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govinfo:USCOURTS-nynd-5_23-cv-00963-1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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TIMOTHY ANDREW ROODENBURG,
Plaintiff,
-v- 5:23-CV-963 (DNH/MJK)
PAUL SANDY, Chief of Police, City of
Cortland; LT. CHEYENNE CUTE,
City of Cortland Police Lieutenant;
DEPUTY CHIEF DAVID GUERRERA,
City of Cortland Police Deputy Chief;
JIM SPONAUGLE, City of Cortland
Police Commission Chairman; TRISH
HANSEN, City of Cortland Commission
Member; LIZ STARR, City of Cortland
Police Commission Member; CHERYL
MICHAELES, City of Cortland Police
Commission Member, MICHAEL
WHITLOCK, City of Cortland Police
Commission Member; WAYNE SCHUTT,
II, City of Cortland Common Council
Member; KATHRYN SILLIMAN, City
of Cortland Common Council Member;
MARY CLARE PENNELLO, City of
Cortland Common Council Member;
PATRICIA LANE, City of Cortland
Common Council Member; SETH
THOMPSON, City of Cortland Common
Council Member; BILL CARPENTER,
City of Cortland Common Council
Member; THOMAS MICHALES, City of
Cortland Common Council Member; CITY
OF CORTLAND,CORTLAND, NY;
CORTLAND MAYOR SCOTT STEVE,
City of Cortland Mayor; CORPORATION
COUNCIL AJ MELDRIM, City of Cortland
Corp Counsel; JAY A. SUPNICK, PH.D.,
Case 5:23-cv-00963-DNH-MJK Document 125 Filed 04/22/26 Page 1 of 22
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APBB, City of Cortland Police Department
Psychiatrist,
Defendants.
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APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:
TIMOTHY ANDREW ROODENBURG
Plaintiff, pro se
P.O. Box 173
DeRuyter, NY 13052
BARGNESI BRITT PLLC JASON T. BRITT, ESQ.
Attorneys for Defendant Jay JULIE M. BARGNESI, ESQ.
A. Supnick, Ph.D, ABPP
350 Main Street, Suite 1105
Buffalo, NY 14202
GOLDBERG SEGALLA LLP DAVID E. LEACH, ESQ.
Attorneys for Defendants REBECCA R. RABIDEAU, ESQ.
5786 Widewaters Parkway
Syracuse, NY 13214
DAVID N. HURD
United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 8, 2023, Timothy Andrew Roodenburg (“Roodenburg” or
“plaintiff”), acting pro se, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§
1983”) against defendants City of Cortland Police (“Cortland Police”) Chief
Paul Sandy, Cortland Police Lieutenant Cheyenne Cute, Cortland Deputy
Case 5:23-cv-00963-DNH-MJK Document 125 Filed 04/22/26 Page 2 of 22
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Police Chief David Guerrera, Cortland Police Commission Chairman Jim
Sponaugle, Cortland Police Commission Members Trish Hansen, Liz Starr,
Cheryl Michales, and Michael Whitlock, Cortland Common Council Members
Wayne Schutt II, Kathryn Silliman, Mary Clare Pennello, Patricia Lane,
Seth Thompson, Bill Carpenter, and Thomas Michales, the Cortland Police
Psychiatrist, and the City of Cortland. Plaintiff, who has since filed a third
amended complaint, alleges that he was deprived of his constitutional right
to procedural and substantive due process. See Dkt. No. 111.
Defendant City of Cortland Police Department Psychiatrist Jay A.
Supnick, Pd.D., ABPP (“Supnick”) has now moved to dismiss plaintiff’s third
amended complaint as to him pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(“Rule”) 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(e).1 Dkt. No. 115. That motion has been fully briefed and will
be decided on the papers and without oral argument. Dkt. Nos. 111, 115,
120, 122.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
After filing his initial action in this matter, Roodenberg moved to amend
his complaint on December 12, 2023, which was granted. Dkt. Nos. 52, 62.
1 As explained infra, plaintiff first filed an amended complaint to replace unnamed defendant
“Cortland Police Psychiatrist” with named defendant Supnick.
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The purpose of this amendment was to replace unnamed defendant “Cortland
Police Psychiatrist” with Supnick. See Dkt. No. 52. On July 16, 2024,
Roodenburg filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”). Dkt. No. 63.
On September 11, 2024, Supnick moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claims
against him pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) or,
in the alternative, to allow for a more definite statement of the allegations
against him pursuant to Rule 12(e). Dkt. No. 78-5. On April 2, 2025,
Supnick’s motion to dismiss was granted. Dkt. No. 91. But the Court
permitted Roodenberg thirty days to file a second amended complaint (“SAC”)
with respect to his claims against Supnick, which he then filed on April 28,
2025. Id.; see also SAC, Dkt. No. 93.
Thereafter, counsel for all defendants aside from Supnick filed a motion
for an extension of the deadline to file an answer to the SAC. Dkt. No. 95. In
that motion, defendants’ counsel asserted that plaintiff’s SAC made changes
beyond what this Court’s Order dismissing plaintiff’s FAC as to Supnick
allowed for, i.e., plaintiff added new facts and claims against the defendants.
See id. To address these concerns, U.S. Magistrate Judge Mitchell J. Katz
conducted a video conference with the parties on May 28, 2025. See Dkt. Nos.
100, 108. Thereafter, the parties conferred and agreed to permit plaintiff to
file a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) setting forth all of his claims
against Supnick, while also reaching consensus that plaintiff’s claim against
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defendants would be limited to a § 1983 claim for the deprivation of his due
process rights. Dkt. No. 109. Not long after, plaintiff filed his TAC and
Supnick filed his third motion to dismiss.2 Dkt. Nos. 111, 115.
B. Factual Background
This case arises from plaintiff’s employment as a police officer with the
Cortland Police. See generally TAC, Dkt. No. 111. On December 21, 2021,
plaintiff received a conditional offer of employment as a police officer with
Cortland Police. Id. at ¶ 5. One condition of employment was the completion
of an 18-month probationary period. Id. Another was the passage of both a
medical and psychological examination. Id. Thereafter, plaintiff completed
the medical exam and was scheduled to take a psychological exam at the
Cortland County personnel office.3 Id.
When he arrived to complete the psychological examination, Roodenberg
alleges that, two hours into his psychological exam, the personnel officer
conducting the exam informed him they received a call from defendant
Cortland Police Chief Paul Sandy (“Chief Sandy”). TAC at ¶ 5. Chief Sandy
2 In its previous Decision and Order and accounting for plaintiff’s pro se status, this Court
construed plaintiff’s first amended complaint as bringing a separate claim for discriminatory
termination on the basis of his mental health in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990. Dkt. No. 91. That claim was rejected. Further, plaintiff has since expressly indicated in his
Third Amended Complaint that he did not intend to bring such a claim. See TAC. Accordingly,
plaintiff’s third amended complaint shall be construed as bringing the claims set forth infra.
3 Plaintiff’s TAC, like his prior pleadings, offers little to no detail about precisely when his
medical and psychological examinations were conducted. TAC ¶ 5.
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requested that Roodenberg’s psychological examination be terminated
because plaintiff had already completed a psychological examination for a
different agency and Chief Sandy was concerned Roodenberg would fail the
exam and jeopardize his employment with the Cortland Police. Id. Plaintiff
claims he was unaware that Chief Sandy had any concerns about his
psychological examination before. Id. According to plaintiff, Chief Sandy
made reference4 to a May 11, 2022 conversation he had with defendant
Supnick, a “police psychiatrist[,]” regarding Roodenberg. Id. During that
conversation, plaintiff alleges that Chief Sandy and Supnick discussed
plaintiff’s two prior incidents of misconduct.5 In light of these incidents,
Supnick recommended that Roodenberg be terminated, asserted that
plaintiff’s conduct “was disrespectful to the badge, the citizens and
command[,]” and concluded that plaintiff failed to learn from his first
4 However, it is unclear when Sandy made this reference, i.e., whether he made it during the
call to the Cortland County personnel office to intervene in plaintiff’s psychological examination or at
another point in time.
5 Roodenberg alleges the letter Sandy sent to DCJS pertained to two events. First, it addressed
an internal investigation regarding plaintiff’s use of a motor vehicle while intoxicated on February
28, 2022. TAC. ¶ 6. Second, it discussed an internal investigation of an April 20, 2022 incident at a
local restaurant where certain police officers, including Roodenberg, acted in a disrespectful manner.
Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff disputes the merits of either of these internal investigations and claims that Sandy
misrepresented his conduct in the letter. See generally TAC. Ultimately, on May 12, 2022, plaintiff
was informed by letter that he failed to complete his probationary period, and his employment was
discontinued effective May 19, 2022. Id. at ¶ 10. Plaintiff now brings this complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 arguing that all defendants were acting under the color of state law wherein they deprived
plaintiff of his constitutional right to due process. As it pertains to this motion , plaintiff contends
that he was entitled to a professional interaction with Jay Supnick regarding his mental state before
Supnick reached medical conclusions, which he provided to Sandy, that yielded an unfavorable
employment outcome and loss of certification to work in law enforcement.
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incident of misconduct before engaging in the second incident. Id. Plaintiff
claims Supnick advised Chief Sandy that he “would continue to be a
disciplinary problem [. . .] for as long as he was employed.” Id.
Plaintiff contends that Chief Sandy “failed to supply supporting
documentation or interview materials regarding the termination of the
psychological exam” but did “provide a letter to the [New York State Division
of Criminal Justice Services (“DCJS”)]” stating that the psychological exam
was a “condition for employment under Civil Regulations.” TAC at ¶ 5. In
Roodenberg’s view, if Chief Sandy had any concerns about plaintiff’s off-duty
behavior, he should not have intervened in the conducting of his
psychological evaluation. Id. Plaintiff also contends that Roodenberg failed
to supply any clinical evaluations, reports, or notes from Supnick as to
plaintiff’s mental status to suggest he was unfit to continue his employment
as a police officer in Cortland. Id. Plaintiff asserts that when Supnick
provided Chief Sandy with a “medical evaluation” as to his mental status
without ever interacting with him, it was an act of misconduct. Id.
Plaintiff argues Supnick violated his Fourteenth Amendment Rights to
procedural and substantive due process when, acting under the color of state
law, he issued a professional psychological opinion as to plaintiff’s mental
fitness without conducting “a clinical examination, personal interview, or [a]
review of any mental health records.” TAC at ¶ 5. Further, plaintiff takes
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issue with Supnick’s opinion, which labeled him as “suffering from a
personality disorder, being out of control, and unsuitable for duty” because
the opinion is based entirely on hearsay provided by Chief Sandy without
“any objective or clinical basis.” Id. In support, plaintiff points to a
November 1, 2023 email where Supnick acknowledged having “no records of
ever evaluating [plaintiff]” as support that Supnick’s opinion was both
speculative and non-clinical. Id.
Plaintiff contends that Supnick’s opinion violated his procedural due
process rights by depriving him of: 1) notice; 2) an impartial evaluation; and
3) the opportunity to be heard. TAC at ¶ 5. Plaintiff further asserts that
Supnick’s opinion violated his substantive due process rights by “interfering
with his liberty interest in holding police certification without a fair or
rational basis.”6 Id. Further, plaintiff argues Supnick’s actions “breached
Principle 7.3 of the American Psychiatric Association’s Code of Ethics,
commonly known as the Goldwater Rule, which prohibits psychiatrists from
rendering professional opinions about individuals they have not personally
examined.” Id. As a result of Supnick’s alleged ethical breach, plaintiff
contends he was decertified by the DCJS without any formal process, clinical
6 Plaintiff’s lawsuit seeks to have the DCJS reinstate his police certification. See Dkt. No. 111.
Construing plaintiff’s allegations in a light most favorable, he has alleged that Supnick provided
Sandy with an opinion regarding his fitness for employment with the Cortland Police. Id. While
plaintiff has alleged the opinion contributed to the loss his certification, his pleadings nonetheless
fail to shed light as to how Supnick’s opinion ultimately relates to, or played into, his decertification.
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report, or hearing and that he was “effectively barr[ed] […] from future
employment as a police officer[.]” Id.
Finally, Plaintiff’s TAC clarifies that he brings no employment
discrimination claims or Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”)
claims. Id. Rather, plaintiff’s lawsuit is premised on violations of his due
process rights and asserts that he now seeks the reinstatement of his New
York State Police Certification. Id.
Supnick has now moved to dismiss plaintiff’s TAC. Dkt. No. 115. The
motion has been fully briefed and will be resolved on the basis of the parties’
submissions and without oral argument. Dkt. Nos. 111, 115-3, 120-3, 122.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint’s factual
allegations must be enough to elevate the plaintiff’s right to relief above the
speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). So
while legal conclusions can provide a framework for the complaint, they must
be supported with meaningful allegations of fact. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 679 (2009). In short, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
To assess this plausibility requirement, the court must accept as true all of
the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable
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inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). In doing so, the court generally confines itself to the facts alleged in
the pleading, any documents attached to the complaint or incorporated into it
by reference, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken. Goel v.
Bunge, Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Concord Assocs., L.P.
v. Ent. Props. Tr., 817 F.3d 46, 51 n.2 (2d Cir. 2016)).
B. Rule 12(b)(e)
A motion for a more definite statement may be granted where “a pleading
to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a
party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(e). Motions pursuant to Rule 12(e) are not favored and are
appropriately granted where “the complaint is so excessively vague and
ambiguous as to be unintelligible and as to prejudice the defendant seriously
in attempting to answer it.” Bower v. Weisman, 639 F. Supp. 532, 538
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The
purpose of the complaint is to ‘inform the defendant as to the general nature
of the action and as to the incident out of which a cause of action arose.’”
Greater N.Y. Auto. Dealers Ass'n v. Envtl. Sys. Testing, 211 F.R.D. 71, 76
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Bower, 639 F. Supp. at 538). Rule 12(e) is “designed
to remedy unintelligible pleadings, not merely to correct for lack of detail.”
Kelly v. L.L. Cool J., 145 F.R.D. 32, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd 23 F.3d 398 (2d
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Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Therefore, a motion for a more definite
statement should be granted only if the complaint is missing a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
IV. DISCUSSION
As was the case in the prior motion to dismiss decided by this Court,
plaintiff’s complaint is construed as bringing a § 1983 claim against Supnick
for violating his constitutional right to substantive and procedural due
process where, despite having had no interaction with or having been
examined by Supnick, Supnick rendered an unfavorable employment opinion
regarding plaintiff to defendant Chief Sandy. TAC at ¶ 5. Supnick again
moves to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on the basis that it fails to state a
plausible claim for which relief could be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or,
in the alternative, that their motion for a more definite statement pursuant
to Rule 12(e) be granted. Supnick’s Mem at 4–5.7
A. Due Process
Plaintiff contends that Supnick violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights
to procedural and substantive process where, acting under the color of state
law, he issued a professional psychological opinion regarding plaintiff’s
7 Pagination corresponds to CM/ECF headers.
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mental fitness without conducting “a clinical examination, personal
interview, or review of any mental health records.” TAC at ¶ 5. Supnick now
moves to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege either that
Supnick possessed the duty or authority to make employment decisions
regarding Roodenberg or that Roodenberg possessed any property interest in
his probationary employment with the Cortland Police that Supnick has, or
even could have, deprived him of. Supnick’s Mem., Dkt. No. 115-3 at 4.
§ 1983 provides in relevant part that “every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subject . . .
any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in action at law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. § 1983 “is not
itself a source of substantive rights,” but instead provides “a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 393–94 (1989) (quoting Barker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3
(1979).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state
from “depri[ving] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause contains both
procedural and substantive components. Home for Aged of Little Sisters of
the Poor v. McDonald, 711 F. Supp. 3d 81, 114 (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494
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U.S. 113, 125 (1990)). The procedural component applies where government
action results in the alleged deprivation of a constitutionally protected
interest without sufficient procedural safeguards. Id. By contrast, the
substantive component bars “certain government action irrespective of the
fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Hurd v. Fredenburgh,
984 F.3d 1075, 1087 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 840 (1998)). “Substantive due process rights safeguard persons
against the government’s exercise of power without any reasonable
justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective.” Id.
(quoting Southerland v. N.Y.C., 680 F.3d 127, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (cleaned up).
The Court will now address plaintiff’s procedural and substantive due process
claims in turn.
1. Procedural Due Process
First, plaintiff contends that Supnick’s opinion violated his procedural due
process rights because it deprived him of notice, an impartial psychological
evaluation, and the opportunity to be heard. TAC at ¶ 5. Supnick seeks to
dismiss this claim, arguing that plaintiff fails to assert any property interest
in his probationary employment with the Cortland Police. Supnick’s Mem.,
Dkt. No. 115-3 at 4. Supnick also contends that he did not have any duty or
authority to make employment decisions regarding plaintiff and thus could
not have deprived him of employment. Id. Finally, Supnick argues that
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plaintiff has failed to identify any other constitutional right or collective
bargaining agreement provision that was violated by his termination. Id. at
5.
To prevail on a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim at
this posture, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that they “possessed a protected
liberty or property interest, and that he was deprived of that interest without
due process.” McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2001)
(quoting Hynes v. Squillace, 143 F.3d 653, 658 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 907 (1998)).
Under New York Law, “[i]t is well settled that a probationary employee,
unlike a permanent employee, has no property rights in his position and may
be lawfully discharged without a hearing and without any stated specific
reason.” Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1297–98 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting
Meyers v. City of New York, 208 A.D. 2d 258, 262 (2nd Dep’t 1995)); see also
York v. McGuire 63 N.Y.2d 760, 761 (1984) (holding that a probationary
employee may be terminated without a hearing or statement of reasons); see
also Flood v. Cty. of Suffolk, 820 F.Supp. 709, 713 (E.D.N.Y. May 14, 1993)
(holding that a probationary employee had no property right in her position).
As a threshold matter, and as this Court has already ruled in its previous
Decision & Order, probationary employees do not have a property interest in
their employment, and no reason or hearing need be provided to them for
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terminating their employment. See Decision & Order, Dkt. No. 91. As such,
the question now before this Court is whether Supnick’s alleged conduct
otherwise deprived plaintiff of some property or liberty interest.
While not expressly mentioned in plaintiff’s TAC, Roodenberg appears to
bring a stigma-plus claim against Supnick in his opposition to Supnick’s
pending motion. See Pl’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 120-3 at 4–5. Plaintiff contends
that Supnick’s psychiatric opinion damaged his reputation to such an extent
that he may now assert a liberty interest. Id. at 4. Specifically, he argues
that the statements in Supnick’s opinion stigmatized him, directly
contributed to the loss of his police certification, and foreclosed future
employment opportunities for him in law enforcement. Id. at 4–5. However,
“[a] pro se plaintiff may not raise ‘entirely new’ causes of action for the first
time in his opposition papers, but the Court may consider new claims
appearing for the first time in briefing if ‘the claims could have been asserted
based on the facts alleged in the complaint.’” Davila v. Lang, 343 F. Supp. 3d
254, 267–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (internal citations omitted).
Probationary employees may “‘invoke the protections of the Due Process
Clause’ where they have suffered a loss of reputation ‘coupled with the
deprivation of a more tangible interest, such as government employment.”
Segal v. N.Y.C., 459 F.3d 207, 212 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Patterson v. City of
Utica, 370 F.3d 322, 330 (2d Cir. 2004)). “Such an action is referred to as a
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stigma-plus claim; it involves an ‘injury to one’s reputation (the stigma)
coupled with the deprivation of some “tangible interest” or property right (the
plus), without adequate process.’” Id. (quoting DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d
292, 302 (2d Cir. 2003)). A stigma-plus claim is properly addressed at this
juncture “[b]ecause stigma plus is a species within the phylum of procedural
due process claims[.]” Segal, 459 F.3d at 213. “Like any procedural due
process claim, a stigma-plus claim enforces a limited but important right: the
right to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Id.
(quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970)) (cleaned up).
To succeed on a stigma-plus claim at this pre-answer stage, “a plaintiff
must plausibly allege: (1) a defamatory statement; (2) ‘some tangible and
material state-imposed burden in addition to the stigmatizing statement’;
and (3) a lack of process adequate to justify the state's action.” Velez v. Levy,
401 F.3d 75, 87 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted); see also Sadallah
v. City of Utica, 383 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff must allege “the utterance of a statement about [him] that is
injurious to [his] reputation, ‘that is capable of being proved false, and that
he or she claims is false[.]’” Velez, 401 F.3d at 87. And “[t]he state-imposed
burden or alteration of status must be ‘in addition to the stigmatizing
statement.’” Id. (emphasis in original). Finally, “[t]he defamatory statement
must be sufficiently public to create or threaten a stigma; hence, a statement
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made only to the plaintiff, and only in private, ordinarily does not implicate a
liberty interest.” Id. (citing Donato v. Old-Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d
623, 631–32 (2d Cir. 1996)).
Even if a plaintiff’s allegations sufficiently “demonstrate a government-
imposed stigma, such defamation is not, absent more, a deprivation of a
liberty or property interest protected by due process.” Sadallah, F.3d at 38
(citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991)); see also DiBlasio, 344 F.3d
at 302 (“‘Stigma plus’ refers to a claim brought for injury to one’s reputation
(the stigma) coupled with the deprivation of some ‘tangible interest’ … (the
plus), without adequate process.”); see also Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992,
1002 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that even where the plaintiff demonstrates that
the government has implicated her liberty interest, she “still must show that
the procedural safeguards of her interest established by the state are
insufficient to protect her rights”).
Upon review, plaintiff made no mention of a stigma-plus claim in his TAC.
But the TAC does include allegations that that Supnick provided Chief Sandy
with a psychological opinion that concerned plaintiff’s fitness for employment
in law enforcement, and that this opinion caused him both reputational harm
and barred him from future employment as a police officer. TAC ¶ 5.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the facts contained in the TAC are sufficient
for plaintiff to now assert a stigma-plus claim.
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Turning to whether plaintiff’s stigma-plus claim should survive at this
pre-answer stage, the Courts first finds that plaintiff’s TAC makes no
mention of a defamatory statement made by Supnick. See generally TAC. It
makes no allegations of Supnick’s opinion being false or containing untrue
statements. Rather, plaintiff’s complaint takes issue with Supnick’s opinion
being “speculative and nonclinicial.”8 It alleges no specific statement that is
both injurious to his reputation and capable of being proven false.
Next, plaintiff has not alleged that any statements made by Supnick were
sufficiently public to stigmatize plaintiff or otherwise cause the requisite
reputational harm to implicate a liberty interest. Rather, plaintiff contends
that Chief Sandy solicited an opinion from Supnick regarding plaintiff’s
fitness as a law enforcement officer, received that opinion, and ultimately
made an employment decision that was adverse to plaintiff. The TAC
contains no allegations that Chief Sandy further disseminated Supnick’s
opinion. Nor has plaintiff provided detailed allegations about the proximity
in time of Supnick’s opinion to his discharge as a probationary employee or
about how the psychological opinion was relied upon to reach a different
conclusion. See Donato, 96 F.3d at 631 (“Stigmatizing statements by the
government about an employee upon her discharge only implicate a liberty
8 In the TAC, plaintiff asserts that issuing a psychological opinion without direct observation is
unethical, unconstitutional, and violative of the American Psychiatric Association’s Code of Ethics.
However, plaintiff did not allege that Supnick made a false statement.
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interest when there is also public disclosure [. . .] This requirement is
“satisfied where the stigmatizing charges are placed in the discharged
employee’s personnel file and are likely to be disclosed to prospective
employers.”)
Finally, plaintiff has not alleged that Supnick took further adverse action
against him. As best as this Court can tell, the extent of Supnick’s
involvement here was to provide an opinion to defendant Chief Sandy, and as
part of that opinion, he stated that plaintiff was unfit to work in law
enforcement. However, there are no allegations that Supnick took further
action to affect the terms of plaintiff’s employment.
Upon review, plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that Supnick violated
his procedural due process rights. Accordingly, this claim against Supnick
will be dismissed.
2. Substantive Due Process
Plaintiff also contends that Supnick violated his Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process rights when he issued a psychological opinion that
led to the loss of his probationary employment and his license to serve in law
enforcement. TAC ¶ 5. Specifically, he asserts that Supnick’s opinion
“interfer[ed] with his liberty interest in holding police certification without a
fair or rational basis.” Id. But when Supnick moved to dismiss, plaintiff
offered no new arguments regarding his substantive due process claim,
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instead advancing his stigma-plus claim in response. See Pl’s Opp’n, Dkt. No.
120-3. In response, Supnick argues that he played no role in plaintiff’s
subsequent termination from the Cortland Police Department or any loss of
certification and had no power to affect or take away either. Supnick’s Reply,
Dkt. No. 122-1 at 4–5.
“For a substantive due process claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
motion, it must allege governmental conduct that ‘is so egregious, so
outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.’”
Velez, 401 F.3d at 93 (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 847 n. 8); see
also Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 139 (2d Cir.2002).
Insofar as plaintiff’s substantive due process claim here was intended to
serve as a claim distinct from his procedural due process and stigma-plus
claim, it nevertheless does not rise to the requisite level of harm required in
order for a substantive due process claim to survive dismissal at this stage.
While plaintiff alleges that Supnick’s opinion was unethical and that he did
not receive notice or an opportunity to be heard in response to Supnick’s
opinion, he has not plausibly alleged any conduct which was sufficiently
egregious at this stage to make out a substantive due process claim. See
Velez, 401 F.3d at 94 (quoting Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239
F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The measure of what is conscience-shocking is
no calibrated yard stick. Nevertheless, “malicious and sadistic” abuses of
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power by government officials, intended to “oppress or to cause injury” and
designed for no legitimate government purpose, “unquestionably shock the
conscience.”) Accordingly, insofar as plaintiff seeks to bring a distinct
substantive due process against Supnick, this claim will be denied.
B. Leave to Amend
Plaintiff’s opposition to Supnick’s motion asks that the Court allow him
leave to further amend rather than dismissing his claims outright with
prejudice. Pl’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 120-3 at 8. Leave to amend “shall be freely
given when justice so requires.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); see also Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). “In the absence of any apparent or declared
reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the
movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
amendment, futility of amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the
rules require, be ‘freely given.’” Id.
At this point, the Court does not find that permitting leave to Roodenberg
to further amend his complaint would be futile. In light of the fact that
plaintiff has filed four iterations of this complaint to date, he will be given
one final opportunity to amend his complaint as to Supnick with respect to
his due process and stigma plus claims. Plaintiff will be given until May 20,
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2026 to file a Fourth Amended Complaint consistent with this Court’s
Decision & Order.
V. CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that
1. Supnick’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 115) is GRANTED;
2. Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 111) is DISMISSED as
to Supnick;
3. Plaintiff has until May 20, 2026 to file a Fourth Amended Complaint;
4. If Plaintiff fails to file a Fourth Amended Complaint by May 20, 2026,
the Clerk is directed to close the file and enter a judgment accordingly
without further Order of the Court.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the pending motion and set
deadlines accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 22, 2026
Utica, New York.
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