govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-1_23-cv-22379-9

United States District Court 
for the 
Southern District of Florida 
 
Naval Logistic, Inc., doing business 
as Middle Point Marina, Plaintiff 
 
v. 
 
M/V Family Time, in rem, and 
Andrew Vilenchik, in personam, 
Defendants. 
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Civil Action No. 23-22379-Civ-
Scola 
 
 
In Admiralty 
 
Order on Motion for Reconsideration 
Defendant Andrew Vilenchik, previously represented by counsel and now 
proceeding pro se, asks the Court for relief from the judgment entered against 
him for $40,428.30, in favor of Plaintiff Naval Logistic, Inc., doing business as 
Middle Point Marina (the “Marina”) (Am. Final Judgment, ECF No. 108), and 
from the Court’s order awarding the Marina $118,197.11 in attorney’s fees and 
costs (Order on Fees, ECF No. 221). Vilenchik contends relief is warranted 
based on fraud on the Court, newly discovered evidence, and extraordinary 
circumstances. (Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 232.) The Marina opposes the motion 
(Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 237) and Vilenchik has timely replied (Def.’s Reply, ECF 
No. 241). After careful review, the Court denies Vilenchik’s motion (ECF No. 
232). 
1. Background 
The Marina’s lawsuit against Vilenchik arose out of the Marina’s 
provision of necessaries to the M/V Family Time, Vilenchik’s boat, for which 
the Marina was not compensated. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) The Marina prevailed 
on its motion for summary judgment and, as result, in September 2024, the 
Court entered final judgment in the Marina’s favor for $40,428.30 (comprised 
of expenses for pre-arrest storage, custodia legis expenses, and arrest related 
costs). (Am. Final Judgment at 1.) More recently, the Court awarded the Marina 
$118,197.11 in fees and costs. (Order on Fees at 5.) Since the entry of the final 
judgment, Naval Logistic has sought post-judgment discovery from Vilenchik 
which he has repeatedly and vigorously resisted at every turn.  
In the meantime, Vilenchik appealed the Court’s orders (1) authorizing 
the Marina to serve as the custodian of the vessel, (2) approving the sale of the 
vessel, and (3) granting summary judgment in favor of the Marina. (Def.’s Not. 
of Appeal, ECF No. 111.) Finding the Court’s decisions “grounded in the record 
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and consistent with established legal principles,” the Eleventh Circuit 
determined that Vilenchik had not identified any reversible errors and affirmed 
the Court’s orders. Naval Logistics, Inc. v. M/V FAMILY TIME, No. 24-13172, 
2025 WL 1733999, at *3 (11th Cir. June 23, 2025). 
Vilenchik now complains that the Marina has concealed evidence, 
fraudulently misstated the Marina’s expenses, and improperly inflated its 
attorney’s fees. (Def.’s Mot. at 1–2.) He also contends the Court never had in 
rem jurisdiction over the M/V Family Time, in the first place, rendering its 
arrest improper. (Id. at 1.) Because of these issues, says Vilenchik, the Court’s 
judgments should be vacated.  
2. Legal Standard 
The aim of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), generally, “is to strike 
a balance between the desideratum of finality and the demands of justice.” 
Chege v. Georgia Dept. of Juv. J., 815 F. App’x 425, 427 (11th Cir. 2020) 
(cleaned up). “To obtain relief under Rule 60(b), a movant must do more than 
show that the district court could have vacated its order: the movant must 
demonstrate a justification so compelling that the court was required to 
vacate its order.” Id. (cleaned up) (emphasis in original). 
Relevant here, Rule 60(b)(2) affords relief where there is “newly 
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been 
discovered in time to more for a new trial under Rule 59(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
60(b)(2). A movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(2) must establish “(1) the 
new evidence was discovered after the judgment was entered, (2) [the movant] 
had exercised due diligence in discovering that evidence, (3) the evidence was 
not merely cumulative or impeaching, (4) the evidence was material, and (5) 
the evidence was likely to produce a different result.” In re Glob. Energies, 
LLC, 763 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2014). Importantly, a motion sought 
“under Rule 60(b)(2) is an extraordinary motion and the requirements of the 
rule must be strictly met.” Waddell v. Hendry Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 329 F.3d 
1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003). 
Also relevant here, “[t]o obtain relief from a final judgment based upon 
fraud under Rule 60(b)(3), the moving party must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the adverse party obtained the verdict through 
fraud, misrepresentations, or other misconduct.” Waddell, 329 F.3d at 1309. 
The movant must also “show that the fraud prevented him from fully and 
fairly presenting his case.” Clements v. Commr. of Soc. Sec., No. 23-12520, 
2025 WL 1890635, at *4 (11th Cir. July 9, 2025). Notably, to meet the “clear 
and convincing evidence” standard, a movant must do more than supply 
“conclusory averments of the existence of fraud made on information and 
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belief and unaccompanied by a statement of clear and convincing probative 
facts which support such belief.” Booker v. Dugger, 825 F.2d 281, 283–84 
(11th Cir. 1987) (cleaned up). 
Finally, Rule 60(b)(6) serves as a “catchall provision that allows a district 
court to relieve a party from a final judgment for ‘any other reason that justifies 
relief.’” BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 145 S. Ct. 1612, 1617 (2025) (quoting 
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(6)). Relief from a final judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) 
is only available in “extraordinary circumstances,” and those extraordinary 
circumstances must, at the same time, “suggest that the movant is faultless in 
the delay.” BLOM Bank, 145 S. Ct. at 1623 (cleaned up). 
3. Analysis 
The bases Vilenchik relies on to support his motion can be summarized 
as follows: (1) a credit-card authorization form that he says the Marina failed to 
disclose and which defeats in rem jurisdiction (and thus the arrest of the 
vessel); (2) the Marina’s counsel’s improper conduct relating to, among other 
things, settlement negotiations, legal fees, communication, and post-judgment 
discovery; and (3) the Marina’s overstatement of the Marshal’s arrest fee by 
$637.50. After review, the Court finds Vilenchik’s first two arguments 
meritless. On the other hand, both parties appear to agree as to the Marshal’s 
fee discrepancy.  
First, Vilenchik acknowledges that he signed the credit-card 
authorization form in May 2023 and that the Marina, thereafter, produced it in 
discovery, in May 2024. (Def.’s Mot. at 8.) Accordingly, he is not entitled to 
relief under Rule 60(b)(2) because this evidence is not “newly discovered.” Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2). Second, other than his vague and conclusory references to 
fraud, Vilenchik fails to explain how this form, of which he was fully aware 
from the moment he acknowledges signing it, amounts to “clear and convincing 
evidence” that the Marina obtained its judgment through “fraud, 
misrepresentations, or other misconduct” as required by Rule 60(b)(2). 
Waddell, 329 F.3d at 1309. And, finally, Vilenchik fails to articulate any 
extraordinary circumstances, resulting in manifest injustice, arising from the 
form, that would warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 
Next, Vilenchik fails to explain how any of the complained of counsel 
conduct would trigger relief under Rule 60(b). For example, Vilenchik 
complains that his attorney failed to notify him about a settlement offer from 
the Marina in August 2023. First, Vilenchik fails to explain what relevance that 
settlement offer has on either the final judgment or the fees judgment. And 
second, nothing about the Marina’s communication of that settlement offer to 
Vilenchik’s lawyer is improper—if Vilenchik’s attorney failed to advise him of 
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that offer, that is between Vilenchik and his lawyer and does not amount to 
newly discovered evidence, fraud, or extraordinary circumstances. Similarly, 
none of the post-judgment discovery, collection, or settlement-communication 
conduct that Vilenchik complains of has any bearing on the propriety of the 
judgments in this case. Even if any of those interactions were shown to be 
improper, Vilenchik fails to show how any of it would amount to grounds for 
relief from the judgments here.  
Finally, both parties agree there is a discrepancy regarding the Marshal’s 
refund of $637.50 in fees to the Marina. As the Marina points out, this 
miscalculation can be remedied through the application of either Rule 60(b)(1) 
or (b)(5). Accordingly, the Court denies this aspect of Vilenchik’s motion 
without prejudice. If Vilenchik would like the Court to amend the final 
judgment to reflect this correction, relating to the $637.50, the Court orders 
the Marina to cooperate with Vilenchik in preparing a joint motion, requesting 
that relief, including a proposed amended final judgment.  
4. Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Vilenchik’s motion for 
relief under Rule 60(b) (ECF No. 232). This denial is without prejudice as to 
Vilenchik’s claims regarding the Marshal’s refund to the Marina of $637.50. 
The Court also denies Vilenchik’s request for a stay of execution of the 
judgment under Rule 62(b): he has not supplied any indication that he has 
posted a bond or other security and therefore is not entitled to a stay.  
Done and ordered at Miami, Florida on August 22, 2025. 
 
 
       ___________________________________ 
  
     Robert N. Scola, Jr. 
       United States District Judge 
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