govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-9_23-cv-81384-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
 
CASE NO. 23-CV-81384-ROSENBERG 
 
RONALD ITRI & MARIA 
ITRI,  
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
JONES FOSTER P.A., et al.,  
 
Defendants. 
    /  
ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT  
 
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 
docket entry 44.  The Plaintiffs filed their Resp onse at docket entry 48 and the Defendants filed 
their Reply at docket entry 54.  On August 27, 2024, this Court granted the Defendants’ Motion in 
part and reserved in part. DE 50.  The Court reserved on the question of whether the Defendants 
were entitled to summary judgment on their counterclaims for unpaid legal bills.  For the reasons 
set forth below, the Motion is granted and the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on 
their counterclaims for unpaid legal bills.     
To recover their unpaid legal bills, the De fendants have brought a claim for breach of 
contract.1  Such a claim requires the Defendants to have evidence of the existence of a contract, a 
material breach of that contract, and damages resulting from the breach. E.g., Vega v. T-Mobile 
USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1272 (11th Cir. 2009).  As the Plaintiffs have ad mitted all facts in 
 
1 The Defendants have brought other counts in the alternative to their breach of contract claim, such as a count for 
quantum meruit, but each count seeks the same relief based upon the same underlying facts.  Because the Defendants’ 
additional claims are brought in the alternative and because the Defendants prevailed on their breach of contract claim, 
the Court does not address the Defendants’ other claims. 
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support of the Defendants’ Motion,2 the Plaintiffs have admitted that they had a contract with the 
Defendants for the Defendants to provide legal services, that they breached the contract by failing 
to pay for the services, and that their failure to pay resulted in damages to the Defendants. DE 45 
at 4, 8, 9.  The Plaintiffs have also admitted that their outstanding balance owed to the Defendants 
is $128,118.49. Id. at 9. 
The Plaintiffs’ opposition to the Defendants’ counterclaim is limited to a single paragraph 
in their Response,
3 quoted below: 
Defendants move for summary judgment on their counterclaim for unpaid 
attorney’s fees merely on the basis that th ere is no dispute as to the amount billed 
by the Defendants and the am ount paid by the ITRI’s. Ho wever, attorney’s fees 
must be for activities performed that were reasonably necessary. See, e.g., City of 
Miami v. Harris, 490 So. 2d 69, 73 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Brake v. Murphy, 736 So. 
2d 745, 747 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). In the instan t case, there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to the amount of activ ity that was necessary, inasmuch as the 
Defendants admit in their Motion for Summary Judgment that the ITRI’s were not 
likely to prevail on their defenses, and the Defendants never advised the ITRI’s of 
this. At some point relatively early on during a six-year representation, the 
Defendants should have advised the ITRI’s that they were unlikely to prevail on 
their theories and saved them hundreds of thousands of dollars. It is noted that the 
case was referred to the Defendants by Charles Weiss, Esq., the attorney who 
drafted the trust documents. Defendants we re in touch with Weiss, and need not 
have waited until his deposition relatively late in the case to know how Weiss would 
have testified as to the Fourth Amendment and factors impacting its validity. 
 
DE 48 at 5-6.  This argument is unpersuasive for the following five reasons delineated in bold 
below. 
 
2 The Plaintiffs did not file a response to the Defendants’ statement of material facts.  As a result, all of the Defendants’ 
facts in support of their Mo tion are deemed admitted. See Local Rule 56.1.  The Court previously informed the 
Plaintiffs that it would strictly enforce the Local Rule requirements for statements of  material fact at summary 
judgment. DE 10 at 12. 
3 The Plaintiffs author a second paragr aph in opposition wherein they argue that the amount they owe should be 
adjusted downward because the Defendants did not send bills at regular monthly intervals.  That argument is meritless 
for all of the reasons set forth in the Defendants’ Reply, and the Court does not otherwise address it. 
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First, the Plaintiffs’ legal authorit y consists of two case citations .  The Plaintiffs cite to 
those cases for the proposition that “attorney’s f ees must be for activities performed that were 
reasonably necessary.”  Neither case stands for that proposition, at least as applied to the question 
before this Court. 
 The first cited case, City of Miami v. Harris, involved prevailing party attorney’s fees under 
42 U.S.C. § 1988. See 490 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).  That case therefore stands for 
the proposition that when fees are awarded against an adverse party under § 1988, the Court must 
only award fees that are reasonably necessary. Id.  The second cited case, Brake v. Murphy , 
involved a contested claim for attorneys’ fees by the attorney of the beneficiaries of an estate. See 
736 So. 2d 745, 746-47 (Fla. Dist. Ct . App. 1999).  Just as with City of Miami, Brake stands for 
the proposition that when a court awards fees to  an adverse party, the underlying activity must 
have been reasonably necessary. See id.  But Florida law is clear that Brake has no application to 
the situation before th is Court—a breach of contract clai m for unpaid legal bills between an 
attorney and a former client. See Law Offices of Granoff & Kessler, P.A. v. Glass, 305 So. 3d 345, 
349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020) (“In both Brake and Seitlin, attorney’s fees were sought against 
adverse parties rather than a former client.  Neit her case involved an attorney’s claim for breach 
of contract against a former c lient under an express agreement to pay fees for legal services 
provided by the attorney.”).  The Plaintiffs ther efore lack any legal authority for the proposition 
that they are only required to pay for legal services that were reasonably necessary.
4     
 
4 Relatedly, the Court does not understand how a jury could be asked to decide what legal fees were reasonably 
necessary.  The Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury as to all issues in this case. DE 1-1 at 13.  
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 Second, what then is the governin g law over the Plaint iffs’ obligation to  pay their legal 
bills?  Because the Defendants ha ve brought a breach of contract claim, the governing law is the 
contract itself.  Florida law is in accord. See Kessler, 305 So. 3d at 349 (declining to consider a 
reasonable attorney’s fee when the case “involved an attorney’s claim for breach of contract 
against a former client” w ho had previously expressly agreed to pay for legal services received).  
The contract executed by the parties reads as follows: 
 
DE 9-1 at 2.  The contract contains no “reasonably necessary” limitation.5    
Third, on what evidentiary basis do the Plaintiffs dispute the Defendants’ legal fees?  For 
three reasons, they do not have one.  First, they did not file a response to the Defendants’ statement 
of facts.  Second, they do not cite to any evidence6 in the paragraph quoted above in their Response.  
Third, in the words of one Plaintiff at his deposition:  
Q. As you sit here right now, you have no position, one way or the other, on whether 
or not the amount of fees and costs char ged to you by the Jones Foster firm was 
reasonable, correct?  
 
A. No knowledge as to what?  
 
*** 
 
Q. As you sit here right now, you have no knowledge as to whether the fees and 
charges to you by the Jones Foster firm were reasonable, do you?  
 
 
5 The Plaintiffs do not cite any authority for their position that attorneys may only bill their clients for their advocacy 
if the case is “likely to prevail.”  Finally, although the Florida Bar prohibits “clearly excessive” fees, the Plaintiffs do 
not cite to that provision, argue it, or  provide evidence in support of the same. See Fla. R. Regulating Fla. Bar. 4-
1.5(a).   
6 Even if the Court were to consider uncited evidence that can be located in the court file—a Plaintiff’s affidavit—that 
evidence tends to support the Defendants’ position on fees, not dispute it, for the reasons set forth in the Defendants’ 
Reply. 
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A. Were reasonable?  
 
Q. Yes, sir.  
 
A I don’t know that they were reasonable, and I don't know that they’re accurate.  
 
Q. In this case, are you challenging the reasonableness or the accuracy of the 
invoices?  
 
A. I have no opinion at this point. 
 
DE 54 at 4. 
 Fourth, although the parties’ contract permitted the Plaintiffs to terminate the Defendants’ 
legal representation at any time or to inquire as to why certain fees were being charged, the 
Plaintiffs admit that they ne ver objected to their legal bills or othe rwise disputed the 
reasonableness of the Defendants’ legal services.  Instead, the Plaintiffs simply decided not to pay: 
Q. …you recognized that at some point, you sh ould have inquired as to the status 
of the invoices, to the extent you weren’t getting them?  
 
A. Well, it didn’t make any difference to  me because I wasn’t going to be paying 
any more than $500 a month, so he could send me whatever bill he wanted. To me, 
at that point, I didn’t care. I was paying what I could pay. 
 
Id. at 6. 
 Fifth and finally, much of the Plaintiffs’ argum ent in opposition rests on the premise that 
the Defendants engaged in legal malpractice.  For example, the Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants 
“should have advised the ITRI’s that they were unlikely to prevail on their theories.”  But the Court 
has already granted summary judgment against the Plaintiffs and in favor of the Defendants on the 
Plaintiffs’ allegations of legal malpractice. See DE 50.  The Plaintiffs are therefore not entitled to 
a “setoff” against the legal bills for the alleged malpractice, as their affirmative defense avers. DE 
12 at 3.  
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For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendants’ 
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to the Defendants’ counterclaims.  The 
Defendants shall submit a proposed final judgment in Microsoft Word format within two business 
days of the date of rendition of this order at rosenberg@flsd.uscourts.gov.  As no active claims 
remain in this case, the Clerk of the Court shall mark the case as CLOSED.  The Defendants’ 
Response to the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend at  docket entry 51 remains due on September 11, 
2024.    
 DONE AND ORDERED  in Chambers, West Palm Beach, Florida, this 5th day of 
September, 2024. 
 
                            
      UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
      ROBIN L. ROSENBERG 
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