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govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_22-cv-06308-0
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JARRETT NELSON,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
Civil Action No.: 22-6308 (ES)
OPINION
SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is pro se petitioner Jarrett Nelson’s (“Petitioner”) motion to vacate, set
aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Section 2255”). (D.E. No. 15
(“Motion” or “Mot.”)). This Court ordered Petitioner to show cause as to why the Court should
not dismiss his Motion as untimely (D.E. No. 18 (“October 4, 2024 Order” or “Oct. 4, 2024
Order”)), and Petitioner responded (D.E. No. 19 (“Response to OTSC” or “Resp. to OTSC”)). For
the reasons set forth below, the Court DISMISSES the Motion as untimely and DENIES a
certificate of appealability.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 7, 2018, Petitioner Jarrett Nelson pled guilty to: ( i) conspiracy to commit
carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2119(1) and (2); (ii) conspiracy to use and carry
a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o); (iii)
carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119(1) and 2; and (iv) using and carrying a firearm during
and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 2. (See
Crim. No. 18-0455, D.E. Nos. 1 & 27). On January 17, 2019, this Court entered judgment against
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Petitioner and sentenced him to a cumulative prison term of 240 months. (Id., D.E. 33).
On October 10, 2022, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum.1
(Oct. 10, 2022 Pet.). Believing that Petitioner intended to file a motion to vacate, set aside, or
correct his sentence pursuant to Section 2255, the Court sent Petitioner a standard form Section
2255 motion and directed him to resubmit his pleading on the standard form. ( D.E. No. 2).
Thereafter, Petitioner submitted his motion on this standard form. (D.E. No. 5). The motion raises
a single claim arguing that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to convict or sentence him.
(See id.).
Before the Court finished screening the motion, on or about June 27, 2023, Petitioner filed
another petition for writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, which the Clerk of Court docketed as
a new matter under a separate docket number . ( See Civ. No. 23-3511, D.E. No. 1). The Court
once again sent Petitioner a standard form Section 2255 motion (see id., D.E. No. 2), and, on or
about August 28, 2023, Petitioner resubmitted his pleading on that form, see id. , D.E. No. 3
(“Motion” or “Mot .”)). The Motion raises four grounds or claims for relief , including the
jurisdictional claim that Petitioner previously asserted in the present matter (and are recited herein
verbatim):
(i) The two essential elements need ed to find a defendant guilty –
Actus Reus and/or Mens Rea – were not present in the Criminal
Complaint;
(ii) With respect to Ground One, the Court lacks jurisdiction as seen
by Title 40 U.S.C. § 3112(c); 18 U.S.C. § 3231 defined by 18 U.S.C.
§ 7(3); 18 U.S.C. § 10; and Amendments XXXIII, and XXXVII, for
the District Court to convict or sentence me in the first place.
1 The Court deems his petition filed on October 10, 2022, which is the date he certified that he delivered the
filing to the prison officials for mailing to the Clerk of Court. (D.E. No. 1 (“Oct. 10, 2022 Pet.”) at 20); see Burns v.
Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that a pro se prisoner’s habeas petition is deemed filed at the
moment he delivers it to prison officials for mailing to the district court) .
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(iii) My plea of “guilty” is invalid and unstable due to what was
charged in the complaint by statute, and violation of plea standards
on behalf of the government as to plea bargaining in this instant case
of motion to dismiss counts.
(iv) I was charged with “Conspiracy to Commit Carjacking” under
18 U.S.C. § 371 against the United States, but Section B of
document 1 never alleges an “offense against the United States.”
Title 18 U.S.C. § 371 has nothing to do with carjacking as does 18
U.S.C. § 2119. Title 18 U.S.C. § 371 is: Conspiracy to commit
offenses or defraud the United States. This standalone, renders my
plea of “guilty” invalid, and proves that this Court did not have
jurisdiction to entertain or proceed in adjudicating this case.
(Id. at 4–5, 7–8).
In an Order entered on October 13, 2023, the Court construed Petitioner’s June 27, 2023
filing and his Motion as attempts to amend his original motion in the current action. (Civ. No. 23-
3511, D.E. No. 2 at 2). Therefore, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to docket the August 28,
2023 Motion and the prior June 27, 2023 Petition in the present matter and to mark Civil Action
Number 23-3511 as closed. (Id. at 2–3). According to the Court, “[t]he August 28, 2023 motion
will be the operative pleading in [this current] matter, and the Court will screen it in due course.”
(Id.).
On October 13, 2023, the Clerk of Court docketed the Motion dated August 28, 2023, and
the June 27, 2023 Petition in the current matter. (D.E. Nos. 14 & 15).
In its October 4, 2024 Order, the Court concluded, under Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing
Section 2255 Proceedings (“Rule 4(b)”) and 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1), that the statute of limitations
expired on January 31, 2020, Petitioner did not file his first submission in the current matter until
October 10, 2022, and accordingly Petitioner’s Motion must be dismissed on untimeliness grounds
unless the Court finds another statute-of-limitations trigger applies or that Petitioner has met an
exception to the statute of limitations. (Oct. 4, 2024 Order at 5) . Furthermore, the Court
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considered and rejected Petitioner’s apparent argument that he was not aware of the legal basis of
his claims until he spoke with another inmate with a carjacking conviction in February 2023 as a
valid basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. ( Id. at 6–7 (noting, inter alia, that
attorney error in non- capital cases generally does not constitute extraordinary circumstances for
purposes of equitable tolling) ). It also determined that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Jones v.
Hendrix, 589 U.S. 465 (2023), which was cited by Petitioner, has no bearing on the issue of
timeliness because the Supreme Court instead held that “the statutory limitation on a second or
successive motion ‘based solely on a more favorable interpretation of statutory law adopted after
[a petitioner’s] conviction became final and his initial § 2255 motion was resolved’ does not make
§ 2255 ‘inadequate or ineffective’ such that the prisoner may proceed with his statutory claim
under [28 U.S.C.] § 2241.” ( Id. at 7 (quoting Jones, 589 U.S. at 469) ). Specifically, “Jones did
not announce a new right retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review under § 2255(f)(3).”
(Id.). Finally, the Court noted that Petitioner did not present any new reliable evidence establishing
his actual innocence. (Id.).
Although concluding that the Motion should be denied as untimely under Rule 4(b), the
Court could not “rule out rule out the possibility that Petitioner might have valid grounds for
equitable tolling and/or a claim of actual innocence, or that he may be able to argue that the
limitations period is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(2), (3), or (4).” ( Id. (citing Day v.
McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 210 (2006)). Accordingly, the Court ordered Petitioner to show cause
within forty-five (45) days why it should not dismiss his Motion as untimely. (Id. at 8).
On November 17, 2024, Petitioner filed his Response to OTSC. (D.E. No. 19).
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 4(b) , a district court must review a petitioner’s Section 2255 motion and
“dismiss the motion” if “it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record
of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4(b).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255( f), “[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a [ Section
2255] motion.” Id. § 2255(f). Evaluation of the timeliness of a motion generally requires t wo
determinations. First , the court must determine the date from which the statute of limitations
begins to run. There are four possible triggers for this 1-year limitations period:
The limitation period shall run from the latest of—
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such
governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been
newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise
of due diligence.
Id. Under Section 2255(f)(1), “[i]f a defendant does not pursue a timely direct appeal to the court
of appeals, his or her conviction and sentence become final, and the statute of limitation begins to
run, on the date on which the time for filing such an appeal expired.” Kapral v. United States, 166
F.3d 565, 577 (3d Cir. 1999).
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Second, if a Section 2255 motion is untimely, a court must determine whether the matter
warrants equitable tolling or whether some other exception to the statute of limitations applies. To
receive the benefit of equitable tolling, a petitioner “must show (1) that he faced ‘extraordinary
circumstances that stood in the way of timely filing,’ and (2) that he exercised reasonable
diligence.” United States v. Johnson, 590 F . App’x 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Pabon v.
Mahanoy, 654 F.3d 385, 399 (3d Cir. 2011)). Mere excusable neglect is insufficient to warrant
tolling of the statute of limitations. See United States v. Thomas, 713 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2013).
Indeed, extraordinary circumstances have been found only where: (i) the respondent has actively
misled the petitioner; (ii) the petitioner has in some extraordinary way been prevented from
asserting his rights; (iii) the petitioner has timely asserted his rights mistakenly in the wrong forum;
or (iv) the court itself has misled a party regarding the steps that the party needs to take to preserve
a claim. See Brinson v. Vaughn, 398 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2005).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that “actual innocence, if proved, serves
as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass . . . [despite] expiration of the statute of
limitations.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013). To make a sufficient showing of
actual innocence, a petitioner must (i) “present new, reliable evidence that was not presented at
trial” and (ii) “show by a preponderance of the evidence, ‘that it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.’” Houck v. Stickman,
625 F.3d 88, 93 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)); see also
Wallace v. Mahanoy, 2 F.4th 133, 150–52 (3d Cir. 2021); Jackson v. Nogan, No. 15- 0763, 2021
WL 2660271, at *2 (D.N.J. June 29, 2021).
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III. DISCUSSION
In his Response to the OTSC, Petitioner argues that his Motion should not be dismissed as
untimely because: (i) cases are “legion” holding that a party may not waive a defect in subject
matter jurisdiction or invoke federal jurisdiction by consent; (ii) an individual can assert injury
from “government action taken in excess of authority that federalism defines,” individual rights
belong to the litigant and not to the state, and a litigant is not prohibited from objecting to an injury
resulting in disregard of the “federal structure of [the] United States Government;” and (iii) “[a]s
jurisdiction is an essential element of any crime, its absence makes [him] actual [ly] innocent.”
(Resp. to OTSC at 1–2). According to Petitioner, “in a criminal case we have said that a person
convicted by a court without jurisdiction over the place of the crime could be released from
restraint by habeas corpus.” ( Id. at 2 (citing United States v. William s, 341 U.S. 58 (1951);
Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919)). “Based upon such[,]
[P]etitioner assert[s] that he is actual[ly ] innocent of the crime [charged] , [a]s the Court lack[s]
jurisdiction to indict.”
2 (Id.).
Like the Petition, the Response to the OTSC does not establish “valid grounds for equitable
tolling and/or a claim of actual innocence,” or indicate that the “imitations period is governed by
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(2), (3), or (4).” (Oct. 4, 2024 Order at 7). Instead, Petitioner’s submissions
are “replete with legal -sounding arguments but meaningless verbiage . . . commonly used by
adherents to the so-called sovereign-citizen movement.”3 Mos-Bey v. Corp. State of N.J., No. 20-
2 Petitioner also submits certificates of completion for various Bureau of Prisons programs he has attended ,
apologizes for “numerous incident[s] that may have happened” and claims that he has changed his “mentality.” (See
Resp. to OTSC at 3–16). While commendable, such circumstances are not relevant to the present inquiry.
3 For example, Petitioner claims that this Court lacked jurisdiction because: (i) the offenses “did not take place
in [the] ‘special maritime jurisdiction or territorial jurisdiction’ of the Federal Government” and instead “took place
in ‘state jurisdiction;’” (ii) this Court is “a federal claims [or legislative or territorial] court” established under Article
IV of the United States Constitution (as opposed to a “constitutional Article III court”) and there fore lacks criminal
jurisdiction; (iii) “[e]very single opinion rendered by the [Supreme Court and the federal appellate and district courts]
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20719, 2022 WL 3927892, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2022). “Similar arguments have been repeatedly
rejected by other courts and are rejected by this Court.” Id. (citations omitted); see also In re
Johnson, No. 22- 5258, 2023 WL 1784747, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2023) (“Legal-sounding but
meaningless verbiage commonly used by adherents to the so- called sovereign citizen movement’
has been rejected by courts throughout the country as legally frivolous.” ( citation modified) ).
Specifically, t o the extent that Petitioner claims that such alleged jurisdictional deficiencies
establish his actual innocence, it is well established that “ actual innocence refers to factual
innocence, not legal insufficiency.” Thigpen v. McGill, No. 22-2371, 2025 WL 1322756, at *18
(D.N.J. May 7, 2025) (citing Sistrunk v. Rozum, 674 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 2012). Petitioner has
failed to present new reliable factual evidence that shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
it is more likely than not that no reasonable factfinder would have convicted him in light of the
new evidence. 4 See Houck, 625 F.3d at 93; see also Mos -Bey, 2022 WL 3927892, at *3
(“Plaintiff’s frivolous [sovereign citizen] arguments do not warrant equitable tolling of the instant
Petition or establish a basis for his actual innocence.”).
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above as well as in the October 4, 2024 Order, the
Petition is DISMISSED as untimely. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), the petitioner in a Section
2255 proceeding may not appeal from the final order in that proceeding unless he makes “a
throughout the Union States where the felonious ‘interstate commerce crime’ did not occur on land under the
concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction of the United States (Federal Government) is null and void for lack of [subject
matter] jurisdiction;” (iv) the Court’s authority in criminal cases is limited to the territories or property belonging to
the United States , and it cannot adjudicate criminal cases occurring “within the boundaries of the several 50 Union
States;” and (v) “[n]o federal court has jurisdiction to try persons whether or claiming to be American Citizens for
crimes committed in foreign countries,” and “the sovereign State of New Jersey [is] such [a] foreign country.” (Pet.
at 23–27, 34); see also Smith v. F&M Bank, No. 23-1951, 2024 WL 1545222, at *2, 4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2024) (noting,
in case with “sovereign citizen” hallmarks, that the plaintiff alleged that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is a
“member of the several Union States of America” and cite d maritime and admiralty law (citations omitted )), R&R
adopted by 2024 WL 1539501 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2024).
4 Furthermore, the case law cited by Petitioner in his Response to the OTSC did not involve habeas or other
collateral review proceedings. See Williams, 341 U.S. at 59–61; Hamilton, 251 U.S. at 153–54.
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substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” “A petitioner satisfies this standard by
demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court ’s resolution of his
constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). “When the
district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner ’s
underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner
shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid
claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that ju rists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000). Because jurists of reason could not disagree with this Court’s decision to dismiss the
Motion as untimely, Petitioner’s Motion is inadequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further
at this time, and this Court DENIES a certificate of appealability.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court DISMISSES Petitioner’s Motion and DENIES a
certificate of appealability. An appropriate Order follows.
Dat
ed: April 23, 2026 s/ Esther Salas
Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.
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