govinfo:USCOURTS-tned-2_16-cr-00105-3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
AT GREENEVILLE 
 
 
JOEY LEE SHETLEY, ) 
  ) 
 Petitioner, ) 
  ) 
v.  ) Nos. 2:18-CV-168   
  )   2:16-CR-105 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  )  
  ) 
 Respondent. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 Before the Court is Joey Lee Shetley’s (“Petitioner’s”) amended pro se motion to 
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  § 2255. [Doc. 9]. 1 The 
United States has responded in opposition [Docs. 5 & 10], and Petitioner has filed a reply 
[Doc. 11]. Petitioner has also filed a motion fo r an affidavit from trial counsel [Doc. 12] 
and an objection to the Court’s previous rulings on Petitioner’s motions to appoint counsel 
and for discovery, which the Court construes as  a Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider [Doc. 
9]. For the reasons below, Petitione r’s § 2255 motion [Doc. 9] will be DENIED; 
Petitioner’s motion to reconsider [Doc. 9] will be DENIED; and Petitioner’s motion for an 
affidavit [Doc. 12] will be DENIED.   
I. BACKGROUND 
 
1 Document numbers not otherwise specified refer to the civil docket. 
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In September 2016, Petitioner and seven co -defendants were charged in a twenty-
count indictment pertaining to  conspiracy and distributi on of 50 grams or more of 
methamphetamine. [Crim. Doc. 3]. Petitioner was named in three counts. [See id.]. 
On January 23, 2017, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement with the government. 
[Crim. Doc. 89]. The United States also filed an Information to Establish Prior Conviction 
[Crim. Doc. 86], wherein the Un ited States gave notice of its  intention to seek increased 
punishment for Petitioner’s pr ior convictions of possession with intent to distribute 
methamphetamine in April 2013 and possession with intent to distribute oxycodone in 
April 2013. Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and 
possess with the intent to dist ribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, its salts, 
isomers, and salts of its isomers a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 846 and 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). [See Crim. Doc. 89]. The plea agreement was 
signed by Petitioner and attorney Casey A. Sears, II. [Id.].  
In his plea agreement, Petitioner acknowledged that he was involved in a conspiracy 
with his co-defendants and others to distribute methamphetamine, a schedule II controlled 
substance, in and around the Tri-Cities area in the Eastern District of Tennessee. Petitioner 
admitted to selling metham phetamine to a confiden tial informant, selling 
methamphetamine to co-defendants, and in troducing co-defendants to sources of 
methamphetamine on mu ltiple occasions. [ See id .]. Petitioner also admitted to being 
stopped by officers on February 23, 2016 and consenting to a search where officers found 
a Correctional Officer’s badge, a red and blue dash light, approximately one half-ounce of 
methamphetamine, $9,000.00 in U.S. currency bundled in the vehicle’s manual folder, and 
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more money on Petitioner’s person and in his wallet. [ See id.]. Petitioner also spoke with 
police officers on March 26, 2016 and admitted to providing co-defendant with a contact 
from GA to obtain methamphetamine and making several trips with co-defendant to obtain 
methamphetamine. [See id.]. For the purposes of the plea agreement, the parties agreed that 
Petitioner should be held responsible for at least 500 grams but less than 1.5 kilograms of 
actual methamphetamine. [Id.]. Petitioner also admitted that he was previously convicted 
of controlled substances in at least two cases as listed in the Plea Agreement. [Id.]  
The Court conducted a change of plea hearing on March 1, 2017. Although there is 
no transcript of that hearing in the record , the minutes from the hearing indicate that 
Petitioner was arraigned and specifically advise d of his rights, that he was competent to 
change his plea, that his motion to change his plea to guilty was granted, that he waived 
the reading of the Indictment, that he pled guilty to Count 1 of the Indictment, that the 
Government moved to dismiss the remainin g counts at sentencing, that Petitioner was 
referred for a Presentence Investigative Repor t (“PSR”), and that he was to remain in 
custody until his sentencing hearing. [Crim. Doc. 105]. 
The PSR calculated a total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI, 
resulting in a guideline range of 262 to 327 mo nths. [Crim. Doc. 150, ¶ 75]. There was a 
statutory minimum term of im prisonment for 20 years. [ Id. at ¶ 74]. The PSR noted that 
dismissing the other counts against Petitioner did not have an effect on the guideline range. 
[Id. at ¶ 76]. The PSR also noted that had the United States filed a notice to seek enhanced 
punishment based on Petitioner’s prior conviction in Johnson County, TN, he would have 
been subject to a mandatory term of Life imprisonment. [Id.].  
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The government filed a notic e of no objections to the PSR. [Crim. Doc. 160]. The 
government also filed a motion for acceptance  of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 
3E1.1(b) [Crim. Doc. 161] and a sentenci ng memorandum wherei n it moved for a one-
level downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and requested a sentence between 
235 to 293 months. [Crim Doc. 228].  
Petitioner, through counsel, filed a notice of no objections to the PSR. [Crim. Doc. 
164]. Petitioner, through counsel, also f iled a sentencing memorandum requesting a 
variance to a sentence of 200 months due to Petitioner’s cooperation, his attempts to be 
more helpful to law enforcement, and the § 3553 factors, noting the Court’s limitations to 
considering the normal § 3553(a) factors. [Crim. Doc. 225]. 
 On October 2, 2017, the Court senten ced Petitioner to a total of 220 months’ 
imprisonment and then ten years of supervised release. [Crim. Doc. 238]. Petitioner did not 
file a direct appeal, but on October 9, 2018, he filed this timely § 2255 motion. 
II. OBJECTION – CONSTRUED AS A RULE 59(e) MOTION 
The Court will first address Petitioner’s objections to the Court’s prior rulings 
denying his request for counsel and an evid entiary hearing [Doc. 7] and his motion for 
discovery [Doc. 6]. [Doc. 9, pp. 1-8]. Petitione r’s objection was filed within 28 days of 
the Court’s order, well within Rule 59(e)’s  28-day time limit; therefore, the Court 
considers the objection to be a motion to alte r or amend under Rule 59(e) of the Federal 
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Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 In re Greektown Holdings, LLC , 728 F.3d 567, 574 (6 th Cir. 
2013) (explaining that a motion to reconsider “that is filed within 28 days can be construed 
as a motion to alter or amend th e judgment under Rule 59(e)”); Williams v. Thaler, 602 
F.3d 291, 303-304 (5th Cir. 2010) (explai ning that “[w]hen a litigant files a motion 
seeking a change in judgment, courts typically determine the appropriate motion based on 
whether the litigant filed the motion within Rule 59(e)’s time limit”).  
A Rule 59(e) motion should only be granted if there was (1) a cl ear error of law; 
(2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a need 
to prevent manifest injustice. Michigan Flyer LLC v. Wayne Cnty. Airport Auth., 860 F.3d 
425, 431 (6th Cir. 2017). Although Rule 59(e) permits a court to alter or amend a judgment, 
it “may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that 
could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 
U.S. 471, 485 n 5 (2008) (cita tion omitted). Where a movant merely “views the law in a 
light contrary to that of this Court,” his “proper recourse” is not by way of a motion for 
reconsideration “but appeal to the Sixth Circuit.” McConocha v. Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield Mut. of Ohio, 930 F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (quoting Dana Corp. v. 
United States, 764 F. Supp. 482, 489 (N.D. Ohio 1991)). 
“The grant or denial of a Rule 59(e) motion is within the informed discretion of the 
district court, reversible only for abuse.” Betts v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 558 F.3d 461, 
 
2 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in § 2255 cases, to the exte nt that they are not 
inconsistent with the Rules G overning Section 2255 Proceedings fo r the United States District 
Courts or statutory law. See Rule 12, Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases. 
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467 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In exercising this discretion, the Court must balance 
the need for finality with the need to render just decisions. Day v. Krystal Co., 241 F.R.D. 
474, 476 (E.D. Tenn. 2007); see also GenCorp, Inc. v. American Intern. Underwriters , 
178 F.3d 804, 834 (6 th Cir. 1999). Finally, the Court’s discretion to grant relief must be 
used sparingly, as revising a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy. Ira Green, Inc. v. 
Military Sales & Serv. Co., 775 F.3d 12, 28 (1st Cir. 2014). 
The arguments offered in Petitioner’s Ru le 59(e)’s motion are similar to the 
arguments made in his initial motions. [Doc. 9]. Petitioner’s Rule 59(e) motion does not 
establish a clear error of law,  newly discovered evidence, an intervening change in law, 
or any manifest injustice. Indeed, as the Court reads Petitioner’s Rule 59(e) motion, he is 
seeking to relitigate the argume nts and claims he offered in  his original motions. Rule 
59(e) is not to be used fo r this purpose. It is obvious  that Petitioner views the law 
differently from the way the Court viewed it in  resolving his previous motions. As it is, 
nothing in Plaintiff’s motion, including his attempt to relitigate the issues addressed in the 
Court’s order suggests that he is entitled  to relief under Rule 59(e). Accordingly, 
Petitioner’s Rule 59(e) motion (as construed) [Doc. 9] will be DENIED. 
III. § 2255 MOTION  
A. Standard of Review 
Under § 2255(a), a federal prisoner may move  to vacate, set aside, or correct his 
judgment of conviction and sentence if he claims that the sentence was imposed in violation 
of the Constitution or laws of the United States, that the court lacked jurisdiction to impose 
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the sentence, or that the sentence is in ex cess of the maximum authorized by law or is 
otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U. S.C. § 2255(a). As a threshold standard, to 
obtain post-conviction relief under § 2255, th e motion must allege: (1) an error of 
constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence impose d outside the federal statutory limits; or 
(3) an error of fact or law so fundamental  as to render the entire criminal proceeding 
invalid. Mallett v. United States , 334 F.3d 491, 496-97 (6 th Cir. 2003); Moss v. United 
States, 323 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 A movant bears the burden of demonstrating an error of constitutional magnitude 
which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the criminal proceedings. See 
Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 353 (1994) (noting that the Petitioner had not shown that his 
ability to present a defens e was prejudiced by the alleged constitutional error); Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993) (addressi ng the harmless-error standard that 
applies in habeas cases allegi ng constitutional error). In orde r to obtain collateral relief 
under § 2255, a movant must clear a significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct 
appeal. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166 (1982). 
 When a defendant files a § 2255 motion, he must set forth facts which entitle him 
to relief. Green v. Wingo, 454 F.2d 52, 53 (6th Cir. 1972); O’Malley v. United States, 285 
F.2d 733, 735 (6 th Cir. 1961). A movant must prove that he is entitled to relief by a 
preponderance of evidence. Pough v. United States, 442 F.3d 959, 964 (6 th Cir. 2006). A 
motion that merely states general conclusions of law, without substantiating the allegations 
with facts, is without legal merit. Loum v. Underwood, 262 F.2d 866, 867 (6th Cir. 1959); 
United States v. Johnson, 940 F. Supp. 167, 171 (W.D. Tenn. 1996).  
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 Under Rule 8(a) of the Governing Rules,  the Court is to review the answer, any 
transcripts, and records of prior proceeding s and any material submitted under Rule 7 to 
determine whether an eviden tiary hearing is warranted. Rules Governing Section 2255 
Proceedings, Rule 8(a). If a petitioner presents a factual dispute, then “the habeas court 
must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the truth of the petitioner’s claims.” Huff v. 
United States, 734 F.3d 600, 607 (6 th Cir. 2013) (quoting Valentine v. United States, 488 
F.3d 325, 333 (6 th Cir. 2007)). An evidentia ry hearing is not required “if the petitioner’s 
allegations cannot be accepted as true becau se they are contradicted by the record, 
inherently incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of facts.” Valentine, 488 F.3d 
at 333 (quoting Arrendondo v. United States, 178 F.3d 778, 782 (6th Cir. 1999)). The Court 
FINDS no need for an evidentiary hearing in the instant case. 
B. Analysis 
As an initial matter, Petitioner raises two claims in his amended § 2255 motion: 1) 
ineffective assistance of counsel  for failing to object to the PSR, failing to object to the 
career offender enhancement, an d failing to investigate legal and factual issues; and 2) 
ineffective assistance of coun sel for failing to investigate family members, not seeking 
mitigating evidence for sentencing, and “violating Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights.” 
[Doc. 9].  
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosec utions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistan ce of counsel for h[is] defense.” U.S. Const. 
amend. VI. A criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel necessarily implies 
the right to “reasonably effec tive assistance” of counsel. Strickland v. Washington , 466 
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U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Under the Strickland standard for proving ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a movant must show: (1) that coun sel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that 
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  Id. 
To prove deficient performance, the movant  must show “that counsel made errors 
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by 
the Sixth Amendment.” Id. The appropriate measure of  attorney performance is 
“reasonableness under preva iling professional norms.” Id. at 688. A movant asserting a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must  “identify the acts or omissions of counsel 
that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 690. 
The evaluation of the objective reasonablene ss of counsel’s performance must be made 
“from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the 
circumstances, and the standard of review is highly deferential.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 
477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). It is strongly presumed that counsel’s condu ct was within the 
wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
The prejudice prong “requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial,  a trial whose result is unreliable.” Id. at 687. The 
movant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceedi ng would have been different[.]” Id. at 703. Counsel is 
constitutionally ineffective only if a performance below professional standards caused the 
defendant to lose what he “otherwise would probably have won.” United States v. Morrow, 
977 F.2d 222, 229 (6th Cir. 1992). 
1. Claim 1 
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Petitioner’s first claim revolves around ineffective assistance of counsel pertaining 
to the PSR and Petitioner’s career offender e nhancement. [Doc. 9]. Petitioner argues that 
his plea agreement was made with the understa nding that he would not receive a career 
criminal enhancement. [ Id. at 9-10]. Petitioner cites to a portion of the plea agreement 
which states that the United States would not seek an enhanced punishment for Petitioner’s 
Johnson County conviction but would seek enhancement for Petitioner’s prior convictions 
in Georgia. [Id. at 10; see also Crim. Doc. 89, ¶ 2]. Petitioner asserts that his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to the PSR’ s offense level base designation for being a 
career offender. [Doc. 9, p. 12]. Petitioner then cites to his sentencing memorandum, filed 
by counsel, wherein his counsel argues that  the career offender designation and the 
acceptance of responsibility essentially cancel each other out , putting Petitioner at a base 
offense level of 34. [ Id.]. Petitioner does not argue that he is innocent of the prior 
convictions. 
The United States responds that the partie s never agreed that Petitioner should not 
be classified as a career offender for purposes of sentencing, rather, the parties agreed that 
the United States would not file a § 851 notice subjecting Petitioner to a mandatory 
minimum life sentence for his two prior Tennessee drug convictions. [Doc. 5, p. 5]. In the 
Plea Agreement, Petitioner stipulated that he  had two prior convictions for controlled 
substance offenses in Tennessee and ackno wledged that his sentencing determination 
would be based on the entire sc ope of his criminal conduct. [ Id. at 6; see also Crim Doc. 
89, pp. 5-6]. 
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Petitioner’s Claim 1 fails at Strickland’s first step. As Petitioner stipulated to the 
prior convictions and acknowledged that they would be considered at sentencing, counsel 
was not ineffective for failing to raise the me ritless argument Petitioner is now asserting 
counsel should have raised. Ludwig v. United States , 162 F.3d 456, 459 (6 th Cir. 1998) 
(“Counsel was not required to raise me ritless arguments to avoid a charge 
of ineffective assistance of counsel.”). Petitioner has also not shown that the result of the 
proceeding would have been different had his counsel object to the PSR. Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694. 
Accordingly, Petitioner’s Claim 1 will be DENIED. 
2. Claim 2 
Petitioner arguments for Claim 2 center around his counsel’s failure to interview co-
defendants and witness rega rding Petitioner’ family and me ntal history as mitigating 
evidence. [Doc. 9, pp. 15-16]. Petitioner claims  that had counsel investigated, he would 
have known that a phone did not belong to Petitioner, that  when a co-defendant was 
interviewed by officers he was under the influe nce of illegal substances and made false 
statements, and that had counsel investigated the government’s witnesses he may not have 
suggested a plea agreement. [Id.]. 
The United States argues that Petitioner has not demonstrated how the testimony he 
believes those witnesses would have provided would have actua lly been useful to him at 
sentencing. [Doc. 5, p. 6]. Further, the te stimony Petitioner asserts the witnesses would 
provide seem to conflict with Petitioner’s sworn admissions of guilt in his plea agreement. 
[Id.]. The United States further asserts that had Petitioner’s counsel brought these witnesses 
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to testify at sentencing, he likely would have jeopardized Petitioner’s ability to receive the 
three-level § 3E1.1 acceptance-of-responsib ility reduction and the one-level § 5K1.1 
departure. [Id. at 7]. 
Petitioner’s Claim 2 argument fails at Strickland’s second step. Petitioner’s primary 
argument for ineffective assistance of counsel is that his counsel did not investigate and 
get testimony from various witnesses. [Doc. 9 ]. Even if Petitioner’s attorney would have 
interviewed the witnesses Pe titioner suggested, Petitioner has not shown that the result 
would have been different. As discussed above, Petitioner affirmed at the change of plea 
hearing that he wished to pl ead guilty, and that his attorney  had adequately  covered the 
plea agreement with him. The Plea Agreement clearly states that Petitioner made several 
trips to Georgia with a co-defendant and that  he sold methamphetami ne directly with at 
least one of his co-conspirators. [Crim. Doc. 89].  
As the Supreme Court has explained, “[s]ol emn declarations in open court carry a 
strong presumption of verity. The subseque nt presentation of c onclusory allegations 
unsupported by specifics is subject to summar y dismissal, as are c ontentions that in the 
face of the record are wholly incredible.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). 
Petitioner’s unsupported allegations are directly  contradicted by the record and are not 
credited. Petitioner thus cannot bear his burden of showing “a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the re sult of the proceeding would have been 
different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under § 2255 
as to Claim 2. 
Accordingly, Petitioner’s Claim 2 will be DENIED.  
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IV. MOTION FOR AFFIDAVIT 
Petitioner, acting pro se , filed a Motion for an Order for Affidavit from Trial 
Counsel wherein he requests the Court order his trial counsel, Casey Sears, to provide an 
affidavit pertaining to Petitioner’s pending § 2255 motion. [Doc. 12]. As discussed above, 
the Court has found that Petitioner has not prevailed on his claims and has already denied 
Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hear ing, finding that one is not needed. [ See also 
Doc. 8]. Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion for an affidavit [Doc. 12] will be DENIED. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above, Petitioner’s amen ded § 2255 motion [Doc. 9] will be 
DENIED and DISMISSED ; Petitioner’s motion for an a ffidavit [Doc. 12] will be 
DENIED; and Petitioner’s Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider [Doc. 9] will be DENIED. 
VI. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court mu st determine whether a certificate of 
appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if a petitioner has demonstrated 
a “substantial showing of a deni al of a constitutional right.” Id. The district court must 
“engage in a reasoned assessment of each clai m” to determine whether a certificate is 
warranted. Murphy v. Ohio , 263 F.3d 466, 467 (6 th Cir. 2001). Each issue must be 
considered under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 
U.S. 473 (2000). Id. 
A petitioner whose claims have been rejected on the merits satisfies the 
requirements of § 2253(c) by showing that ju rists of reason would find the assessment of 
the claims debatable or wrong. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. A petitioner whose claims have been 
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rejected on a procedural basis must demonstr ate that reasonable jurists would debate the 
correctness of the Court’s procedural ruling. Id.; Porterfield v. Bell, 258 F.3d 484, 485-86 
(6th Cir. 2001). Having examined Petitioner’s claims under the Slack standard, the Court 
finds that reasonable jurists could not find that the dismissal of those claims was debatable 
or wrong. Therefore, the Court will DENY issuance of a certificate of appealability. 
A separate judgment will enter. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
ENTER: 
s/ Leon Jordan 
United States District Judge 
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