govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-8_23-cv-00208-2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
  
PHILLIP JOSHUA KYLE BROOKS,  *  
   
 Plaintiff, * 
   
v. * Civ. No. DLB-23-208 
   
TIMOTHY MCKIMMIE, * 
  
Defendant. * 
  
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
 Charles County deputy sheriff Timothy McKimmie arrested Phillip Joshua Kyle Brooks at 
the Hilton Garden Inn in Waldorf, Maryland after a front desk clerk complained to police that 
Brooks, who was staying at the hotel for a work conference, was behaving in a disorderly manner. 
McKimmie and other officers forced their way into Brooks’s room and arrested him. McKimmie 
charged Brooks with trespass ing and disorderly conduct , and Brooks spent a night in jail . The 
charges were eventually dismissed.  
Brooks filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against McKimmie and several 
other defendants. A jury found that McKimmie falsely arrested and falsely imprisoned Brooks in 
violation of Maryland state law; that McKimmie violated Brooks’s right to be free from unlawful 
arrest under the Maryland Declaration of Rights ; and that McKimmie violated Brooks’s right to 
be free from unlawful arrest under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Court 
entered judgment against McKimmie only on the Fourth Amendment claim . The Court did not 
enter judgment against McKimmie on the state-law claims because the jury found that McKimmie 
did not act with malice and McKimmie thus was immune from liability on those claims.  
 Pending before the Court are two post-trial motions. McKimmie filed a Rule 50(b) motion 
for judgment as a matter of law on the Fourth Amendment claim, arguing that he is entitled to 
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qualified immunity. ECF 98. Brooks filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment, 
arguing that McKimmie is not immune from liability on the state -law claim s. ECF 106. The 
motions are fully briefed. ECF 98- 1, 104, 105, 107, & 110. No hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 
105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the following reasons, both motions are denied.    
I. Background 
A. Procedural History 
On October 3, 2022, Brooks filed this lawsuit in state court against the State of Maryland, 
Charles County, Charles County Sheriff Troy Berry, St. Charles Hotel Operating, LLC d/b/a Hilton 
Garden Inn, and McKimmie, asserting various constitutional and tort claims arising out of his 
arrest at the Hilton . ECF 1 , at 1–2; ECF 1 -2. After the state, with the consent of all defendants,  
removed the case to federal court , some defendants filed motions to dismiss, ECF 12, 13, & 21, 
and some filed motions for summary judgment, ECF 52 & 53. Brooks voluntarily dismissed a 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. ECF 25. When the dust settled, the only 
claims that survived were Brooks’s state-law claims against McKimmie for false imprisonment, 
malicious prosecution, battery, and false arrest, his federal constitutional claim against McKimmie 
for malicious prosecution, and his federal and state constitutional claims  against McKimmie for 
unlawful arrest and excessive force.  
Trial began on January 12, 2026. The jury heard evidence over two days  and deliberated 
over two more. On January 15, 2026, the jury returned a partial verdict in Brooks’s favor. The jury 
found McKimmie liable for false arrest and false imprisonment under Maryland state law and for 
violating Brooks’s state and federal constitutional rights to be free from unlawful arrest. ECF 94, 
at 1–2. The jury found McKimmie not liable on Brooks’s remaining claims. Id. The jury also found 
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that McKimmie did not act with malice. Id.  at 2. The jury awarded Brooks $27,500 in 
compensatory damages. Id. at 3.  
On January 27, 2026, the Court entered judgment in Brooks’s favor on the Fourth 
Amendment unlawful-arrest claim and awarded him $27,500 in damages. ECF 101, at 2. The Court 
did not enter judgment in Brooks’s favor on the false arrest, false imprisonment, and state 
constitutional unlawful-arrest claims because McKimmie did not act with malice and he thus was 
immune from liability on those claims under the Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”) . Id. at 1; 
see also Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 12-105; Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(b).  
B. Evidence Adduced at Trial  
Following the lead of the parties, the Court recites only the trial evidence relevant to the 
pending motions.  
In October 2019, Brooks stayed at the Hilton in Waldorf, Maryland for a business 
conference. ECF 99, at 6:15–7:7. In the early morning hours of October 10, Charles County deputy 
sheriff McKimmie and his partner were dispatched to the Hilton in response to a report by the front 
desk clerk, Leonard Lowery,  that Brooks was causing a disturbance. ECF 100, at  4:3–6, 4:14–
5:10, 69:1–2. When McKimmie arrived, Lowery told him that Brooks had knocked over “a water 
bottle and maybe a hand sanitizer” and had left the hotel. Id. at 5:15–16, 70:18–20. Lowery asked 
McKimmie to “talk to [Brooks] ” and “get him to calm down[ .]” Id. at 5:19–21. After searching 
for and failing to locate Brooks on the premises, McKimmie and his partner left. Id. at 7:1–12.  
Less than half an hour later, Lowery called the police again and told them that Brooks had 
returned to the Hilton. Id.  at 7:23–8:1; 72:6–12. Lowery did not say anything about how Brooks 
had behaved upon his return. Id.  at 8:2–4. McKimmie returned to the Hilton , and Lowery asked 
him to “make sure things were calmed down.” Id. at 8:9. Lowery did not ask McKimmie to arrest 
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Brooks for trespassing at this time. Id.  at 10:1–3. McKimmie went to the door of Brooks’s hotel 
room and told Brooks, through the door, that “the hotel wanted him to stay in the room for the rest 
of the night[.]” Id. at 10:19–20. Brooks expressed confusion and was not “nice about it.” ECF 99, 
at 25:13–14; see also ECF 100, at 16:21–22 (McKimmie testifying that Brooks swore at him and 
told him that he would do what he wanted). McKimmie went to speak to Lowery, told him that his 
interaction with Brooks had not been “cordial,” and asked Lowery what he wanted McKimmie to 
do next. ECF 100, at 16:11–12. Lowery asked McKimmie to evict Brooks from the hotel. Id.  at 
16:14. McKimmie and his partner went back to Brooks’s door. Id.  at 20:7 –8. Another officer 
arrived and joined them at the door. Id. at 23:5–6.    
At this point, Brooks’s and McKimmie’s accounts sharply diverge. The officers were not 
wearing body cameras, see id. at 5:2–4, and no footage of what happened at Brooks’s hotel room 
door was introduced into evidence.  
Brooks testified that one of the officers used a room key to spring the lock on his door. 
ECF 99, at 26:19–21. The door did not open all the way because Brooks had a latch on it. Id.  at 
26:23. One of the officers stuck his foot in the door. Id. at 26:19–20. McKimmie told Brooks that, 
if he did not let the officers in, he would be arrested for trespassing. Id. at 26:12–13; see also ECF 
100, at 20:21–23 (McKimmie testifying that he told Brooks that if he did not leave , he would be 
locked up for trespassing). “As soon as” McKimmie said that, Brooks responded, “okay, guys, I 
do not want to be arrested for trespassing. I will let you in.” ECF 99, at 26:16–18. To let the officers 
in, Brooks first had to close the door so that he could undo the latch. Id. at 27:2–3. Brooks told the 
officers that he needed to close the door to open it and asked the officer with his foot in the door 
to move his foot. Id.  at 27:1–7. Brooks and the officer “agreed” that the officer would move his 
foot. Id. at 27:18. 
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As soon as the officer moved his foot and Brooks began to close the door  to unhook the 
latch, the officers kicked in the door, knocking Brooks to the ground. Id. at 27:18–28:14. “[W]ithin 
seconds of seeing” Brooks, the officers arrested him. Id. at 32:4–5.  
McKimmie had a different recollection. He testified that, after he told Brooks that he would 
be arrested for trespassing if he did not leave, Brooks responded, “[f]uck you, I paid for my room, 
I’ll do what I want.” ECF 100, at 21:2–3. McKimmie testified that he gave Brooks several minutes 
to leave, but Brooks did not. Id. at 57:7–13. McKimmie denied that Brooks told him that he would 
need to close the door to undo the latch, and he denied that he forced his way into the room. Id. at 
23:22, 25:14. McKimmie testified that t he other officers tackled Brooks after Brooks made an 
“aggressive stance.” Id. at 29:16–20. 
After Brooks’s arrest, the hotel discovered that the door lock was broken during the 
interaction with the police. Id.  at 23:16–18. Brooks was charged with disorderly conduct , in 
violation of Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 10-201(c)(5), and trespassing, in violation of Crim. Law 
§ 6-403(b). ECF 56-5, at 2; ECF 56-6. The charges eventually were dismissed. ECF 99, at 44:24–
45:7. 
II. Discussion 
A. Rule 50(b) Motion 
McKimmie has filed a Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law. “Judgment as a 
matter of law ‘is properly granted if the nonmoving party failed to make a showing on an essential 
element of his case with respect to which he had the burden of proof.’ ” Russell v. Absolute 
Collection Servs., Inc., 763 F.3d 385, 391 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheatley v. Wicomico Cnty. , 
390 F.3d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 2004)). When considering a Rule 50 motion, the court “construe[s] the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was made and ask[s] 
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whether ‘there is substantial evidence in the record to support the jury’s findings.’” Anderson v. 
Russell, 247 F.3d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 2001) ( quoting Wilhelm v. Blue Bell, Inc. , 773 F.2d 1429, 
1433 (4th Cir. 1985)). The court must “disregard all evidence favorable to [McKimmie] that the 
jury [was] not required to believe.” Harris v. Wormuth , 669 F. Supp. 3d 477, 500 (D. Md. 2023) 
(quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000)). The court “may 
not substitute [its] judgment for that of the jury or make credibility determinations[.]” Price v. City 
of Charlotte , 93 F.3d 1241, 1249 (4th Cir. 1996). Further, “[i]f the evidence as a whole is 
susceptible of more than one reasonable inference, a jury issue is created and a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law should be denied.” Myrick v. Prime Ins. Syndicate, Inc., 395 F.3d 485, 
489–90 (4th Cir. 2005). 
McKimmie argues that —even crediting only Brooks’s testimony—he is entitled to 
qualified immunity on Brooks’s Fourth Amendment unlawful -arrest claim  and that the Court 
should enter judgment in McKimmie’s favor on this claim.  
“The defense of qualified immunity shields public officials from civil liability unless they 
violated a ‘statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged 
conduct.’” Lewis v. Caraballo, 98 F.4th 521, 530 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Carroll v. Carman, 574 
U.S. 13, 16 (2014)). To defeat qualified immunity, the record must show that (1) McKimmie 
violated Brooks ’s constitutional right and (2) that right was “clearly established” when the 
violation occurred. Id. “The plaintiff bears the burden on the first prong, and the officer bears the 
burden on the second prong.” Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227, 233 (4th Cir. 2022).  
Here, only the second prong is at issue. McKimmie claims it was not clearly established at 
the time he arrested Brooks that “announcing ‘open the door or you’ll be arrested for trespassing’ 
followed by even a brief pause before entering the room was insufficient to establish probable 
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cause for trespass.” ECF 98-1, at 6. Brooks responds that no reasonable officer could have believed 
there was probable cause to arrest him for trespassing because Brooks was not given an opportunity 
to comply with McKimmie’s orders before being arrested and thus Brooks did not “remain” on 
the property in violation of the relevant trespassing statute, Crim. Law § 6-403(b). Brooks has the 
better argument. McKimmie has not met his burden of showing that Brooks’s right to be free from 
unlawful arrest was not clearly established in October 2019.    
“A right is clearly established if, at the time of the alleged offense, ‘ [t]he contours of the 
right [allegedly violated were] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that 
what he is doing violates that right.’”  Lewis, 98 F.4th at 534 ( alterations in  original) 
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). To determine whether an officer was 
on notice, “we first look to cases from the Supreme Court, [the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit], or the highest court of the state in which the action arose.” Ray v. Roane, 948 
F.3d 222, 229 (4th Cir. 2020). “In the absence of ‘directly on-point, binding authority,’ courts may 
also consider whether ‘the right was clearly established based on general constitutional principles 
or a consensus of persuasive authority.’” Id. (quoting Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 
543 (4th Cir. 2017)). The facts need not be an exact match to the facts of an earlier 
case. See Williams v. Strickland, 917 F.3d 763, 770 (4th Cir. 2019)  (“In some cases, government 
officials can be expected to know that if X is illegal, then Y is also illegal, despite factual 
differences between the two.”). Still, courts should take care “not to define clearly established law 
at a high level of generality.”  Ashcroft v. al -Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). “Instead, [a court] 
must identify the specific right the plaintiff alleges was infringed at a ‘high level of 
particularity.’” Atkinson v. Godfrey, 100 F.4th 498, 505 (4th Cir. 2024)  (quoting Edwards v. City 
of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 250–51 (4th Cir. 1999)). And “[a]lthough a case directly on point is 
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not required, existing precedent ‘must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond 
debate.’” Id. at 505–06 (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (per curiam)). 
The jury found McKimmie violated Brooks’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Fourth 
Amendment protects citizens from “unreasonable searches and seizures [.]” U.S. Const. amend. 
IV. “A seizure is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if it is not based on probable 
cause.” Hupp v. Cook, 931 F.3d 307, 318 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 
200, 213 (1979)). “Thus, ‘[i]f a person is arrested when no reasonable officer could believe . . . 
that probable cause exists to arrest that person, a violation of a clearly established Fourth 
Amendment right to be arrested only upon probable cause ensues.’”  Id. (alterations in original) 
(quoting Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 290 (4th Cir. 2001)). “[W]hether a plaintiff’s right to 
be free from arrest is clearly established turns not on ‘whether there actually was probable cause  
. . . but whether an objective law officer could reasonably have believed probable cause to 
exist.’” Thurston v. Frye , 99 F.4th 665, 676 (4th Cir. 2024)  (second alteration in original) 
(quoting Gomez v. Atkins, 296 F.3d 253, 261–62 (4th Cir. 2002)).  
“Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officers ’ knowledge 
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant 
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the 
person to be arrested.” Elliott v. State, 10 A.3d 761, 771 (Md. 2010) (quoting Longshore v. State, 
924 A.2d 1129, 1137 (Md. 2007)). Probable cause is a “fluid concept” that “depends on the totality 
of the circumstances[.]” State v. Johnson, 183 A.3d 119, 129 (Md. 2018) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983), and then quoting Maryland v. Pringle , 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)); see 
also Nero v. Mosby , 890 F.3d 106, 130 (4th Cir. 2018)  (“Probable cause is ‘a probability or 
substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity,’ and it is assessed 
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based on the totality of the circumstances.” (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 243 n.13)). “For probable 
cause to exist, there need only be enough evidence to warrant the belief of a reasonable officer that 
an offense has been or is being committed; evidence sufficient to convict is not required.” Brown 
v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 2002). “Probable cause ‘is not a high bar.’”  District of 
Columbia v. Wesby , 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) (quoting Kaley v. United States , 571 U.S. 320, 338 
(2014)). 
Here, McKimmie argues that a reasonable officer could have believed there was probable 
cause to arrest Brooks for trespassing in violation of Crim. Law § 6- 403(b). Section 6- 403(b) 
provides in relevant part that “[a] person may not remain on private property . . . after having been 
notified by the owner or the owner’s agent not to do so.” The parties do not dispute that, when 
McKimmie was at Brooks’s hotel room door for the second time, McKimmie, acting as the hotel’s 
agent, notified Brooks that he could no longer remain on the property. The disputed issue is 
whether, between the moment McKimmie gave Brooks notice and the moment the officers broke 
down the door  and arrested Brooks , a reasonable officer could have believed that Brooks had 
“remained” on the property.  
The parties do not identify a Supreme Court, Fourth Circuit, or Maryland case directly on 
point. That, however, does not end the inquiry. The Fourth Circuit has recognized that the “plain 
language” of a criminal statute and “a consensus of decisions from other jurisdictions interpreting 
similar language” can place the absence of probable cause beyond reasonable debate. Rogers, 249 
F.3d at 293; see also, e.g., Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151, 1164 (10th Cir. 2020) (concluding 
that officer could not have reasonably believed that he had probable cause to arrest plaintiff “based 
on the plain language” of the criminal statute) . Here, the plain language of § 6 -403(b), coupled 
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with a consensus of authority from other jurisdictions interpreting the term “remain,” makes it 
clear that McKimmie lacked probable cause to arrest Brooks for trespassing.  
Maryland’s criminal trespassing subtitle does not define “remain.” See Crim. Law § 6-401. 
The plain meaning of “remain,” according to the dictionary, is to stay in the same place. See 
Remain, Oxford English Dictionary Online, https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/1172250299 
[https://perma.cc/U783-75PB] (last visited Apr. 22, 2026)  (defining “remain” as, among other 
things, “[t]o continue in the same place or with the same person; to abide, to stay”); Remain , 
Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary Online , https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/remain 
[https://perma.cc/6WE3-6KDM] (last visited Apr. 22, 2026)  (defining “remain” as, among other 
things, “to stay in the same place or with the same person or group”).1 Courts outside of Maryland 
similarly have interpreted the term “remain” to mean “to stay in the same place” by referring to its 
ordinary and common meaning. See, e.g., People v. Howard, 89 N.E.3d 308, 313 (Ill. 2017) 
(“Ordinary people using common understanding can readily deduce that passing through a 
restricted school zone, and even dropping a person off at the school and then immediately leaving 
the area, are not acts of ‘remaining’ . . . . On the other hand, it is equally clear that parking one’s 
car in front of a school and waiting to pick someone up does constitute a prohibited act of 
‘remaining.’”); State, Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, Div. of Gaming Enf’t v. Boardwalk Regency 
Corp., 548 A.2d 206, 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (defining “remain,” as used in statute 
forbidding casinos to allow underage persons to “remain” in a casino, to mean “to stay in the same 
 
1 Interpreting the term “remain” according to its plain meaning also is consistent with principles 
of statutory construction that were well -established under Maryland law at the time of Brooks’s 
arrest. In October 2019, Maryland courts looked to “the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, 
popular understanding of the English language” in interpreting statutory terms, and when a term 
was undefined, courts used the dictionary as a starting point to ascertain the meaning of the statute. 
Schreyer v. Chaplain, 5 A.3d 1054, 1058 (Md. 2010) (quoting Adventist Health Care Inc. v. Md. 
Health Care Comm’n, 896 A.2d 320, 333 n.13 (Md. 2006)).  
 
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place or with the same person or group”) (internal quotation marks omitted); State ex rel. Seaton 
v. Holmes, 798 N.E.2d 375, 377 (Ohio 2003) (defining “remain,” as used in statutory phrase “such 
State remains the residence of the child or of any contestant,” to mean “to stay in the same place” 
and “to continue unchanged in form, condition, status, or quantity”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); State v. Fowler , 32 A. 162, 164 (Conn. 1895) (“ remain,” as used in law referring to 
“remaining” tax collector who exists after emergence of a vacancy, “means to continue; to stay; to 
be left; to be left after another or others have gone”).  
In light of the statute’s plain language and this consensus of authority, no reasonable officer 
could have concluded, under the circumstances of this case, that he had probable cause to arrest 
Brooks for trespassing in violation of § 6-403(b). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to Brooks, once McKimmie told Brooks to open the door or else be arrested for trespassing, Brooks 
immediately attempted to comply. He promptly acceded to the officer ’s command and told the  
officers that he did not want to be arrested for trespassing and that he would let them into his hotel 
room. Brooks told the officers that he had to close the door to unhook the latch before he could 
open the door. They agreed to let him do so. But before Brooks could unhook the latch, the officers 
kicked down the door, knocked him to the ground, and arrested him. Thus, from the moment 
McKimmie notified Brooks that he was trespass ing and had to leave  the hotel, Brooks tried to 
comply with the order to leave. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Brooks, 
Brooks did not “remain” —that is, stay, abide, or continue —on the property. Instead, Brooks 
immediately attempted to leave, all the while making it clear to McKimmie and the other officers 
that he was complying with the order. No reasonable officer would have believed that  Brooks’s 
immediate attempt to comply with an order to leave the hotel gave rise to probable cause that 
Brooks was “remaining” on hotel property.  
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McKimmie argues that it was not clearly established that a person had to “remain” on the 
property for any particular period of time before being arrested  for trespassing. ECF 98- 1, at 6 
(“[N]o authority in the Fourth Circuit or in Maryland case law in October 2019 clearly 
establish[ed] that . . . McKimmie provided insufficient time to satisfy the element that Plaintiff 
remained on the property.”) The Court rejects this  attempt to muddy the waters. When Brooks is 
given the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the evidence, the jury could have found that 
Brooks did not wait at all before he tried to comply with McKimmie’s order. There is substantial 
evidence to support a finding that Brooks immediately attempted to leave  and that he did not 
“remain” on the property for any period of time after McKimmie told him he had to leave. Under 
these facts, no reasonable police officer would have believed he had probable cause to arrest 
Brooks for trespassing. Whatever the qualified immunity analysis may have been had Brooks 
tarried, this is not that case. 
McKimmie has not met his burden to show that Brooks’s right to be free from unlawful 
arrest under these circumstances was not clearly established in October 2019. McKimmie  is not 
entitled to qualified immunity on Brooks’s Fourth Amendment unlawful-arrest claim. His motion 
for judgment as a matter of law is denied. 
B. Rule 59(e) Motion 
The Court entered judgment in Brooks’s favor on the Fourth Amendment unlawful-arrest 
claim against McKimmie. The Court did not enter judgment in Brooks’s favor on the false arrest, 
false imprisonment, and state constitutional unlawful-arrest claims because McKimmie did not act 
with malice and McKimmie is thus immune from liability on those claims, notwithstanding the 
jury’s finding of liability on them.   
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Brooks moves to alter or amend the judgment . Under Rule 59(e) , a party may move “to 
alter or amend a judgment . . . no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 59(e). The Court may amend an earlier judgment “(1) to accommodate an intervening change 
in controlling law; (2) to account for new e vidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear 
error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 
403 (4th Cir. 1998).  
Brooks argues the Court erred by not entering judgment in his favor on the false arrest, 
false imprisonment, and state-constitutional unlawful-arrest claims. In Brooks’s view, McKimmie 
is not immune from liability on these claims. For support, Brooks relies on a recent unreported 
decision from the Appellate Court  of Maryland, McCard v. Jones, No. 1076, Sept. Term, 2024, 
2026 WL 251899 (Md. App. Ct. Jan. 30, 2026), which was issued just over two weeks after the 
jury’s verdict and three days after the Court e ntered judgment in this case. McKimmie responds 
that McCard is inapplicable and that he is immune from liability under the MTCA. McKimmie is 
correct. 
Under the MTCA, Maryland state employees are immune from liability for tortious acts or 
omissions within the scope of their duties unless they act with malice or gross negligence. See 
Marks v. Dann, 600 F. App’x 81, 85 (4th Cir. 2015); Wyckoff v. Maryland, 522 F. Supp. 2d 730, 
738 (D. Md. 2007). A deputy sheriff, such as McKimmie, qualifies as a state employee for MTCA 
purposes. See Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(b); State Gov’t § 12-101(a)(6).
2 Brooks does not dispute 
that McKimmie was acting within the scope of his duties when he arrested him. The  jury found 
 
2 Section 12-101 has been amended since October 2019. However, under the version in effect at 
the time of Brooks’s arrest and the current version, a deputy sheriff qualifies as state personnel. 
  
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that McKimmie did not act with malice.3 Thus, McKimmie is immune from liability on Brooks’s 
state-law claims under the MTCA. The Court entered judgment accordingly.  
McCard does not call into question the Court’s immunity finding. In that case, the plaintiff 
sued a Prince George’s County Police Officer — not a deputy sheriff —for battery, negligence, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, punitive damages, and excessive force under the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights. 2026 WL 251899, at *1. The jury returned a verdict in the 
plaintiff’s favor on the battery and excessive force claims but found that the defendant had not 
acted with malice. Id.  at *4. The court granted the defendant’s post -trial motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, concluding that because the jury found the defendant had not acted 
with malice, she was entitled to public official immunity under Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-507. Id. The 
Appellate Court reversed, holding that  the court had erroneously granted judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict on the excessive force claim because § 5-507 did not confer immunity 
for state constitutional torts and malice was not an element of a claim for excessive force. Id.  at 
*9. 
McCard does not help Brooks for a simple reason: this Court did not find that McKimmie 
was entitled to public official immunity. The Court found McKimmie immune under the MTCA—
which, as the Appellate Court recognized in the very decision Brooks cites, does  apply to 
constitutional torts. Id. at *3 n.1 (“‘immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims Act, if otherwise 
applicable, encompasses constitutional torts’ while public official immunity does not”) (quoting 
 
3 The jury did not reach the question of whether McKimmie acted with gross negligence  because 
it did not find McKimmie liable for excessive force under the Maryland Declaration of Rights , 
which the Court held was the only state-law tort in this case that could have been committed with 
gross negligence.  
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Lee v. Cline, 863 A.2d 297, 310 (Md. 2004)). The McCard Court’s discussion of public official 
immunity has no bearing on McKimmie’s immunity under the MTCA.  
Brooks nonetheless insists that McKimmie is not entitled to MTCA immunity. He contends 
that “any immunity [McKimmie] enjoys stems from . . . § 5-507” because McKimmie was acting 
as an employee of Charles County, rather than the state, when McKimmie arrested him. ECF 106, 
at 5. As the Court has previously explained, however, “it is ‘well settled [under Maryland law] 
that, as a general rule, county sheriffs and their deputies are officials and/or employees of the State 
of Maryland, rather than their county.” Brooks v. St. Charles Hotel Operating, LLC, No. DLB-23-
208, 2023 WL 6244612, at *8 (D. Md. Sept. 26, 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Murphy-
Taylor v. Hofmann, 968 F. Supp. 2d 693, 726 (D. Md. 2013)). And the MTCA expressly classifies 
deputy sheriffs as state personnel. See State Gov’t § 12-101(a)(6).   
Brooks’s arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. He points to the Fourth Circuit’s 
statement in Dotson v. Chester , 937 F.2d 920, 928 (4th Cir. 1991) , that under Maryland law , a 
sheriff “is not always a state employee or always a county employee” and “may, on occasion, be 
both, or sometimes one and sometimes the other.” But Brooks reads  this statement from Dotson 
out of context. The Dotson Court made this statement in the context of assessing whether , in a § 
1983 suit, Dorchester County could be held liable for attorney’s fees and costs arising out of  the 
sheriff’s operation of the county jail. The Dotson Court concluded that notwithstanding Maryland 
caselaw holding that sheriffs qualify as state employees for purposes of tort liability, the 
Dorchester County sheriff qualified as a county official in this § 1983 case because he held “final 
policymaking authority for the [c]ounty”  over the jail’s operation and management ; thus, the 
county was liable for his portion of the  fee award. Id. at 921, 934. But here, the question is not 
whether McKimmie qualifies as a state or county official for purposes of determining Charles 
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County’s liability under § 1983. (Indeed, Charles County has long since been dismissed as a party 
to this suit.) The question is whether McKimmie qualifies as a state official for purposes of MTCA 
immunity. Under Maryland statutes and caselaw, he clearly does. See Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(b); 
State Gov’t § 12- 101(a)(6); Peacock v. Debley, 314 A.3d 439, 449 (Md. App. Ct. 2024) 
(“Maryland law is clear that the deputy sheriff is entitled to immunity under the MTCA.”), cert. 
denied, 319 A.3d 458 (Md. 2024).  
Brooks also points to two district court cases —Santos v. Frederick County Board of 
Commissioners, 346 F. Supp. 3d 785 (D. Md. 2018), and Harried v. Maryland, No. TDC-24-1190, 
2024 WL 4817107 (D. Md. Nov. 18, 2024)—which he claims support his position that McKimmie 
is a county official who is not entitled to MTCA immunity. They do not. Neither Santos nor 
Harried concluded that a sheriff or deputy sheriff was not a state employee for MTCA purposes. 
Harried and Santos both addressed whether deputy sheriffs were state or  county employees for 
purposes of § 1983 liability and Eleventh Amendment immunity—questions of federal, not 
Maryland, law. 2024 WL 4817107, at *4;  346 F. Supp. 3d at  792–800. And the Harried Court 
acknowledged that deputy sheriffs qualify as state personnel under the MTCA. See 2024 WL 
4817107, at *6.  
Finally, Brooks points to various state and Charles County statutes in support of his 
contention that Charles County exercises “significant control” over the sheriff’s office and that the 
state deems counties financially responsible for certain torts committed by deputy sheriffs. ECF 
110, at 3, 5. But Brooks does not explain how these statutory provisions supplant the clear text of 
the MTCA, which classifies McKimmie as a state employee.4  
 
4 Brooks also cites three cases from Maryland’s highest court, Clea v. Mayor and City Council of 
Baltimore, 541 A.2d 1303 (Md. 1988), Rucker v. Harford County, 558 A.2d 399 (Md. 1989), and 
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Whatever his employment status may be in other contexts, for purposes of MTCA 
immunity, McKimmie is a state employee. Under the MTCA, he is immune from tort liability 
unless he acted with malice or gross negligence. He did neither. Thus, the Court did not err in 
concluding that McKimmie is immune from liability on Brooks’s state-law claims. Brooks has not 
identified a change in controlling law, new evidence, or a clear error or manifest injustice that 
would warrant altering or amending the judgment. Brooks’s motion to alter or amend the judgment 
is denied. 
III. Conclusion
McKimmie’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and Brooks’s motion to alter or amend
the judgment are denied. A separate Order follows. 
D
ate:_____________ ________________________ 
Deborah L. Boardman 
United States District Judge    
Lee, to support his position. But none of these cases concluded that a deputy sheriff did not qualify 
as a state official for purposes of MTCA immunity.  
April 30, 2026
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