govinfo:USCOURTS-kyed-2_26-cv-00119-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
NORTHERN DIVISION 
at Covington 
 
GARY WAYNE BEAM, 
 
 Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
KENTON COUNTY DETENTION 
CENTER, 
 
 Respondent. 
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Civil Action No. 2:26-cv-00119-SCM 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 
ORDER 
   
 
 
 
 
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Pro se Petitioner Gary Wayne Beam filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the validity of an ongoing state prosecution 
against him.  [Dkt. 1].  The Court reviewed that Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243 
and denied it because the Petitioner had not alleged facts supporting a cognizable 
§ 2241 claim.  [Dkt. 5; Dkt. 6].   
The Petitioner subsequently filed two l etters objecting to the Court’s ruling 
and requesting a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) under Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 22(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) so that he may appeal this Court’s denial of 
his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  [See Dkt. 12; Dkt. 
13]; see also Winburn v. Nagy , 956 F.3d 909, 911 –12 (6th Cir. 2020) (stating that a 
state pretrial detainee is required to receive a certificate of appealability to appeal 
the denial of his § 2241 petition).  Having reviewed those submissions, the Court will 
deny his requests for a COA.   
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I. Background 
The Petitioner is a pretrial detainee being held in custody by the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky pending a  criminal trial in state court .  As the Court 
explained in its prior Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Petitioner did not allege 
facts supporting a cognizable claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  [Dkt. 5].  Federal courts 
generally abstain under the Younger doctrine when presented with pretrial § 2241 
petitions like the Petitioner’s, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and the Sixth 
Circuit recognizes only “three exceptions that permit a federal court to consider a 
pretrial habeas petition.”  Simmons v. Washington, No. 24-1757, 2025 WL 740835, at 
*1 (6th Cir. Jan. 27, 2025).  Those three exceptions are: “(1) when a petitioner seeks 
a speedy trial”; “(2) when a petitioner seeks to avoid a second trial on double jeopardy 
grounds”; and “(3) when a petitioner faces prejudice from prior ineffective assistance 
of counsel and due process violations on retrial. ”  Minefee v. Sheriff of Cuyahoga 
Cnty., No. 1:26CV00022, 2026 WL 332386, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 9, 2026) .  The 
Petitioner did not raise any of those three claims.  The Court therefore abstained 
under Younger and denied the Petition without prejudice .  See id. (federal courts 
“typically reject petitions for [pretrial] habeas relief under the  Younger abstention” 
doctrine).  The Court later informed the Petitioner that, to the extent he seeks to raise 
a claim related to his speedy-trial rights, he could do so by filing a new § 2241 petition 
that clearly raised and adequately supported that  claim.  [Dkt. 9 at 2].   The Court 
simultaneously instructed the Clerk to send the Petitioner the forms necessary to file 
a new § 2241 petition.  [Id.].  The Petitioner then filed two submissions requesting a 
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COA.  [Dkt. 12; Dkt. 13]. 
The Petitioner has since filed a letter in the record expressly disclaiming any 
argument based on his speedy -trial rights .  [Dkt. 16 at 2 (explaining that the 
Petitioner’s “one and only issue” is the validity of his state-court prosecution due to 
the death of a witness and that he “never raised any question [as] to a speedy trial 
issue”)].  Thus, the Court concludes that the Petitioner neither intended to raise, nor 
actually raised, a claim based on a violation of his speedy-trial rights. 
II. Analysis 
The Court construes the Petitioner’s latest filings as a Notice of Appeal, and it 
will allow him to proceed as a pauper on appeal.  See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) 
(explaining that a party who was allowed to proceed as a pauper in the district court 
may generally proceed as a pauper on appeal without further authorization).   
As noted above, t he Petitioner requires  a COA to appeal the denial of his 
pretrial §  2241 habeas petition.   “[T]he language of § 2253(c)(1)(A) requires 
certificates of appealability for all state -prisoner habeas appeals, whether seeking 
pretrial relief under § 2241 or post-conviction relief under § 2254.”  Winburn, 956 F.3d 
at 912.  A district judge may issue a COA “only if the applicant has made a substantial 
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”   28 U.S.C. §  2253(c)(2).  Under the 
Supreme Court’s standard for granting a COA  set forth in Slack v. McDaniel, “[t]he 
petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’ s 
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.”   529 U.S. 473, 484 
(2000).  The Sixth Circuit has instructed that a district judge considering whether to 
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grant a COA must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine 
whether a COA is warranted.  Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2001) (per 
curiam), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. United States, 310 F.3d 900 (6th Cir. 
2002). 
Here, the Petition was denied without prejudice for procedural reasons.  As the 
Court previously explained, the Petitioner did not make a substantial showing of the 
denial of a constitutional right because he did not base his Petition on any of the three 
grounds justifying pretrial habeas relief recognized by the Sixth Circui t.  
Therefore, Younger abstention was appropriate .  Even assuming  for the sake of 
argument that the Petitioner intended to raise  a speedy-trial claim —one of th ose 
three grounds—he did not establish that he exhausted state-court remedies for that 
potential claim.  “When a district court denies a habeas petition on procedural 
grounds [such as Younger abstention or failure to exhaust state-court remedies], the 
applicant must show that reasonable jurists could disagree about both the procedural 
ruling and the underlying constitutional claim. ”  Winburn, 956 F.3d at 912.   So, for 
the Petitioner to be entitled to a COA, there would have to be some doubt about 
whether this Court’s dismissal of the Petition was sound and some possibility that 
Younger abstention was improper. 
There is no such doubt here.  The Sixth Circuit recognizes only three grounds 
for a federal court to consider granting a pretrial habeas petition like the Petitioner’s, 
and the Petitioner raised none of them.   See Simmons, 2025 WL 740835, at *1; see 
also Minefee, 2026 WL 332386, at *2;  Folley v. Banks, 2020 WL 9813535, at *2 (6th 
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Cir. Aug. 31, 2020) .  The Petitioner’s requests for a COA do not  raise any of th ose 
three grounds, either.  To the extent that the Petitioner’s submissions could possibly 
have been construed as raising a claim based on his speedy -trial rights, he has now 
clarified that he “never raised any question [as] to a speedy trial issue.”  [Dkt. 16 at 
2]. 
The sole issue the Petitioner clearly raises in his Petition and reiterates in his 
requests for a COA —a claim apparently based on the  Sixth Amendment’s  
Confrontation Clause—does not provide a foundation for pretrial habeas relief.  See 
[Dkt. 1 at 5 (asserting that the Petitioner is “falsely accused of assaulting [his 
fiancée]” and that “[t]here is no accusing authority to hold [him]” because “she passed 
away” due to terminal breast cancer, and as a result of her passing and unavailability 
as a witness, he “cannot be prosecuted”)]; see also [Dkt. 13 at 3 (asserting “there 
became [sic] no authority to prosecute” the Petitioner after his fiancée “passed away 
of cancer unrelated to the matter entirely” and there is “no key witness to accuse 
[him] of assaulting them”)].  However, there has been no trial in the Petitioner’s case 
yet, and so there can be no deprivation of the Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to 
confront witnesses against him at trial .  See Acosta v. Palmer, No. 3:24 -CV-00201-
JJH, 2025 WL 1222641, at *12 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 28, 2025) (“The right to confront one’s 
accuser ‘is a trial right,’ meaning that it applies at trial ,” and if one has not gone to 
trial, his “Confrontation Clause right [does] not attach .” (quoting Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 (1987) (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original))), report and 
recommendation adopted, No. 3:24 -CV-201, 2025 WL 3012772 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 28, 
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2025).  Under these circumstances, n o reasonable jurist could conclude that the 
Petitioner raised  a valid ground for pretrial habeas relief , nor does the Petitioner 
point to any authority that could plausibly establish that he is presently held “in 
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States .”  28 
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).  
The Petitioner’s cited authorities do not establish that reasonable jurists could 
conclude that this Court’s prior ruling is debatable or wrong, either.  The two habeas 
cases the Petitioner cites are not applicable to his situation .  Rather, they are post-
conviction habeas cases  of doubtful relevance  and limited usefulness  when 
considering the Petitioner’s status as a pretrial detainee .  See Allah -U-Akbar v. 
Bradshaw, 154 F.4th 482 (6th Cir. 2025) (post -conviction habeas case not analyzing 
any Confrontation Clause claim); see also Stewart v. Cowan , 528 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 
1976) (post -conviction habeas case  analyzing Confrontation Clause 
claims).  Meanwhile, the Petitioner’s citation to  Michigan v. Long , 463 U.S. 1032  
(1983), has nothing to do with this matter  whatsoever.  That case involved analysis 
of whether adequate and independent state grounds deprived the Supreme Court of 
jurisdiction and related entirely to a Terry search of a car that uncovered marijuana.  
None of those issues are presented in the Petitioner’s case.   The Petitioner’s 
arguments in favor of issuing a COA are unavailing. 
III. Conclusion 
The Petitioner failed to  demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 
Court’s prior Memorandum Opinion and Order is debatable or wrong.  He is therefore 
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not entitled to a Certificate of Appealability.  Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:  
1) The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED  to docket the Petitioner ’s recent 
filings, [Dkt. 12; Dkt. 13], collectively as a Notice of Appeal. 
2) The Petitioner is permitted to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, 
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). 
3) The Petitioner’s requests for a Certificate of Appealability, [Dkt. 12; Dkt. 
13], are DENIED. 
4) To the extent the Petitioner’s most recent filings, [Dkt. 14; Dkt. 15; Dkt. 
16; Dkt. 17], seek a Certificate of Appealability, they are DENIED. 
5) The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Order to the 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.     
Signed this 27th day of April, 2026.          
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