govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-1_23-cv-20068-4

United States District Court 
for the 
Southern District of Florida 
 
MedEnvios Healthcare, Inc., 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
Robert F. Kennedy,
1 in his official 
capacity as Secretary, United States 
Department of Health and Human 
Services, Defendant. 
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Civil Action No. 23-20068-Civ-Scola 
 
Order on Motion for Clarification 
This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s motion for clarification. 
(ECF No. 136.) The Defendant has filed a response (ECF No. 139) and the 
Plaintiff has filed a reply (ECF No. 141). The Court has considered the briefing, 
the record, and the relevant legal authorities. For the following reasons, the 
Court denies the Plaintiff’s motion for clarification (ECF No. 136).  
The Plaintiff seeks clarification of the Court’s order on the parties’ first 
round of cross motions for summary judgment, in which the Court “vacated” 
“[t]he extrapolated overpayment demands implementing the ALJ decisions.” 
(See Order on Parties’ Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 84 at 9.) 
Specifically, the Plaintiff requests a Court order stating that the Plaintiff “is 
liable only for the actual overpayment on the sample claims” and that “the 
Court . . . did not order this matter to be remanded back to the agency[.]” (Pl.’s 
Mot., at 4.) Thus, the Plaintiff believes it is entitled to a refund of the 
extrapolated amounts the Defendant recouped, absent reversal by the Eleventh 
Circuit. (Id.) 
 The motion is in response to the Defendant’s notice of compliance, in 
which the Defendant interprets the Court’s order as (1) requiring the Defendant 
to provide the documentation that the Plaintiff was originally denied and (2) 
“remand[ing] of these matters to the agency, so that [the Plaintiff] may 
challenge the implementation of the ALJ decisions as it sees fit, with the benefit 
of the documentation showing how the ALJ decisions were effectuated.” (See 
Notice of Compliance with Final Judgment, ECF No. 129, at 2.)  
 
1 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Robert F. Kennedy, now Secretary of the Department of 
Health and Human Services, is automatically substituted as the named defendant in 
this case.  
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The Defendant’s interpretation of the Court’s order is correct and 
consistent with case law. The Plaintiff alleged—and proved—a procedural due 
process violation when “the Defendant failed to provide sufficient 
documentation to support overpayments recalculated following partially 
favorable appellate decisions[.]” (Order on Parties’ Cross Motions for Summary 
Judgment, at 7.) The Plaintiff’s injury was the inability to challenge the 
overpayment demands with the proper documentation.
2 Therefore, the proper 
remedy for the Plaintiff is to place it in the same position as if it had the correct  
documentation in the first place—i.e., having “the benefit of the documentation 
showing how the ALJ decisions were effectuated” “so that [the Plaintiff] may 
challenge the implementation of the ALJ decisions as it sees fit.” (Def.’s Resp., 
at 2.) Such a remedy is consistent with Carey v. Piphus, in which the Supreme 
Court explained that “[p]rocedural due process rules are meant to protect 
persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) (emphasis 
added); see also Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 979 (8th Cir. 1994) (“The 
Supreme Court defined the proper remedy for the denial of procedural due 
process in Carey v. Piphus, holding that the remedy for a procedural due 
process violation is defined by the extent of the injury that resulted from the 
denial of constitutionally required process.” (citations omitted)). In other words, 
rather than entitling the Plaintiff to a refund of the recalculated overpayments, 
the Defendant’s procedural due process violation entitles the Plaintiff to 
challenge those overpayments with the proper documentation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 In its reply in support of its motion, the Plaintiff argues that its injury in more than 
just the inability to challenge the ALJ decisions: it notes the alleged “substantial harm” 
to its business as a result of the Defendant’s procedural due process violations. ( See 
Reply, at 4 -5.) But the Plaintiff never sought compensatory damages in its complaint 
and thus this alleged injury is not properly before the Court.  See Monroe Cnty., Fla. v. 
U.S. Dept. of Labor , 690 F.2d 1359, 1363 (“For a party to recover more than nominal 
damages for a deprivation of due process, he must show actual compensable injury.” 
(citing, inter alia, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978)).  
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For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the Plaintiff’s motion for 
clarification (ECF No. 136). The Defendant’s interpretation of the Court’s final 
judgment is correct.  
 
 
 Done and ordered at Miami, Florida on April 21, 2025. 
 
 
       ___________________________________ 
       Robert N. Scola, Jr. 
       United States District Judge 
 
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