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govinfo:USCOURTS-akd-3_25-cv-00307-0
1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
KEVIN GUNTER, on behalf of himself, the ad
hoc committee of Tetlin tribal members, and
disenfranchised shareholders of The Tetlin Native
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
CONTANGO ORE, INC.; KINROSS GOLD
CORPORATION; ROYAL GOLD, INC.; PEAK
GOLD, INC.; FAIRBANKS GOLD MINING,
INC.; A V ALON DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION; BLACK GOLD MINING,
INC.; BRADLEY J. JUNEAU; RICK V AN
NIEUWENHUYSE; CURTIS J. FREEMAN;
YOUNG’S TIMBER, INC.; JOSEPH A.
YOUNG; KRISTIE CHARLEY (YOUNG);
MICHAEL SAM; RICKEY WILLIAM
HENDRY; and JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendants.
Case No. : 3:25-cv-00307-ACP
ORDER GRANTING CONTANGO ORE, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
COMPLAINT TO QUIET TITLE AND FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF (Dkt. 8)
AND DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
A native corporation formed pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANCSA) transferred about 643,000 acres of land to a tribe’s governing body in 1996.
Then in 2008, the tribe leased most of the land to mining companies for exploration and
development.
Case 3:25-cv-00307-ACP Document 55 Filed 04/23/26 Page 1 of 21
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In 2025, the Plaintiff, a shareholder in the native corporation, sued several parties
with a connection to the land, including the mining companies and some of the tribe’s
leaders. The Plaintiff alleges that the 1996 land transfer was unlawful because it did not
follow corporate voting procedures imposed, in his view, by ANCSA itself. The Plaintiff
also alleges that people involved in the land transfer (and people subsequently managing
the land) committed fraud and various torts. The Defendants responded by filing motions
to dismiss based on differing theories. This order focuses on a threshold matter: subject
matter jurisdiction.
As explained below, the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Contango Ore, Inc. is
GRANTED because the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the
complaint.1 The shareholder has not asserted a valid cause of action under federal law .
Rather, his claims about corporate governance , fraud, and torts arise (if at all) under state
law, and those state claims do not involve substantial federal issues. The complaint is thus
DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of federal jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Allegations
Congress passed ANCSA in 1971 to “settle all land claims by Alaska Natives.”2 The
law authorized transfer of “approximately 44 million acres of Alaska land to state-chartered
private business corporations that were to be formed pursuant to the statute; all of the
1 Dkt. 8 (Contango Ore, Inc. and Rick Van Nieuwenhuyse’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint
to Quiet Title and for Equitable Relief).
2 Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie, 522 U.S 520, 523 (1998).
Case 3:25-cv-00307-ACP Document 55 Filed 04/23/26 Page 2 of 21
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shareholders of these corporations were required to be Alaska natives.” 3 Under this
framework, the Tetlin Native Corporation (TNC) was chartered under Alaska law in 1973
and deeded over 700,000 acres of land by the federal government.4
In 1996, TNC allegedly transferred about 643,000 acres of land to the Tetlin Tribal
Council, a tribal governance body , in exchange for $10.5 The complaint alleges that the
transaction “was executed unilaterally by TNC’s leadership” without “seeking or
obtaining” approval from TNC’s shareholders.”6 several years after the land transfer, TNC
shareholders sued its directors in federal court, arguing that the land transfer was unlawful
because the corporation did not hold a shareholder vote beforehand.7 The litigation led to
a settlement, but the District Court declined to enforce the settlement after concluding that
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the entire case.8 The case proceeded in state court,
where the settlement was ultimately voided.9
3 Id. at 524.
4 Dkt. 1 at 16 (Complaint). The Court takes well-pleaded factual allegations as true at this
stage of litigation. See Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013).
5 Id. at 17.
6 Id.
7 Dkt. 8-2 (Tetlin Native Corp. v. Adams, Case no. F99-0008CV (HRH)).
8 Dkt. 8-4. The District Court assumed it had subject matter jurisdiction during the
settlement phase of the case, including when it entered a judgment based on the settlement,
because no one challenged jurisdiction. The Court reevaluated that assumption when a
party finally raised the issue.
9 Jimerson v. Tetlin Native Corp., 144 P.3d 470 (Alaska 2006) (voiding settlement on the
ground that it violated ANCSA).
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In 2008, the Tribal Council allegedly entered a mineral lease with Contango Ore,
Inc. that included most of the land acquired from TNC.10 The lease gave Contango “rights
to explore and extract minerals” in exchange for “3%-5%” royalty and “annual payments”
to the Tribal Council.11 Negotiations over the lease involved Kristie Charley, an official for
the Tribal Council; the lease was extended in 2014 by Micheal Sam, another official for
the Tribal Council.12 According to the complaint, Contango entered the lease knowing that
the “underlying land title was in question.” 13 And since entering the lease, Contango has
partnered with other mining companies on the project, including Kinross Gold
Corporation; Royal Gold, Inc.; Peak Gold, Inc.; and Fairbanks Gold Mining, Inc.14
In 2018, the Tribal Council allegedly entered “a sublease or similar agreement” with
Young’s Timber, Inc, which is owned by Joseph A. Young.15 The complaint says this lease
granted “a direct interest in some portion of the Tetlin lands or the mining operations” to
Young’s Timber.16
10 Dkt. 1 at 18-19.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 21.
13 Id. at 19-20. To make this point, Gunter quotes a 10-K form that Contango filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
14 Id. at 1 (caption), 8-15, 18-21.
15 Id. at 21.
16 Id.
Case 3:25-cv-00307-ACP Document 55 Filed 04/23/26 Page 4 of 21
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B. The Complaint.
The pro se plaintiff in this case, Kevin Gunter, filed a 70-page complaint in October
2025.17 He initially purported to represent himself, “the Ad Hoc Committee of Tetlin Tribal
Members, and disenfranchised shareholders of the Tetlin Native Corporation. ”18 But
Gunter later said he was only representing himself.19
The lengthy complaint is difficult to parse at times. But Gunter appears to raise three
main legal claims. First, he alleges that the initial 1996 land transfer is void because it
happened “without any shareholder approval. ”20 He says this “violated federal law
(ANCSA)” and the Native Corporation’s “internal rules (no shareholder or proper tribal
consent).”21 Second, Gunter alleges that the Defendants’ mining activity was unlawful
because it was done using “false, misleading, or incomplete information [about] the
applicant’s legal authority over the land.” 22 Third, he alleges that several Defendants
engaged in fraud and various torts.23
17 Dkt. 1.
18 Id at 70.
19 Dkt. 37 at 5 (Consolidated Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss).
20 Dkt. 1 at 3.
21 Id. at 36.
22 Id. at 23.
23 Id. at 30. Gunter also makes allegations about tribal “governance manipulation.” Id. at
23. But he abandoned those claims in his opposition, saying “this case does not require the
court to adjudicate tribal governance.” Dkt. 37 at 3, 33 (citation modified).
Case 3:25-cv-00307-ACP Document 55 Filed 04/23/26 Page 5 of 21
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Aside from state law, ANCSA appears to be the principal federal statute on which
Gunter relies, although he cites others.24 The complaint mentions the “Treaty of Cession
between Russia and the United States,” the Indian Reorganization Act, the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act, and Executive Order 5365, which he calls
the “Establishment of Tetlin Indian Reserve.”25
For relief, Gunter “seeks to have the 1996 transfer, and 2008 (and subsequent) leases
declared void ab initio, to quiet title in the affected Tetlin lands back to [TNC], rescind the
unauthorized mining agreements, and to recover assets and profits unjustly diverted from
the Tetlin community.”
26 He also seeks “the appointment of an independent trustee or
receiver to ensure that these lands (and any proceeds derived from them) are managed
going forward for the benefit of the Tetlin Native Corporation shareholders.” 27 He further
asks for, among other things:
- A permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendants from “entering
upon, mining, exploring, or otherwise exploiting the Tetlin lands”
- A court-supervised “independent, certified forensic auditor to conduct
a full forensic accounting of all relevant financial activities”
- An order requiring Defendants to “immediately inspect and top off all
fuel tanks [to prevent] environmental contamination” on the disputed
land
- An order compensating Gunter for “litigation expenses,”
“[r]easonable hourly or monthly compensation,” “[c]osts of higher
24 Dkt. 1 at 36 (“Because these [transactions] violated federal law (ANCSA) and [the
Native Corporation’s] and the Tribe’s internal rules . . . they never conveyed any valid
interest in the land to begin with.”), 68-70.
25 Id. at 68-69.
26 Id. at 3.
27 Id. at 3.
Case 3:25-cv-00307-ACP Document 55 Filed 04/23/26 Page 6 of 21
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education or professional training,” and “[a]llowances for travel,
lodging, communication, and administrative supplies”
- An injunction restoring “tribal self-governance through a fair and
transparent election to be held for the leadership of the Native Village
of Tetlin”
- An order “seizing/impounding the fleet of ore-haul trucks and trailers
used to transport ore from Tetlin”
- An order for “disclosure of all documents” related to the Tetlin project
so they can be “forwarded immediately to . . . the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.”28
C. Motions to Dismiss and Opposition.
The Defendants filed three motions to dismiss 29 and several joined each other’s
motions.30 Contango’s motion to dismiss argues that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Gunter’s claims, they are time-barred, he is the wrong plaintiff for some
claims, and that the Tetlin Tribal Council is a necessary party that cannot be joined due to
sovereign immunity. 31 Kinross Gold’s motion to dismiss argues that the Court lacks
personal jurisdiction over it and that service was inadequate. 32 The tribal Defendants’
motion to dismiss argues, like Contango, that the tribe is a necessary party that cannot be
28 Id. at 38-70 (emphases omitted).
29 Dkt. 8 (Contango Ore Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint to Quiet Title and for
Equitable Relief); Dkt. 11 (Kinross Gold Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction and Insufficient Service of Process); and Dkt. 20 (Tribal Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss).
30 Dkt. 12 (Fairbanks Gold Mining, Inc. and Peak Gold, LLC’s Joinder in Motion to
Dismiss Complaint); Dkt. 30 (Royal Gold Inc.’s Joinder in Motions to Dismiss
Complaint);and Dkt. 32 (Young Defendants’ Joinder in Motions to Dismiss).
31 Dkt. 8.
32 Dkt. 11.
Case 3:25-cv-00307-ACP Document 55 Filed 04/23/26 Page 7 of 21
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joined due to sovereign immunity.33 It emphasizes that in any event, the claims against the
tribe’s officials must be dismissed due to sovereign immunity.34
Gunter filed a consolidated opposition to the Defendants’ motions to dismiss.35 His
arguments are summarized below as necessary.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A party may seek dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) if the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Jurisdictional attacks can be factual or facial.36 A
factual attack “disputes the truth of the [factual] allegations” triggering federal
jurisdiction.37 A facial attack, by contrast, accepts the allegations in the complaint as true
and argues that they “are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.”38 In either
situation, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.39 The Court
construes the complaint liberally because it was filed by a pro se litigant.40
33 Dkt. 20 at 3-10.
34 Id. at 11-15.
35 Dkt. 37.
36 Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).
37 Id.
38 Id.; Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013).
39 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
40 Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987).
Case 3:25-cv-00307-ACP Document 55 Filed 04/23/26 Page 8 of 21
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III. DISCUSSION
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that
power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded
by judicial decree. It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this
limited jurisdiction and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon
the party asserting jurisdiction.
41
Federal courts may not hear a complaint without subject matter jurisdiction. Federal
jurisdiction lies where the complaint presents a federal question, which arises in two main
ways: (1) if federal law creates the plaintiff ’s cause or action or (2) state law creates the
cause of action, but resolving the state claim involves a substantial federal issue. 42 If
Gunter’s complaint meets either of these standards, the Court has a foothold to assert
subject matter jurisdiction.
But the complaint does not meet either standard. First, Gunter has no cause of action
under ANCSA, and his bare citations to other federal laws are too underdeveloped to raise
a federal question. Second, Gunter’s state law claims do not raise a substantial federal issue.
And third, Gunter may not rely on the tribe’s sovereign immunity argument to create
jurisdiction because it goes outside the complaint. The Court thus lacks subject matter
jurisdiction.
41 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (internal citations omitted).
42 Cook Inlet Region, Inc. v. Rude, 690 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2012). There are other
sources of federal jurisdiction, but they have not been asserted here.
Case 3:25-cv-00307-ACP Document 55 Filed 04/23/26 Page 9 of 21
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A. Federal law does not create Gunter’s cause of action.
Federal jurisdiction exists when a complaint raises a federal question “under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 43 One way to establish this is by
showing “that federal law creates the cause of action.” 44 But as explained below, Gunter
has no cause of action under either ANCSA or the other federal laws referenced in the
complaint.
1. Gunter has no cause of action under ANCSA.
Gunter’s main argument is that federal jurisdiction exists because ANCSA creates a
cause of action allowing him to challenge the 1996 land transfer for allegedly happening
without a shareholder vote. 45 According to Gunter’s theory, this cause of action exists
because ANCSA “imposed clear requirements [] on how Native corporation lands can be
managed or conveyed.”46 More specifically, he argues that ANCSA directly “require[s] that
any significant transfer or encumbrance of [a corporation’s] lands must have the consent
of the corporation’s shareholders.” 47 ANCSA could do that either by independently
imposing a voting requirement or by expressly incorporating a state law with that
requirement—but ANCSA does neither.
43 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
44 Rude, 690 F.3d at 1130 (citation modified).
45 Dkt. 37 at 32.
46 Dkt. 1 at 16.
47 Id. at 16-17.
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a. The argument that ANCSA independently required a shareholder
vote is frivolous.
When someone alleges that a federal law was violated, federal courts typically (but
not always) have jurisdiction. However, a party cannot use an “obviously frivolous” federal
claim to evade the Court’s jurisdictional limits.48 While it is difficult to show that a federal
claim is frivolous, it can be done. 49 The claim must be “insubstantial, implausible,
foreclosed by prior decisions of [the Supreme] Court, or otherwise completely devoid of
merit as not to involve a federal controversy.”50
Gunter’s argument that ANCSA independently requires native corporations to hold
a shareholder vote before selling land is frivolous. Gunter does not cite or quote any part
of ANCSA arguably imposing that requirement. He appears to rely on 43 U.S.C. § 1629b,
but that section clearly does not apply.51 It requires a shareholder vote before, as relevant
here, a native corporation seeks to “convey all or substantially all of the assets of a Native
Corporation to a Settlement Trust.” 52 Gunter makes no such allegation here. Rather, he
alleges that TNC transferred assets to the Tetlin Tribal Council, which is not a settlement
48 Rude, 690 F.3d at 1131 (quoting Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Lozen Int’l, LLC, 285 F.3d 808,
814 (9th Cir. 2002)).
49 Id.
50 Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 98 (1998) (alteration
adopted)).
51 Dkt. 1 at 17.
52 43 U.S.C. § 1629b(a)(4) (emphasis added), (b) (requiring “a vote of the shareholders”
when provision triggered). Other subsections of this provision require shareholder votes in
other situations that are not applicable.
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trust. Section 1629b thus does not apply, and Gunter has not meaningfully discussed any
other part of ANCSA.
Precedent does not support Gunter’s argument either. The Supreme Court has held
that “ANCSA corporations received title to the transferred land in fee simple, and no
federal restrictions applied to subsequent land transfers by them.”53 The law thus does not
impose “any restraints on alienation.”54 While these quotes do not come from a case about
procedural restrictions on ANCSA-related land transfers, they show that ANCSA was not
meant to interfere with land sales held by native corporations.
None of the cases Gunter cites give him a cause of action under ANCSA. 55 For
example, he says the Alaska Supreme Court held in Jimerson v. Tetlin Native Corporation
that transactions affecting ANCSA lands “are invalid absent proper shareholder consent.”56
That is incorrect. Rather, Jimerson held that ANCSA barred certain transfers of ANCSA
stock, not land. 57 Gunter also cites Akiachak Native Community v. United States
Department of Interior for the idea that “the federal government retains oversight authority
over land transactions involving” ANCSA.58 But that holding, even if it were an accurate
summary of Akiachak, would not mean that native corporations must hold shareholder
votes before selling land. Indeed, the issue in Akiachak was not about corporate voting
53 Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520, 524 (1998).
54 Id. at 532.
55 Dkt. 1 at 25-26.
56 Id. at 25.
57 Jimerson, 144 P.3d at 471-75.
58 Dkt. 1 at 25.
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procedures at all—it was about whether the federal government could take land into trust
on behalf of a tribe. Plus, the D.C. Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to decide that
issue given the posture of the case. 59 And finally, Gunter cites Chugach Natives, Inc. v.
Doyon, Ltd. to argue “that the 1996 deed and similar transactions were improper.” 60 But
that case was about “whether sand and gravel are part of the surface or subsurface estate”
under ANCSA. 61 Again, it had nothing to do with corporate voting procedures. These
decisions simply do not establish or imply that Gunter has a cause of action under ANCSA.
In sum, the argument that ANCSA independently imposes voting requirements on
native corporations selling land is frivolous. The Court recognizes the difficulty of making
this showing and thus does not reach this conclusion lightly. However, Gunter is not
advancing a debatable interpretation of an ambiguous law , which would clearly give rise
to federal jurisdiction. He is relying on a phantom provision of ANCSA that does not exist.
Beyond that, Gunter offers no explanation for how ANCSA directly imposes a voting
requirement on native corporation land sales. And because Gunter’s claim has no
foundation in the text of ANCSA or any other tool of statutory interpretation, it is
“completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.”
62
59 Akiachak Native Comm. v. U.S. Dep’t of Int., 827 F.3d 100, 102 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“We
therefore dismiss Alaska’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.”).
60 Dkt. 1 at 25.
61 Chugach Natives, Inc. v. Doyon, Ltd., 588 F.2d 723, 724 (9th Cir. 1978). Certain citations
in Gunter’s filings include incorrect and incomplete identifying information. The Court has
done its best to find the cases Gunter meant to cite.
62 See Rude, 690 F.3d at 1130 (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 98).
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b. ANCSA does not incorporate the relevant state law.
ANCSA-related cases can raise a federal question (and thus create federal
jurisdiction) when a “state law is embedded in a federal-law claim.” 63 So even though
ANCSA does not independently require a shareholder vote before a native corporation land
sale, Alaska law might. And if it does, claims under that state law raise a federal question
if ANCSA expressly incorporates the Alaska law at issue. 64 But ANCSA does no such
thing.
The Ninth Circuit outlined this approach in Cook Inlet Region, Inc. v. Rude.65 In that
case, a native corporation, CIRI, sued shareholders for how they handled petitions about
alienating stock.66 The complaint purported to bring claims under both ANCSA and state
law.67 One of the ANCSA claims “required the district court to apply Alaska law governing
proxy solicitations to determine the legality of Defendant’s shareholder petitions[.]”68 Even
though it seemed like state law created that cause of action, the claim actually arose under
federal law (and thus created federal jurisdiction) because ANCSA expressly incorporated
the state law at issue. But to do so, ANCSA did not mince words. It said that the
“requirements of the laws of the State relating to the solicitation of proxies shall govern
63 Id.
64 AS 10.06.568(a) (requiring a shareholder vote for “[a] sale . . . of all, or substantially all,
of the property and assets . . . of a corporation”).
65 Rude, 690 F.3d at 1127-31.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1131.
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solicitation of signatures for” the shareholder petition at issue.69 Rude thus means that when
ANCSA uses clear language to incorporate a specific state law, that can convert the state
law cause of action into a federal one and create federal jurisdiction.
ANCSA lacks sufficiently clear language here. The Alaska law requiring
shareholder votes before certain land transfers, AS 10.06.568(a), is only relevant because
TNC was formed under state law—not because ANCSA says that state law “shall govern”
TNC’s land-sale activities, like the provision in Rude did.70 True, ANCSA generically
directed TNC to incorporate under Alaska law.71 But if that general mandate were enough
to incorporate AS 10.06.568(a), then ANCSA automatically incorporates every Alaska law
governing corporations. And that would requir e federal courts to adjudicate virtually any
ANCSA-related claim brought under the Alaska Corporation Code. There is no evidence
that Congress wanted the federal judiciary to displace Alaska’s state courts by exercising
such sweeping jurisdiction over claims involving native corporations. 72 Because ANCSA
does not clearly incorporate AS 10.06.568(a), ANCSA does not automatically federalize a
69 43 U.S.C. § 1629b(c)(1)(B).
70 Compare 43 U.S.C. § 1607(a) (saying Native village “shall organize as a business for
profit or nonprofit corporation under the laws of the State”), with 43 U.S.C. §
1629b(c)(1)(B) (“The requirements of the laws of the State relating to the solicitation of
proxies shall govern solicitation of signatures.”).
71 43 U.S.C. § 1607(a).
72 See Adams v. Kake Tribal Corp., 1:20-cv-9-SLG, 2022 WL 160656, at *5 (D. Alaska Jan.
18, 2022) (“Under Plaintiff’s apparent interpretation, ANCSA subsection 7(h)(1)(A)(iii)
would permit a federal court to hear any Alaska Corporations Code claim involving
ANCSA stock. The Court does not discern such a broad congressional intent here, and in
fact, most indications are to the contrary.”).
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native corporation shareholder’s cause of action under that state law.
2. Gunter’s citations to other federal laws do not trigger jurisdiction.
There is no federal jurisdiction over claims that “are so attenuated and unsubstantial
that they are devoid of merit.” 73 Gunter’s bare citations to other federal laws fall in that
category. At the end of the complaint, he cites the Treaty of Cession between Russia and
the United States, the Indian Reorganization Act, the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act, and Executive Order 5365 (which he refers to as “Establishment
of Tetlin Indian Reserve”).74 But Gunter offers no explanation of who violated these laws
and how. Indeed, several of these laws deal with the relationship between a tribe and its
members, yet Gunter chose not to sue the Tetlin Tribal Council, and he says this case “does
not require the court to adjudicate tribal governance.”75 Merely citing a federal law without
saying who violated it does not even give “fair notice of what [] the claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests[. ]”76 These bare citations, without more, do not create federal
73 Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (quoting Newburyport Water Co. v.
Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904)).
74 Dkt. 1 at 68-70.
75 Dkt. 37 at 33 (citation modified).
76 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation modified).
Case 3:25-cv-00307-ACP Document 55 Filed 04/23/26 Page 16 of 21
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jurisdiction.77
B. Gunter’s state law claims do not raise substantial questions of federal law.
There is a “special and small category” of state law claims that trigger federal
jurisdiction.78 This happens when state law creates the cause of action but “a federal issue
is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution
in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.” 79
When exploring the “outer reaches” of federal jurisdiction, the Court must make “sensitive
judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal system.”80
None of Gunter’s state law claims necessarily raise a substantial federal issue.
Gunter’s complaint arguably implicates AS 10.06.568(a), which requires a vote for “a
sale . . . of all, or substantially all, of the property and assets . . . of a corporation.” Nothing
about that law points toward a federal issue given the above conclusion that ANCSA does
not require a vote before a native corporation sells land. Thus, a state court applying
AS 10.06.568(a) to the facts in Gunter’s complaint can do so without meaningfully
discussing ANCSA for more than context.
The claim that it was unlawful for the mining Defendants to proceed under the lease
77 See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177- 79 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A complaint must
explain] who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide
discovery.”).
78 Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006).
79 Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013).
80 Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986).
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“despite the lack of clear title” also fails to raise a substantial federal issue.81 Gunter says
that their decision “demonstrates either intentional misconduct and fraudulent behavior, or
a negligent and reckless disregard for clearly documented federal protections.” 82 But
Gunter does not say what law , federal or state, was violated. Even assuming this conduct
might violate some law, it does not appear to be federal. Fraud and torts are typically
governed by state law.83 And Gunter’s off-hand mention of “federal protections” changes
little. A party may not create federal jurisdiction by making a vague reference to “federal
protections” without identifying their source in federal law.84
A similar analysis applies to the claims against the other Defendants. Gunter alleges
that they also engaged in fraud and torts.85 But these claims arise (if at all) under state
law.86 The bare fact that these alleged torts involved a native corporation’s land sale does
not mean that the tort claims raise a substantial federal issue. They therefore do not
establish federal jurisdiction.
81 Dkt. 1 at 23.
82 Id.
83 See Bank of the West v. Valley Nat. Bank of Ariz. , 41 F.3d 471, 477 (9th Cir. 1994)
(applying state law to fraud claim); In re Brown, No. 23-60035, 2024 WL 2127040, *1 (9th
Cir. 2024) (unreported but explaining that “[w]hether conduct is tortious is defined by state
law (citing Lockerby v. Sierra, 535 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008)).
84 See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377; also Shelley’ s Total Body Works v. City of Auburn, No.
C07-126P, 2007 WL 765205, at *2 (W.D. Wash., Mar. 9, 2007) (“Federal Courts have
repeatedly held that vague, ambiguous, or passing references to federal law in a
complaint are not sufficient to support removal based on federal question jurisdiction.”)
(collecting cases).
85 Dkt. 1 at 28-30 (accusing Kristie Charley and Joseph A. Young of self-dealing and breach
of fiduciary duty), at 21 (raising claims against Michael Sam).
86 Supra n. 84 and Section III.A.
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C. The Tribe’s sovereign immunity argument is outside the complaint.
Gunter argues that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction now that the Tetlin Tribe
(a non-party) has entered a limited appearance to make various sovereign immunity
arguments.87 But Gunter cannot rely on these arguments to create federal jurisdiction
because jurisdiction must be based on the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action
and not “some anticipated defense to his cause of action.” 88 Because the Tetlin Tribe’s
sovereign immunity arguments go outside Gunter’s “statement of his own cause of
action[,]” they cannot serve as the basis for federal jurisdiction. 89 The Court thus lacks
subject matter jurisdiction.90
D. Gunter may amend the complaint.
This complaint, as written, raises state claims appropriate for state court. This Order
permits Gunter to refile the same case in state court. But a federal trial court shall grant
leave to amend “freely [] when justice so requires. ”91 And that rule “is particularly
87 Dkt. 37 at 32-33.
88 See Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
89 See id.; Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 841 (1989) (“[T]he existence of a
federal immunity to the claims asserted does not convert a suit arising under state law into
one which . . . arises under federal law.”).
90 Because the Court lacks jurisdiction to decide this case, it does not reach the other
arguments raised in the motions to dismiss.
91 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
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important for the pro se litigant.” 92 Given these mandates, Gunter may file an amended
complaint in this case within 30 days of the date on this Order.
If Gunter elects to file an amended complaint, it must cure the deficiencies identified
in this Order and (1) state all allegations in separately numbered paragraphs, and (2)
separately list each claim and (a) who it is brought against, (b) what conduct supports it,
and (c) what law the conduct violates. Failure to do so risks depriving the Defendants of
fair notice of the claims against them.93
Gunter also must verify the accuracy of any legal citations in future filings with this
Court. The Court understands Contango’s frustration over time spent “chasing down
nonexistent authorities[.]”94 Gunter is reminded that even “unrepresented part[ies]” must
verify the accuracy of the legal authorities cited in court filings. 95 Failure to do so in the
future may be grounds for sanctions, including dismissal.96
92 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d
1446, 1148 (9th Cir. 1987)).
93 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
94 Dkt. 40 at 18-19 (Reply in Support of Contango Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss).
95 Federal R. Civ. P. 11.
96 See id.
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I V. CONCLUSION
The motion to dismiss at Docket 8 is GRANTED. The complaint is DISMISSED
without prejudice and with leave to amend within 30 days of this Order. 97 The remaining
motions to dismiss at Dockets 11 and 20 are DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 23rd day of April, 2026.
/s/ Aaron Christian Peterson__
AARON CHRISIAN PETERSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
97 See Mo. ex rel Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 650 (9th Cir. 2017) (“In general, dismissal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is without prejudice.”).
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