govinfo:USCOURTS-pawd-2_25-cv-01950-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AZURE MITCHELL,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-1950

v. Hon. William S. Stickman IV

OSA GLOBAL, LLC,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV, United States District Judge
Plaintiff A zure Mitchell (“Mitchell”) brings the following claims against her former
employer, Defendant OSA Global, LLC (“OSA”): Count I - discrimination in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII ”) and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (“ADEA”); Count II –
hostile work environment in violation of Title VII; and Count III – retaliation in violation of Title
VII and the ADEA. (ECF No. 1). OSA filed a motion to dism iss arguing that Mitchell’s suit is
untimely because she did no t fi le it within 90 days of receiving the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) August 4, 2025, notice of right-to-sue. (ECF No. 7). For
the following reasons, the Court will grant OSA’s motion.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mitchell began full-time employment with OSA as an armed guard supervisor around
October 2024. Her duties included supervising other guards, ensuring adherence t o procedures,
and managing staffing shortages for OSA’s security contracts with the Housing Authority of the
City of Pittsburgh (“HACP”). (ECF No 1, p. 4).
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On December 7, 2024, two security guards s cheduled to work at 2541 Chauncey Drive,
Apt. 232, Pittsburgh, PA 15219 (the “Chauncey Location”), failed to report for their shifts. The
Chauncey Location was the most dangerous l ocation for which OSA provided security, and the
use of bulletproof vests was standard protocol for guards assigned to that location. According to
Mitchell, OSA’s standard procedure when she could not find guard coverage was for the next
supervisor scheduled to begin their shift to fill the vacanc y. The next scheduled supervisor was
Midrow Leondre ( “Leondre”), a younger male emplo yee. Leondre refused to cover the
Chauncey Location and Mitchell was unable to reach her supervisor, Robert Ford ( “Ford”), to
resolve the situation. (Id. at 4-5).
Mitchell then entered a room wher e approximately five younger male colleagu es were
gathered, including Leondre and another one of Mit chell’s super iors, Corporal Ronmel Hunt
(“Hunt”). She explained the staffing issue and why she believed she was not the appropriate
person to cover the shift. Par t of her rationale was that OSA had failed to pro vide her with a
bulletproof vest and holster. Apparently, her coll eagues “began to taunt a nd haras s her in a
condescending manner,” and said t hings like, “You think because you are a girl that you don ’t
need to go up there.”; “You are nobody and no one likes you.”; “You’re gone.”; and that only the
male supervisors were “real supervisors.” Hunt then allegedly made “a physical gesture as if he
were going to strike [ ] Mitchell, causing her to flinch in fear of being hit. ” (Id. at 5 -6). Hunt
physically blocked the doorway, which prevented her from leaving. When Mitchell pleaded with
him to le t her leave, Hunt shouted, “You black bitch, I ’m on the phone .” (Id. at 6). The other
men held Hunt back, and she escaped from the room. (Id.). Mitchell immediately called Ford to
report the situation, pa rt of which he witnessed on FaceTime. Ford informed her that so meone
would call her the next day. (Id.).
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On December 8, 2024, OSA’s Director of Operations Amy McKnight ( “McKnight”)
called Mitchell, and Mitchell recounted the prior day’s events. McKnight said that she would
document the incident and that OSA would con duct an investigation. On December 27, 2024,
McKnight ca lled Mitchell and informed her that the investigation was complete, and that
Mitchell was being terminated for failure to report to work – i.e., for not covering the shift at the
Chauncey Location on December 7, 2024. (Id. at 6-7).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) tests
the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993) . A
plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that, if accepted as true, state a claim for relief plausible on
its face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal ,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) . A court must accept all we ll-pleaded factual allegations as true and
view them in the light most favorable to a plaintiff. See Doe v. Princeton Univ. , 30 F.4th 335,
340 (3d Cir. 2022); see al so Fowler v. UPM C Shadyside , 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) .
Although a court must acce pt the allegations in the complaint as true, it is “not compelled to
accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
The “plausibility” standard required for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss is not
akin to a “probability” requirement but asks for more than sheer “po ssibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In other words, the compl aint’s factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the
allegations are true even if d oubtful in fact. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Facial plausibility is
present when a plaintiff plea ds factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
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inference that a defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Even if
the complain t’s well -pleaded facts lead to a plausible inference, that inference alone will n ot
entitle a plaintiff to relief. Id. at 682. The complaint must support the inference with facts to
plausibly justify that inferential leap. Id.
Generally, a court may not consider an extraneous document when reviewing a motion to
dismiss. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig. , 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). If
parties present matters outside the pleadings and the court does not exclude them , the mot ion
must be converted to a motion for summary judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). When
reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, however, a court may consider attachments to it
without converting the motion into one for summary judgment if they are integral to the
allegations in the complaint and are authentic . See In re Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1426 (holding
that a court may consider a “document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint”);
ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc. , 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994) (same); Fallon v. Mercy Cath. Med.
Ctr. of Se. Pa., 877 F.3d 487, 493 (3d Cir. 2017) (same) ; FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a
written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”); see
also Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding that a court may consider an “undisputedly authentic document that a defendant
attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the document”).
Thus, the E EOC documents at ECF No s. 7 -1 (Charge of Discri mination at 533-2025-
00826), 7-2 (Notice of Right-to-Sue at Charge No. 533-2025-00826), and 13-1 (Intake Interview
at Charge No. 533 -2025-00826) may be considered by the Court in re solving OSA’s mo tion,
either as undisputed documents referenced in the compla int or central to Mitchell’s claims, or as
information that is a matter of public record, without converting the motion to dismiss to one for
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summary judgment. See Rogan v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 777, 782 (W.D. Pa. 2000),
aff’d, 276 F.3d 579 (3d Cir. 2001) (“It is clear to us that under the applicable legal standard we
may consider the EEOC charge and related EEOC documents, including the letter from the
EEOC summarizing its investigation, the right to sue letter, and the intake questionnaire, either
as undisputed documents referenced in the complaint or central to the plaintiff's claim, or as
information which is a matter of public record, without converting this motio n to one [fo r]
summary judgment.”); see also McNaney v. Sampson & Morris Grp., Inc. , No. 2:21 -CV-1809,
2022 WL 1017388, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2022) (“Federal courts have held that EEOC
documents attached to a defendant ’s motion to dismiss are reviewable without conv erting the
motion to one for summary judgment because they are not subject to dispute as to their
authenticity and issues relating to exhaustion and post -exhaustion timeliness form essential parts
of a plaintiff’s claims.”). At the same time, the Court recognizes that:
The EEOC Charge Form and the Intake Questionnaire serve different purposes.
An Intake Questi onnaire facilitates “pre-charge filing counseling” and allows the
Commission to determine whether it has jurisdiction to pursue a charge. Federal
Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 128 S.Ct. 1147, 1159, 170 L.Ed.2d 10
(2008).[ ] Moreover, the Intake Q uestionnaire is not shared with the employer
during the pendency of the EEOC investigation. On the other hand, an EEOC
Charge Form serves to define the scope of the Commission ’s investigation and to
notify the defendant of the charges against it. See 42 U. S.C. § 2000e –5(b)
(requiring the Commission to serve notice of the charge on the employer against
whom it is made within ten days, and to co nduct an in vestigation); Occidental
Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC , 432 U.S. 355, 359 –60, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 53 L.Ed.2d
402 (1977) (stating the same). A plaintiff cannot be allowed to transfer the
allegations mentioned only in the questionnaire to the char ge it self. Not o nly
would this be circumventing the role of the Commission, but it would be
prejudicial to the employer.

Barzanty v. Verizon PA, Inc. , 361 F. App’x 411, 415 (3 d Cir. 2010). Thus, it will assign ECF
No. 13-1 (Intake Interview at Charge No. 533-2025-00826) the weight it is due.

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III. ANALYSIS
Before a plaintiff may file a claim under Title VII or the ADEA, she must exhaust h er
administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(e)(1); EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 595 (1981); 29 U.S.C. § 626(e). If
the EEOC decides it will no t pursue a plaintiff’s charge, it “shall ... notify” the plaintiff. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). A claim under Title VII or the ADEA must be brought within 90 days of
receiving the right -to-sue notice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e –5(f)(1); McGovern v. City of Phila. , 554
F.3d 114, 115 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009); 29 U.S.C. § 626(e); Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc. , 500 F.3d 375, 383
n.11 (3d Cir. 2007).
In h er complaint, Mitchell alle ges that sh e f iled a charge of discrimination wit h the
EEOC on September 16, 2025 , and that a 90-day right-to-sue notice was received on September
17, 2025, thus making this action timely. (ECF No. 1). On the other hand, OSA argues that
Mitchell’s prior EEOC charge bearing Charge No. 533-2025-00826 (“First Charge”) contained
allegations regarding the same events pled in her complaint, and that the EEOC issued a right-to-
sue notice with respect to the First Charge on August 4, 2025. Plaintiff received the right-to-sue
notice on August 13, 2025 . OSA contends that Mitchell’s complaint was untimely because the
September 17, 2025, right-to-sue notice did not extend or restart the statutory period for Mitchell
to file suit as it was based on the same allegations contained in the First Charge.
A plaintiff cannot revive claims stemming from an expired administrative charge in a ripe
charge. See Soso Liang Lo v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. , 787 F.2d 827, 828 (2d Cir. 1986)
(per curiam) (finding suit time barred where plaintiff obtained a second right -to-sue letter based
on facts identical to an expired, initial right-to-sue letter); see also Rivera-Diaz v. Humana Ins. of
Puerto Rico, Inc., 748 F.3d 387, 391 (1st Cir. 2014) (plaintiff’s Title VII claim filed after the 90-
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day deadline could not be “resuscitated by the filing of a second administrative charge”); Brown
v. Unified Sch. Dist. 501, 465 F.3d 1184, 1186 (10th Cir. 2006) (“lapsed claims are not revived
by including them in a seco nd EEOC charge and restarting the proce ss”); Spears v. Mo. Dep’t of
Corr. & Human Res. , 210 F.3d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 2000) (barring plaintiff from fi ling suit based
on second EEOC charge that replicated an untimely charge). Allowing plaintiffs to renew
expired claims in a ripe administrative ch arge would render “the time limitations of 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(1) ... meaningless, because potential Title VII plaintiffs could evade those
requirements simply by seeking additional Notices of Right to Sue whenever they pleased.” Lo,
787 F.2d at 828. Thus, whether the present action is time barred must be determined with
reference to the First Charge and the complaint.
“The test for exhaustion is ‘whether the acts alleged in the subsequent [judicial
complaint] are fairly within the scope of the prior [administrative charge], or the investigation
arising therefrom.’” Kopko v. Lehigh Valley Health Network , 776 F. App ’x 768, 773 (3d Cir.
2019) (quoting Antol v. Perry , 82 F.3d 1291, 1295 (3d Cir. 1996)). The Court must determine
whether the claims presented in the complaint are reasonably related to those in the First Charge
by assessing “whether there is a close nexus between the facts in the administrative charge and
those in the judicial comp laint.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Hicks v. ABT Assocs., Inc. , 572 F.2d
960, 967 (3d Cir. 1978). The question is whether “a reasonable investigation by the EEOC
would have encompassed t he … claims.” Howze v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. , 750 F.2d
1208, 1212 (3d Cir. 1984). Failure to include an allegation in the EEO C complaint is not fatal,
as long as the acts alleged in the subsequent lawsuit are fairly within the scope of the prior EEOC
complaint or the related EEOC investigation. Waiters v. Parsons , 729 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir.
1984); Antol, 82 F.3d at 1295; Simko v. United States Steel Corp., 992 F.3d 198, 207 (3d Cir.
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2021). To determine whether a claim fairly falls within the EEOC complaint or related
investigation, courts consider (1) whether the claim advances the same theory of discr imination
as the original charge and (2) whether the claim arises from the same set of facts that support the
original charge. Simko, 992 F.3d at 209 (collecting cases).
The First Charge describes the relevant events as:
I [was] hired on or about November 10, 2024, an d was then transitioned to a new
company wher e my las t job title was an armed officer security supervisor. On
December 27, 2024, I was told by another supervisor that I had to go to a site, but
I was not properly equipped and declined. Later, I was complet ing work and
about to che ck out where I was a pproached by a group of 5 men. 4 I know are
supervisors and one is a similarly situated officer. It was originally a conversation
about earlier, but it turned into an argument where I was locked in a room with
them making th reatening gestures. I was told “You can just shut up ”, “Because
you’re a girl you feel you don’t have to do anything”, and “No one here likes you;
you can ask the other supervis ors.” I informed my supervisor and a higher up
Lieutenant Rob Ford, who is also the uncle of the 5 men. On or a bout January 1,
2025, a message was sent to me saying I was terminated.

(ECF No. 7-1, p. 2). It further states, “I believe I have been retaliated against in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amende d, in that I was terminated because I rep orted my
colleagues and didn’t go to the site as they wanted me to since it felt unsafe for me to do so .”
(ECF No. 7-1, p. 2). Mitchell’s year of birth on the First Charge is listed as 1975.
According to Mitche ll, “the First Charge omitted key facts whi ch in turn prevented the
EEOC from conducting any reasonable inv estigation into [her] claims for age, sex, and race
discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation for opposing such unlawful conduct. ”
(ECF No. 11, p. 2). Mitchell contends these facts were omitted from the First Charge:
(1) Plaintiff is 50 years old and African American; (2) Plaintiff was to be provided
with a bulletproof vest and holster for her weapon, which were necessary when
providing security at the Chauncey Location due to its reputation of being the
most dangerous facility at wh ich Defendant provided security services; (3)
Plaintiff was not scheduled to report to the Chauncey location on December 7,
2024 and this shift should have b een covered by a male supervisor, M idrow
Leondre; (4) the five male colleagues were younger than Pl aintiff; (5) the
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statements from the 5 male colleagues that only the male supervisors were the
“real supervisors ”; (6) a gesture made by Corporal Ronmel Hunt at Plaintiff
insinuating that he was going to hit Plaintiff; (7) Mr. Hunt calling Robert Ford on
FaceTime during the interaction with the 5 male colleagues so that Mr. Ford could
participate in the harassing conduct; (8) Mr. H unt blocking the exit door of the
room, c onfining Plaintiff ther ein; (9) Mr. Hunt stating to Plaintiff, “you black
bitch, I ’m on the phone ”; (10) Mr. Hunt having to be physically restrained by
those male colleagues present as it was clear he intended to ph ysically assault
Plaintiff; a nd ( 11) Plai ntiff called Amy McKnig ht, Defendant ’s director of
operations, to report that she believed she was being harassed as a result of her
gender and age. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 12, 15-17, 19-22, 25, 27-32, 34.

(Id. at 8-9).
The Court disagrees and holds that the complaint falls squarely w ithin the scope of
Mitchell’s First Charge for discrimination and retaliation, relying on similar facts involving one
operative incident that occurred on December 27, 2024 . Mitchell merely add s mor e granular
detail as t o what occurred on December 27, 202 4, in her complaint. There are no separate and
distinct events from the December 27, 2024, incident set forth in her complaint. The variations
in details as to what occurred on December 27, 2024, and the theories of liability that they may
support, do not rem ove Mitchell’s claims from the scope of the First Cha rge and the EEOC’s
investigation. The addition of other factual details related to the December 27, 2024, incident in
the complaint, whic h further Mitchell’s various th eories of liability, do not remove Mitchell’s
claims from the scope of the First Charge. Mitchell undoubtedly believed she was the victim of
discrimination and retaliation when she filed her First Charge. The First Charge, complete with
the statement, “I believe I have been retaliated against in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 196 4, as amended, in that I was terminated because I reported my colleagues and didn’t
go to the site as they wanted me to since it felt unsafe for me to do s o” (ECF No. 7-1, p. 2), and
her narrative description of the events tha t occurred on December 27, 202 4, fulfilled the purpose
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of putting the EEOC on notice of her relevant claims. A reasonable investigation by the EEOC
would have encompassed Mitchell’s termination and the events of December 27, 2024.
An EEOC charge is a signed statement asserting that an organization engaged in
employment discrimination and requests that the EEOC take remedial action. Federal Express
Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393 (2008). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has instructed that the scope of an EEOC charge is to be liberally construed. See Hicks,
572 F.2d at 965 (“[C]harges are most often drafted by one who is not well versed in the art of
legal description.... [T]he scope of the origina l charge should be liberally construed.”). “[T]he
purpose of the filing requirement is to enable the EEOC to investigate and, if cause is found, to
attempt to use informal means to reach a settlement of the dispu te.” Anjelino v. N.Y. Times Co. ,
200 F.3d 73, 94 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Hicks, 572 F.2d at 963). Further, “an EEOC charge is not
required to contain any legal conclusions, ‘[i]t is up to the EEOC, not [the plaintiff], to
investigate whether and under what legal theories discrimination might have o ccurred.’” Houle
v. Walmart Inc. , 447 F. Supp. 3d 261, 276 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Kronos Inc. ,
620 F.3d 287, 302 (3d Cir. 2010)). The original charge provides the EEOC with “a jurisdictional
springboard to investigate whether the employer i s engaged in any discriminatory practices,”
which investigators may well “disclose, as in this instance, illegal practices other than those
listed in the charge.” E.E.O.C. v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 511 F.2d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1975)
As to Count I (i.e., age and sex discrimination (ECF No. 1, pp. 7-8)), Mitchell claimed in
her First Charge that she was discriminated against based on her sex. S he specifically refers to
gender-based derogatory remarks and threating treatment by other male supervisors. Given that
the events of December 27, 202 4, form the entire basis of her complaint, and that her date of
birth was listed on the First Charge, Mitchell’s age-based claim of discri mination could also
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reasonably be ex pected to grow out of the EEOC’s investigation into her general claim of
discrimination under Title VII in the First Charge.
Next, as to Count II (i.e., hostile work environment based on her sex and race (Id. at 10-
16)), her claims are clearly within the scope of the EEOC’s investigation into the First Charge.
Mitchell claimed that she was locked in a room and subjected to threatening gestures and
derogatory remarks regarding her gender . The EEOC ’s investigation would have adduced the
respective race and sex of the involved parties, including Mitchell ’s, and it would h ave
reasonably included an inquiry into whether OSA was a hostil e environment. As OSA correctly
notes, one single event, like what allegedly occurred to Mitchell on December 27, 2024, with her
colleagues, can create a hostile w ork environment if extreme enough. See C astleberry v. STI
Group, 863 F.3d 259, 264-65 (3d. 2017).
Lastly, as to Count III (i.e., retaliation (ECF No 1, pp. 16 -20)), the basis for this claim is
unquestionably asserted in M itchell’s EEOC charge. She claimed in the First Charge that her
employment was terminated after she filed a formal compl aint of discrimination /harassment
related to the events of December 27, 2024, to her supervisor.
The Court concludes that all of the claims Mitchell raises in her complaint are reasonably
within the scope of the First Charge and the EEOC investigation. Consequently, it holds that the
90-day fili ng period be gan upo n Mit chell’s receipt of th e August 4, 2025, right -to-sue notice.
She did not file suit until December 15, 2025. Therefore, her complaint is time barred.

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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant OSA’s motion by order of court to follow.
BY THE COURT:

s/ William S. Stickman IV
WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

April 30, 2026
Dated

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