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govinfo:USCOURTS-kywd-1_25-cv-00168-0

U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky · 2026-03-11

· GavelSight synced 2026-09-06 03:23:55

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
BOWLING GREEN DIVISION 
 
JEREMY BELL             PLAINTIFF 
 
v.                 CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-CV-00168-JHM 
 
RITA, NURSE AT RUSSELL COUNTY  
DETENTION CENTER, et al.                       DEFENDANTS 
                        
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
 This is a pro se  prisoner action which was removed from state court.  This matter is 
currently before the Court upon the motions  to dismiss  by Defendants Nurse Rita ; Doctor, 
Unknown First Name ; and All Other Unknown Individuals pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 8(c) and 12(b)(6).  (DNs 7, 8).  For the reasons that follow, the Defendants’ motions are 
denied. 
I. BACKGROUND 
  Plaintiff initiated this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in Russell Circuit Court, Jamestown, 
Kentucky by filing a handwritten complaint on his own paper on October 7, 2025.   (DN 1).  The 
state court granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis status, and Defendants timely filed for removal to 
this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § § 1331 and 1441.  (Id.).  Shortly thereafter, Defendants filed 
motions to dismiss on the grounds of statute of limitations and non -exhaustion of administrative 
remedies.  (DNs 7, 8).1 
 
1 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental 
entity, the Court will undertake an initial screening of the Plaintiff ’s complaint and amended complaint pursuant to  
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.  The Court notes that Defendants’ appearance and filing of dispositive motions has no bearing on 
the Court ’s ability to screen the complaint.  Snelling v. Klee , No. 2:15 -CV-13797, 2016 WL 1625331, at *2  
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2016) (“even if the Court had entered a case management scheduling order setting a dispositive 
motion deadline, the Court is not time -limited in its ability to consider whether Plaintiff ’s complaint states a claim 
upon which relief may be granted.”); Smallwood v. Smith, No. 1:24-CV-76, 2024 WL 2931405, at *1 n.3 (S.D. Ohio 
June 11, 2024) (“The filing of defendants’ answer does not preclude the need for a screen.”). 
 
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 
a court “must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, ” League of United 
Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen , 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted), “accept all 
well-pled factual allegations as true[,]” id., and determine whether the “complaint states a plausible 
claim for relief[.]”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).  Under this standard, the plaintiff 
must provide the grounds for his or her entitlement to relief which “requires more than labels and 
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. ”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).  A plaintiff satisfies this standard only when he or she “pleads 
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 
for the misconduct alleged.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.   
In resolving motions to dismiss, a court may consider the well -pled factual allegations in 
the complaint, exhibits attached to or incorporated by reference into the complaint, matters of 
public record, and records of which the Court may take judicial notice.  See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor 
Issues & Rights, Ltd ., 551 U.S. 308, 322  (2007); Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass ’n,  
528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008).  If “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not 
excluded by the court” when ruling upon a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Federal Rules require 
that “the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. ”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(d). 
III. ANALYSIS 
Defendants move to dismiss this action on the grounds that Plaintiff commenced this 
lawsuit (1) before he exhausted administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation 
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Reform Act (PLRA); and (2) after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.  (DNs 7, 
8). 
As Defendants acknowledge, both of these arguments are affirmative defenses  for which 
they bear the burden of pro of.  (DN 8-1, PageID.51).  Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1) provides that the 
statute of limitations is an affirmative defense.  And in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007), 
the Supreme Court held that that “failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and 
that inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.”  Id.  
In light of Jones, the Sixth Circuit has concluded that the exhaustion affirmative defense is best 
raised in a motion for summary judgment.  See, e.g., Rembisz v. Lew , 590 F. App’x 501, 504  
(6th Cir. 2014); LaFountain v. Martin , 334 F. App’x 738, 740 (6th Cir. 2009).  This is because 
proof of lack of exhaustion generally requires resort to matters outside the pleadings, such as 
affidavits or documentary evidence.  Wysocki v. Int ’l Bus. Mach. Corp ., 607 F.3d 1102, 1104  
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that when “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded 
by the court, ” a motion to dismiss must be treated as a motion “for summary judgment under  
Rule 56”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ P. 12(d)). 
Because the Defendants’ filed their dispositive motions in lieu of an answer before any 
party had the opportunity to conduct discovery, the Court declines to convert Defendants’ motion 
to dismiss to one for summary judgment under Rule 56.  See, e.g., Ramos v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
No. 3:21-CV-00152, 2022 WL 2921133, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. July 25, 2022) (declining to convert a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion that relied on matters outside of the pleading into one for summary judgment 
where the parties had not yet had an opportunity to conduct disc overy).  Accordingly, the Court 
finds that Defendants cannot meet their burden regarding both of these affirmative defenses.   
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First, as to the exhaustion of administrative remedies, Defendants argue that Plaintiff ’s 
“pleadings fail to evidence exhaustion of [the Russell County Detention Center’s] administrative 
remedies.”  (DN 8-1, PageID.52).  It is true that Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain factual 
allegations pertaining to administrative exhaustion.  However, as stated above, Plaintiff does not 
bear the burden of pleading and proving exhaustion. Jones, 549 U.S. at 216.  Relatedly, while on 
the face of Plaintiff’s complaint it appears that the statute of limitations could bar his claims, the 
limitations period for claims subject to the PLRA is tolled while the plaintiff exhausts his required 
administrative remedies. Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d 452, 458 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Brown v. 
Morgan, 209 F.3d 595, 596 (6th Cir. 2000)). Without evidence of whether administrative 
grievances were filed or when any such administrative grievances may have been filed or 
completed, the Court cannot calculate how long the statute of limitations may have been tolled or 
whether the statute of limitations has run on Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference to serious 
medical needs. See, e.g., Thomas v. Slusher, No. 1:17-cv-794, 2018 WL 931301, at *4(N.D. Ohio 
Feb. 16, 2018) (denying motion to dismiss for failing to meet evidentiary burden with regard to 
these two affirmative defenses). 
The Court will therefore deny Defendants ’ motions to dismiss on the grounds of non -
exhaustion of administrative remedies and expiration of the statute of limitations.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants ’ motions to 
dismiss (DNs 7, 8) are DENIED. 
Date:
cc: Plaintiff, pro se
Counsel of record
4414.015
March 11, 2026
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