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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 23-CV-81007-RLR

SHANNON N. BARNEY,

Plaintiff,

GOLDORO DEVELOPMENTS, INC.,
CIRO ADAMO, M.D.,

Defendants.

________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, AND
DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Motion for Relief from Judgments and for
Extension of Time to Comply with Order Compelling Discovery by Defendant s Goldoro
Developments, Inc. and Ciro Adamo. DE 55. The Court has reviewed the Motion, Plaintiff
Shannon N. Barney’s Response [DE 57], and Defendants’ Reply [DE 59], and the record, and is
fully advised in the premises. For the reasons below, Defendants’ Motion for Relief from
Judgments is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART and Defendants’ Motion for
Extension of Time is DENIED AS MOOT.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Shannon Barney filed this case in state court on May 30, 2023, against her former
employer, Defendants Goldoro Developments, Inc., d/b/a Bluewater Radiology (“Goldoro”), and
Ciro Adamo. See DE 1-2. Against Defendant Goldoro, Plaintiff brought claims under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the Florida Minimum Wage Act (“FMWA”), as well as claims
for breach of contract and breach of oral agreement. DE 1-2. Against Defendant Adamo, Plaintiff
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brought a claim for misrepresentation. DE 1-2. Defendants removed the case to this Court on July
7, 2023. See DE 1. Defendants filed an answer and affirmative defenses on July 21, 2023. DE 11.
The parties participated in an unsuccessful mediation on October 25, 2023. DE 16.
On December 14, 2023, Defendants’ legal counsel withdrew from the case. DE 20. On
February 6, 2024, when Defendants were unrepresented, Plaintiff filed three motions for summary
judgment. See DE 37. The Court required Plaintiff to amend her motions for summary judgment
because, among other reasons, Plaintiff’s motions lacked full briefing on various factual and legal
bases for Plaintiff’s FLSA claim. See DE 34 at 1–2.
Defendants did not respond to any of Plaintiff’s motions. On July 1, 2024, the Court
granted Plaintiff’s Second Amended Motion for Summary Judgment . DE 38 . The Court
determined that Defendants were liable as to Count I under the FLSA because Defendants did not
pay Plaintiff for her last two weeks of work, id. at 6; that Defendants were liable as to Count II
under the FMWA for the same reason, id. at 7; and that Defendants were liable for Counts III
(breach of contract ) and IV (breach of oral agreement ) because Defendants did not compensate
Plaintiff for her unused vacation time, id. at 9. The Court did not reach Count V
(misrepresentation) because Plaintiff sought no additional relief and was therefore made whole
with respect to summary judgment on the other four counts. Id.
On July 12, 2024, the Court entered a final judgment for Plaintiff in the amount of
$24,230.79 in damages. DE 39. On August 1, 2024, Plaintiff moved for attorney’s fees under the
FLSA and FMWA , which this Court referred to the Honorable Bruce E. Reinhart for his report
and recommendation. DE 42. Defendants did not respond or object. The Court adopted Judge
Reinhart’s report and recommendation on November 15, 2024, awarding Plaintiff $27,268.00 in
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attorney’s fees and $685.00 in costs. DE 44. On January 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to
Compel Discovery in Aid of Execution. DE 45. The Court referred the Motion to Compel to Judge
Reinhart, who granted the motion in part. DE 50.
Then, on February 25, 2025, Defendants retained counsel. DE 47. That counsel withdrew
two weeks later. DE 53.
On April 4, 2025—a fter Defendants retained their current counsel—Defendants moved for
relief from the Court’s judgments pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) as well as an extension of
time to comply with the Court’s order compelling responses to discovery in aid of execution. DE
55.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) “authorizes a court to reopen a final judgment under
certain enumerated circumstances.” Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 531 (2022). Rule 60(b)
is a remedial rule that “should be liberally construed in order to do substantial justice.” Seven
Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 1981).
1 “By its very nature, the rule seeks to
strike a delicate balance between two countervailing impulses: the desire to preserve the finality
of judgments and the ‘incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of
all the facts.’” Id. (quoting Bankers Mortg. Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1970)).
“Rule 60(b)(1) permits a district court to reopen a judgment for ‘mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect,’ so long as the motion is filed ‘within a reasonable time,’ and, at
most, one year after the entry of the order under review.” Kemp , 596 U.S. at 531 (citing Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (c)(1)). “The term ‘mistake’ in Rule 60(b)(1) includes legal errors made by

1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala. , 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding
precedent former Fifth Circuit decisions handed down prior to September 30, 1981.
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judges.” Clements v. Gov. of Fla., No. 23-13766, 2024 WL 1882172, at *1 (11th Cir. Apr. 30,
2024) (citing Kemp, 596 U.S. at 535). “[W]here a district court’s mistake was clear on the record
and involved a plain misconstruction of the law and the erroneous application of that law to the
facts, compelling policies of basic fairness and equity reflected by 60(b) may mandate amendment
to conform its judgment to the law.” Nisson v. Lundy, 975 F.2d 802, 806 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing
Compton v. Alton Steamship Co., 608 F.2d 96, 104 (4th Cir. 1979) (quotation marks omitted)).
Whether to grant Rule 60(b) relief is “a matter for the district court’s sound discretion.”
Cano v. Baker, 435 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2006).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants move for relief from the Court’s judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) based on the
Court’s errors of law. DE 55. Defendants first contend that Plaintiff, as an exempt employee,
cannot be awarded relief under the FLSA, and therefore also cannot be awarded relief under the
FMWA. Defendants next contend that Plaintiff was not entitled to five weeks of paid vacation,
which had formed the bases of Plaintiff’s breach of contract and breach of oral agreement claims.
Finally, Defendants contend that Adamo is not liable for the Court’s judgments. Plaintiff objects
to Defendants’ contentions and argues that Defendants have not presented compelling
justifications that would require the Court to vacate its final judgment and fee award. DE 57.
Plaintiff has also argued, in the alternative, that Defendants’ Motion is untimely because it
was not brought within the time allowed to perfect an appeal. DE 57 at 4. Plaintiff has cited to
Kemp for the proposition that Courts of Appeals have used the “reasonable time” requirement for
Rule 60(b) motions “to forestall abusive litigation by denying Rule 60(b)(1) motions alleging
errors that should have been raised sooner ( e.g., in a timely appeal).” 596 U.S. at 538 (citing
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Mendez v. Republic Bank, 725 F.3d 651, 660 (7th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff relies on Real Property, in
which the Eleventh Circuit construed the government’s motion as a Rule 60(b)(1) motion and then
denied it, among other reasons, because it was untimely , even though it was brought within the
one-year period. United States v. Real Prop. & Residence Located at Route 1, Box 111, Firetower
Rd., Semmes, Mobile Cnty., Ala., 920 F.2d 788, 791–92 (11th Cir. 1991).
“[T]he time allowable for taking an appeal,” however, “is not a per se limitation on filing
of a Rule 60(b)(1) motion.” Parks v. U.S. Life and Credit Corp., 677 F.2d 838, 840 (11th Cir.
1982) (discussing Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co. , 542 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1976) ). The text of
Rule 60(c)(1), which governs the timing of a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, states that the motion must be
made “within a reasonable time” and “no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order,
or the date of the proceeding.” See also Kemp, 596 U.S. at 533; 11 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2866
(3d ed. 2025).
Here, final judgment was entered against Defendants on July 1, 2024, DE 39, and the order
granting attorney’s fees was entered against Defendants on November 15, 2024, DE 44.
Defendants moved for relief from the judgments on April 4, 2025, less than one year after the entry
of final judgment. DE 55. Defendants have raised a compelling basis for their Motion—clear legal
error, as discussed below . Furthermore, Defendant Adamo admits that after the death of
Defendants’ business advisor, who served as the primary contact with Defendants’ legal counsel,
Adamo “dropped the ball on this case” and failed to monitor the lawsuit. DE 55 at 2. But
Defendants are unlike the litigants in the cases Plaintiff cites from the Eleventh Circuit: In Godwin,
the litigant had moved for Rule 60(b)(1) relief two years after attempting to appeal . Godwin v.
Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 8:16-CV-2253-T-23SPF, 2022 WL 22860320, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug.
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16, 2022). In Real Property, the Eleventh Circuit found untimely the government’s Rule 60(b)
motion seeking costs after a forfeiture; the Eleventh Circuit’s decision was “reinforced” by the
court’s heavy skepticism regarding the government’s “proffered excuse” for why it failed to move
for costs earlier, despite having actively participated in the litigation. 920 F.2d at 791–92 (emphasis
in original).
Based on these comparisons, the Court determines that Defendants’ Motion, though filed
after the time to perfect an appeal, does not raise the same concerns of abusive litigation. Having
determined that Defendants’ Motion is timely, the Court next addresses in turn Defendants’
arguments for relief as to each count.
A. Count I – Plaintiff’s Entitlement to Relief Under the Fair Labor Standards Act
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff, an exempt employee, cannot be awarded relief under
the FLSA. DE 55 at 5. The FLSA imposes minimum wage and overtime pay requirements for
covered employees, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207(a)(1), and creates a statutory right of action for covered
employees to sue for back pay, liquidated damages, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs,
§ 216(b). Congress removed certain employees from FLSA coverage. See generally 29 U.S.C.
§ 213. So long as their status remains exempt under the FLSA, these employees are not entitled
to relief under the FLSA. See, e.g., Pioch v. IBEX Engineering Services, Inc., 825 F.3d 1264, 1273
(2016) (holding that because the employee was exempt from the FLSA’s coverage, he “was not
entitled to recover anything under the FLSA”).
In the Court’s Order Granting Plaintiff’s Second Amended Motion for Summary Judgment,
the Court determined that Plaintiff is an exempt employee, and that Defendants did not pay
Plaintiff’s full salary for her last two weeks of work. DE 58 at 6. Based on the se findings, the
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Court proceeded to award Plaintiff $5,384.62 in backpay and $5,384.62 in liquidated damages. DE
58 at 6. This was an error. The Court incorrectly relied on 29 C.F.R. § 541.602, which delineates
the salary requirements to define exempt status. Although 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a)(1) states that
“an exempt employee must receive the full salary for any week in which the employee performs
any work without regard to the number of days or hours worked,” it does not provide a right to
sue. And 29 U.S.C. § 216—which does provide a right to sue — covers only non -exempt
employees. 29 U.S.C. § 213.
Therefore, because Plaintiff acknowledges that she was exempt , Plaintiff is eligible to
recover under the FLSA only if Plaintiff is correct in her argument that her exempt status changed
to non- exempt because Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff her final paycheck . DE 37 at 7–8
(providing the factual bases for Plaintiff’s classification as an exempt, executive employee under
the FLSA); DE 37 at 8–10 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.603(b) (providing that if a n employer has an
actual practice of making improper deductions from an exempt employee’s salary, the exemption
is lost during the period in which the improper deductions were made)).
The Eleventh Circuit addressed this issue in Pioch. 825 F.3d at 1271. In Pioch , the
Eleventh Circuit held that an hourly computer employee’s exempt status under § 213(a)(17) did
not change to non- exempt status during the three -week period when the employer withheld the
employee’s final paycheck . Id. at 1271–72. That is, the employee’s exempt status did “not
evaporate simply because the employer withholds a final paycheck.” Id. In reaching this
conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit examined Nicholson v. World Bus. Network, Inc., 105 F.3d 1361
(11th Cir. 1997).
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In Nicholson, two managerial employees argued that their status as exempt administrative
employees under § 213(a)(1) became non-exempt when they failed to receive their paycheck. The
employees argued that because “the exemption required a minimum weekly salary,” the employees
“could not have been exempt as a matter of law because they never received a dime.” Pioch , 825
F.3d at 1269 (discussing Nicholson, 105 F.3d at 1362 (quotation marks omitted)). The Eleventh
Circuit determined that the Nicholson employees’ interpretation of the FLSA was “unusual” and
“would convert an entire category of state contract law actions into federal labor suits.” Nicholson,
105 F.3d at 1362. Emphasizing Congress’s intent in enacting the FLSA, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected the Nicholson employees’ proffered interpretation of the FLSA “[b]ecause Congress did
not intend such a result for well-compensated, highly responsible positions.” Id.
The Eleventh Circuit in both Nicholson and Pioch emphasized that the FLSA “is not a
vehicle for litigating breach of contract disputes between employers and employees.” Pioch , 825
F.3d at 1271. Here, like the plaintiffs in Pioch and Nicholson, Plaintiff does not dispute that her
status was exempt.2 DE 37 at 7–8. Plaintiff’s sole argument as to why her status changed to non-
exempt was that Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff her final paycheck. Id. at 8–10. Given the
Eleventh Circuit decision s, Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing. Furthermore, even if Plaintiff’s
status had changed to non-exempt, Plaintiff “has failed to take into account that, under the FLSA,
[s]he is only entitled to the federal minimum hourly wage.” Bowers v. Trading Card World LLC ,
22-22897-CIV, 2023 WL 5154316, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 26, 2023), r eport and recommendation

2 Plaintiff cite s to Edwards v. Clinical Research Consultants, Inc. , in which t he district court disagreed with the
defendants’ contention that, based on Pioch and Nicholson, the defendants’ failure to pay the plaintiffs “waived” the
plaintiffs’ exempt status. No. 2:15-CV-902-TMP, 2017 WL 2265834, at *8–10 (N.D. Ala. May 24, 2017). The district
court emphasized, however, th at the Edwards plaintiffs disputed whether they were exempt before their paychecks
were withheld. Id. at *9–10. Like the plaintiffs in Pioch and Nicholson, Plaintiff here does not dispute that she was
exempt—and the Court is persuaded that Pioch and Nicholson make clear that Plaintiff did not become non-exempt
when Defendants withheld her final paycheck.
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adopted, 2023 WL 5139371 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2023); see also Pioch v. IBEX Eng’g Servs., 825
F.3d 1264, 1269 n.3 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[The Plaintiff] does not explain why, if he is seeking
minimum wage recovery under the FLSA, he is entitled to recover his hourly rate, which far
exceeds the minimum wage.”).
Therefore, because Plaintiff’s employment status did not change to non- exempt when
Defendants withheld Plaintiff’s paycheck, it was legal error to award Plaintiff $5,384.62 in
backpay and $5,384.62 in liquidated damages under the FLSA.
B. Count II – Plaintiff’s Entitlement to Relief Under the Florida Minimum Wage Act
Defendants next argue that because Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under the FLSA,
Plaintiff is also not entitled to relief under the Florida Minimum Wage Act (“FMWA”). Under
the FMWA, “[o]nly those individuals entitled to receive the federal minimum wage under the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended, and its implementing regulations shall be eligible
to receive the s tate minimum wage pursuant to s. 24, Art. X of the State Constitution and this
section.” Fla. Stat. § 448.110(3). Th e FMWA exp ressly incorporates the exemptions and
restrictions in §§ 213 and 214 of the Fair Labor Standards Act “as interpreted by applicable federal
regulations and implemented by the Secretary of Labor.” Anagnos v. Nelsen Residence, Inc., 721
F. App’x 901, 904 (11th Cir. 2018). A plaintiff’s entitlement to minimum wages under the FMWA
is dependent on the plaintiff’s coverage under the FLSA. Id.
Based on the foregoing, because Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under the FLSA as an
exempt employee, Plaintiff also is not entitled to relief under the FMWA. See Part III.A. It was
therefore legal error to grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to her FMWA claim.

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C. Plaintiff’s Entitlement to Attorney’s Fees
Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, which was granted in part in the amount of
$27,268.00 in attorney’s fees and $685.00 in costs , was premised on Plaintiff’s right to recover
attorney’s fees under the FLSA and the FMWA. DE 44; 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Fla. Stat.
§ 448.110(6)(c)1. Because Plaintiff was not entitled to recover under either the FLSA or the
FMWA, see Parts III.A–B, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion for Relief from the Court’s Order
Adopting the Report and Recommendations on Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
[DE 44].
D. Counts III and IV – Plaintiff’s Entitlement to Paid Vacation
Defendants next assert that the Court erred in granting summary judgment for Plaintiff as
to Counts III (breach of contract) and IV (breach of oral agreement). Defendants first argue that
the “written agreement” in question was, by its terms, an offer of at-will employment from which
no claim for breach of contract may arise. DE 55 at 11 (citing Scirotto v. City of Ft. Lauderdale ,
No. 23-60424-CIV, 2023 WL 11814856, at *7 (S.D. Fla. 2023) (collecting cases)). An at -will
employee, however, may still recover “compensation, benefits, or other rights accrued” prior to
the employee’s termination. Patwary v. Evana Petroleum Corp., 18 So. 3d 1237, 1238 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2009) (collecting cases). And Plaintiff attests that she entered into an Employment and
Ancillary Agreement contract with Defendants that “memorialized the terms of [her]
employment.” DE 37 ¶ 4; DE 37-2 ¶ 3. Because Defendants did not object, t his fact is pro perly
deemed admitted. L.R. 56.1(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3), (e)(2).
Defendants next argue that under the terms of the agreement, Plaintiff had not earned five
weeks of paid vacation. DE 55 at 11. The agreement states that:
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The Company’s current vacation policy allows you to be eligible to earn up to an
initial three weeks of paid vacation during your first full year of employment; four
weeks during your second year of full employment; and 5 weeks during your third
year of full employment. Nevertheless, this policy can be revisit ed form [sic] time
to time, and then revised or amended as agreed upon.

DE 37-2 at 9–10. Given that Plaintiff worked only sixteen days into her third year of employment,
Defendants argue, “she could not have possibly earned five weeks of vacation even if that vacation
time was guaranteed, which it was not by the plain language in the document.” DE 55 at 11–12.
Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts , however, asserts that the agreement provide s that “during
[Plaintiff’s] third full year of employment, [Plaintiff] would be entitled to five (5) weeks of paid
vacation at her contracted rate,” and that Plaintiff was due “$13,461.55 in payment for her accrued,
unused vacation time,” DE 37 ¶¶ 9, 11. In support, Plaintiff cited to her affidavit, which states,
“As of my termination on March 3, 2023, I had not used any of my accrued paid vacation leave.
Furthermore, to date, I have not been compensated for the five (5) weeks of accrued paid vacation
leave I was contractually entitled to under the Agreement.” DE 37-2 ¶ 11.
Because Plaintiff’s citation to her affidavit supports the proposition that she was entitled to
five weeks of paid vacation, and because Defendants did not challenge her proposition, Plaintiff’s
proposition is deemed admitted. Therefore, the Court did not err in awarding $13,461.55 to
Plaintiff for Counts III and IV.
E. Defendant Adamo’s Liability
Finally, Defendants argue that the Court erred in entering judgment against “Defendants,
Goldoro Developments, Inc. d/b/a Bluewater Radiology and Ciro Adamo in the amount of
$24,230.79.” DE 39 ¶ 1 (emphasis added). The only claim in Plaintiff’s Complaint against
Defendant Adamo was Count V for misrepresentation, DE 1-2 at 12, which the Court did not reach
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in its Order Granting Summary Judgment , DE 38 at 9. Therefore, the Court erred in including
Defendant Adamo in the judgments as to Counts I, II, III, and IV, and grants Defendants’ Motion
to relieve Adamo from the judgments.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court committed legal error in its Order granting Plaintiff
summary judgment as to Counts I and II, but not as to Counts III and IV. The Court entered the
Final Judgment [DE 39] in question pursuant to Rule 58, which requires a full resolution of all of
Plaintiff’s claims for relief. Due to the Court’s legal error as to Counts I and II, however, Plaintiff’s
counts have not all reached a final resolution. And because this matter would benefit from the
complete resolution of all of Plaintiff’s counts, the Court determines that the standard for a Rule
54(b) partial judgment on Counts III and IV is not met. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (stating that the
court may enter partial final judgment “only if the court expressly determines that there is no just
reason for delay”). Therefore, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. Defendant’s Motion for Rule 60(b) Relief from Judgments is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART to the extent that the Court committed legal error as to Counts I
and II, but not as to Counts III and IV.
2. The Court accordingly VACATES the Order Granting the Second Amended
Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 38], VACATES the Final Judgment [DE 39], and VACATES
the Order Adopting the Report and Recommendation to Grant in Part Plaintiff’s Motion for
Attorney’s Fees [DE 44].
3. The Clerk of Court shall REOPEN this case.
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4. Because the Court has vacated its judgment s and reopened the case, therefore
rendering MOOT Plaintiff’s need for discovery in aid of execution, see DE 50, the Court DENIES
AS MOOT Defendant’s Motion for Extension of Time to Comply with the Court’s Order Granting
in Part Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery in Aid of Execution.
5. No later than June 4, 2025, the parties shall file case-management notices with the
Court stating the parties’ positions on how this case ought to proceed.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, West Palm Beach, Florida, this 21st day of May,
2025.
_______________________________
ROBIN L. ROSENBERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies furnished to Counsel of Record
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