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govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_24-cv-11502-1
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JANE DOE (A.A.M.),
Plaintiff,
v.
WYNDHAM HOTELS & RESORTS, INC., et
al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No.: 24-11502 (ES) (JRA)
OPINION
SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court are four motions to dismiss Plaintiff Jane Doe (A.A.M.)’s (“Plaintiff”)
Complaint, (D.E. No. 1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”)): (i) defendants Days Inns Worldwide, Inc.
and Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.’s (collectively, the “ Wyndham Defendants”) motion to
dismiss, (D.E. No. 23 (“Wyndham Motion”); D.E. No. 23- 1 (“Wyndham Mov. Br.”) ); (ii)
defendants Hotel OM Sai Ram, LLC and Ashvin Kumar Patel’s motion to dismiss, (D.E. No. 65);
(iii) defendant SG Hospitality, LLC d/b/a Days Inn’s (“SG Hospitality”) motion to dismiss, (D.E.
No. 67); and (iv) defendants D. Laxmi, Inc. (“D. Laxmi”) and Ashvin Kumar Patel’s motion to
dismiss, (D.E. No. 86).
1 The Court refers to Defendants Hotel OM Sai Ram, LLC, SG Hospitality,
and D. Laxmi collectively as the “Franchisee Defendants ,” and to their motions, (D.E. Nos. 65,
67, and 86), as the “Franchisee Defendants’ motions to dismiss.”
1 Because Plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed Defendant Ashvin Kumar Patel, (see D.E. No. 119; see also D.E.
No. 138), the Court addresses D.E. No. 67 and D.E. No. 86 only as to Defendants Hotel OM Sai Ram, LLC and D.
Laxmi, respectively.
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The Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions in connection with the four
motions, as well as the balance of the record, and decides the matters without oral argument. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons stated herein, Franchisee Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss, (D.E. Nos. 65, 67, & 86), are each GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART. This Court transfers the instant matter to the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Congress enacted the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”) to
combat human trafficking and provide both criminal penalties and civil remedies for victims of
the same. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–97. Among its provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (“ Section 1591”)
establishes criminal liability for sex trafficking, while 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (“Section 1595”) provides
a private right of action for victims. In particular, Section 1595 provides that an individual who is
a victim of a TVPRA violation may bring a civil action against the perpetrator or against any
person who knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, fr om participation
in a venture that the person knew or should have known engaged in trafficking in violation of the
statute. See Section 1595(a).
This case is one of several filed in this D istrict seeking similar redress under the TVPRA
for alleged sex trafficking in hotels located in various cities. Plaintiff alleges that between January
2010 and December 2014, she was sex trafficked in two Days Inn hotels located in San Antonio,
Texas and Houston, Texas. (Compl. ¶¶ 37–42). Plaintiff alleges that, when her abusers trafficked
her at these locations, “hotel rooms would be paid for in cash or prepaid card, she would not leave
the room, she had few or no personal items, the do not disturb sign was constantly on the door to
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the room being used, housekeeping was constantly refused, and there was constant heavy foot
traffic in and out of her room involving men who were not hotel guests.” (Id. ¶ 43).
Plaintiff claims that the Wyndham Defendants, along with Franchisee Defendants, “owned,
operated, controlled and/or managed” the subject Days Inn hotels and facilitated Plaintiff’s sexual
exploitation. ( Id. ¶ 18). She alleges that the relationship between sex trafficking and the hotel
industry is “widely known and pervasive,” (Id. ¶ 45–47), and that “Wyndham’s public statements
confirm that it knew sex trafficking was a problem at its hotels.” ( Id. ¶ 61). Moreover, Plaintiff
claims that “each of the Wyndham Brand Defendants monitored criminal activity occurring at its
branded hotels and were aware of activity indicating commercial sex trafficking or related crimes
occurring at those branded hotels, including the specific property where [Plaintiff] was trafficked.”
(Id. ¶ 67).
B. Procedural History
On December 30, 2024, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit against several defendants,
2 alleging
violations of Sections 1591 and 1595 of the TVPRA. In Count I of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges
that the Franchisee Defendants are liable as perpetrators under Section 1595(a). (Id. ¶¶ 201–03).
In Count II, Plaintiff asserts that all Defendants are liable as beneficiaries under Section 1595(a)
for the financial benefits derived from their participation in a venture violative of the TVPRA. (Id.
¶¶ 204–09). Finally, in Count III Plaintiff contends that the Wyndham Defendants are vicariously
liable for the acts of their franchisees and those of the franchisees’ subagents. (Id. ¶¶ 210–15).
2 The Complaint was originally filed against eleven Defendants: Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc. ; Days Inn
Worldwide, Inc.; AMBM Investment Company, LLC; Binu George; Michael Abraham; SG Hospitality, LLC; MMSD
Corporation; D. Laxmi, Inc.; Ashvin Kumar Patel; Kantilal Patel; and Hotel OM Sai Ram , LLC. (See generally
Compl.). Plaintiff thereafter voluntarily dismissed his claims against Defendants Binu George and AMBM Investment
Company, LLC, (D.E. No. 40), Michael Abraham, (D.E. Nos. 73 & 74), Ashvin Kumar Patel and Kantilal Patel, (D.E.
No. 119), and MMSD Corporation, (D.E. No. 136). The remaining Defendants are thus Wyndham Hotels & Resorts,
Inc.; Days Inn Worldwide, Inc.; SG Hospitality, LLC; D. Laxmi, Inc.; and Hotel OM Sai Ram LLC.
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Following Plaintiff’s commencement of this action, Defendants filed the present motions
to dismiss. (See D.E. Nos. 23, 65, 67, & 86). On February 25, 2025, the Wyndham Defendants
moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). (See generally the Wyndham Motion). Plaintiff opposed the motion, (D.E. No. 29), and
the Wyndham Defendants filed a reply, (D.E. No. 37).
On April 22, 2025, Defendant Hotel OM Sai Ram, LLC moved to dismiss the Complaint
under Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3) for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. (D.E. No.
65). Plaintiff opposed, (D.E. No. 72), and Defendant Hotel OM Sai Ram, LLC filed a reply, (D.E.
No. 75).
On April 25, 2025, Defendant SG Hospitality moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(2),
12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6), arguing that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction, venue is improper, and
Plaintiff fails to state a claim against it. (D.E. No. 67). Plaintiff opposed, (D.E. No. 71), and SG
Hospitality filed a reply, (D.E. No. 76).
On June 20, 2025, Defendant D. Laxmi moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(2) and
12(b)(6) for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. (D.E. Nos. 86 & 87). Plaintiff
opposed. (D.E. No. 92).
3 Defendant D. Laxmi did not reply.
The motions are therefore all now ripe for adjudication.
II. Legal Standard4
Under Rule 12(b)(2), the Court may dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.
When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), courts “must accept all of the plaintiff's
3 Plaintiff appears to have filed her opposition to Defendant D. Laxmi’s motion to dismiss twice. ( See D.E.
Nos. 91 & 92). As best the Court can discern, the two oppositions are identical.
4 Because this Court does not reach the merits of the Wyndham Defendants’ motion, nor the Rule
12(b)(6) arguments raised in the Franchisee Defendants’ m otions, it omits the Rule 12(b)(6) standard from this
section.
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allegations as true and construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.” Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v.
Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 142 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the
court’s jurisdiction over the defendant. Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir.
2004). Although the plaintiff must ultimately prove personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of
the evidence, such a showing is unnecessary at the early stages of litigation. Mellon Bank (E.)
PSFS, Nat. Ass’n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992). Rather, the plaintiff need only
present “a prima facie case for the exercise of personal jurisdiction by ‘establishing with reasonable
particularity sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum state.’” Id. at 1223 (quoting
Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass ’n, 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir. 1987)). Once
the plaintiff meets this burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the presence of other
considerations that would render the exercise of personal jurisdiction unreasonable. Carteret Sav.
Bank, 954 F.2d at 150.
III. Discussion
Franchisee Defendants contend that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint against
them for lack of personal jurisdiction. (See generally Franchisee Defendants’ motions to dismiss).
A federal court engages in a two -step inquiry to determine whether it may exercise personal
jurisdiction. First, the court must determine whether the relevant state long -arm statute permits
the exercise of jurisdiction; second, the court must then satisfy itself that the exercise of jurisdiction
comports with due process. See IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG , 155 F.3d 254, 258–59 (3d Cir.
1998). “New Jersey’s long-arm statute provides for jurisdiction coextensive with the due process
requirements of the United States Constitution.” Miller Yacht Sales, 384 F.3d at 96 (citing N.J.
Ct. R. 4:4–4(c)). Under the Constitution, personal jurisdiction can be established either through
general or specific jurisdiction. See Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 582 U.S. 255,
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262 (2017). Franchisee Defendants assert that the Court has neither general nor specific
jurisdiction over them. (See generally the Franchisee Defendants’ motions to dismiss). The Court
will address each argument in turn.5
A. General Jurisdiction
The Franchisee Defendants first argue that Plaintiff fails to establish that they are “at home”
in New Jersey for purposes of general personal jurisdiction. (See D.E. No. 65-4 at 8–10; D.E. No.
67-5 at 10–13; D.E. No. 87 at 13–14 (ECF Pagination) ). A district court may exercise general
jurisdiction when a defendant’s contacts with the forum state “are so ‘continuous and systematic’
as to render [it] essentially at home.” BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. 402, 413 (2017) (quoting
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014)). The Supreme Court has observed that “[w]ith
respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation and principal place of business are ‘paradig[m]
... bases for general jurisdiction.’” Daimler , 571 U.S. at 137 (citation omitted). “ General
jurisdiction over a limited liability company only tends to exist in its state of citizenship. ” Canal
Ins. Co. v. Fema Trucking, LLC, No. 20-17953, 2022 WL 3227188, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2022).
Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized that “it is
‘incredibly difficult to establish general jurisdiction over a corporation in a forum other than the
place of incorporation or principal place of business.’” Malik v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 710 F.
5 If the court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff need only present “a prima facie case for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction by ‘establishing with reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between the
defendant and the forum state.’” Mellon Bank, 960 F.2d at 1223 (quoting Provident Nat’l Bank, 819 F.2d at 437).
The governing standard, then, is similar to that on an ordinary Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, which is directed to
the face of the pleadings plus documents of which the court may properly taken notice. See Schmidt v. Skolas , 770
F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (“To decide a motion to dismiss, courts generally consider only the allegations contained
in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record”). Here, the Franchisee Defendants
attached several exhibits and declarations to their motions to dismiss, each in support of their argument that this Court
may not properly exercise personal jurisdiction over them. ( See D.E. Nos. 65-2–3; 67-2–4; & 86-3–5). Because the
Court holds that Plaintiff has not met her burden to present a prima facie case for the exercise of personal jurisdiction,
as explained herein, the Court does not reach the question of whether it can—or should—properly consider the
Franchisee Defendants’ declarations and exhibits at this stage.
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App’x 561, 564 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Chavez v. Dole Food Co., 836 F.3d 205, 223 (3d Cir.
2016)) (citation modified).
Here, the Court lacks general jurisdiction over the Franchisee Defendants. None of the
Franchisee Defendants are incorporated in New Jersey, nor do they maintain their principal place
of business in this State. Defendants Hotel OM Sai Ram, LLC and SG Hospitality are limited
liability companies organized under the laws of Texas with their principal places of business in
Texas. (D.E. No. 65-4 at 9; D.E. No. 67-5 at 12). Defendant D. Laxmi is a Texas corporation with
its principal place of business in the same. (D.E. No. 87 at 13–14 (ECF Pagination)). These
Defendants are thus “at home” in Texas —not New Jersey. Plaintiff also fails to allege facts
suggesting that this is an “exceptional case” where “a corporation ’s operations in a forum other
than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of
such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19.
Accordingly, this Court lacks general jurisdiction over the Franchisee Defendants. 6
B. Specific Jurisdiction
The Franchisee Defendants next argue that this Court lacks specific jurisdiction over them.
In response, Plaintiff argues that (i) the Franchisee Defendants purposely directed their activities
at New Jersey through its business relationship with t he Wyndham Defendants, (D.E. No. 71 at
7–10; D.E. No. 72 at 6–9; D.E. No. 92 at 6–9 ); (ii) the Franchisee Defendants reached beyond
their home state to establish an ongoing business relationship tied to New Jersey, as the franchise
agreements included a New Jersey choice-of-law clause and a forum-selection provision requiring
disputes to be resolved in New Jersey and the agreement contemplated continuing contacts with
New Jersey, including the routine submission of operational reports, royalty payments, and other
6 Plaintiff concedes that this Court lacks general jurisdiction over the Franchisee Defendants. (See D.E. Nos.
71 at 5 n.2; 72 at 4 n.2; 92 at 6 n.4).
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communications to Wyndham in New Jersey, (D.E. No. 71 at 9; D.E. No. 72 at 8; D.E. No. 92 at
7); (iii) the Franchisee Defendants’ contacts with New Jersey relates to multiple elements of her
beneficiary claim, including the alleged financial benefits, participation in the trafficking ventures,
and knowledge of trafficking; (iv) the burden shifts to the Franchisee Defendants to show that the
exercise of jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, and
the Franchisee Defendants have failed to make the required showing ; and (v) New Jersey has a
“strong interest in regulating the relevant conduct.” ( Id.). In reply, the Franchisee Defendants
contend that Plaintiff offers only a weak connection between the Franchisee Defendants, New
Jersey, and Plaintiff’s sexual trafficking allegations. (D.E. No. 75 at 4). Specifically, the
Franchisee Defendants argue that the alleged contacts—such as payment processing through New
Jersey systems, obligations under a New Jersey-governed franchise agreement, and remittance of
funds to a New Jersey franchisor —are too attenuated to show that Plaintiff’s claims arise out of
or relate to the forum. (Id. at 5; D.E. No. 76 at 3). As such, they contend that these contacts fall
short of the “strong relationship” required for specific jurisdiction.
Specific jurisdiction arises from “an ‘ affiliation between the forum and the underlying
controversy,’” and a district court exercising specific jurisdiction “is confined to adjudication of
issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.”
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (citation modified).
To determine whether specific jurisdiction is appropriate, court s must conduct a three -pronged
test. First, the defendant must have “‘purposefully directed’ his activities at the forum.” Marten
v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 296 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 472 (1985)). Second, the plaintiff’s claim must “arise out of or relate to at least one of those
specific activities.” Id. (citation modified). The Court notes the “central concern” of the second
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prong is “the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Daimler, 571 U.S.
at 126 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977)). Third, if the prior two requirements
are met, a court must consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction otherwise comports with “‘fair
play and substantial justice.’” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (citation omitted).
Turning to the first prong, the Court finds that the Franchisee Defendants purposefully
availed themselves of this forum by entering a franchising relationship with t he Wyndham
Defendants. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 480–82. In Burger King, the Supreme Court held that
a nonresident franchisee had sufficient minimum contacts with Florida even though its only
physical connection to the state was attending a brief training course. Id. The Court reasoned that
the franchisee established a substantial connection with Florida by reaching out to form a long-
term franchise relationship with a Florida franchisor and by engaging in ongoing obligations that
tied the parties’ relationship to the forum. Id. at 478–83. Similarly, by entering into an ongoing
franchise relationship with a New Jersey -based franchisor that required regular operational
coordination, the Franchisee Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of
conducting activities in New Jersey. See also Doe (S.A.T.) v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.,
No. 24- 11511, 2025 WL 2848587 at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2025) (“Here, Franchisee LLC
purposefully availed itself of this forum by entering a franchising relationship with [the]
Franchisor Defendants.”).
Turning to the second prong, the Court finds instructive the reasoning in Doe (S.A.T), a
similar case in this District involving materially indistinguishable allegations against a franchisee
defendant. There, applying Bristol -Myers, the court held that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the
relatedness requirement where the conduct underlying the claim—namely, the alleged trafficking
activity—occurred outside the forum notwithstanding the franchisee’s ongoing business
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relationship with a forum -based franchisor and its use of forum -based systems. 2025 WL
2848587, at * 4 (citing Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 259); see id. (“Although Franchisee LLC may
have used the Wyndham Defendants’ systems in carrying out certain actions, the conduct at the
core of the alleged ventures, namely, the rental of rooms to sex traffickers, occurred in Texas.
(citation modified)). Thus, the Court held that “the connection between the conduct underlying
Plaintiff’s claim and this forum [was] too attenuated to find specific personal jurisdiction.” Id.;
see also Doe (M.J.J.) v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 24-6490, 2026 WL 308896 (D.N.J.
Feb. 5, 2026) (applying the Doe (S.A.T.) reasoning to hold that the court lacked personal
jurisdiction over the franchisee defendants). The c ourt further emphasized that such contacts
standing alone were insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction. Id. (“Plaintiff’s reliance on
Franchisee LLC ’s routine interactions with Wyndham by virtue of their ongoing business
relationship also does not constitute a strong connection to Plaintiff’s venture claim. Jurisdiction
must be established on the basis of each defendant’s own contact with a given forum.” (c iting
Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 286 (2014))).
The Court finds that reasoning persuasive and applicable here. As in Doe (S.A.T) and Doe
(M.J.J.), the alleged conduct at the core of Plaintiff’s claims occurred outside New Jersey, and the
Franchisee Defendants’ routine interactions with a New Jersey-based franchisor do not establish
the requisite connection to the forum. As the Court therefore finds that the Franchisee Defendants
are not subject to personal jurisdiction in this District with respect to Plaintiff’s claims, the Court
need not address the third prong of the specific jurisdiction inquiry.
C. Transfer is Appropriate
As the Court has found that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the Franchisee Defendants,
it must now determine the appropriate disposition of the claims against them. The Third Circuit
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has made clear that “a district court that lacks personal jurisdiction must at least consider a
transfer.” Danziger & De Llano, LLP v. Morgan Verkamp LLC, 948 F.3d 124, 132 (3d Cir. 2020).
Indeed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (“Section 1631”), when a civil action is filed in a court that
lacks jurisdiction, “the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action . . . to any
other such court in which the action . . . could have been brought at the time it was filed.”
Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (“Section 1404(a)”) permits a court to sua sponte transfer a civil
action from one proper venue to another proper venue. Doe (S.A.T.) , 2025 WL 2848587 at *5
(first citing Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 878 (3d Cir. 1995); then citing Sondhi v.
McPherson Oil Co., No. 20- 13986, 2021 WL 5356182, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2021) ).
“Conversely, Section 1406 [28 U.S.C. § 1406] applies when the original venue is improper.” Id.
(citing Jumara, 55 F.3d at 878).
The Court holds that venue is proper in the District of New Jersey pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1391 (“Section 1391”) and therefore will analyze the propriety of a transfer pursuant to Section
1404(a).7 That statute provides: “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.” The purpose
7 In so holding, the Court adopts the reasoning of several of its colleagues in this District on related TVPRA
claims brought against Wyndham and its franchisees. See, e.g. , Doe (S.A.T.), 2025 WL 2848587, at *5 (holding (i)
that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the franchisee defendants; (ii) that venue was proper in the District of
New Jersey, such that Section 1404(a) applied; and transferring the entire matter to the Northern District of Texas);
Doe v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc. , No. 25-1550, 2025 WL 3754148 (D.N.J. Dec. 24, 2025) (finding venue in
the District of New Jersey appropriate because “[t]he relationship between [Franchisee Defendant] , enforcing
Wyndham’s polices, and Wyndham, setting the policies, cannot be separated from the harm alleged. Their franchising
agreement directed how [Franchisee Defendant] would be paid, what Wyndham’s cut would be, how payments would
be processed back in New Jersey, and additionally outlined when and how [Franchisee Defendant] must report
suspected sex trafficking to Wyndham. And Wyndham’s corporate decision -making—which includes decisions
related to its policies, reporting requirements, and its supervision and training of [Franchisee Defendant] —and its
profit-sharing from its corporate headquarters in New Jersey mean that a ‘substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to’ [Plaintiff’s] claims occurred here.” (citation modified)). The Court accordingly holds that the District
of New Jersey is a proper venue pursuant to Section 1391(b), as it is “ a judicial district in which a substantial part of
the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”
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of Section 1404(a) is to “prevent the waste of time, energy, and money and to protect litigants,
witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.” Kremer v. Lysich, No.
18-03676, 2019 WL 3423434, at *3 (D.N.J. July 30, 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, when considering transfer pursuant to Section 1404(a), a court must determine: (i)
whether the proposed forum is one in which plaintiff could have originally brought suit (or one to
which the parties have consented), and (ii) whether transfer would be in the interest of justice and
for the convenience of parties and witnesses. Id. As to the former, the Court finds that Plaintiff
could have originally filed this action in the Western District of Texas, as a “substantial part of the
events . . . giving rise” to Plaintiff’s claim occurred there. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The Court must
next determine whether transfer to that District would be “in the interest of justice” and serve the
“convenience of parties and witnesses.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
In performing this analysis, courts in the Third Circuit consider all “relevant public and
private interests.” Santi v. Nat’l Bus. Recs. Mgmt., LLC, 722 F. Supp. 2d 602, 606 (D.N.J. 2010)
(citing Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879). Those private interests typically include: (i) the plaintiff’s forum
preference; (ii) the defendant’s preference; (iii) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (iv) the
convenience of the parties; (v) the convenience of the witnesses; and (vi) the location of books and
records. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879 (citations omitted). The relevant public interests include (i) the
enforceability of the judgment; (ii) practical considerations that could make the trial easy,
expeditious, or inexpensive; (iii) the relative administrative difficulty in the two fora from court
congestion; (iv) the local interest in deciding controversies at home; (v) the public policies of the
fora; and (vi) the familiarity of the trial judge with the applicable state law in diversity cases. Id.
at 879–80 (citations omitted). C ourts have broad discretion when resolving a Section 1404(a)
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motion to transfer, and must consider “convenience and fairness . . . on a case-by- case basis.”
Santi, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 606; Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988).
The Court finds that, on balance, the relevant public and private interests favor transferring
this matter. The record reflects that Plaintiff lives in Texas and the Franchisee Defendants are
limited liability corporations and corporations with their principal places of business each in Texas.
(Compl. ¶¶ 10–29). Critically, as the hotels at issue in this case are located in Texas, most of the
activities underlying Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Texas. (See Compl. ¶¶ 38 & 39). In turn, it is
likely that witnesses and evidence related to the alleged trafficking at issue are also in Texas.
Further, this Court is confident that Texas has “an interest in deciding this matter.” Doe (S.A.T.),
2025 WL 2848587, at *5. As my colleagues in this District have held:
Taking into account judicial economy and the TVPRA ’s purposes
of combatting trafficking, ensuring “just and effective punishment
of traffickers,” and victim protection, this Court deems the transfer
of this case to the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas proper. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106- 939, at
3 (2000); see Doe v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., No. 24- 1598, 2025
WL 2108792, at *12 (D. Md. July 28, 2025) (“[T]he [c]ourt finds
that its lack of personal jurisdiction over [franchisee] GP 4, a key
party in this litigation, strongly counsels in favor of transferring this
case to the Middle District of Florida, a proper venue where, as
acknowledged at the hearing by Defendants, personal jurisdiction
would exist over both GP4 and [franchisor] Choice.”); Doe v.
Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., No. 24-2836, 2025 WL 2430024, at *6–7
(D. Md. Aug. 22, 2025) (affording minimal weight to the plaintiff's
choice of venue where the alleged trafficking occurred in
Wisconsin, the same state as Plaintiff's domicile, and transferring
the case to Wisconsin).
Id. Judicial economy concerns also favor transfer, as the alternative would involve splitting
Plaintiff’s claims between two fora. The Court finds that most of the remaining public interest
factors (e.g., enforceability of a judgment, judicial familiarity with state law, etc.) are neutral to
the analysis. Accordingly, this Court concludes that transfer to the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas is warranted.
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IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Franchisee Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED
IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over
the Franchisee Defendants. Rather than dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against the Franchisee
Defendants, however, the Court finds a transfer to the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas is appropriate. The Court will therefore transfer this matter, sua sponte , to that
District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In light of this transfer, the Court does not address the
merits of the Wyndham Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The Wyndham
Defendants may re-file that application, post -transfer, at the direction of the Western District of
Texas. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
Date: April 27, 2026
s/ Esther Salas
Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.
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