govinfo:USCOURTS-laed-2_25-cv-01978-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 
 
CONNIE VERDIN ET AL 
 
 CIVIL ACTION 
V.   
 
 NO: 25-1978 
GREG CHAMPAGNE ET AL 
 
 SECTION: C (3) 
 
 
ORDER AND REASONS 
 
 
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Fed. Civ. Proc. Rule 12B(6) filed by 
defendant, St. Charles Parish Sheriff Greg Champagne, on October 22, 2025 (R ec. 
Doc. 5).  The motion is GRANTED.  
BACKGROUND 
 
  Plaintiffs, the family members and estate of Charles Verdin,  filed a 
complaint against St. Charles Parish Sheriff  Greg Champagne  and unidentified 
individuals, making both  state-law claims for survival and wrongful death  and 
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , all arising from the shooting death of Charles 
Verdin.1 The complaint makes the following allegations: On September 26, 2024,  a 
resident called 911 and said Verdin was walking down the street in Hahnville, 
Louisiana with a firearm.2  St. Charles Parish Sheriff deputies responded and found 
 
1  R. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 4-13. 
2  Id. at ¶¶ 4-5. 
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Verdin in his van.3  The deputies observed Verdin neither with a firearm nor actively 
threatening anyone with a firearm. 4  The deputies surrounded Verdin’s van and 
ordered him out.5  Verdin did not comply. Then, three deputies fired approximately 
30 to 40 rounds at Verdin, killing him.6  The reported “firearm” was actually an 
airsoft gun equipped with a visible red tip.7  The presence of the red tip should have 
alerted adequately trained law enforcement that the airsoft gun was not a firearm.8   
Plaintiffs sued claiming excessive force, constitutional violations resulting in 
suffering and death, failure to train  and adequately supervise , a nd survival and 
wrongful death actions.  Plaintiffs seek recovery for Verdin’s pain and suffering, 
mental anguish and anxiety, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of income, funeral and 
burial expenses, exemplary and punitive damages, and loss of love, affection, 
society, consortium, and services.9 
Champagne moves to dismiss select claims for failure to state a claim  upon 
which relief can be granted.10 
  
 
3  Id. at ¶ 6. 
4  Id. 
5  Id. at ¶ 7. 
6  Id. at ¶¶ 8, 10. 
7  Id. at ¶ 11. 
8  Id. at ¶ 12. 
9  R. Doc. 1, at 7. 
10  R. Doc. 5. 
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ANALYSIS  
 
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s allegations. 
A complaint, or any part of it, may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted if plaintiff fails to set forth factual allegations that would 
entitle him to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Cuvillier 
v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007).  
To survive, a complaint must contain sufficient facts, accepted as true, to state 
a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads the factual content 
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 
the misconduct alleged . Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a 
plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court 
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679.  
In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court should confine itself to the 
pleadings and documents attached to the complaint. Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan 
Bank USA, NA, 369 F.3d 833, 839 (5th Cir. 2004); Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean 
Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 4 98 (5th Cir. 2000). The Court may also consider documents 
attached to a motion to dismiss or an opposition to that motion when the documents 
are referred to in the pleadings and are central to a plaintiff’s claims.  Carter v. 
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Target Corp, 541 Fed. Appx. 413, 416 (5th Cir. 2013).  The court “may also consider 
matters of which [it] may take judicial notice.”  Hall v. Hodgkins, 305 F. App’x 224, 
227 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Lovelace v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017-
18 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
While detailed factual allegations are not required, a complaint must offer 
more than mere labels, legal conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the elements of 
a cause of action. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The complaint is construed in the light most 
favorable to plaintiff, accepting as true all well -pleaded factual allegations and 
drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Lovick v. Ritemoney Ltd., 378 
F.3d 433, 437 (5 th Cir. 2004). However, the court  will not accept “conclusory 
allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions” as true. Ferrer v. 
Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 
407 F.3d 690, 696 (5 th Cir. 2005)). If factual allegations are insufficient to raise a 
right to relief above the speculative level, the claim should be dismissed. Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 555.   
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims 
Plaintiffs assert two theories under Section 1983 : 1) a municipal policy or 
custom caused the alleged constitutional deprivation , and; 2) a failure to train or 
adequately supervise caused the alleged constitutional deprivation.   When sued in 
their official capacity, government actors represent their municipality. Mitchell v. 
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City of New Orleans, 184 F.Supp.3d 360, 370 (E.D. La. May 2, 2016); Victoria W. 
v. Larpenter , 205 F.Supp.2d 580, 586 (E.D. La. May 21, 2002).  To establish 
municipal policy or practice liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) 
an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving 
force behind the violation of a constitutional right.  Vardeman v. City of Houston, 55 
F.4th 1045, 1052 (5th Cir. 2022). 
Plaintiffs have not pled the elements required to establish municipal policy or 
practice liability.  They only pled that unidentified defendant deputies acted “under 
the color of law” and under the customs, policies, and  practices of the Sheriff’s 
office.  That does not allege the challenged official policy, custom, or practice; that 
the practice was promulgated by a policymaker; or that the practice was the moving 
force behind the alleged violation of Verdin’s rights.  Neither do plaintiffs specify 
what constitutional right was violated, beyond a categorical claim that Verdin was 
deprived “of his constitutional rights.” 11 The Court grants defendant’s motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim for municipal policy or practice  liability under 
Section 1983. 
Plaintiffs also allege the failure to adequately train the officers either to 
identify firearms or to use deadly force , and such failure reflects a “deliberate 
indifference” to Verdin’s constitutional rights.  Failure-to-train liability requires 
 
11  R. Doc. 1, at 4. 
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three elements: (1) the municipality failed to train or supervise the officers, (2) the 
alleged failure to supervise or train caused the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s 
rights, and (3) the failure to train or supervised was “deliberate indifference” to the 
plaintiff’s constitutional rights.  Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 623 
(5th Cir. 2018).  On the first element, because of the high threshold for municipal 
fault, a pattern of similar constitutional violations is usually required.  Connick v. 
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011). Plaintiffs have not pled a pattern of constitutional 
violations.   
Absent a pattern of constitutional violations, plaintiffs must plead the single-
incident exception.  Burge v. St. Tammany Par., 336 F.3d 363, 372 (5th Cir. 2003).  
The single-incident exception applies to the use of deadly force.  “[T]he need to train 
officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force … can be said to 
be ‘so obvious,’ that failure to do so could be properly characterized as deliber ate 
indifference to constitutional rights.”  City of Canton v. Harris , 489 U.S. 378, 390 
n.10 (1989).  The Fifth Circuit only applies the exception in cases “in which the 
government actor was provided no training whatsoever.”  Peña, 879 F.3d at 624.  
Plaintiffs have not pled the deputies were provided no training; instead, they allege 
the Sheriff’s office failed to adequately train the officers.12  That is insufficient.  The 
 
12  R. Doc. 1, at 6 (emphasis added). 
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failure-to-train claim is dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted. 
Respondeat Superior 
It is unclear whether plaintiffs assert a respondeat superior argument against 
Champagne under Section 1983.  If so, the Supreme Court has rejected such claims 
“because the text of Section 1983 will not bear such a reading.”  Pitrowski v. City of 
Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan County 
v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997)).  To the extent that plaintiffs assert such claims 
against Champagne, the Court dismisses them for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted.   
State Law Claims for Survival and Wrongful Death 
To the extent plaintiffs brought  the state law survival and wrongful death 
claims as representatives of the estate of Charles Verdin and not in their individual 
capacities, Champagne moves for their dismissal.  Plaintiffs have now clarified that 
those claims are brought only in their individual capacities. 13  Consequently, the 
Court dismisses the motion to dismiss those claims as moot. 
Punitive Damages 
 
13  R. Doc. 9, at 12. 
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Claims for punitive damages against Champagne have been withdrawn.14  The 
Court dismisses the motion to dismiss the punitive damage claims as moot.  
CONCLUSION 
The motion to dismiss  plaintiffs’ claims against Champagne  is GRANTED.  
LEAVE TO AMEND the complaint within twenty-one days of this order only as to 
the Section 1983 claims for failure-to-train and municipal policy or practice liability 
is GRANTED.  
 
New Orleans, Louisiana this _____ day of April 2026 
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
                   WILLIAM J. CRAIN 
             UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 
14  R. Doc. 9, at 11. 
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