govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-1_23-cv-02521-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
DA VONNE SYDNOR,  * 
 
 Petitioner, * 
 
v.  *  Civ. No. DLB-23-2521 
 
RONALD SHANE WEBER, * 
 
 Respondent.  * 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
Davonne Sydnor filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 
ECF 1. The respondent filed an answer asserting that the petition must be dismissed as untimely. 
ECF 9. The Court advised Sydnor of the applicable limitations period and the exceptions that 
would allow this Court to review a claim raised in a petition filed outside of the limitations period, 
ECF 11. Sydnor filed a response to the answer , ECF 12, and a “motion for relief,” in which he 
asked the Court to grant him habeas relief, ECF 13. No hearing is necessary. See Rule 8(a), Rules 
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts and Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 
2025); see also Fisher v. Lee, 215 F.3d 438, 455 (4th Cir. 2000) (petitioner not entitled to a hearing 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)). For the following reasons, the petition is  dismissed as untimely, 
and Sydnor’s motion for appropriate relief is denied. 
I. Background 
 On April 13, 2009, Sydnor accompanied Jermaine McCory, who was 15 years old at the 
time, to meet Russell Day at an agreed-upon location where Day attempted to purchase heroin 
from McCory. ECF 9-1, at 151; ECF 9-3, at 11. During the attempted purchase, Day was robbed 
and fatally shot. ECF 9- 1, at 151. On May 7, 2009, Sydnor was indicted in the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City on charges of first- degree murder, second-degree murder, use of a handgun in a 
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crime of violence, unlawfully wearing/carrying a handgun on his person in case number 
109127079; armed robbery, first-degree assault, second-degree assault, use of a handgun in a crime 
of violence, and unlawfully wearing/carrying a handgun on his person in case number 109127080; 
and conspiracy to commit armed robbery in case number 109127081. Id. at 4–5; 24–25; 44–45.  
McCory also was charged with murder, robbery with a deadly weapon, and theft . ECF 9-
1, at 153. He agreed to plead guilty to robbery with a deadly weapon and use of a handgun. Id. As 
part of his plea agreement, McCory also agreed  to cooperate in the state’s prosecution of Sydnor 
and Sydnor’s co-defendant. Id. Pursuant to the agreement, McCory would testify in both trials and 
then receive a sentence of 18 months in the Department of Juvenile Services . Id. If he had not 
cooperated, he faced a possible sentence of 20 years in the Department of Corrections. Id. McCory 
testified at Sydnor’s trial. He admitted on cross -examination that he had not yet been sentenced.  
Id.; see also ECF 9-6, at 35–36. Defense counsel argued to the trial judge that McCory had testified 
that he was on juvenile probation at the time of the crime, and counsel sought disclosure of 
McCory’s juvenile records showing he was on juvenile probation. ECF 9-6, at 3–4 (trial transcript); 
ECF 9-12, at 11–12, 13–14 (post-conviction transcript). The state countered that McCory testified 
that there was  a warrant out for his arrest  when he committed the crime, not that he was on 
probation then. ECF 9 -6, at 4.  After some discussion, the trial court denied the motion for 
disclosure of McCory’s juvenile records. Id. at 4–8. 
 After a seven-day trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on June 17, 2010. On November 
30, 2010, Sydnor was sentenced to serve a life sentence and a consecutive term of 20 years. ECF 
9-1, at 4, 24–25, 44, 148. He timely noted a direct appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland,  
which affirmed his conviction on February 15, 2013. Id. at 147–84. The mandate issued on March 
18, 2013. Id. at 185. Sydnor, representing himself, sought certiorari review with the Supreme Court 
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of Maryland. Id. at 187–206. The court denied certiorari review on June 24, 2013, id. at 207, and 
Sydnor did not seek any further appellate review of his conviction. 
 Sydnor filed his first post -conviction petition on April 8, 2014 and then filed a motion to 
withdraw it without prejudice to refiling , which the court granted on January 6, 2015. Id. at 12, 
14–15, 32, 34–35, 51, 53. Sydnor did not file another post -conviction petition until October 19, 
2020. Id. at 15, 35, 54.  
 On November 5, 2021, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City held a post-conviction hearing 
on Sydnor’s second post-conviction petition. Id. at 18, 38, 57, 209. On March 30, 2022, the court 
granted the petition in part and denied it in part . Id. at 208–27. The court found that trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to file a Rule 4-345(e) motion for modification of sentence and granted 
Sydnor the right to file a belated motion. Id. at 225–26. The post-conviction court rejected Sydnor’s 
claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for not rais ing on appeal the trial court’s refusal to 
allow the introduction of McCory’s juvenile record and Sydnor had failed to rebut the presumption 
of an intelligent and knowing waiver of the alleged error. Id. at 218–19. 
 On September 6, 2023, Sydnor filed this habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  
II. Standard of Review 
A one-year limitation s period applies to petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 
counting down from the latest of four dates: 
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review 
or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 
 
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action 
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the 
applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 
 
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by 
the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court 
and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 
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(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could 
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.  
 
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).  
The limitations period is subject to tolling in certain circumstances . The habeas statute 
provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post -conviction or 
other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be 
counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.”  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In other 
words, the federal clock is paused during the pursuit of state post -conviction relief, assuming the 
application for state post-conviction relief was properly filed. The limitations period also may be 
subject to equitable tolling “in those ‘rare instances where—due to circumstances external to the 
party’s own conduct—it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation against the party and 
gross injustice would result.’ ” Whiteside v. U nited States , 775 F.3d 180, 184 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 
330 (4th Cir. 2000))) . To equitably toll the limitations period, the habeas petitioner must 
demonstrate “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 
circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.”  Id. (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 631, 649 (2010) ). “The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is reasonable 
diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.”  Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).  Extraordinary circumstances may involve  “wrongful conduct” on the 
part of the government or other circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control. Harris, 209 F.3d at 
330 (quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1996)).  
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III. Analysis 
In this case, the one -year limitations period runs from the date on which the judgment 
became final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) ; see Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 704 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(noting the first date applies “unless one of the circumstances enumerated by the statute is present 
and starts the clock running at a later date”).  The Maryland Supreme Court denied Sydnor’s 
petition for writ of certiorari on June 24, 2013. Sydnor had 90 days to petition the U.S. Supreme 
Court for certiorari review. ECF 9. Thus, the limitations period began 90 days after the Maryland 
Supreme Court’s denial of the writ of certiorari . Id. Because 90 days after June 24, 2013 was 
September 22, 2013, which was a Sunday, the limitations period began to run on Monday, 
September 23, 2013. If no event toll ed the one-year limitations period, it would have expired on 
September 23, 2014. 
Sydnor does not dispute those calculations. Instead, Sydnor contends that his petition is not 
time-barred because he was “continually in the state courts pursuing his direct appeal and post -
conviction for relief.” ECF 12, at 4. He further states that he had to withdraw his post -conviction 
petition “several times,” but each time he did so, it was “withdrawn without prejudice to refiling 
as allowed in Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 704 (4th Cir. 2002).” Id. at 4–5. 
When a state post-conviction petition is properly filed within the one -year federal 
limitations period, the limitations period  is tolled, or stops running, while that petition remains 
pending.1 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) . Here, the limitations period began on September 23, 2013. 
Sydnor filed a state post-conviction petition 169 days later, on April 8, 2014, which remained 
 
1 See Pace v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (application for state post -conviction relief 
that failed to satisfy time constraints for seeking relief is not “properly filed”); Allen v. Siebert, 552 
U.S. 3, 6 (2007) (state time limits are filing requirements and untimely state applications are not 
properly filed). 
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pending for 273 days, until January 6, 2015, when the state court signed the order dismissing the 
petition without prejudice. With the state post-conviction proceedings over, the limitations period 
began to run again on January 6, 2015. Sydnor had 169 days, or until March 12, 2015, to file a 
federal habeas corpus petition. Sydnor did not file any other post -conviction petitions before 
limitations period expired on March 12, 2015. Five years later, on October 19, 2020, Sydnor filed 
a second state post-conviction petition. But that petition and the ensuing appeal to the Maryland 
Supreme Court did not toll the federal habeas clock because the post-conviction petition was filed 
more than five years after the limitations period had expired. Sydnor’s September 6, 2023 federal 
habeas petition was filed way too late. 
 Sydnor claims that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he continually pursued his 
rights diligently and “whenever he withdrew his post -conviction petition, he withdrew it without 
prejudice to refiling.” ECF 12, at 5. Sydnor did not diligently pursue his rights. For a five-year 
period, from 2015 until 2020, he did not pursue any post- conviction relief. Sydnor is not entitled 
to equitable tolling.  
The Court may review an untimely petition that is not subject to equitable tolling “only 
when there has been a ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice. ’” United States v. Herrera-Pagoada, 
14 F.4th 311, 319 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392 (2013)). The 
miscarriage of justice exception applies where a petitioner shows that “a constitutional violation 
has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 
U.S. 478, 496 (1986). Actual innocence is a basis for review  of a petitioner’s untimely claims  
where the petitioner demonstrates that, “in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that 
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no reasonable juror would have convicted him [.]”2 Herrera-Pagoada, 14 F.4th at 319 (quoting 
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998)). “A valid innocence claim ‘requires petitioner 
to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence —whether it be 
exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence —
that was not presented at trial.’” Hayes v. Carver, 922 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Schlup 
v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995)). The Court must evaluate “‘all the evidence,’ old and new, 
incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it would necessarily be admitted under 
[evidentiary rules],” but with “due regard to any unreliability[.]” United States v. MacDonald, 641 
F.3d 596, 612 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting House v. Bell , 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006) and Schlup, 513 
U.S. at 328)). The Court then makes “a holistic judgment about all the evidence and its likely effect 
on reasonable jurors applying the reasonable -doubt standard.” Carver, 922 F.3d at 216 (quoting 
House, 547 U.S. at 539). The actual innocence standard “is demanding and permits review only in 
the extraordinary case.” Id. at 218 (quoting House, 547 U.S. at 538)). 
On May 24, 2024, the Court notified Sydnor that actual innocence may, in extraordinary 
cases, permit review of an untimely petition that is not subject to equitable tolling. ECF 11. In 
response, Sydnor stated that “he has not asserted a full -fledged claim of actual innocence in his 
petition because of two reasons: (1) it has not been presented to state courts, and (2) his petition is 
not time -barred as the respondents claim.” ECF 12, at 6. Thus, Sydnor has not shown a 
fundamental miscarriage of justice would occur if the Court does not review his untimely petition. 
 
2 A “gateway” innocence claim is distinct from a substantive innocence claim. Schlup v. Delo, 513 
U.S. 298, 315 (1995) (discussing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403 (1993)). In the latter, the 
petitioner asserts he is entitled to habeas relief based on his innocence alone.  
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I V. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed herein, Sydnor’s habeas petition must be dismissed as untimely.
A separate order dismissing the petition and denying Sydnor’s motion for appropriate relief 
follows. 
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides that the district court “must 
issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” 
Because the accompanying Order is a final order adverse to the applicant, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) 
requires issuance of a certificate of appealability before an appeal can proceed. A certificate of 
appealability may issue if the prisoner has made a “substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a petition is denied solely on procedural 
grounds, the petitioner may meet the standard by showing that reasonable jurists “would find it 
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right” and 
“whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 
484 (2000). Sydnor has failed to satisfy this standard. Therefore, a certificate of appealability shall 
not issue. 
________________ _____________________________ 
D
ate  Deborah L. Boardman 
United States District Judge 
April 29, 2026
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