govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-1_23-cv-01433-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
JEFFREY SCHATZ, 
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN,  
 
Respondent. 
* 
* 
*   Civ. No. DLB-23-1433 
* 
* 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 Jeffrey Schatz filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF 
1. The r espondent filed an answer to the petition asserting the petition must be dismissed as 
untimely. ECF 11. Schatz filed a response. ECF 16. No hearing is necessary. See Rule 8(a), Rules 
Governing § 2254 Cases in the U.S. Dist. Cts.; Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025);  see also Fisher v. 
Lee, 215 F.3d 438, 455 (4th Cir. 2000) (petitioner not entitled to a hearing under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(e)(2)). For the following reasons, the petition is dismissed as time-barred, and a certificate 
of appealability shall not issue. 
I. Background 
 On September 19, 2019, Schatz was arrested and arraigned in the District Court for 
Baltimore City, Maryland in Case No. 4B02405785 on charges of second- degree assault, theft 
under $100, malicious destruction of property, misuse of telephone equipment, ele ctronic mail 
harassment, and stalking. ECF 11 -1, at 26 –31; see State Dist rict Court Docket, 
https://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/casesearch/case-detail-page?caseId=4B02405785. On March 
11, 2020, the state court held a bench trial and convicted Schatz on all counts except theft and 
malicious destruction of property. ECF 11-1, at 15–17, 29–30. On the same day, the state court 
sentenced Schatz to seven years  of incarceration, with six years suspended, and three years of 
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probation. Id. at 17, 28; ECF 1, at 1. Schatz states that he appealed to the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City on the same day, but his appeal was “withdrawn under duress of State Prosecutors.” 
ECF 1, at 2; ECF 16, at 7. There is no indication in the record or on the state court docket that 
Schatz ever appealed his conviction.  
 Two years after Schatz’s conviction, on April 22, 2022, a warrant was issued for his arrest 
for a probation violation. ECF 11 -1, at 17 –18. On May 17, 2022, Schatz was arraigned and 
detained. Id. at 18–19. On September 14, 2022, Schatz filed a motion for leave to appeal or for  a 
new trial. Id. at 41–44. In his motion, Schatz argued that the State of Maryland “effectively denied 
his [original] appeal” by filing another case against him charging 11 counts of violation of a 
protective order and by forcing him to abandon his appeal in exchange for dropping those counts. 
Id. at 41–42. The state court  denied Schatz’s motion on September 28, 2022. Id. at 20. Schatz 
posted bail and was released from custody on the probation violation on November 7, 2022, and 
the state court held a hearing on March 16, 2023. Id. at 22, 24. It appears from the docket that the 
state court  reimposed Schatz’s probation conditions  at the hearing  but did not impose any 
additional penalty. Id. at 24–25.  
 The state court issued a second warrant for a probation violation on April 24, 2023. Id. at 
26. Shortly thereafter, on May 8, 2023, Schatz was arrested and held without bond on separate 
charges in Baltimore County. Id. at 50 –52. As of June 29, 2023, Schatz remained in custody 
because a detainer was issued for the probation violation.1 Id. at 53.    
Schatz filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court on May 25, 2023. See ECF 1 
(date of Schatz’s signature). Schatz alleges (1) he was forced to dismiss his appeal of his conviction 
 
1 Because Schatz was in custody in Baltimore County and subject to a detainer for his probation 
violation in Baltimore City, he was “in custody” for purposes of a habeas challenge to his 
Baltimore City conviction. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 493 (1989).  
 
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on the state charges in exchange for the state dismissing 11 counts of violating a protective order, 
(2) his conviction was based on insufficient evidence, and (3) the charges were fraudulent. Id. at 
5, 7, 8. The respondent filed a limited answer arguing that Schatz’s petition is barred by the statute 
of limitations. ECF 11. In response, Schatz argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling. ECF 16 ; 
see also ECF 1, at 13–14.  
II. Standard of Review 
A one-year limitations period applies to petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 
counting down from the latest of four dates: 
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review 
or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 
 
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action 
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the 
applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 
 
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by 
the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court 
and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 
 
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could 
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.  
 
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).    
The limitations period is subject to tolling in certain circumstances. The habeas statute 
provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post -conviction or 
other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or cla im is pending shall not be 
counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In other 
words, the federal clock is paused during the pursuit of state post -conviction relief, assuming the 
application for state post-conviction relief was properly filed.  
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The limitations period also may be subject to equitable tolling “in those ‘rare instances 
where—due to circumstances external to the party’s own conduct —it would be unconscionable to 
enforce the limitation against the party and gross injustice would result.’” Whiteside v. United 
States, 775 F.3d 180, 184 (4th Cir. 2014) ( quoting Rouse v. Lee , 339 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000))). To equitably toll the limitations 
period, the habeas petitioner must demonstrate “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, 
and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Id.  
(quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)). “The diligence required for equitable 
tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not m aximum feasible diligence.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 
653 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Extraordinary circumstances may involve 
“wrongful conduct” on the part of the government or other circumstances beyond the petitioner’s 
control. Harris, 209 F.3d at 330 (quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 700 (9th 
Cir. 1996)).   
The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that his petition is timely. See Rouse v. Lee, 
339 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2003). 
III. Analysis 
In this case, the one -year limitations period for filing for federal habeas relief runs from 
the date on which the time for seeking direct review of the judgment expired. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d)(1)(A). Schatz had 30 days from his sentencing on March 11, 2020 to file an appeal with 
the Appellate Court of Maryland, which he did not do. See Md. R. 7-104(a) (affording defendants 
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30 days to note an appeal from a judgment of conviction entered in the state district court).2 
Therefore, Schatz’s conviction became final on April 10, 2020, and the one-year limitations period 
expired on April 10, 2021. Schatz’s habeas petition, filed nearly two years later on May 25, 2023, 
is untimely.3  
Schatz argues the limitations period should be subject to equitable tolling. He claims it took 
him “years of study and research” to understand the issues he raised in his petition, the COVID-
19 pandemic prevented him from timely filing the petition, he lacked access to the law library, and 
he is indigent. ECF 1, at 13–14; see ECF 16, at 5. Schatz also asserts that new developments in 
case law and “ethical standards” have delayed his filing, and the Court should permit his petition 
to proceed in the interest of justice. ECF 1, at 14. 
None of these reasons is grounds for excusing the late filing of Schatz’s habeas petition. 
Unfamiliarity with the law and lack of access to a law library are not bases for equitable tolling. 
See United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 2004); Gales v. Warden Deyena Corp., No. 
RDB-12-3614, 2013 WL 1352309, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 1, 2013) (“[I]gnorance of the law, inability 
to obtain assistance, or attend the prison law library are inadequate grounds to establish entitlement 
to equitable tolling of the filing deadline.”). Nor is Schatz’s indigency a basis for equitable tolling. 
See Jones v. Graham, No. CCB -17-3523, 2019 WL 1935412, at *2 (D. Md. May 1, 2019) (“[ A 
 
2 Schatz argues that it “defies all logic” to conclude that he “did not file an appeal” because “[i]f 
he hadn’t [appealed], how could he agree to its withdrawal in ‘trade’ for the nol pros of the eleven 
counts of violating a protective order .” ECF 16, at 7. Schatz’s position is not supported by the 
record. According to the state court docket, Schatz never filed an appeal. Even if he did timely file 
an appeal and then withdrew the appeal in connection with a plea bargain, his habeas petition 
would be timely only if the appeal was pending for more than two years before he withdrew it (and 
thus paused the habeas filing clock while it was pending). Schatz does not say when he withdrew 
the alleged appeal, and the record does not show that he filed or withdrew an appeal. Thus, Schatz 
has not met his burden of establishing that his petition was timely.  
3 C ollateral or post -conviction pleadings filed before  April 10, 2021  would have tolled the 
limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), but Schatz did not file any. 
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petitioner’s] inability to pay a private attorney does not amount to an exceptional circumstance 
justifying equitable tolling of the federal filing deadline . . . .”). And Schatz does not identify any 
new case law that prevented him from timely filing his petition.  
The COVID-19 pandemic also is not grounds for equitable tolling. A “petitioner cannot 
meet his burden of establishing that a court should apply the doctrine of equitable tolling simply 
by making a passing reference to the pandemic or the resulting lockdown.” United States v. 
Aigbekaen, No. JKB-15-0462, 2021 WL 1816967, at *1 (D. Md. May 6, 2021); see  also Donald 
v. Pruitt, 853 F. App’ x 230, 234 (10th Cir. 2021)  (unpublished) (“The bottom line is that the 
COVID-19 pandemic does not automatically warrant equitable tolling for any petitioner who seeks 
it on that basis.  The petitioner must establish that he was pursuing his rights diligently and that the 
COVID-19 pandemic specifically prevented him from filing his motion .” (quoting United States 
v. Henry, No. 17-CR-00180, 2020 WL 7332657, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2020)). 
No extraordinary circumstances stood in the way of Schatz filing his habeas petition by 
April 10, 2021. Further, there is no indication that Schatz was diligently pursuing his appellate 
rights. In short, Schatz has failed to present any circumstance that prevented him from complying 
with the one-year filing deadline or any basis for finding a miscarriage of justice would result if 
this Court does not reach the merits of his petition.  
IV. Certificate of Appealability 
 Having found that the petition is untimely, this Court must determine if a certificate of 
appealability should issue. When a district court dismisses a habeas petition solely on procedural 
grounds, a certificate of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner can demonstrate both “(1) 
‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial 
of a constitutional right’ and (2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district 
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court was correct in its procedural ruling.’” Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 684-685 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Schatz’s pleadings fail to demonstrate that 
a certificate of appealability should issue. He may request that the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit issue such a certificate. See Lyons v. Lee, 316 F.3d 528, 532 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(considering whether to grant a certificate of appealability after the district court declined to issue 
one). 
 A separate order dismissing the petition as untimely and denying a certificate of 
appealability follows. 
____________     _____________________________ 
Date       Deborah L. Boardman 
United States District Judge 
 
April 27, 2026
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