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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

United States of America,

Wayne Alford, et al.,

Defendants.

_________________________________/

Case No. 1:24-cr-340-MLB

ORDER
A grand jury indicted Defend ants Wayne Alford, Matthew
Freeman, Latasha Baker, and Jahie m Arnold, charging them with
conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and—along with Defendants
Carlos Pearson and Jayden Barnes—two counts of conspiring to commit
murder for hire. (Dkt. 118, Counts 1-3.) According to the United States,
Defendant Alford (while being held at the Fulton County jail) conspired
with Defendants Freeman, Baker, and Arnold to distribute controlled
substances. (Dkt. 215 at 3.) After jail guards seized some of their drugs,
that group conspired with Defendan ts Pearson and Barnes to kill the
guards. (Dkt. 215 at 3.) In additi on to those conspiracy charges, the
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United States charged various Defend ants with various other crimes.
The United States, for example, charged Defendant Arnold with being a
felon in possession of a firearm and possessing that firearm during the
commission of a drug crime on one specific date in November 2023. (Dkt.
118, Counts 4, 6.) It also charged Defendants Alford, Freeman, Arnold,
and Baker with conspiring with Defendant Arnold to possess that firearm
during the drug trafficking crime. (Id. Count 5.) Finally, the indictment
charges Defendant Pearson with possessing a machine gun (id. Count 9)
and Defendant Barnes with both possessing a machine gun and
possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute (id. Counts 7-
8).
Defendants Alford, Pearson, and Barnes move to sever. (Dkts. 160,
164, 179.) The Magistrate Judge is sued a report and recommendation,
saying this Court should deny thos e motions. (Dkt. 215.) Defendants
Alford and Pearson filed objections; Defendant Barnes did not. (Dkt. 220,
221.)
I. Standard of Review
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) requires distri ct courts to “make a de novo
determination of those portions of [an R&R] to which objection is made.”
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Any such objection “must specifically identify the portions of the [R&R]
to which objection is made and th e specific basis for objection.”
McCullars v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 825 F. App’x 685, 694 (11th Cir.
2020)1; see United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2009)
(“[A] party that wishes to preserve its objection must clearly advise the
district court and pinpoint the specif ic findings that the party disagrees
with.”). “Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections need not be
considered by the district court.” Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548
(11th Cir. 1988).
“It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court
review of a magistrate’s factual or le gal conclusions, under a de novo or
any other standard, when neither pa rty objects to those findings.”
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). And, in most cases, “[a] party
failing to object to [an R&R] waives the right to challenge on appeal the
district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal

1 The Court recognizes McCullars is unpublished and not binding. The
Court cites it and other unpublished ca ses as instructive, nonetheless.
See Searcy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. , 902 F.3d 1342, 1355 n.5 (11th
Cir. 2018) (“Unpublished cases do no t constitute binding authority and
may be relied on only to the extent they are persuasive.”).
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conclusions.” McGriff v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 654 F. App’x 469, 472
(11th Cir. 2016). Ultimately, whether or not objections are filed, a district
court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
II. Defendant Alford’s Motion to Sever
Defendant Alford moves to sever his trial from the trial of his
codefendants, arguing he faces the “d anger of transference of guilt” if
tried with his codefendants who ar e charged with other crimes and
because the United States may seek to introduce codefendants’ post-
arrest statements implicating him, in violation of his Sixth Amendment
rights. (Dkt. 179 at 6-7.)
The Court applies a two-step process to determine whether
severance is appropriate. First, the Court determines whether initial
joinder of defendants or charges was proper under Rule 8. United States
v. Gabay , 923 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1991). Second, the Court
determines whether, despite proper joinder, prejudice to the defendant
nevertheless warrants severance under Rule 14. United States v. Chavez,
584 F.3d 1354, 1359-60 (11th Cir. 2009). A defendant who moves to sever
carries the “heavy burden of demonstr ating [that] ‘compelling prejudice’
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would result from a joint trial.” United States v. Lopez , 649 F.3d 1222,
1234 (11th Cir. 2011).
The Magistrate Judge concluded jo inder of Defendant Alford with
his codefendants was proper under Rule 8(b) because Defendant Alford
is charged in the murder for hire co nspiracies with all his codefendants
and in the drug and firearms conspiracies with three of his codefendants.
(Dkt. 215 at 7.) Defendant Alford does not object to this conclusion. But
even if he did, the Court would ad opt it. Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 8(b) provides that joinder of two or more defendants in the
same indictment is proper “if they are alleged to have participated in the
same act or transaction, or in the sa me series of acts or transactions,
constituting an offense or offenses.” See Fed. R. Crim P. 8(b). Counts 1
and 2 involve conspiracies linking all Defendants in the same
transaction; Counts 3 and 5 allege conspiracies linking the Defendants
(except Defendants Barnes and Pear son) in the same transaction and
also linking Defendant Alford to the series of acts gi ving rise to the
individual charges against Defendan t Arnold; and Defendants Barnes’s
and Pearson’s alleged possession of machine guns was part of the
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murder-for-hire conspiracies, meaning they arose from the same series of
acts as Counts 1 and 2.
On this last point, the United States has proffered that the machine
gun Defendant Barnes possessed at the time of the murder-for-hire
conspiracies was “a potential instrumentality of the agreed-upon murder-
for-hire.” (Dkt. 184 at 5-6.) Li kewise, it argues Defendant Pearson’s
agreement to shoot up the guards’ homes “would have required that
[Defendant Pearson] possess a fi rearm,” thus making the charges
related. (Id. at 7-8.) Finally, as the Magistrate Judge noted, the United
States has proffered that Defendant Pearson and all the other
Defendants (except Defendant Baker) were members of a criminal gang
known as the “GoodFellas,” that Defendant Pearson and Barnes
“engaged in shootings arranged” by Defendant Freeman “as part of their
role with the gang,” and that Defe ndant Pearson and Barnes agreed to
participate in the shootings planned in t h i s c as e as p ar t of t h e g an g ’s
activity after Defendant Alford (t hough Defendant Freeman) agreed to
pay them. (Dkt. 184 at 2-3.)
2 Given the interrelatedness of all the crimes

2 The Court also agrees Defendant Alford did not properly raise improper
joinder under Rule 8(a) before the Magistrate Judge and thus cannot
raise it now. (Dkt. 215 at 7 n.3.) See Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287,
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charged, the Court concludes joinde r of Defendant Alford with his
codefendants was proper.
The Magistrate Judge also concluded Defendant Alford has not
shown compelling prejudice from a joint trial. ( Id. at 12.) Defendant
Alford objects, arguing the Magist rate Judge failed to consider the
“highly prejudicial” possession of ma chine gun charges in Counts Seven
and Eight and the likelihood that he will “suffer compelling prejudice”
unless severed from Defendants Pearson and Barnes. (Dkt. 221 at 2.) To
support this argument, Defendant Alfo rd posits that the United States
intends to show Defendants Pearso n and Barnes used their machine
guns to “[shoot] up the homes of other individuals, including the bedroom
of a minor child.” (Id.)
The Magistrate Judge considered some of this, noting that, as part
of the murder-for-hire conspiraci es, Defendant Freeman and Alford

1292 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[A] district co urt has discretion to decline to
consider a party’s argument when that argument was not first presented
to the magistrate judge.”); Nambiar v. Cent. Orthopedic Grp., LLP , 158
F.4th 349, 359 (2d Cir. 2025) (“A proper objection generally may not raise
new arguments not previously made before the magistrate judge.”). But,
even if he had, it would fail for the same reasons Defendant Pearson’s
motion fails.
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agreed to kill the two guards and Defendant Freeman then got Defendant
Barnes and Pearson to agree to “shoot up the cars and houses” of those
guards. (Dkt. 215 at 4.) So—as al ready stated—Defendants Barnes’s
and Pearson’s possession of machin e guns (that would allow them to
shoot up homes and cars) may be related to the murder-for-hire
conspiracy, thus minimizing any unfair prejudice. The Magistrate Judge
also referenced a claim by the United States that Defendants Barnes and
Pearson had “participated in other sh ootings for [Defendant] Freeman.”
(Dkt. 215 at 4 (citing Dkt. 184 at 2).) The Court can find no reference to
shooing up a child’s bedroom, and Defe ndant Alford includes no citation
to this allegation. So the Court will not assume this evidence. But, even
if the trial were to go as Defendant Alford suggests and the United States
was able to admit evidence of other shootings, this Court agrees that a
proper limiting instruction—like (if appropriate) telling the jury
Defendant Alford was not involved in those shootings and (if appropriate)
that they could not considered that evidence against him—would protect
Defendant Alford from any unfair prejudice arising from evidence of the
other shootings. Lopez, 649 F.3d at 1237 (“limitin g instructions usually
will cure any prejudice resulting from a joint trial” since [w]e presume
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that juries follow the instructions given to them”). The same, of course,
is true of any unfair prejudice from evidence of Defendants Barnes’s and
Pearson’s alleged possession of mach ine guns. Defendant Alford can
propose a limiting instruction to avoi d any prejudicial spillover if the
United States fails to connect Defend ant Alford to those crimes as it
proffers it can through the murder-fo r - h i r e p l o t o r a c t i v i t y o f t h e
GoodFellas gang.
Regarding Defendant Alford’s concern about the admission of his
codefendant’s confessions, the Co nfrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to confronted and
cross-examine witnesses against him or her, Richardson v. Marsh , 481
U.S. 200, 206 (1987), and thus prohibits use of a non-testifying criminal
defendant’s confession in a joint tr ial if the confession, on its face,
incriminates another codefendant, Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123,
136-137 (1968). (Dkt. 215 at 8.) Th e Magistrate Judge, however,
concluded that—despite alleging his codefendants gave statements that
implicated him—Defendant Alford had not carried his burden of
demonstrating a so-called Bruton problem because he had not identified
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specific statements or shown how th ose statements directly implicated
him so as to present a Sixth Amendment violation. (Id.)
Defendant Alford does not really object to this conclusion. He says
the “dozens of hours of interviews ” between his codefendants and law
enforcement and “hundreds of thousa nds of pages of social media and
messaging” among the Defendants ma kes it “impossible” for him to
provide this showing. (Dkt. 221 at 3. ) That is the same argument he
made to the Magistrate Judge, and the Court disagrees. Bruton only
implicates post-arrest statements to law enforcement, thus eliminating
the social media posts from consideration in his motion to sever. And, if
he wants to raise a Sixth Amendment challenge, he bears the burden of
going through those “dozens of hours of interviews” to present his claim.
He cannot simply throw his hands up in a gasp of impossibility
(particularly in the face of a task that seems imminently doable).
The Court overrules Defendant Alford’s objections, adopts the
report and recommendation and DENIES Defendant Alford’s motion to
sever.
One more issue. In his object ions, Defendant Alford seems to
assume the Court will conduct a so-called James hearing before trial to
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determine the admissibility of co-con spirator statements under Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(e). (Dkt. 22 1 at 3.) He contends it is “more
efficient” for the United States to id entify the statements it intends to
introduce at that hearing and that he will “renew his motion for
severance regarding Bruton” at that time. (Id.) Again, Defendant Alford
is mixing potential Bruton issues (that involve post-arrest statements)
and the admissibility of coconspirator statements during and in
furtherance of a conspiracy. Defendant Alford should address these
issues separately. The Court does not anticipate holding a pre-trial
hearing to preview codefendant st atements under Rule 801(d)(2)(e) but
rather anticipates considering that issue at trial when (and if) the United
States seeks to introduce those statements. If the Court believes
additional evidence is necessary fo r it to make the necessary showing
under Ruel 801(d)(2)(e), it will provid e the parties an opportunity to
explore that evidence outside the presence of the jury. The Court believes
this process far more efficient. All of this is to say, Defendant Alford
should not anticipate a pre-trial James hearing as an opportunity to
perfect his Bruton argument. Instead, Defendant Alford should review
his codefendant’s post-arrest statemen ts on his own time to determine
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whether a Bruton issue exists rather than expecting the Court to
organize the work for him. Otherw ise, he will be forfeiting his
opportunity to raise the issue.
III. Defendant Pearson’s Motion to Sever
Defendant Pearson moves to sever Count Nine (the count charging
him with possession of the machin e gun) from the murder-for-hire
charges in Counts 1 and 2, arguing there was no “temporal or factual
connection” between the charges. (Dkt. 160 at 2-5.)
Rule 8(a) allows the joinder of o ffenses against a single defendant
when the offenses are: (1) of the same or similar character; or (2) based
on the same act or transaction; or (3) connected with or constitute parts
of a common scheme or plan. See Fed. R. Crim P. 8(a). Courts construe
this rule broadly in favor of initial joinder, allowing jo inder of offenses
that “are of the same or similar char acter” even if the offenses occur at
different times and even if they don’t arise out of the same series of acts
or transaction. United States v. Hersh , 297 F.3d 1233, 1241 (11 th Cir.
2002). The Magistrate Judge conclu ded the gun possession count and
murder-for-hire conspiracy counts ar e of similar character and thus
recommends denial of Defendant Pearson’s motion. (Dkt. 215 at 16.)
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Defendant Pearson objects, arguing the lack of any factual
connection or temporal proximity between the charges precludes joinder.
(Dkt. 220.)3 The Court overrules this conclusion. First, as stated above,
those things are not required for jo inder of offenses under Rule 8(a).
Second, the Court concludes the charges are of similar character. The
murder-for-hire charges involve Defendant Pearson’s alleged agreement
to shoot up the guard’s homes and ca rs. The possession charge involves
his alleged possession of an instrumentality with which he could do that
– a machine gun. (Dkt. 184 at 5-6.) They are of similar character. See
United States v. Wilson , 2011 WL 7628707, at *1-2 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 18,
2011) (finding that counts charging carjacking and robbery, conspiracy to
possess firearms to commit violent felonies, and unlawful possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, were all of “similar character” as all involved

3 Defendant Pearson argues the two crimes are separated by 11 months.
(Dkt. 220 at 2.) But that’s not nece ssarily true. The United States has
stated that, while investigating the mu rder-for-hire offense, it obtained
evidence that Defendant Pearson possessed an automatic weapon and
then later recovered that weapon at the time of his arrest. (Dkt. 184 at
2-3.) This suggests Defendant Pearson’s continued possession of the
weapon from sometime during the in vestigation until his arrest, not a
separation of two crimes. But, again, temporal proximity is net
necessary.
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the possession of firearms, and severance of the felon-in-possession count
was not warranted, despite the fact that the possession alleged in that
count occurred two years after the ot her charges). Indeed, as explained
above, it appears the possession of the machine gun was part of a common
scheme or plan within the Goodfellas gang to commit the murder-for-hire
offense.
4
The Magistrate Judge also conc luded Defendant Pearson had not
shown compelling prejudice from jo inder to warrant severance under
Rule 14. Defendant Pearson does not object to that conclusion, and the
Court sees no error (plain or otherwise) in it.
The Court overrules Defendant Pe arson’s objections, adopts the
report and recommendation, and DENIES Defendant Pearson’s motion
to sever.

4 Defendant Pearson says a jury might believe the recovered machine gun
was “a tool that was part and parc el of the earlier agreement” even
though the United States has asserted no such connection. (Dkt. 215.)
As stated, it appears the United St ates has asserted that connection,
albeit not in the indictment. If the United States fails to establish that
connection at trial, the Court will provide a limiting instruction to protect
against any unfair prejudice.
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IV. Defendant Barnes’s Motion to Sever
Defendant Barnes also moves to sever Counts Seven and Eight
(charging him will possession of the machine gun and possession of drug)
from the murder-for-hire charge. (Dkt. 164.) The Magistrate Judge
recommends denial of that motion fo r the same reasons it recommends
denial of Defendant Pearson’s moti on. Defendant Barnes filed no
objections, and the Court seen no e rror (plain or otherwise) in the
Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that joinder was proper under Rule 8. So
the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and DENIES
Defendant Barnes’s motion to sever.
V. Conclusion
The Court OVERRULES Defendants Alford’s and Pearson’s
Objections (Dkts. 220, 221), ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation (Dkt. 215), and DENIES the Motions to Sever filed by
Defendants Alford, Pearson, and Barnes (Dkts. 160, 164, 179).
SO ORDERED this 3rd day of April, 2026.

1 (1 1 (1
MICH" KEL L. BROWN
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