govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_24-cr-00340-3

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
 
 
United States of America, 
 
v. 
 
Wayne Alford, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
 
_________________________________/ 
 
 
 
Case No. 1:24-cr-340-MLB 
 
 
 
  
ORDER 
A grand jury indicted Defend ants Wayne Alford, Matthew 
Freeman, Latasha Baker, and Jahiem Arnold for conspiracy to distribute 
methamphetamine and—al ong with Defendants Carlos Pearson and 
Jayden Barnes—conspiracy to commit murder for hire.  (Dkt. 118.)  The 
United States alleges that Defendant Alford (while detained at the 
Fulton County jail) conspired with  Defendants Freeman, Baker, and 
Arnold to distribute controlled substances.  ( Id. at 3.)  After jail guards 
seized their drugs, that group enli sted Defendants Pearson and Barnes 
to kill the guards.  ( Id.)  The United States also charged Defendant 
Barnes with possessing a ma chine gun and possessing 
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methamphetamine with the intent to distribute.   (Id.)   
During its investigation, the Unit ed States obtained three search 
warrants for Defendant Barnes’s In stagram accounts and two for his 
iCloud account.  (Dkts. 166-1, 1 66-2, 166-3, 165-1, 165-2.)  Defendant 
Barnes moved to suppress.  (Dkts.  162, 163.)  The Magistrate Judge 
recommends denying those motions.  (Dkt. 223.)  Defendant Barnes 
objects but only to a narrow issue in volving the iCloud warrants.  (Dkt. 
227.)   
I. Standard of Review 
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) requires distri ct courts to “make a de novo 
determination of those portions of [an R&R] to which objection is made.”  
Any such objection “must specifically identify the portions of the [R&R] 
to which objection is made and th e specific basis for objection.”  
McCullars v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 825 F. App’x 685, 694 (11th Cir. 
2020)1; see United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2009) 
 
1 The Court recognizes McCullars is unpublished and not binding.  The 
Court cites it and other unpublished ca ses as instructive, nonetheless.  
See Searcy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. , 902 F.3d 1342, 1355 n.5 (11th 
Cir. 2018) (“Unpublished cases do no t constitute binding authority and 
may be relied on only to the extent they are persuasive.”). 
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(“[A] party that wishes to preserve its objection must clearly advise the 
district court and pinpoint the specif ic findings that the party disagrees 
with.”).  “Frivolous, conclusive, or  general objections need not be 
considered by the district court.”  Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 
(11th Cir. 1988).   
“It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court 
review of a magistrate’s factual or le gal conclusions, under a de novo or 
any other standard, when neither pa rty objects to those findings.”  
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).  And,  in most cases, “[a] party 
failing to object to [an R&R] waives the right to challenge on appeal the 
district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal 
conclusions.”  McGriff v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 654 F. App’x 469, 472 
(11th Cir. 2016).  In any event, the Co urt may accept, reject, or modify 
the recommendation in whole or in part.  28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).  
II. Discussion 
Defendant Barnes originally ar gued the Instagram and iCloud 
warrants lacked probable cause, were overbroad,  and relied on stale 
information.  (Dkts. 162, 163.)  Th e Magistrate Judge rejected those 
arguments.  (Dkt. 223.)  Defendan t Barnes does not meaningfully 
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challenge that analysis.  Instead, he seeks to adopt his prior briefing “[f]or 
the sake of brevity.”  (Dkt. 227.)  Th at doesn’t trigger de novo review.  
United States v. Matthews , 2024 WL 688666, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 20, 
2024) (Brown, J.) (“[W]hen a party merely makes general objections, such 
as incorporating by reference other arguments made in prior briefs, the 
objecting party does not receive a de novo review.”); United States v. 
Middleton, 595 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 1283 (N .D. Ga. 2022) (Batten, J.) (“[A] 
party does not state a valid objection to an R&R by merely incorporating 
by reference previous filings. . . .  Because [defendant’s] objections were 
general and merely incorporated th eir prior briefing, the Court will 
overrule them.”).  The Court finds no clear error in the Magistrate Judge’s 
probable cause, timeliness, or particularity analysis.  
The iCloud warrants present one additional issue.  The first iCloud 
warrant required Apple to produce photographs and other information 
from Defendant Barnes’s account between October 1, 2023 and December 
24, 2023.  (Dkt. 165-2 at 4 -5.)  Apple, however, provided data from both 
before and after those dates.  ( Id. at 5 n.1.)  To determine which 
photographs fell within the warrant’s timeframe, the investigating agent 
had to open them and review their metadata.  ( Id.)  In doing so, she 
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viewed photographs outside the da te range—including some showing 
Defendant Barnes possessin g illegal firearms.  ( Id. at ¶¶ 29, 30.)  She 
then sought a second warrant to access a broader range of the data Apple 
had produced.  (Dkt. 165-2.)  She di sclosed Apple’s overproduction, her 
review of photographs outside the initial timeframe to access date-
identifying metadata, and photograph s or descriptions of photographs 
taken outside that original timefr ame that showed Defendant Barnes 
brandishing firearms.  (Dkt. 165-2 ¶¶ 11, 31, n.1.)  Although she 
mistakenly said she had not relied on  information outside the original 
timeframe (Dkt. 165-2 n.1), the affidavit showed she had. 
Defendant Barnes sought to suppress the iCloud warrants on the 
ground law enforcement exceeded th e scope of the first warrant by 
viewing photographs outside the requ ired date range and using that 
information to obtain the second warra nt.  (Dkt. 163 at 11-13.)  In the 
light of the undisputed facts that law enforcement did not cause Apple to 
produce information beyond the date range in the first warrant and that 
the investigating agent had to op en photographs to access date-
identifying metadata, the Magistrate  Judge concluded the search was 
reasonable under the circumstances.  (Dkt. 223 at 45.)  Alternatively, the 
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Magistrate Judge concluded the warra ntless seizure of images showing 
Defendant Barnes possessing illegal firearms was authorized under the 
plain view doctrine since law enforc ement was authorized to search the 
images to determine whether they fe ll within the specified date range 
and the illegality of the firearms wa s immediately apparent from the 
images.  ( Id. at 46-47.)  Finally, she conclu ded that—even if the search 
warrant was invalid—suppression is improper as the agent acted in good 
faith.  (Dkt. 47-48.)   
Defendant Barnes objects to each co nclusion.  (Dkt. 227.)  He says 
law enforcement should have used  a “filter team” to review the 
photographs and ensure the investig ating agent only saw photographs 
that fell within the specified dates.   (Id. at 2.)  The Court disagrees.  “The 
seizure of items not covered by a warrant does not automatically 
invalidate an otherwise valid search.” United States v. Schandl, 947 F.2d 
462, 465 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).  The Fourth Amendment 
requires reasonableness, not perfection.  Id. (“The crucial inquiry is 
always ‘whether the search and seiz ures were reasonable under all the 
circumstances.’”).  “[A] search may be as extensive as reasonably required 
to locate the items described in the warrant.”  See United States v. 
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Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1352 (11th Cir.  1982).  “[T]he scope of the 
warrant, the behavior of the search ing agents, the conditions under 
which the search was conducted, and the nature of the evidence being 
sought must be considered in determining whether or not the search was 
reasonable.”  Schandl, 947 F.2d at 465.  Absent “flagrant disregard” of a 
warrant’s limits, suppressi on is not appropriate. United States v. 
Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2007). 
A “filter team” was not required, and Defendant Barnes cites no 
authority holding otherwise.  He argues Khanani somehow supports his 
argument.  Not so.  In that case, la w enforcement obtained a warrant to 
search several computers and seize a limited set of documents.  To 
identify items subject to the warrant, law enforcement engaged in a two-
step process.  Id. at 1290.  A “computer exam iner” first eliminated files 
that were “unlikely” to contain info rmation within the warrant’s scope.  
Id.  Agents then ran “keyword search es” against the remaining files to 
identify documents for individual review.  Id.  If an agent opened a 
document and determined it was not covered by the warrant, the agent 
stopped looking at the document.  Id.  In other words, the agents looked 
at a broader set of documents to determine which documents were subject 
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to further search and seizure.  Contrary to Defendant Barnes’s 
suggestion, there was no “filter team.”  There were just agents reviewing 
a larger pool of documents to identify documents subject to the warrant.  
The Eleventh Circuit concluded noth ing in that process violated the 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.  Id.   
And that is essentially what happened here.  To determine whether 
photographs fell within the first warra nt’s date range, the investigating 
agent had to open the photographs and access their date-identifying 
metadata.  No one disputes that.  So nothing suggests the agent did 
anything more than necessary to wi eld the authority granted her in the 
first warrant.  The Court thus over rules Defendant Barnes’s objection 
and concludes the agents acted reasonably under the circumstances.   
Because the agent lawfully accessed the images, the Court agrees 
that the plain-view doctrine permitted her warrantless seizure of images 
showing Defendant Barnes possessing obviously illegal firearms.  For the 
same reason, the Court adopts the Ma gistrate Judge’s conclusion that, 
even if the agent did something wrong, her conduct was not so egregious 
as to preclude the good-faith exception to suppression.  See United States 
v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 900 (1984) (court should not exclude evidence 
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“obtained by officers acting in re asonable reliance on a search warrant 
issued by a detached and neutral magi strate but ultimately found to be 
unsupported by probable cause.”).   
None of Leon’s exceptions apply here.  The issue arose from Apple’s 
overproduction—not from law enforce ment malfeasance or Magistrate 
Judge neglect.  Defendant Barnes ar gues that, because the agent knew 
Apple did that, she could not have acte d in good faith.  (Dkt. 227 at 3.)  
The Court disagrees.  Good faith co nsiders the agent’s knowledge and 
conduct.  The question is: once the agent knowingly received the larger 
set of documents, did she have a good faith believe she could do what she 
did.  No evidence suggests she ever thought her process was wrong or in 
any way improper.  Defendant Barnes cites no authority it was and, as 
explained, Khanani supports her judgment.  The Court concludes the 
good-faith exception would apply if necessary.2 
 
2 As the United States notes, Defendant Barnes did not argue before the 
Magistrate Judge either that law enforcement was required to use a 
“filter team” or that the good-fai th exception to suppression is 
inapplicable.  (Dkt. 237 at 3, 5.)  Th e Court thus alternatively overrules 
those objections for that reason. See Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 
1292 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[A] district co urt has discretion to decline to 
consider a party’s argument when that argument was not first presented 
to the magistrate judge.”); Nambiar v. Cent. Orthopedic Grp., LLP , 158 
F.4th 349, 359 (2d Cir. 2025) (“A proper objection generally may not raise 
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III. Conclusion 
The Court OVERRULES Defendant Barnes’s Objections (Dkt. 
227), ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation 
(Dkt. 223), and DENIES the Defendant Barnes’s Motions to Suppress 
(Dkts. 162, 163).  
SO ORDERED this 20th day of April, 2026. 
 
   
 
 
new arguments not previously made before the magistrate judge.”).  And 
going even further, the Court concludes Defendant Barnes abandoned his 
argument that the good-faith exception does not apply when he failed to 
respond to that argument before the Magistrate Judge.  (Dkt. 223 at 48 
n.9.)  See also United States v. Hearst, 2022 WL 16832834 *24 n.3 (N.D. 
Ga. March 10, 2022) (citing Lapaix v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 1138, 1145 
(11th Cir. 20210)).  
1 (1 1 (1 
MICH" KEL  L.  BROWN 
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