govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-01784-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
____________________________________       
      )   
FRANKLIN OSVALDO RUBIO,  ) 
      ) 
   Plaintiff,  ) 
      ) 
 v.     ) Civil Action No. 25-1784 (RBW)  
      )  
CREDENCE MANAGEMENT   ) 
SOLUTIONS, LLC,     ) 
      )    
   Defendant.  )       
       ) 
        
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
The plaintiff, Franklin Osvaldo Rubio, proceeding pro se, brings this civil action against 
the defendant, Credence Management Solutions, LLC, asserting that the defendant: (1) violated 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, by discriminating 
against him based on his race and national origin; creating a hostile work environment based on 
his race and national origin; and retaliating against him for engaging in protected activity, see 
Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”) at 3–4, ECF No. 12; (2) violated the District of Columbia 
Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code § 2-1402.11, by wrongfully terminating him, see id. 
at 4; and (3) defamed him under District of Columbia common law, see id.  Currently pending 
before the Court is the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (“Def.’s Mot.”), 
ECF No. 14, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Upon careful consideration 
of the parties’ submissions,
1 the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant the 
defendant’s motion. 
 
1 In addition to the filings already identified, the Court considered the following submissions in rendering its 
decision: (1) the exhibits filed by the plaintiff following the filing of his Amended Complaint, see Notice of Filing 
of Exhibits (“Pl.’s Exs.”), ECF No. 13; (2) the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant’s 
(continued . . .) 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
 
The following allegations are derived from the plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, unless 
otherwise specified.  The plaintiff identifies himself as a “Hispanic/Latino male of Salvadoran 
origin.”  See Am. Compl. at 1.  He alleges that he was employed by the defendant, Credence 
Management Solutions, LLC, id. at 1, as a “System Administrator” from November 27, 2023, to 
May 3, 2024, when he was terminated by his immediate supervisor, Richard Pokorny, and an 
unnamed Human Resources (“HR”) representative, see id. at 2.  
The plaintiff alleges that, prior to his termination, he “was placed on a Performance 
Improvement Plan [(‘PIP’)] on March 14, 2024, for [allegedly] trivial reasons such as a 30-
minute [delay in providing a Microsoft] Teams response, child-care related absences, and a 
disputed remote work schedule.”  Id.  The plaintiff also alleges that, at some point during his 
approximately six-month term of employment, he was assigned to shadow another systems 
administrator who he alleges was rarely at the office, rendering the shadow-training impossible.  
Id.  Nonetheless, the plaintiff claims he “was criticized as if he failed his duties” despite being 
unable to shadow the other systems administrator.  Id. 
At bottom, the plaintiff contends that he “was held to stricter standards” than “[o]ther 
systems administrators [who] engaged in similar conduct, such as repeated absences and flat tire 
excuses, but were not disciplined.”  Id.  And, the plaintiff appears to allege that he “was placed 
on [the] PIP after complaining” about these stricter standards.  Pl.’s Opp’n at 2.  Moreover, the 
 
(. . . continued) 
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (“Def.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 14–1; (3) the Plaintiff’s Opposition to 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 20; and (4) the Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s 
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (“Def.’s Reply”), ECF No. 19.  
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plaintiff alleges that during the PIP meeting to discuss his purported performance issues, Mr. 
Pokorny “instructed [him] not to mention [his] coworkers’ absences . . . .”  Am. Compl. at 2. 
These purportedly unequal standards do not appear to be the only conflict that existed 
between the plaintiff and Mr. Pokorny.  The plaintiff also alleges that, at some point during his 
employment, he “complained to [Mr. Pokorny’s] supervisor about [Mr. Pokorny’s] unfair 
treatment and badmouthing of employees[,]” id., which he alleges included “mock[ing] 
employees’ accents[ and] hygiene[,]” id. at 3, and “follow[ing the p]laintiff around the office, 
even into the restroom[,]” id. 
Ultimately, as previously indicated, the plaintiff alleges that on May 3, 2024, he was 
terminated by Mr. Pokorny and an unnamed HR representative.  See id. at 2.  According to the 
plaintiff, he was never informed, in writing or otherwise, that he had failed to meet the 
requirements set forth in the PIP, see id. at 3, and he asserts that, to the contrary, “[h]e was 
terminated despite meeting [the PIP’s] requirements[,]” id.  The plaintiff further alleges that he 
subsequently learned from a former colleague that, “[a]fter [his] termination, [Mr. Pokorny] 
instructed employees not to contact [the p]laintiff.”  Id. 
Subsequently, on April 9, 2025, HR representative Abby Smith allegedly told Anna Rose 
Kelly Tedrow, “an associate” of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff had been terminated for 
performance reasons.2  Id.  According to the plaintiff, “[t]his disclosure was unauthorized” and 
occurred before the defendant obtained “any release [of information from him].”  Id.  Sometime 
after the alleged April 9, 2025 disclosure, the plaintiff represents that the defendant contacted 
him and requested that he sign a “release for salary information[.]”  Id.  The plaintiff contends 
 
2 The plaintiff identifies “Anna Tedy” as the associate to whom the disclosure was allegedly made, see Am. Compl. 
at 2, but later identifies the same individual as “Anna Rose Kelly Tedrow[,]” id. at 3.  In his opposition to the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiff also refers to this same alleged disclosure, but he alleges that it was 
made to “a third party verifier[,]” who appears to be Ms. Tedrow.  Pl.’s Opp’n at 2. 
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that this subsequent request for release indicates the defendant knew the alleged April 9, 2025, 
disclosure was unauthorized and premature.  Id.  Finally, the plaintiff contends that the defendant 
reported his job performance as “poor” to a prospective employer and “advised [the plaintiff to] 
remov[e] [the defendant] as a [job] reference.”  Id. 
As a result of his termination, the plaintiff represents that he has had to turn to other, less 
stable and less lucrative employment, including “gig work such as DoorDash and Instacart,” to 
support his family.  Id.  The plaintiff contends that he has “suffered approximately $121,656 in 
back pay losses [up] to [the] date[ of the filing of his Amended Complaint], plus emotional 
distress, anxiety, depression, and financial hardship.”  Id.  
B. Administrative and Procedural Background 
 
On April 22, 2025, nearly one year after his termination, the plaintiff filed a charge of 
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) based on his 
race and national origin, as well as a charge of retaliation for engaging in protected activity.  See 
Pl.’s Exs., Exhibit (“Ex.”) A (EEOC Charge of Discrimination (“EEOC Charge”)) at 2, ECF No. 
13–1.  Subsequently, on May 6, 2025, the EEOC issued the plaintiff a notice of his right to sue.  
See id., Ex. B (EEOC Right to Sue Letter (“Right to Sue Letter”)) at 2, ECF No. 13–1. 
Then, on June 6, 2025, the plaintiff filed his original Complaint in this case.  See 
Complaint for Employment Discrimination and Retaliation (“Compl.”) at 1, ECF No. 1.  On 
August 26, 2025, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for a more definite statement, see 
Order at 1 (Aug. 26, 2025), ECF No. 8, and ordered the plaintiff to file an amended complaint 
that clearly set forth:  
(1) the specific facts regarding his termination; (2) the type of employment 
discrimination claims he s ought to advance; (3) the specific facts underl ying his 
employment discrimination claims; (4) his efforts to exhaust his administrative 
remedies; and (5) information regarding the content of any allegedly defamatory 
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statement including the date and location of such statement(s), the identity of the 
speaker and how any such statement was communicated, and information bearing 
on the falsity of that statement. 
 
Id. at 4–5.   
In response to the Court’s Order, on August 29, 2025, the plaintiff filed his Amended 
Complaint.  See Am. Compl. at 1.  The defendant then filed its motion to dismiss the amended 
complaint on September 19, 2025.  See Def.’s Mot. at 1.  On October 14, 2025, the plaintiff filed 
his opposition to the defendant’s motion to dismiss, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 1, and, on October 23, 
2025, the defendant filed its reply to the plaintiff’s opposition, see Def.’s Reply at 1.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether a complaint “state[s] a claim upon which relief can 
be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  “To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. 
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads 
factual content that allows the court to draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 
for the misconduct alleged.”  Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 
In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “the Court must construe the 
complaint in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be 
derived from the facts alleged.”  Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 
(D.C. Cir. 1979)).  While the Court must “assume [the] veracity” of any “well-pleaded factual 
allegations” in a complaint, conclusory allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.  Thus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 
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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”  Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 555).  Accordingly, the Court need not “accept legal conclusions cast as factual 
allegations[,]” or “inferences drawn by [the] plaintiff if those inferences are not supported by the 
facts set out in the complaint[.]”  Hettinga, 677 F.3d at 476.  The Court “may consider only the 
facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the 
complaint[,] and matters of which [the Court] may take judicial notice.”  Equal Emp. 
Opportunity Comm’n v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  
Finally, a defendant may properly raise an affirmative defense in a motion to dismiss only  
“when the facts that give rise to the defense are clear from the face of the complaint.”  Smith-
Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  
The Court is mindful of the fact that the plaintiff in this matter is proceeding pro se, and 
that the pleadings of pro se parties are “to be liberally construed, [and] a pro se complaint, 
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted 
by lawyers.”  Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  And, because the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court is also mindful that all of his 
factual allegations, whether contained in the complaint or other filings in the matter, should 
be read together in considering whether to grant a dispositive motion.  See Richardson v. United 
States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 
146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (concluding the same in the context of a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6)).  However, just like parties represented by attorneys, a pro se litigant “must 
comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s local rules[.]”  Hedrick v. 
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 216 F. Supp. 3d 84, 93 (D.D.C. 2016) (citations omitted); see 
McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“[W]e have never suggested that procedural 
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rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who 
proceed without counsel.”). 
III. ANALYSIS 
The defendant moves to dismiss the plaintiff’s Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), 
arguing that: (1) the plaintiff’s Title VII and DCHRA claims “are time-barred under the 
applicable statute[s] of limitations[,]” Def.’s Mem. at 2; and (2) the plaintiff’s defamation claim 
“is factually and legally insufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted[,]” id.  In 
response, the plaintiff argues that his DCHRA claim was timely filed, and that although his Title 
VII claims were filed outside the applicable timeframe, he is entitled to equitable tolling 
“because he diligently pursued his rights and only later discovered key facts confirming [the 
d]efendant’s unlawful conduct.”  Pl.’s Opp’n at 1.  The plaintiff further argues that he has 
sufficiently pleaded his defamation claim.  See id. 
The Court will first address whether the plaintiff’s Title VII and DCHRA claims are 
time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitations and, if so, whether equitable tolling 
applies to these claims.  Because the Court ultimately concludes that the plaintiff’s Title VII and 
DCHRA claims are time-barred and that the plaintiff has failed to show that he is entitled to 
equitable tolling as to those claims, the Court need not address the defendant’s other arguments 
in support of dismissal of the plaintiff’s Title VII and DCHRA claims.  Finally, the Court will 
determine whether the plaintiff has adequately stated his common law defamation claim.  
A. Whether the Plaintiff’s Title VII and DCHRA Claims Are Time-Barred Under the 
Applicable Statutes of Limitations (Counts I, II, III, and V) 
 
The defendant first argues that the plaintiff’s Title VII and DCHRA claims are all clearly 
time-barred because the plaintiff’s submissions establish that the plaintiff’s original Complaint in 
this case was not filed within the applicable limitations periods for the plaintiff to bring his 
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claims under those statutes.  See Def.’s Mem. at 2.  In response, the plaintiff appears to argue: 
(1) that the Court should not assess timeliness at the motion-to-dismiss stage, see Pl.’s Opp’n 
at 2; (2) that even if the Court does assess timeliness at this time, his Title VII claims are either 
timely because he filed this lawsuit within 90 days of receiving his Right to Sue Letter from the 
EEOC, see id., or they are subject to equitable tolling because he “diligently attempted to file 
[his EEOC charge] earlier and did not learn [of] critical facts until an associate confirmed [that] 
HR had disclosed damaging information [about him] without [his] authorization[,]” id.; and (3) 
that his DCHRA claim is timely because “[t]he one-year [statute of limitations] period tolled 
while the EEOC charge was pending[,]” and he “filed [his complaint] shortly after receiving his 
Right-to-Sue letter[,]” id. at 2. 
“Title VII ‘[c]omplainants must timely exhaust the[ir] administrative remedies before 
bringing their claims to court.’”  Payne v. Salazar, 619 F.3d 56, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (alterations 
in original) (quoting Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).  “In the 
District of Columbia, [ ] an EEOC charge must be filed within 300 days of the date of the 
allegedly discriminatory/retaliatory act.”  Duberry v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc., 898 F. Supp. 2d 
294, 298 (D.D.C. 2012); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also Craig v. District of Columbia, 
74 F. Supp. 3d 349, 361 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Ordinarily, . . . a plaintiff alleging a violation of Title 
VII must file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the date that the allegedly discriminatory act 
occurred[; however,] [i]n the District of Columbia . . . a ‘worksharing agreement’ between the 
EEOC and the [District's Office of Human Rights (‘DCOHR’)] results in the automatic cross-
filing of an EEOC complaint with the [DCOHR], thereby extending the filing deadline for 
plaintiffs in the District to 300 days.” (citations omitted)).   
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And, in June 2025, when the plaintiff filed his original Complaint in this case, the 
DCHRA had a one-year statutory deadline for filing a judicial complaint, see D.C. Code § 2-
1403.16(a), but that the filing of an administrative complaint with the DCOHR tolled the 
DCHRA’s statute of limitations for bringing a judicial complaint until the DCOHR issued the 
plaintiff a notice of his right to sues, see id. § 2-1403.16(b)(2).3  The worksharing agreement 
between the EEOC and DCOHR also causes the timely filing of a complaint with the EEOC to 
trigger the DCHRA’s tolling provision.  See Alexander v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 826 
F.3d 544, 551 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (per curiam). 
However, “Title VII’s  time limit on filing a complaint with the EEOC is not jurisdictional 
and is subject to ‘estoppel[] and equitable tolling,’” Currier v. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 
Inc., 159 F.3d 1363, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 
U.S. 385, 393 (1982)), although “only in extraordinary and carefully circumscribed instances[,]” 
Smith-Haynie, 155 F.3d at 580.  Relevant here, “a litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a 
statute of limitations only if the litigant establishes two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing 
his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way and 
prevented timely filing.”  Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisc. v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 255 
(2016).  On the other hand, “the principles of equitable tolling . . . do not extend to what is at best 
a garden variety claim of excusable neglect.”  Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 96 
(1990).  And, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating a basis for equitable tolling.  See 
McAlister v. Potter, 733 F. Supp. 2d 134, 143–44 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding that equitable 
 
3 The DCHRA was recently amended to enlarge the statute of limitations to a two -year period.  See § 2–1403.16(a); 
see also Valentine v. Geo. Wash. Univ., No. 24-cv-1081 (RC), 2025 WL 2029802, at *5 n.5 (D.D.C. July 21, 2025) 
(“The D.C. Council has recently established a two-year statute of limitations for DCHRA claims, but that change 
does not apply retroactively.”); Payne v. D.C. Gov’t, 722 F.3d 345, 352 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (noting that statutes are 
construed as having only prospective operation absent clear legislative intent that the statute should be applied 
retroactively). 
 
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considerations were not applicable because the plaintiff failed to explain or raise an excuse for 
her late filing). 
Here, the plaintiff alleges that he was terminated on May 3, 2024, see Am. Compl. at 2, 
and therefore, he had 300 days from that date to file his EEOC charge, i.e., until February 27, 
2025, in order for the claims relating to acts that occurred during his employment to be 
actionable under Title VII.4  However, the plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and associated 
exhibits establish that he did not file his EEOC Charge until April 22, 2025.  See Pl.’s Exs., Ex. 
A (EEOC Charge) at 2.  Thus, it is “clear from the face of the complaint[,]” Smith-Haynie, 155 
F.3d at 578, that his claims are untimely under Title VII’s statutory deadline for filing an EEOC 
charge, and thus, the Court must dismiss those claims even at this early stage of the case unless 
equitable tolling is applicable.
5 
Similarly, the plaintiff was required to file his DCHRA wrongful termination lawsuit 
within one year of his May 3, 2024, termination, unless he brought an administrative complaint, 
thus tolling the limitations period for filing suit.  On April 22, 2025, 354 days after his 
termination, the plaintiff filed his EEOC Charge, see Pl.’s Exs., Ex. A (EEOC Charge) at 2, 
tolling the one-year statute of limitations until May 6, 2025, when the EEOC dismissed the 
plaintiff’s charge and issued the plaintiff his Right to Sue letter, see id., Ex. B (Right to Sue 
Letter) at 1.  The plaintiff then filed his original complaint in this case on June 6, 2025, 31 days 
after the EEOC dismissed his administrative charge.  See Compl. at 1.  Thus, in total, the 
 
4 Although the plaintiff alleges that the defendant disseminated damaging information about him after he was 
terminated, that disclosure is the basis for his defamation claim, and not any of his employment discrimination 
claims, and was not included in his EEOC Charge.  See Pl.’s Exs., Ex. A (EEOC Charge) at 1. 
 
5 Although the plaintiff argues that his lawsuit is timely because he filed it within 90 days of receiving his Right to 
Sue letter, his reliance on that separate deadline is inapposite because the plaintiff failed to file his EEOC Charge in 
a timely manner in the first instance. 
 
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plaintiff waited 385 days to bring suit under the DCHRA, exceeding the one-year statute of 
limitations.  Accordingly, the plaintiff’s DCHRA claim is also time-barred unless he is entitled to 
equitable tolling. 
For the following reasons, the Court concludes that the plaintiff has not established that 
he is entitled to equitable tolling as to any of his employment discrimination claims.  As 
indicated previously, the plaintiff contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling regarding his 
Title VII claims because he “diligently attempted to file earlier and did not learn critical facts 
until an associate confirmed [that an] HR [representative] had disclosed damaging information 
without [his] authorization.”  Id.  However, the plaintiff does not provide any explanation 
regarding how he “diligently attempted” to file his EEOC Charge before the statutory filing 
deadline.  See Pl.’s Opp’n at 1.  Nor does the plaintiff explain how “some extraordinary 
circumstances stood in his way and prevented timely filing.”  Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisc., 
577 U.S. at 255.  To the contrary, the plaintiff’s assertions regarding the “damaging” disclosure 
of information appears to relate to his common law defamation claim, not any of his Title VII 
claims.  See Pl.’s Opp’n at 1.  Moreover, because the alleged disclosure did not form a part of the 
basis for his EEOC Charge, it had no bearing on his ability to file his administrative charge.  See 
Pl.’s Exs., Ex. A (EEOC Charge) at 1 (describing the basis for the plaintiff’s claims).  Therefore, 
the plaintiff has failed to establish that he is entitled to equitable tolling of Title VII’s statutory 
deadlines.  And, although the plaintiff does not explicitly argue that his DCHRA claim is subject 
to equitable tolling, the Court concludes that equitable tolling is inapplicable to this claim for the 
same reasons as his Title VII claims.  Accordingly, the Court must dismiss the plaintiff’s Title 
VII and DCHRA claims as untimely. 
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B. Whether the Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim for Defamation (Count IV) 
 
The Court next addresses the plaintiff’s common law defamation claim based on his 
allegation that Ms. Smith informed Ms. Tedrow “that [the p]laintiff had been terminated due to 
performance reasons[,]” Am. Compl. at 3, or “poor performance[,]” Pl.’s Opp’n at 2; and (2) the 
purported report by the defendant to an unnamed prospective employer of the plaintiff’s alleged 
“poor performance[,]”6 Am. Compl. at 3.  The defendant argues that the Court should dismiss 
the plaintiff’s defamation claim because the plaintiff has failed to allege that Ms. Smith’s 
statements were false, see Def.’s Mem. at 14, and because the plaintiff’s allegations regarding 
the defendant’s report to prospective employers fails to “identify the speaker, recipient, timing, 
location, manner of communication, or the content of the statement,” rendering the allegation 
“deficient on its face[,]” id. at 14–15.  In response, the plaintiff merely states that “[t]he 
statement was false,” because he “was never told he failed his PIP, never received 
documentation, and was terminated despite compliance[,]” Pl.’s Opp’n at 2, and that the 
statement was “factual in nature, and caused reputational and financial harm, including rejection 
by prospective employers[,]” id. 
As an initial matter, although the Court agrees with the defendant that it could treat the 
defendant’s arguments for dismissal of the plaintiff’s defamation claim as conceded because he 
did not address many of the defendant’s arguments in its motion to dismiss, see Def.’s Reply 
at 9, the Court will nonetheless address the arguments out of an abundance of caution and also 
due to the plaintiff’s pro se status. 
 
6 In his opposition, the plaintiff fails to respond to the defendant’s arguments for dismissal of his defamation claim 
based on this statement to a prospective employer, and instead represents that his defamation claim is based only on 
Ms. Smith’s statement.  See Pl.’s Opp’n at 2 (explaining basis for his defamation claim).  Nonetheless, the Court 
will address this as a basis for his claim due to his pro se status, rather than treating the defendant’s arguments as 
conceded. 
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To adequately allege a defamation claim, the plaintiff must show  
(1) that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement concerning the 
plaintiff; (2) that the defendant published the statement without privilege to a third 
party; (3) that the defendant ’s fault in publishing the statement amounted to at 
least negligence; and (4) either that the statement was actionable as a matter of 
law irrespective of special harm or that its publication caused the plaintiff special 
harm. 
Jankovic v. Int’l Crisis Grp., 494 F.3d 1080, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Croixland Props. 
L.P. v. Corcoran, 174 F.3d 213, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).  A published statement is defamatory if 
the statement “tends to injure the plaintiff in his trade, profession, or community standing, or 
lower him in the estimation of the community.”  Farah v. Esquire Mag., 736 F.3d 528, 534 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013) (citing Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011, 1023 (D.C. 1990)).  “An allegedly 
defamatory remark must be more than unpleasant or offensive; the language must make the 
plaintiff appear odious, infamous, or ridiculous.”  Luhn v. Scott, 843 F. App’x 326, 327 (D.C. 
Cir. 2021) (quoting Smith v. Clinton, 886 F.3d 122, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2018)).  “The plaintiff has the 
burden of proving the defamatory nature of the challenged statement.”  Benz v. Wash. 
Newspaper Pub. Co., No. 05-cv-1760 (EGS), 2006 WL 2844896, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2006) 
(quoting Klayman v. Segal, 783 A.2d 607, 613 (D.C. 2001)). 
Under D.C. law, there is no heightened pleading standard requiring the plaintiff to plead 
his defamation claim with specificity.  See Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 948 (D.C. 2009).  
Instead, courts must determine “whether the factual allegations in the [plaintiff’s] complaint are 
sufficient to permit [the defendant] to form responsive pleadings” in response to the plaintiff’s 
defamation claim.  Id.
7 
 
7 Although the D.C. Circuit has indicated in at least two cases that at the motion to dismiss stage, the Cou rt “must 
assume, as the complaint alleges, the falsity of any . . . factual statements made[,]” Farah, 736 F.3d at 534 (quoting 
Weyrich v. New Republic, Inc., 235 F.3d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2001)), at least one other member of this Court has 
noted that the D.C. Circuit did not explain how its prior propositions in Weyrich were affected by the Supreme 
Court’s subsequent decisions in Twombley and Iqbal, see Libre By Nexus v. Buzzfeed, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 3d 149, 
(continued . . .) 
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For the following reasons, the Court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to adequately 
plead his defamation claim.  First, the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant communicated the 
plaintiff’s purported “poor performance” to an unnamed prospective employer at some date after 
his termination, see Am. Compl. at 3, lacks any supporting factual information, such as which of 
the defendant’s employees made that statement, to whom specifically they made that statement 
and when, and the content of that statement beyond the conclusory remark regarding his 
purported performance.  Thus, although the plaintiff was not required to include all of that 
information in support of his claim, he has nonetheless still failed to allege sufficient facts to 
“permit [the defendant] to form responsive pleadings” in response to this allegation, Solers, Inc., 
977 A.2d at 948; see also Ruifang Hu v. K4 Sols., Inc., No. 18-cv-1240 (TSC), 2020 WL 
1189297, at *12 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2020) (concluding that allegations that statements were shared 
with unnamed potential employers were insufficiently detailed to state a claim for defamation) 
(citing Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 76–77 (D.C. 2005)), despite the Court’s express 
instruction to amend his Complaint with further factual allegations regarding his claims, see 
Order at 4–5 (Aug. 26, 2025). 
And, although the plaintiff’s other allegation that Ms. Smith informed Ms. Tedrow “that 
[the p]laintiff had been terminated due to performance reasons[,]” Am. Compl. at 3, does have 
more detail regarding the circumstances surrounding the allegedly defamatory statement, the 
plaintiff’s allegation nonetheless fails to state a viable defamation claim because even construing 
the Amended Complaint liberally and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as the Court 
must at this stage of the case, the plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that the statement was 
 
(. . . continued) 
155 n.2 (D.D.C. 2018).  Therefore, because Weyrich relied on a more generous pleading standard subsequently 
repudiated by the Supreme Court in Twombley and Iqbal, the Court will apply the current pleading standard and 
require that the plaintiff plausibly allege that the statements were false. 
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false, even assuming arguendo that it was plausibly defamatory.  The plaintiff expressly 
acknowledges that he was placed on a PIP because of purported performance issues “such as a 
30-minute [delay in providing a Microsoft] Teams response, child-care related absences, and a 
disputed remote work schedule.”  Am. Compl. at 2.  Similarly, the plaintiff alleges that he was 
criticized by his supervisors for failing to shadow another systems administrator when in reality 
the systems administrator “was rarely in the office, making training impossible.”  See id.  The 
plaintiff contends that these criticisms were “trivial” or otherwise unfair, but he does not allege at 
any point, for example, that these purported performance issues were in fact false and that he had 
no such performance issues.   
Moreover,
 although the plaintiff alleges that the defendant never informed him, in writing 
or otherwise, that he had failed to meet the requirements set forth in the PIP, see id. at 3, and 
that, to the contrary, “[h]e was terminated despite meeting [the PIP’s] requirements[,]” id., he has 
provided no factual allegations to support his conclusory statement that his performance at the 
time of his termination as satisfactory.  Without more, the Court cannot reasonably infer that Ms. 
Smith’s comment was false, especially in light of the factual allegations contained in the 
Amended Complaint that appear to contradict his conclusory statements regarding the quality of 
his performance.  See Am. Compl. at 2 (noting but not disputing his supervisor’s criticism of the 
plaintiff’s performance and absences).  The plaintiff’s failure to adequately support his 
conclusory statements of falsity, especially after the Court’s prior order directing him to 
supplement the factual allegations in his original complaint, prevents the Court from concluding 
that Ms. Smith’s purported statement regarding his termination for performance reasons was 
plausibly false. 
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Accordingly, having concluded that the plaintiff has not adequately alleged his 
defamation claim based on either of the two statements set forth in his Amended Complaint, the 
Court must grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s defamation claim. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that it must grant the defendant’s motion 
to dismiss.8 
SO ORDERED this 30th day of April, 2026.9 
            
        REGGIE B. WALTON 
        United States District Judge 
 
8 The plaintiff also requests that the Court grant him leave to further amend his complaint under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), if the Court determines it must grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss.  See Pl.’s Opp’n 
at 2.  However, “a bare request in an opposition to a motion to dismiss—without any indication of the particular 
grounds on which amendment is sought—does not constitute a motion within the contemplation of Rule 15(a).”  
Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 130 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  The Court will therefore deny this request . 
 
9 The Court will contemporaneously issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.  
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