govinfo:USCOURTS-nyed-1_12-cr-00774-3

United States District Court 
Eastern District of New York 
 
-----------------------------------X 
 
United States, 
 
- against - 
 
Imran Ismile Badoolah, 
 
Defendant. 
 
-----------------------------------X 
 
 
 
 
Memorandum and Order 
 
No. 12-cr-774 (KAM) 
 
Kiyo A. Matsumoto, United States District Judge: 
Before the Court is Defendant Imran Ismile Badoolah’s second 
motion for early termination of supervised release pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).  (ECF No. 220, “Def. Mot.”; ECF No. 222, 
“Def. Reply”; ECF No. 223, “Def. Supp. Mot.”)  The government 
opposes Mr. Badoolah’s motion.  (ECF No. 221, “Govt. Opp.”)  The 
United States Probation Department (“Probation”) does not oppose 
the motion.  (ECF No. 221, Govt. Opp. at 1.)  For the reasons set 
forth below, having considered the parties’ filings, the factual 
record, applicable law, and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a), Mr. Badoolah’s motion for early termination of his 
supervised release is respectfully DENIED. 
BACKGROUND 
I. Underlying Offense 
On November 20, 2014, Mr. Badoolah pleaded guilty to one count 
of conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud in connection to a 
“multi-year mortgage fraud scheme.”  (ECF No. 221, Govt. Opp. at 
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11.)  Prior to sentencing, this Court conducted a Fatico hearing 
and determined the government had demonstrated by a preponderance 
of the evidence that Mr. Badoolah’s involvement in a scheme to 
secure fraudulent mortgage loans associated with at least six 
properties resulted in a total loss amount of $999,721.  (ECF No. 
150, Sentencing Tr. at 8-12.)  The Court further found that the 
testimony and evidence presented at the Fatico hearing 
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Badoolah 
“was involved in the fraudulent scheme involving the properties at 
issue” and had a “managerial or supervisory role” in the scheme.  
(ECF No. 150, Sentencing Tr. at 12-14.) 
On January 25, 2017, this Court sentenced Mr. Badoolah to 30 
months in custody, followed by a 5-year term of supervised release.  
(ECF No. 221, Govt. Opp. at 1; ECF No. 150, Sentencing Tr. at 
40-41.)  At sentencing, the Court advised Mr. Badoolah that it had 
imposed a below guidelines “sentence based on [his] need to pay 
restitution” and expressed the hope that “[he] takes very seriously 
his obligation to compensate his victims for their losses which 
will be . . . conditioned under supervised release.”  (ECF No. 
150, Sentencing Tr. at 40-41.)  The Court ordered Mr. Badoolah to 
pay mandatory restitution of $449,721, with $184,721 payable to 
HSBC Bank for losses associated with the property located at 115-
 
1 Unless otherwise noted, all pin citations to the record refer to the page 
numbers provided by the Court’s CM/ECF system. 
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03 168th Street and $265,000 payable to Freddie Mac for losses 
associated with the property located at 117-19 164th Street.  (ECF 
No. 120, Sentencing Tr. at 44-45.)  The Court also entered an Order 
of Forfeiture in the amount of $237,170.05.  (ECF No. 150, 
Sentencing Tr. at 45.) 
Mr. Badoolah’s supervised release commenced on May 17, 2019 
and, on March 19, 2020, Probation filed a Violation of Supervised 
Release (“VOSR”) Report charging Mr. Badoolah with (1) failing to 
disclose the location of the proceeds of the underlying offense 
(Charge One); (2) opening a new line of credit without permission 
from the Court or Probation (Charge Two); and (3) failing to 
disclose financial records to Probation (Charge Three).  (ECF No. 
138, VOSR Rep. at 1, 5-8.)  Mr. Badoolah pleaded guilty to Charge 
Two and the Court found Mr. Badoolah in violation of his conditions 
of supervised release as to Charge One.  (ECF No. 219, VOSR 
Sentencing Tr. at 314; ECF No. 205, VOSR Judgment.)   
On November 18, 2022, at sentencing for the violations, the 
Court again acknowledged that it had previously given Mr. Badoolah 
a below guideline sentencing with an expectation of “having [Mr. 
Badoolah] participate in compensating [his] victims and showing 
true remorse by participating” particularly where, as here, “time 
is of the essence” in determining where the proceeds of the 
fraudulent scheme were located.  (ECF No. 219, VOSR Sentencing Tr. 
at 14-15.)  The Court revoked Mr. Badoolah’s supervised release 
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and sentenced him to one month in custody followed by three years, 
six months, and 25 days of supervised release.  (ECF No. 224, Prob. 
Rep. at 12.)  On July 19, 2023, the Court transferred Mr. Badoolah’s 
supervision to the Middle District of Florida.  (ECF. 224, Prob. 
Rep. at 2.)  Mr. Badoolah’s supervision is scheduled to end on 
October 1, 2026.
3  (ECF No. 224, Prob. Rep. at 1; ECF No. 221, 
Govt. Opp. at 2.) 
II. Personal Circumstances 
Mr. Badoolah currently lives with his elderly mother and son 
in Haines City, Florida.  (ECF No. 224, Prob. Rep. at 1-2.)  For 
the entirety of his supervision in the Middle District of Florida, 
Mr. Badoolah has been unemployed.  (ECF No. 224, Prob. Rep. at 2.)  
Mr. Badoolah reports that he is the primary caretaker for his 
mother, which has prevented him from seeking full-time employment.  
(ECF No. 224, Prob. Rep. at 2; ECF No. 223, Def. Supp. Mot. at 
1-2.)  His daughter currently pays him $200 per month to babysit 
her children and take them to and from school and doctors’ 
appointments while she is at work.  (ECF No. 224, Prob. Rep. at 2; 
ECF No. 223, Def. Supp. Mot. at 2; ECF No. 223-3, Letter dated 
Aug. 13, 2025.) 
 
2 Because ECF No. 224 was filed under seal and is not available on the Court’s 
CM/ECF system, all pin citations to ECF No. 224 refer to the page numbers of 
the document.  
 
3 Mr. Badoolah erroneously states, without support, that his term of supervised 
release is set to expire on June 12, 2026.  (ECF No. 220, Def. Mot. at 2.)   
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Mr. Badoolah reports that he has sought employment as a “paid 
long term care service specialist through a county funded program,” 
which would permit him to be paid for caring for his mother.  (ECF 
No. 223, Def. Supp. Mot. at 2.)  Mr. Badoolah’s application for 
this work program has been pending since December 4, 2024.  (ECF 
No. 223, Def. Supp. Mot. at 2; ECF No. 223-4, Emails dated Dec. 4, 
2024.) 
III. History of Restitution Payments 
On August 26, 2025, Probation submitted a report regarding 
Mr. Badoolah’s restitution payments to date and his efforts to 
secure employment.  (See ECF No. 224, Prob. Rep.)  Mr. Badoolah 
has paid a total of $25,897.20 towards his restitution, and has a 
current principal balance of $423,382.77
4.  (ECF No. 224, Prob. 
Rep. at 2.)  In 2024, Mr. Badoolah paid $100 per month towards his 
restitution, and, in 2025, Mr. Badoolah has paid $200 per month to 
date.  (ECF No. 224, Prob. Rep. at 2.) 
On August 18, 2025, Mr. Badoolah submitted an updated 
financial disclosure statement to Probation that describes his 
current occupation as “babysitter, transporting grandchildren, 
[and] taking care of mother.”  (ECF No. 224, Fin. Disc. Stmt. at 
 
4 Probation’s report states Mr. Badoolah has a current principal balance of 
$432,382.77.  (ECF No. 224, Prob. Rep. at 2.)  At sentencing, the Court ordered 
restitution in the amount of $449,721 and the parties are in agreement that Mr. 
Badoolah has paid $25,897.20 towards his restitution to date.  (ECF No. 224, 
Prob. Rep. at 2; ECF No. 221, Govt. Opp. at 2; ECF No. 223, Def. Supp. Mot. at 
2.)  Accordingly, the Court calculates Mr. Badoolah’s outstanding principal on 
his restitution obligation as $423,382.77.  (See also ECF No. 221, Govt. Opp. 
at 2.) 
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2.)  Mr. Badoolah’s monthly income is listed as $200, and he 
receives $291 in government assistance through food stamps.  (ECF 
No. 224, Fin. Disc. Stmt. at 8.) 
LEGAL STANDARD 
A district court may “terminate a term of supervised release 
. . . at any time after the expiration of one year of supervised 
release . . . if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by 
the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of 
justice.”  18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).  The court may only do so after 
considering certain 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, 
including “the need to provide restitution to any victims of the 
offense.”  See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7).  A 
district court “is not required to discuss each and every 
sentencing factor in exercising its discretion.”  United States v. 
Torres, No. 21-cr-2511, 2022 WL 17087048, at *3 (2d Cir. 2022) 
(citing United States v. Christie, 736 F.3d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 
2013)).  “A statement that the district court has considered the 
statutory factors is sufficient.”  United States v. Gammarano, 321 
F.3d 311, 315–16 (2d Cir. 2003)  (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted) (alteration accepted). 
“Courts do not order early termination of supervised release 
as a matter of course.”  United States v. Stein, No. 09-CR-377 
(RPK), 2020 WL 4059472, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 19, 2020) (internal 
quotations omitted); see also United States v. Bastien, 111 F. 
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Supp. 3d 315, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (same).  Rather, early 
termination “is a discretionary decision made by the district 
court.”  United States v. Sheckley, No. 96-cr-1786, 1997 WL 701370, 
at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 10, 1997) (Summary Order).  “[S]uch relief may 
occasionally be justified by new or unforeseen circumstances, such 
as when exceptionally good behavior by the defendant renders a 
previously imposed term or condition of release either too harsh 
or inappropriately tailored to serve the general punishment goals 
of Section 3553(a).”  Stein, 2020 WL 4059472, at *2 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Lussier, 104 
F.3d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
DISCUSSION 
Mr. Badoolah argues first that the Court should apply the 
forthcoming amendments to the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
(the “Guidelines”) to evaluate his motion for early termination of 
supervised release.  (ECF No. 220, Def. Mot. at 2-5.)  Applying 
the forthcoming amendments, Mr. Badoolah argues that the Court 
should terminate his term of supervised release because he has 
complied with the terms of his supervision and his “unique 
circumstances” make termination in the “interests of justice.”  
(ECF No. 220, Def. Mot. at 5-8.)  The government opposes Mr. 
Badoolah’s motion, arguing that the Court should not apply the 
forthcoming amendments to the Guidelines to Mr. Badoolah’s motion 
because they are not yet in effect and, even assuming arguendo the 
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Court did apply the forthcoming amendments, “an individualized 
assessment of the need for ongoing supervision militates against 
early termination.”  (ECF No. 221, Got. Opp. at 2-3.)   
As an initial matter, Mr. Badoolah has cited to no compelling 
legal authority,5 and indeed this Court has found none, in support 
of his argument that the Court should apply forthcoming amendments 
to the Guidelines, which will not be in effect until after Mr. 
Badoolah’s term of supervision expires, to the instant motion.  
Moreover, the Guidelines instruct that a court “shall use the 
Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is 
sentenced” unless doing so would violate the ex post facto clause 
of the United States Constitution.  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a), (b)(1) 
(emphasis added).  Accordingly, the Court will consider only the 
Guidelines in effect as of the date of this Order. 
I. Mr. Badoolah’s Outstanding Restitution Obligation 
The Court has considered all of the relevant sentencing 
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and finds that Mr. 
Badoolah’s significant outstanding restitution balance weighs 
heavily against early termination.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7).  At 
 
5 Mr. Badoolah cites only to Rodriguez- Alonso v. United States in support of 
his argument that the Court should apply forthcoming Amendments to the instant 
motion.  807 F. Supp. 21 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).  In Rodriguez- Alonso, however, the 
court granted defendant’s motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2) and considered whether to retroactively apply an amendment to the 
Guidelines in place at the time of defendant’s motion and the court’s order 
that was not in place at the time of defendant’s sentencing.  Id. at 21-23.  
Accordingly the facts and procedural posture of Rodriguez- Alonso are entirely 
inapposite to the question of whether this Court should apply a future amendment 
to the Guidelines that is not in effect at the time of defendant’s motion.  
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Mr. Badoolah’s sentencing on January 25, 2017, the Court emphasized 
that it had imposed a below guidelines “sentence based on [Mr. 
Badoolah’s] need to pay restitution.”  (ECF No. 150, Sentencing 
Tr. at 40-41.)  Thereafter, at Mr. Badoolah’s sentencing for his 
violations of supervision, the Court noted that leniency had not 
yielded greater recoveries, as the Court anticipated in imposing 
a below guidelines sentence, because Mr. Badoolah had refused to 
pay his restitution obligation until Probation “wrote memo after 
memo advising that he had been very reluctant” to make payments.  
(ECF No. 219, VOSR Sentencing Tr. at 15.)  The Court recognizes 
that Mr. Badoolah has, over the last two years, made modest monthly 
payments towards his restitution and that he has paid a total of 
$25,897.20 to date.  (ECF No. 224, Prob. Rep. at 2.)  Nevertheless, 
these payments amount to only approximately 5.75% of Mr. Badoolah’s 
total restitution obligation and he has a significant remaining 
balance of $423,382.77 that has not been repaid to his victims.  
(Id.)   
Mr. Badoolah has not made any showing that early termination 
would allow him to seek a higher paying job that would allow him 
to increase the pace and amount of his restitution payments, nor 
has he demonstrated that he has sought employment beyond caring 
for his family members.  See United States v. Rosario, No. 17-c-
27 (LTS), 2023 WL 7305260, at *3 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2023) 
(denying motion for early termination even where defendant 
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represented early termination would allow him to seek a higher 
paying job and increase his restitution payments).  Instead, Mr. 
Badoolah appears to be seeking early termination primarily so that 
he may travel to Saudi Arabia, a country with no extradition 
treaty, to visit his family, arguing his “supervised release is 
serving as punishment because it deprives him of the ability to 
see his youngest two children.”  (ECF No. 220, Def. Mot. at 7.)  
He does not, however, disclose how he will fund his international 
travel.   
Mr. Badoolah points to United States v. Mabry in support of 
his argument that the purpose of supervised release has been 
fulfilled in this case and is now serving as a punishment.  528 F. 
Supp. 3d 349 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (granting early termination over the 
government’s objection where defendant had maintained steady 
employment, maintained his sobriety, and had no outstanding 
restitution obligation).  Critically, though, in Mabry, “neither 
restitution nor a fine were required at the time of sentencing” 
and defendant had satisfied his only financial obligation of a 
$100 special assessment.  Id. at 357-58.  Moreover, although the 
Court is sympathetic to Mr. Badoolah’s desire to spend time with 
children, the Court has repeatedly denied Mr. Badoolah’s motions 
to travel to Saudi Arabia and other international destinations due 
to his significant restitution obligations.  (See , e.g. ECF Dkt. 
Order dated Aug. 3, 2023; see also ECF Dkt. Order dated July 17, 
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2019; ECF Dkt. Order dated Nov. 28, 2023.) 
Accordingly, although it is well settled that “the primary 
purpose of supervised release is to facilitate the integration of 
offenders back into the community rather than to punish them,”  
Mabry, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 353, the Court has not identified any 
“new or unforeseen circumstances” that render the “previously 
imposed term or condition of release either too harsh or 
inappropriately tailored to serve the general punishment goals of 
section 3553(a).”  United States v. Lussier, 104 F.3d 32, 36 (2d 
Cir. 1997).  Thus, in light of the ongoing “need to provide 
restitution to [the] victims of the offense,” the Court finds that 
the “interests of justice” would not be served by early 
termination.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). 
II. Mr. Badoolah’s Past Failure to Comply with the Terms of his 
Supervision 
Mr. Badoolah also argues that his law-abiding conduct while 
under supervision weighs in favor of early termination.  (ECF No. 
220, Def. Mot. at 5-6.)  The Court recognizes that, in recent 
years, Mr. Badoolah has made monthly restitution payments and taken 
steps to comply with the conditions of his supervision.  (See ECF 
No. 223, Def. Supp. Mot.)  His prior violations and history of 
non-compliance, however, weigh against early termination.   
As set forth above, in March 2020, Probation filed a VOSR 
Report charging Mr. Badoolah with (1) failing to disclose the 
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location of the proceeds of the underlying offense (Charge One); 
(2) opening a new line of credit without permission from the Court 
or Probation (Charge Two); and (3) failing to disclose financial 
records to Probation (Charge Three).  (ECF No. 138, VOSR Rep. at 
1, 5-8.)  Mr. Badoolah pleaded guilty to Charge Two and the Court 
found Mr. Badoolah in violation of his conditions of supervised 
release as set forth in Charge One.  (ECF No. 219, VOSR Sentencing 
Tr. at 314; ECF No. 205, VOSR Judgment.)  Moreover, although a 
standard condition of Mr. Badoolah’s supervised release is that he 
shall work full time or endeavor to find full-time employment, Mr. 
Badoolah has been unemployed for the entirety of his supervision 
in the Middle District of Florida, which has impacted his ability 
to make restitution payments.  (ECF No. 221, Govt. Opp. at 2; ECF 
No. 224, Prob. Rep. at 1.)   
Mr. Badoolah attributes his inability to obtain steady 
employment in part to his “inability to produce proof of 
citizenship” because his expired passport is being held by 
Probation, and he cannot afford to obtain a new naturalization 
certification.  (ECF No. 220, Def. Mot. at 5 n.6.)  He argues that 
“if his supervision was terminated, he could reclaim his U.S. 
passport . . . and, upon getting it renewed, utilize it to prove 
his citizenship and hopefully become employed.”  (Id.)  Despite 
these assertions, Mr. Badoolah has not made any recent applications 
to the Court to take temporary possession of his passport so that 
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he may seek employment, which the Court has previously granted.  
For example, on April 10, 2019, the Court granted Mr. Badoolah’s 
request to take temporary possession of his passport solely for 
job interview purposes, and, on October 31, 2022, the Court granted 
Mr. Badoolah’s request to take possession of his expired passport 
for the limited purpose of renewing it.  (ECF No. 125, Order dated 
Apr. 10, 2019; ECF Dkt. Order dated Oct. 31, 2022.)  Thus, Mr. 
Badoolah’s claim that he has been unable to secure employment due 
to his expired passport being in the possession of Probation 
strains credulity.  
Where, as here, there is a history of non-compliance with the 
terms of supervision, courts in this Circuit have regularly denied 
requests for early termination.  See e.g., United States v. 
Heyward, No. 15-cr-341 (LTS), 2021 WL 5889323, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 13, 2021) (finding defendant’s “progress in his personal and 
professional life [to be] commendable and encouraging,” but 
denying early termination as defendant had previously violated the 
terms of his supervision); United States v. Solano, No. 19-cr-17 
(PKC), 2023 WL 4599937, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2023) (denying 
early termination where defendant had made progress, but had a 
history of non-compliance with the terms of supervision); United 
States v. Parker, No. 21-cr-341 (MKB), 2025 WL 1635971, at *4 
(E.D.N.Y. June 9, 2025) (finding early termination was not 
warranted where Defendant had previously violated the terms of his 
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release, resulting in multiple VOSR hearings).  
Indeed, courts in this circuit have repeatedly denied motions 
for early termination even where defendants are in full compliance 
with the terms of probation or supervised release, because “such 
conduct does not amount to ‘exceptionally good behavior’ as to 
render the conditions of their supervised release ‘too harsh or 
inappropriately tailored to . . . the general punishment goals of 
[18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a).’”  Parker, 2025 WL 1635971, at *4 (quoting 
Lussier, 104 F.3d at 36); United States v. Wheeler, No. 20-cr-492 
(GHW), 2025 WL 1295610, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2025) (denying early 
termination of supervised release because “successful compliance 
with the conditions of [Defendant’s] supervised release to date” 
are “what is expected of a person under . . . supervised release 
and does not warrant early termination”) (quoting United States v. 
Fenza, No. 03-cr-0921 (ADS), 2013 WL 3990914, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 
2, 2013)).   
The Court recognizes that Mr. Badoolah’s recent “progress 
during his current term of supervised release is a positive 
indicator of rehabilitation and decreased risk of recidivism.”  
United States v. Fleming, No. 18-cr-00197 (KAM), 2025 WL 1262484, 
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2025).  Nevertheless, the Court finds that 
in light of Mr. Badoolah’s significant outstanding restitution 
obligation, his failure to secure full time employment, and his 
previous violations of supervised release, both Mr. Badoolah and 
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the community “will benefit from [(and not be unduly burdened by)] 
the continued s
upervision and support afforded to him by the 
Probation [Department] in navigating life post-incarceration” at 
this time.  Heyward, 2021 WL 5889323, at *2. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Badoolah’s motion for 
early termination of his supervised release is respectfully 
DENIED.  The Court will consider a renewed motion for early 
termination of supervised release or motion to travel should Mr. 
Badoolah satisfy his restitution obligation or reduce the balance 
below $40,000.  The Court encourages Mr. Badoolah to seek full 
time employment so that he may meet his restitution obligations. 
Should Mr. Badoolah require the use of his passport for the limited 
purpose of seeking employment, he may make an application to take 
temporary possession of his passport to the Court through his 
counsel.  
So ordered. 
Dated: September 29, 2025 
Brooklyn, New York  _______________________________ 
Kiyo A. Matsumoto 
United States District Judge 
Eastern District of New York
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