govinfo:USCOURTS-ohnd-5_16-cr-00112-6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
EASTERN DIVISION 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
  Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
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CASE NO.  5:16-cr-00112-002 
  
 
JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER 
 v.  
 
 
 
CARLOS ELIAS, 
      
  Defendant-Petitioner. 
OPINION & ORDER 
 
 
On February 5, 2026, Defendant-Petitioner Carlos Elias (“Elias”) filed a pro se motion to 
reduce his  sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), also known as a motion for 
compassionate release, as well as pursuant to First Step Act §§  102, 401, and 402  and “guiding 
case law.” ECF 291. The Government filed a response in opposition on March 20, 2026. ECF 297. 
No reply was filed. For the reasons discussed herein, Elias’ motion is DENIED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On April 16, 2016, Elias was named in a twenty -count indictment charging him with a 
wide variety of crimes on sixteen of those counts, including: Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to 
Distribute and Distribution of Crystal Methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 
841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) (Count 1); Possession with Intent to Distribute Heroin and Crystal 
Methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (Counts 2 through 5); and 
Use of a Telecommunication Facility to Facilitate a Drug Trafficking Off ense, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 843(b) (Counts 8, and 11 through 20). ECF 9. On September 22, 2016, Elias pled guilty 
to the indictment, without a plea agreement. ECF 81. 
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The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) calculated Elias’ base offense level as 38. 
ECF 146. Elias received a two -level increase for possessing a dangerous weapon, a two- level 
increase for attempting to have a cooperator killed, and a four -level increase for his role as an 
organizer or leader in the conspiracy, resulting in an adjusted offense level of 46. Id. A three-level 
reduction for acceptance of responsibility yielded a total offense level of 43. Id. An evaluation of 
Elias’ criminal history placed him in criminal history category III. Id. Elias’s total offense level of 
43 and criminal history category III resulted in an advisory Guidelines range of life imprisonment. 
Id. In March 2017, the Court granted a downward departure based on the parties’ sentencing 
agreement and sentenced Elias to 240 months imprisonment, five years supervised release, and a 
$1,600 special assessment. ECF 154, 155. Elias is currently incarcerated at Jesup FCI, with a 
projected release date of October 20, 2032.
1  
Elias previously moved for a sentence reduction, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
(“U.S.S.G.”) § 1B1.13(b)(6), and U.S.S.G. Amendment 821, and compassionate release under 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) . ECF 262. This Court denied that motion. ECF 266. The Sixth Circuit 
affirmed. United States v. Elias, Case No. 24-3465, 2025 WL 1568308 (6th Cir. Apr. 16, 2025).  
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
A motion for sentence reduction filed under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) —a motion for 
compassionate release—is analyzed under a three- step inquiry.  United States v. McCall, 56 F.4th 
1048, 1054 (6th Cir. 2022)  (en banc) (quotations omitted), cert. denied , 143 S. Ct. 2506, 216 L. 
Ed. 2d 461 (2023). First, when an imprisoned person files a motion for compassionate release, they 
must show exhaustion by either: (1) a warden denying their request; or (2) thirty days passing since 
 
1 https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last accessed April 24, 2026).  
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their request was made without a response. United States v. Alam , 960 F.3d 831, 832 (6th Cir. 
2020). 
Second, the Court must find that both “extraordinary and compelling” reasons justify a 
sentence reduction and that such a reduction would be consistent with policy statements issued by 
the Sentencing Commission. Jones, 980 F.3d at 1101. In McCall, 56 F.4th 1048, the Sixth Circuit 
held that a nonretroactive change in sentencing law does not  constitute an “extraordinary and 
compelling” circumstance under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) . The Court affirmed this holding in 
United States v. Bricker , 135 F.4th 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2025) , petition for cert. filed , Case No.  
25-81 (U.S. July 18, 2025). 
If an “extraordinary and compelling reason” is found, the final step of the inquiry requires 
re-weighing the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) . McCall, 56 F.4th at 1054. When 
weighing these factors, a district court is permitted to consider a defendant’s “history and 
characteristics, including his propensity to be a danger to the community upon release, as well as 
the nature and circumstances of his offense.” United States v. Sherwood, 986 F.3d 951, 954 (6th 
Cir. 2021). 
The defendant bears the burden of showing they are eligible for a sentence modification. 
United States v. McClain , 691 F.3d 774, 777 (6th Cir. 2012) (the defendant bears the burden to 
show eligibility for reduction of sentence under Section 3582(c)(2)). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. COMPASSIONATE RELEASE 
1. Timeliness 
The Court cannot entertain a defendant’s compassionate release  motion unless : (1) the 
defendant exhausted all administrative remedies ; or (2) at least thirty  days have passed since a  
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Warden received the defendant’s compassionate release request. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Here, 
Elias has not provided any evidence that he even attempted to utilize his administrative remedies 
prior to filing his motion, let alone that he exhausted them, or sufficient time had first passed since 
the Warden received his request.  
However, section 3582 administrative exhaustion is a claims-processing rule, which may 
be waived or forfeited by the gover nment. See Alam, 960 F.3d at  833 (noting that “ mandatory 
claim-processing rules bind the courts only when properly asserted and not forfeited” (citing 
Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005) (per curiam)); id. at 833-34 (finding that section 
3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement was not jurisdictional, but a mandatory claims-processing 
rule). Here, the Government has not made mention of administrative exhaustion in their opposition 
brief. Therefore, to the extent an objection on this ground could have been raised, the Government 
has waived it. 
2. Extraordinary/Compelling Reasons 
Elias seems to rely on a handful of grounds that he argues “collectively constitute 
extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying a sentence modification.” ECF 291, at 1. These 
include: (1) his status as a “first -time, non -violent drug offender”; (2) his “extraordinary 
rehabilitation” via completion of “extensive Bureau of Prisons [(“BOP”)] programming”; (3) a 
“perfect disciplinary record”; and (4) his mandatory deportation upon release. Id. , at 1. As 
explained below, though, none of these grounds —individually or in their totality —satisfy this 
requirement. 
i. First Step Act 
Elias appears to rely on three sections of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115- 391, 
132 Stat. 5194, as an extraordinary and compelling reason. Section 102 mandates that the BOP 
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implement a risk and needs assessment system to evaluate recidivism rates of inmates (as 
developed in accordance with section 101 of the Act). 132 Stat. at 5208-13. Section 401 modified 
the criteria under which prior drug felonies can lead to enhanced sent ences, particularly for 
individuals with prior non-violent drug offenses. Id. at 5220-21. Notably, section 401 only applies 
to offenses committed before the Act “if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed” at the 
time of the Act’s enactment. §401(c), 132 Stat. at 5221. Section 402 broadens the existing safety 
valve provision allowing courts to impose sentences below the mandatory minimum for certain 
nonviolent, cooperative drug offenders with a limited criminal history. Id.  at 5221. This section 
only applies “to a conviction entered on or after the date of enactment of this Act.” §402(b), 132 
Stat. at 5221. 
Elias provides no explanation for how any of these sections may apply to him , though it 
would seem that he intends to invoke U.S.S.G. §  1B1.13(b)(6)—Unusually Long Sentence. This 
section provides: 
Unusually Long Sentence.— If a defendant received an unusually 
long sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of 
imprisonment, a change in the law (other than an amendment to the 
Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be 
considered in determining whether the defendant presents an 
extraordinary and compelling reason, but only where such change 
would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served 
and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed, 
and after full consideration of the defendant's individualized 
circumstances. 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). This argument fails for several reasons. First and foremost, the Sixth 
Circuit recently held § 1B1.13(b)(6) to be entirely invalid. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit held that 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating § 1B1.13(b)(6) 
by “issu[ing] a policy statement that is plainly unreasonable under the statute and in conflict with 
the separation of powers.” Bricker, 135 F.4th at 430. Specifically, § 1B1.13(b)(6) “contradicts the 
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nonretroactivity of the individual sentencing revisions and circumvents Congress's clear limitation 
on retroactively applying new legislation.” Id. at 444. As this Court is bound by Bricker , any 
section of the First Step Act that could result in a different sentence if Elias was newly convicted 
today cannot be relied upon as an extraordinary and compelling reason. And even if this Court 
were not bound by Bricker, Elias would be ineligible for relief under § 1B1.13(b)(6) because he 
has not yet served at least ten years of his sentence. “Elias’s sentence was imposed on March 16, 
2016[,] and he has served only 9 years and 11 months of his sentence.” ECF 291, at 9. 
ii. Other Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons 
The remainder of Elias’ arguments also fail. First, Elias cannot demonstrate an 
extraordinary and compelling reason as a first-time nonviolent drug offender because that assertion 
is false. Elias has a criminal history dating back over two decades, including “ a prior conviction 
for possession of drugs and two more criminal convictions following that incident.” Id. (citing 
ECF 146, the sealed PSR). Accordingly, this claim cannot be considered.  
Nor can Elias’ subsequent prison conduct  constitute an extraordinary and compelling 
reason for compassionate release. Rehabilitation alone cannot constitute an extraordinary and 
compelling reason. See United States v. Bass, 17 F.4th 629, 637 (6th Cir. 2021) . Thus, while the 
Court commends the Elias’ work towards self -improvement, the Court cannot find such work 
constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason. 
3. Section 3553(a) Factors  
Even if the Court were inclined to believe that Elias has an “extraordinary and compelling” 
reason for compassionate release, the Court must still find that the reduction is “consistent with 
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission” and consider “all relevant 
sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States vs. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 518 (6th 
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Cir. 2021). The only new factor that the Court could potentially consider here is Elias’ 
rehabilitation efforts in prison; however, the Court declines to find that this changes its  prior 
section 3553(a) analysis  as stated on the record at the March 28, 2017, sentencing hearing, 
particularly considering Elias’ concerning BOP inmate disciplinary record. See ECF 297-1. 
B. TIME CREDITS UNDER SECTION 3632(D)(4) 
Elias has motioned to receive credits against his sentence under 18 U.S.C.S. § 3632(d)(4). 
ECF 291, at 5. That section permits defendants to receive credit towards their sentences  as they 
complete “evidence-based recidivism reduction pr ogramming or productive activities.”   
§ 3632(d)(4)(A). However, he is ineligible to receive any time credits because he “ is the subject 
of a final order of removal under any provision of the immigration laws (as such term is defined 
in section 101(a)(17) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(17))).” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3632(E)(i). Elias himself acknowledges that he is subject to deportation upon his release. See 
ECF 291, at 5 (“Defendant wi ll be deported to Mexico upon release.” ). Additionally, Elias is  
ineligible to receive credits due to the nature of his drug convictions , which are specifically 
excepted from earning time credits . See § 3632(d)(4)(A) (“A prisoner, except for an ineligible 
prisoner under subparagraph (D)…  shall earn time credits as follows.” (emphasis added)); see also 
id. (d)(4)(D)(lxv), (lxvii) (exempting offenders convicted of possession with intent to distribute 
heroin and methamphetamine, respectively, where the court “finds that the offender was … [a] 
leader … in the offense”); ECF 146, ¶  102 (the sealed PSR, adjustment to offense level for Elias’ 
role in the offense). 
  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court finds that Elias  is ineligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.  
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). And even if he were eligible, the section  3553(a) factors weigh against his 
requested relief. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Elias’ motion for sentence reduction. The Court 
further finds that Elias is ineligible to receive time credits under section 3562(d)(4)(A). 
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Elias’ motion to reward time credits.  
The Court also certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) , that an appeal from that 
decision could not be taken in good faith. 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED.   
 /s/Dan Aaron Polster   
Dan Aaron Polster    
Date: April 24, 2026    United States District Judge 
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