkCaller’s dramatic traffic decline—flows directly from conduct in that market.

The Supreme Court in Brown Shoe recognized that market definition and the effects
of alleged monopolistic behavior often i nvolve intricate factual inquiries (e.g.,
cross-elasticities of demand, distribution channels , barriers to entry). Here,
Plaintiffs’ theory rests on facts—such as behind-the-scenes ranking changes, data

4 The Court previously observed and referenced the Plaintiff’s use of incoherent jargon in a prior order of dismissal.
DE 53 at 13.
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indexing decisions, exclusive default agr eements, and new to the SAC – whether
GWT is part of the GSE platform.

DE 63 at 7-8 (case citations omitted). The Court simply cannot discern what this text is intended
to convey—how the text refutes Google’s cogent argument. Notably, the quoted text contains no
citations to Greenflight’s Second Amended Complaint. That is the case for most of Greenflight’s
response—pleading citations are scarce—and when Greenflight does provide a citation, the Court
fails to see how the cited allegation is responsive to Google’s arguments.
The Court’s discussion on this topic is not intended to malign or impugn Greenflight or
Greenflight’s counsel; antitrust is a complex area of the law, and it can be a difficult task to clearly
communicate antitrust legal principles to the Court. The Court’s discussion on this topic is instead
intended to explain its conclusion, referenced below in its analysis,
5 that Greenflight has failed to
substantively respond to various arguments raised by Google in its motion to dismiss.
B. Count I, styled as “Maintaining Monopoly of General Search Engines in Violation of
Sherman Act § 2 (DOJ Verbatim Cause of Action)”

Greenflight’s first count seeks to hold Google liable in antitrust for maintaining a monopoly
in the market of “general search engine services.” DE 61 at 44. According to Greenflight, general
search engine services “enable users to retr ieve responsive informa tion from the internet by
entering keyword queries.” Id. at 27. A key characteristic of these services is that a user can search
for essentially anything. See id. Also according to Greenflight, th ere is no substitute for general
search engine services. Id. Example general search engine services are Google, Bing, and
DuckDuckGo. Id.

5 The Court’s conclusion that Greenf light’s response is non-responsive is limited to Count I and Count II.
Greenflight’s responses as to Counts II I through V are at least sufficiently cl ear that the Court believes Greenflight
has complied with the Local Rules.
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For Greenflight to bring an antitrust clai m against Google for a monopoly in the general
search engine services market, Greenflight must be a market participant (here, a competitor) in
that market. Fla. Seed Co., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 105 F.3d 1372, 1374 (11th Cir. 1997). Just like
Google’s prior motion to dismiss, Google argues in the present motion to dismiss that Greenflight
has not plausibly alleged that it is a competitor in the general search engine services market.
Greenflight’s Second Amended Complaint doe s contain the words: “Plaintiffs are
competitors [with Google].” DE 61 at 44. But that is a legally conclusory allegation that is not
accepted as true at the motion to dismiss stage. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (“[C]ourts ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conc lusion couched as a factual
allegation.’” (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986))). What Greenflight must do
is allege sufficient facts such that this Court may conclude that Greenflight’s claim is plausible on
its face. E.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
On this point, Google’s moti on to dismiss is persuasive . OkCaller merely returns
information about a phone number. DE 61 at 4-5. OkCaller does not allow a user to search for,
essentially, anything. Google therefore argues that Greenflight has failed to allege any facts upon
which this Court could find that Gr eenflight may plausibly be inferred to be a competitor in the
general search engine services market.
Greenflight’s answer to this point, as discus sed above in Section A, is sufficiently
incoherent to be non-responsive. For that reason alone, Google’s motion is due to be granted. The
Court has nonetheless endeavored to make its best guess why Green flight contends that it has
plausibly alleged it is a competitor in the market of general search engines. The Court’s best guess
is that Greenflight relies upon four theories.
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First, Greenflight alleges that it is a competitor with Google because it makes use of certain
tools that Google provides called “Google webmaster tools.” Id. at 27, 28. Based upon that
allegation, Greenflight argues, “Plaintiffs, as direct users of Google’s Webmaster Tools and overall
GSE services, plead that they have no meaningful alternative for distribution, making them
effectively consumers of Google’ s platform.” DE 63 at 6. But this is not a case about the
webmaster tools market—Greenflight has chosen to allege that Google has a monopoly in general
search services. The Court fails to s ee how Greenflight’s use of a tool that influences6 Google’s
search engine renders Greenflight a plausible competitor in the area of general search services.
Second, Greenflight alleges that it is a competitor with Google because of “[proposed] DOJ
and [active] EU regulations to permit competing developers access to Googlebot data.” DE 61 at
44. If what Greenflight means is that governmental regulations allow for it to access Google data,
that fact does not transform OkCaller from a reverse phone lookup service to a general search
engine service. After all, Greenflight also alleges the commonsense observation that to become a
general search engine (like Google) a company must possess “significant capital, highly complex
technology, access to effective distribution, and adequate scale.” Id. at 29. But Greenflight alleges
that it possesses none of those thin gs. Instead, it alleges that a governmental regulation (might)
allow it access to Google data. That does not make Greenflight’s status as a Google competitor
plausible.
Third, Greenflight alleges that it would have become a valid competitor with Google, had
Google not exercised improper mo nopoly power over the general sear ch services market in the

6 If one’s influence on or use of Google’s search engine results was sufficient to confer antitrust standing to sue Google
as a competitor, the Court believes that every person who has ever posted something on the internet (or typed
something into Google search) has standing to sue Google as a competitor. That simply cannot be the law, and courts
have limited those who may sue in antitrust for a reason. See Fed. Trad Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974, 992
(9th Cir. 2020) (“Parties whose injuries, though flowing from that which makes the defendant’s conduct unlawful, are
experienced in another market do not suffer antitrust injury.”).
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past. See DE 63 at 8. The Court addressed this argum ent in a prior dismi ssal, and it found that
nothing in the First Amended Complaint could be said to plausibly suggest that OkCaller, a reverse
phone number website, could have ever had (or has) the ability to compete with Google in the
market of general search services. DE 53 at 6. Nothing in the Second Amended Complaint alters
the Court’s prior conclusion on this subject. Simply stated, if OkCaller could be said to have had
the potential to grow into a G oogle competitor, every website on the internet with a search bar
could say the same—every website on the internet with a search ba r could sue in antitrust as a
competitor to Google. The Court declines to conclude that OkCaller could plausibly be inferred
to have the potential to challenge Google as a competitor in the market of general search services.
Fourth, Greenflight alleges that it has st anding, competitor or not, under the case of Blue
Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982). The Court addressed that argument at great
length in a prior dismissal. DE 63 at 2-6. The Court declines to do so a second time. Suffice it to
say that for Greenflight to have standing under McCready, Google must have used Greenflight as
a conduit to harm its true competitors, such as Bing. Id. That is not this case. For all of the reasons
the prior complaint did not qualify for standing under McCready, the Second Amended Complaint
also does not qualify.
In summary, for all of the reasons set forth above, for all of the reasons outlined in the
Court’s prior order of dismissal, and for all of the reasons in Google’s motion and reply (which
are incorporated and adopted into this Order), the Court dismisses Count I.
C. Count II, styled as “Maintaining Sherman Act § 1 Unreasonable Restraints of Trade
in the GSE, VSP, and Directory Services, In ternet Access, and Google Single-Brand
Content Markets”

Greenflight’s Count II is brought under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. For such a claim to
be cognizable, a plaintiff must allege an agreement between two or more persons that unreasonably
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restrains trade. Levine v. Cent. Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc. , 72 F.3d 1538, 1545 (11th Cir. 1996). It
is not enough, however, that a plaintiff is affected by the anticompetitive agreement. Nat’l Indep.
Theater Exhibitors, Inc. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co. , 748 F.2d 602, 608 (11th Cir. 1984). The
plaintiff must instead be the target against which anticompetitive activity is directed. Id.
Additionally, the injury the plaintiff experiences must be “of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent and that flows from th at which makes defendants’ act unlawful.” Id. Non-
cognizable injuries that are incidental or re mote do not give a plai ntiff antitrust standing. Id. Of
course, not only does a plaintiff have to allege the foregoing, but the plaintiff must do so in a way
that satisfies federal pleading standards.
In its motion to dismiss, Google argues that Greenflight fails to identify an anticompetitive
agreement, fails to explain how the agreement targeted Greenflight, and fails to explain how it was
harmed from the agreement. Gr eenflight’s response to Google’ s arguments is sufficiently
incoherent that the Court concludes it is non-responsive, as previously discussed in Section A, and
Google’s motion is due to be granted on that basis alone. In the alternative, the Court has done its
best to guess what Greenflight’s counterarguments are.
What is the Anticompetitive Agreement?
As best as the Court can discern, Greenflight believes that federal pleading standards do
not require it to identify a noncompetitive agreement. By way of example, Greenflight argues the
following: “Although unilatera l conduct is generally not actiona ble under Section 1, the courts
recognize that even tacit or impl icit understandings may suffice if pleaded with factual support
suggesting ‘a meeting of the minds’ to restrain trade.” DE 63 at 10. Greenflight’s Second
Amended Complaint also contains references to “implicit understandings.” DE 61 at 46. In lieu
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of the identification of an agreement, Greenf light requests discovery approximately one dozen
times.
Greenflight’s Count II does not satisfy federal pleading standards; without knowing what
the agreement is, the Court cannot analyze whether Greenflight was th e target of the agreement.
Vague and conclusory allegations about anticomp etitive agreements are not sufficient to satisfy
federal pleading standards. See Lombard’s Inc. v. Prince Mfg. Inc. , 583 F. Supp. 1572, 1573-74
(S.D. Fla. 1984), aff’d, 753 F.2d 974 (11th Cir. 1985).
Was Greenflight Targeted by an Anticompetitive Agreement?
Because the Court does not know what the anti competitive agreement in this case is alleged
to be, it is difficult for the Court to analyze wh ether Greenflight has plausibly alleged it was the
target of an anticompetitive agre ement. As best as the Court can discern, however, Greenflight
alleges some sort of agreement between Google and Apple. DE 61 at 11. The Court understands
how Greenflight could allege the existence of an agreement between Google and Apple to restrain
trade in the general search serv ices market—that was the subject of the recent antitrust decision
brought by the United States. See United States v. Google LLC, No. 20-CV-03010, DE 1033 at 6-
7 (D.C. Aug. 5, 2024). The Court similarly understands how such an agreement could be alleged
to directly target other companie s in the general search services market, or comp anies trying to
enter the general search services market. What the Court does not understand is how an agreement
between Google and Apple could plausibly be alleged to target OkCaller. Stated differently, any
injury to OkCaller that flowed from an agreement between Google and Apple would be incidental
or remote at best. Nothing in the Second Amended Complaint persuades the Court otherwise.
For the reasons set forth above and in the Cour t’s prior order of dismissal, Count II is
dismissed. There are also other grounds upon which Count II is ripe for di smissal that the Court
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has not discussed given the already lengthy nature of this Order. Instead, the Court also dismisses
Count II for each of the reasons set forth in Google’s motion to dismiss and reply, which the Court
adopts and incorporates into this Order.
D. Count III, styled as “Refusal to Deal in Violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act
(Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Precedent)”

Greenflight’s third count is an antitrust claim intended to be premised upon the legal
standard created in a Supreme Court case, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472
U.S. 585 (1985). The Court addressed this count at length in its prior order of dismissal, and the
Court declines to do so a second time. DE 53 at 11-12. Suffice it to say that an Aspen Skiing claim
would require Greenflight to (among other things) plausibly allege that it previously entered into
a joint venture with Google. This Greenflight has not done. Count III is dismissed for all of the
reasons described in the Court’s prior of dismissal, as there is no meaningful difference between
the First and Second Amended Complaints, and for all of the reasons set forth in Google’s present
motion and reply, which the Court adopts and incorporates into this Order.
E. Count IV, styled as “Violation of Califor nia’s Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus &
Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq)”

Greenflight’s Count IV is premised upon Ca lifornia state law, which prohibits “any
unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Each
prong is a distinct theory of liability. Lozano v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 731 (9th
Cir. 2007). Because Greenflight contends that it has brought a claim under each prong in Count
IV, the Court analyzes each prong separately.
1. The Unlawful Prong
The unlawful prong “borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices
that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Loss
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Angeles Cellular Tel. Co. , 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999) (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Superior Ct., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1093, 1103 (1996)). Google therefore argues that: (i) Greenflight’s
“unlawful” claim is premised upon alleged violati ons of federal antitrus t law (Counts I through
III), but because (ii) those claims are ripe for dismissal (iii) Greenflight’s Count IV is also ripe for
dismissal.
In response, Greenflight argues that its Count IV is premised upon ot her sorts of alleged
violations of the law, citing va gue references to the same in the Second Amended Complaint.
Implicit within Greenflight’s argument is that va gue references are sufficient for an “unlawful”
prong claim, but that is wrong: “[T]he plaintiff bringing a claim based on the unlawful prong must
identify the particular section of the statute that was allegedly violated, and must describe with
reasonable particularity the facts supporting the violation.” Sonoma Foods, Inc. v. Sonoma Cheese
Factory, LLC, 634 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Other than the federal antitrust counts
in the Second Amended Complaint, Greenflight has not identified claims or facts with reasonable
particularity that could s upport an unlawful prong claim. 7 For these reasons as well as the
additional reasons set forth in Google’s motion and reply, which the Court adopts and incorporates
in this Order by reference, Count IV is dismissed.
2. The Fraudulent Prong
For a claim to be cognizable under the frau dulent prong, Greenflight must allege a
deception by Google against members of the public. Watson Lab’ys, Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 2001). To plead its claim, Greenflight relies upon the
allegation that Google fraudulently markets itself as a neutral company, but that it manipulates its
search rankings in a misleading way that is not neutral. DE 61 at 51. Google argues that

7 For the same reasons, Greenflight’s vague references to other violations of the law cannot form the basis of liability
under other prongs of the California Business Code.
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Greenflight cannot cite to any aut hority to show that it has a duty to disclose to members of the
public how it ranks its search results.
In response, Greenflight provides no citation to authority for the proposition that Google
has a duty to disclose how it generates its search results. Instead, Greenflight’s cited authority
may even stand for the opposite proposition—that Google has no duty to disclose under California
law. See Dreamstime.com, LLC v. Google LLC, No. 20-16472, 2022 WL 17427039, at *2 (9th Cir.
2022) (“Google had no affirm ative duty under the parties’ agreem ent to disclose its confidential
algorithmic revision.”).8 Count IV is therefore ripe for dismissal. See Daugherty v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., 144 Cal. App. 4th 824, 838 (2006) (“We cannot ag ree that a failure to disclose a fact
one has no affirmative duty to disc lose is ‘likely to deceive’ a nyone within the meaning of the
UCL.”). For these reasons as well as the addition al reasons raised in Google’s motion and reply,
which the Court adopts and incorporates into this Order by reference, Count IV is dismissed.
3. The Unfair Prong
Google argues that Greenflight’s claim under the “unfair” prong should be dismissed for
two reasons: (i) the overlap of C ount IV with Greenflight’s federa l antitrust claims and (ii) the
overlap of any “unfair” claim with Greenflight’s “unlawful” and “fraudulent” claims. Each is
addressed in turn.
Overlap with the Federal Antitrust Claims
The Supreme Court of California has recognized that a prohibition on “unfair” conduct is
an “amorphous” concept that provides “too little guidance to courts and businesses.” Cel-Tech, 20

8 The Court notes that if Google had a duty to disclose its internal algorithms under California law, the appellant in
Dreamstime would presumably have had no need to cite to the parties’ contract for the alleged duty, as the appellant
could have instead relied upon California law, generally.
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Cal. 4th at 185. As a result, the California Supr eme Court tied the concept of unfairness, at least
for the purposes of the case before this Court, to antitrust violations:
These principles convince us that, to guide courts and the business community
adequately and to promote consumer prot ection, we must require that any finding
of unfairness to competitors under section 17200 be tethered to some legislatively
declared policy or proof of some actual or threatened impact on competition. We
thus adopt the following test: When a plai ntiff who claims to have suffered injury
from a direct competitor’s “unfair” act or practice invokes section 17200, the word
“unfair” in that section means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an
antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects
are comparable to or the same as a viola tion of the law, or otherwise significantly
threatens or harms competition.

Id. at 186-87. Here, every factual a llegation that Greenflight incorpor ates into Count IV is also
incorporated into the federal antitrust counts: C ounts I through III. The Court’s review of Count
IV confirms that the factual pred icate of Count IV is effectively the same as the antitrust counts.
E.g., DE 61 at 50. The Court is therefore persuaded by Google’s argument that because Counts I
through III are ripe for dismissal, Count IV is ripe for dismissal as well.
Overlap with the “Unlawful” and “Fraudulent” Claims
California courts have held that where alle ged unfair business prac tices overlap entirely
with the other prongs of the California Busi ness Code, claims under the unfair prong cannot
survive. E.g., Hadley v. Kellogg Sales Company, 243 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1104-05 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
Here, Count IV commingles claims under all three prongs—the same factual predicate underscores
all three prongs.
Upon review, the Court is unable to construe a meaningful, unique factual predicate for an
“unfair” type of claim for Count IV. The Court is also unable to construe a meaningful, unique
legal basis for Count IV; indeed, Greenflight’s Count IV repeatedly references Google’s alleged
status as a monopolist. DE 61 at 51. The Court is therefore persuaded by Google’s argument that
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because Greenflight’s unlawful and fraudulent claims are ripe for dismissal, the unfair claim is
also ripe for dismissal.
For these reasons as well as the additional r easons raised in Google’s motion and reply,
which the Court adopts and incorporates into this Order by reference, Count IV is dismissed.
F. Count V, styled as “Illegal Duopoly Contro l of the U.S. Internet Content Access in
Violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act”

In Count V, Greenflight seeks to bring an antitrust “duopoly” cl aim against Google and
Apple for “dominat[ing] all meaningful channels” of the internet. This claim is ripe for dismissal
for two reasons, each of which is delineated in bold below.
First, the Eleventh Circuit has never recognized a Section 2 antitrust claim for a “duopoly,”
and many courts have rejected the concept as a matter of law. See JES Props., Inc. v. USA
Equestrian, Inc., No. 802CV1585T24MAP, 2005 WL 1126665, at *18 (M.D. Fla. May 9, 2005),
aff’d on other grounds, 458 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2006). Indeed, the weight of authority is strong
that monopoly means one, not two. Midwest Gas Servs., Inc. v. Indiana Gas Co., Inc. , 317 F.3d
703, 713 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[A] section 2 claim can only accuse one firm of being a monopolist.”).
In response, instead of conceding the lack of legal authority for its claim, Greenflight relies
upon a quotation that is either fabricated or hallucinated. More specifically, Greenflight cites to a
seminal case on antitrust law, American Tobacco Co. v. United States , 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
Greenflight quotes from American Tobacco: “The power that controls the market by destroying
competition . . . is a monopoly . . . though it be shared by three persons acting in concert.” DE 63
at 9. That quotation does not appear in American Tobacco, and the text of the opinion does not
lend support to Greenflight’s quot ation. The Court was similarl y unable to locate the quotation
(or even portions of the quotation) anywhere inside the entirety of the Westlaw database. Google
was unable to locate the source of the quotation as we ll. As a result, the C ourt is concerned that
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Greenflight’s quotation may be the result of Gr eenflight’s usage of ar tificial-intelligence-
hallucinated legal authority. See Varun Magesh, AI on Trial: Legal Models Hallucinate ,
https://hai.stanford.edu/news/ai-trial-legal-models-hallucinate-1-out-6-or-more-benchmarking-
queries (May 23, 2024) (noting that artificial intelligence progr ams can hallucinate incorrect
answers to legal questions 58 to 82 percent of the time). In a ny event, the Court declines to
recognize a claim that ignores th e prefix “mono” in the word monopoly, has been rejected by
courts as a matter of law, and has not been recognized by Eleventh Circuit, all based upon a
quotation that does not exist.
Second, for all of the reasons Greenflight lacks standing to sue Google as a competitor for
“general search services” in Count I, Greenflight also lacks standing to sue Google as a competitor
for “smartphone app distribution.” DE 61 at 54 (“Apple controls the lion’s share—approximately
80%—of . . . smartphone app distribution, while Google, with its dominance in general web search,
commands the remaining 20%.”). Stated differently, while Greenflight may have plausibly alleged
that it can create smartphone applications, it has not plausibly alleged that it is a competitor with
Google in the market of smartphone app distribution.
For all of the reasons set forth above and in Google’s motion and re ply, which the Court
adopts and incorporates into this Order, Count V is dismissed.
G. Order to Show Cause
The Court construes the Second Amended Complaint as bringing claims not only on behalf
of Greenflight, but also on behalf of pro se Plaintiff Jeffrey Isaacs. DE 61 (referencing Plaintiffs,
plural, and also containing a pro se signature). The Court previously stayed all claims brought pro
se. DE 26 at 2. Before dismissing any pro se claims, however, the Court will utilize an order to
show cause process. Pro se Plaintiff Jeffrey Isaacs is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE by
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February 10, 2025 , why his pro se claim(s) should not be dis missed for the same reasons
Greenflight’s (identical) antitrust claims were dismissed. Mr. Isaacs’ response shall be no greater
than ten pages, double spaced, with twelve-point font and one-inch margins.
H. Leave to Amend
This case has been pending for almost one y ear, and the Plaintiffs have had adequate
opportunity to amend. Further opportunities to amend would am ount to unfair prejudice on
Google, and the Court is also persuaded that, in any event, further amendment would be futile.
See, e.g., Bloom v. Alvereze, 498 F. App’x 867, 884 (11th Cir. 2012) (“After a district court grants
an opportunity to amend and identifies the pleading’s deficiencies, if the plaintiff fails to submit a
proper pleading, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate.”). Further leave to amend in this case is
denied, and the Court’s dismissal of Greenflight’s claims is therefore without leave to amend.
III. Ruling
The Eleventh Circuit has observed that: “[a]ntitrust standing is best understood in a general
sense as a search for the proper plaintiff to enforce the antitrust laws.” Todorov v. DCH Healthcare
Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1448 (1991) (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc. , 479 U.S. 104, 110 n.5
(1986)). If this were a case about the proper standing for a consumer of Google search to enforce
antitrust laws, this Court would likely have (as other courts have had) greater difficulty in reaching
its decision. See Arcell v. Google LLC , No. 22-CV-02499 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2024) (grappling
with the question of whether certain consumers may sue Google in antitrust). The analysis would
be more difficult because Google search is (for the most part) free, and it is also a ubiquitous
product that so much of the world consumes . But this is a case about an alleged competitor to
Google search, and OkCaller is not the proper pa rty to sue Google as a competitor. Although
Greenflight makes much of the lawsuits in Mr. Isaacs’ past and its allegation that Google learned
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of Mr. Isaacs’ lawsuits shortly before the drop in OkCaller traffic, that does not transform OkCaller
into a competitor of Google search.
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Google’s Motion to
Dismiss [DE 62] is GRANTED as to Greenflight’s claims. A ll of Greenflight’s claims are
therefore DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND . The Court may exercise its case
management discretion to su mmarily deny future motion practice (such as a motion for
reconsideration) without explanation.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, West Palm Beach, Florida, this 4th day of
February, 2025.
_______________________________
Copies furnished to: ROBIN L. ROSENBERG
Counsel of record UNI TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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