govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-04316-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC 
PRESERVATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, et al., 
Defendants. 
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) Civil Case No. 25-4316 (RJL) 
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___ ___ _ _ __ ) 
,_,_ 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
March 11_, 2026 [Dkt. #51] 
The President of the United States is the steward of the White House for future 
generations of First Families. He is not, however, the owner! President Trump ("the 
President") claims that Congress has given him authority in existing statutes to construct 
his East Wing ballroom project and to do it with private funds. The plaintiff, the National 
Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States ("National Trust"), claims the President 
has no such authority under existing statutes and that a preliminary injunction is necessary 
to avoid irreparable harm. I have concluded that the National Trust is likely to succeed on 
the merits because no statute comes close to giving the President the authority he claims to 
have. As such, I must therefore GRANT the National Trust's Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction, and the ballroom construction project must stop until Congress authorizes its 
completion. 
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BACKGROUND 
I. The White House 
Shortly after the founding, Congress passed the Residence Act of 1790, which 
authorized three commissioners to "provide suitable buildings for the accommodation 
of ... the President." See An Act for Establishing the Temporary and Permanent Seat of 
the Government of the United States, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 130 (1790).1 The three commissioners, 
empowered by Congress and appointed by the President, selected James Hoban as the 
architect of the President's residence through a design competition. See Pl. 's Suppl. Br., 
Annex 1 ("Annex") [Dkt. #20-1] at 2. Congress funded construction of the White House 
through several statutes. See id. In 1800, President John Adams moved into the still­
unfinished White House, and every President has resided in the White House since then. 
Second Am. Compl. [Dkt. #50] 127. 
Congress has continued to authorize and fund construction and maintenance at the 
White House up until the present day. See generally Annex. For example, Congress 
authorized repairs to the White House after it suffered extensive damage during the War of 
1812,seeAnnexat2-3;ActofFeb.13, 1815,ch.41,3 Stat.205;ActofFeb.10, 1820,ch. 
10, 3 Stat. 541, and received regular updates on progress, see H. R. Doc. No. 15-8, at 14-
1 Relevant filings are abbreviated as follows: Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for TRO & Prelim. Inj. ("Pl.'s 
TRO Br.") [Dkt. #2-1]; Defs.' Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. for TRO & Prelim. Inj. ("Defs.' TRO Opp'n") [0kt. 
#15-1]; Pis.' Suppl. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. ("Pl.'s Suppl. Br.") [0kt. #20]; Defs.' Suppl. 
Resp. Br. in Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. ("Defs.' Suppl. Br.") [0kt. #30]; Pl.'s Reply Br. in Supp. 
of Mot. for Prelim. lnj. ("Pl. 's Reply Br.") [0kt. #33]; Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. ("Pl.'s 
Renewed PI Br.") [Dkt. #51-1]; Defs.' Mem. in Opp'n to Pl.'s Second Mot. for Prelim. Inj. ("Defs.' 
Renewed Opp'n") [0kt. #52]; Pl.'s Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. ("Pl.'s Renewed Reply Br.") 
[0kt. #54]. 
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16 (1818). Congress appropriated funds for construction of the South Portico in 1823, the 
North Portico in 1829, and the East and West Wings in 1902. See An Act Making 
Appropriations for the Public Buildings, ch. 62, 3 Stat. 784 (1823); An Act Making 
Appropriations for the Public Buildings, and for Other Purposes, ch. 51, 4 Stat. 362 (1829); 
Act of June 28, 1902, ch. 1301, 32 Stat. 419,460. 
In the late 1940s, after the discovery of major structural issues, Congress 
appropriated funds for "the renovation, repair, and modernization" of the White House but 
prohibited any "change of [the] present architectural appearance of the exterior of the 
mansion or the interior of its main floor." Act of June 23, 1949, ch. 236, 63 Stat. 231,235; 
see also Annex at 10-11. More recently, Congress funded the replacement of the White 
House perimeter fence in 2019 through a series of appropriations. See Annex at 13-14; 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, 131 Stat. 135, 435; 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242, 2503. 
Today, the White House remains the official residence of the President. Second Am. 
Compl., 25. It sits in President's Park, a federal park administered by the National Park 
Service in Washington, D.C. Id. 
II. The East Wing Ballroom Project 
On July 31, 2025, the White House issued a press release announcing plans to build 
a "State Ballroom" on White House grounds. Second Am. Compl. , 36; see also Mot. for 
TRO & Prelim. Inj., Ex. J [Dkt. #2-14]. The press release stated the ballroom would be 
constructed at the site of the "small, heavily changed, and reconstructed East Wing" and 
would encompass "approximately 90,000 total square feet." Ex. J. The press release also 
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stated that "President Trump, and other patriot donors, have generously committed to 
donating the funds to build" the ballroom. Id.; see also Mot. for TRO & Prelim. Inj., Ex. 
X ("Ex. X") [Dkt. #2-28] (ballroom will have "zero cost to the American Taxpayer!"). 
On October 20, 2025-without advance notice or apparent approval-President 
Trump announced on social media that "ground ha[ d] been broken on the White House 
grounds to build the new, big, beautiful White House Ballroom." Second Am. Comp 1. ,r 51. 
On October 21, 2025, media outlets confirmed that heavy machinery was demolishing the 
East Wing. Id. ,r 53. The next day, President Trump showed new renderings of the 
proposed ballroom to the press, noting that "many presidents have made changes" at the 
White House but "[t]his ... obviously would be the biggest change." Id. ,r,r 59-60. By 
October 23, 2025, the East Wing had been demolished in its entirety. Id. ,r 64. 
After the demolition of the East Wing, the National Trust-a nonprofit with 
"thousands of members" who "have a substantial interest in preserving and protecting 
historic and cultural resources in Washington, D.C."---contacted various federal entities to 
express concerns. Mem. Op. [Dkt. #47] at 3--4; see also Second Am. Compl. ,r 22. The 
National Trust warned that the "massing and height of the proposed new construction 
would overwhelm the White House itself and might also permanently disrupt the carefully 
balanced classical design of the White House." Second Am. Compl. ,r 55 (cleaned up). 
Receiving no response, the National Trust brought this lawsuit in December 2025. 
See Comp 1. [Dkt. # 1]. Since then, there has been significant progress on construction of 
the ballroom. The site of the former East Wing is a "bustling project site" with "heavy 
construction machinery," "pile drivers," and a "construction crane." Second Am. Compl. 
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,r,r 78, 81. Demolition work has been largely completed, and work on "footings and below­
grade structural concrete" began in February 2026. Deel. of John Stanwich ("Stanwich 
Deel.") [Dkt. #14-6] ,r 20. "Above[-]grade structural work" is "anticipated to begin" in 
April 2026. Id. Indeed, President Trump has stated that ballroom construction is "ahead 
of schedule." Pl.'s Renewed PI Br. at 23 (quoting Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), 
Truth Social (Feb. 10, 2026, at 1 :41 PM ET), https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump 
/posts/116047799547098230). 
According to the parties' filings, the ballroom plans are in the final stages of the 
design approval process. The Commission of Fine Arts approved designs on February 27, 
2026. See T. Luebke to J. Fisher, CFA 19/FEB/26-1, https://perma.cc/CV2F-VE6M (cited 
in Suppl. Deel. of Heather Martin ("Martin Suppl. Deel.") [Dkt. #52-2] ,r 6). The National 
Capital Planning Commission has reviewed detailed "final" plans for the ballroom and is 
scheduled to vote on the design on April 2, 2026. See Martin Suppl. Deel. ,r 7. The plans 
presented to these entities show a planned size of 89,000 square feet and a seated capacity 
of 1,000 guests. Exec. Director's Recommendation, Nat'l Cap. Planning Comm'n (Mar. 
5, 2026), https://perma.cc/4LFC-YDEJ (cited in Martin Suppl. Deel. ,r 7). The ballroom is 
now projected to cost around $400 million, and the President has represented that private 
donations will foot the bill. See Jan. 22, 2026 Hr'g Tr. [Dkt. #38] at 33:2-3; Ex. X. 
III. Procedural History 
I recounted the procedural history of this case in my previous opinions, which I 
incorporate by reference here. See Mem. Order [Dkt. #17] at 2; Nat'/ Tr.for Historic Pres. 
v. Nat'/ Park Serv., _ F. Supp. 3d _, 2025 WL 3672837 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2025); Mem. 
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Op. [Dkt. #47]; Nat'! Tr.for Historic Pres. v. Nat'! ParkServ., _ F. Supp. 3d_, 2026 WL 
533420 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2026). To summarize, I previously denied the National Trust's 
motion for a temporary restraining order for lack of irreparable harm before the Court could 
decide the motion for a preliminary injunction. See Mem. Order. On February 26, 2026, I 
denied the National Trust's request for a preliminary injunction. See Mem. Op. While I 
concluded that the National Trust had shown a "substantial likelihood" of Article III 
standing, see id. at 7-12, I found that the National Trust's motion suffered from two fatal 
flaws. As to its Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") claims, I concluded that "the Office 
of the Executive Residence ... is not an 'agency,' so there is no 'agency action' to enjoin 
under the APA." Id. at 13. As to the National Trust's constitutional claims, I concluded 
that those claims were foreclosed by Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994) because they 
were "statutory in nature." Mem. Op. at 13, 16-22. 
On February 27, 2026, the National Trust sought leave to file a second amended 
complaint, see Mot. for Leave to File Second Am. Comp 1. [Dkt. #49], which I granted, see 
Minute Order (Mar. 1, 2026). The National Trust's second amended complaint adds four 
new ultra vires claims challenging the Defendants' statutory authority to construct a 
ballroom on White House grounds and to do it with private funds. Second Am. Compl. 
,r,r 197-224. 2 On March 5, the National Trust filed a renewed motion for a preliminary 
injunction based on its ultra vires claims. See Second. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. [Dkt. #51]. 
2 Defendants named in the Second Amended Complaint include: the National Park Service; Jessica Bowron, 
in her official capacity as Acting Director of the National Park Service; John Stanwich, in his official 
capacity as Superintendent of the White House and President's Park; the Department of the Interior; 
Douglas Burgum, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Interior; the General Services Administration; 
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Defendants filed their opposition on March 12, see Defs.' Renewed Opp'n, and the 
National Trust filed its reply on March 16, see Pl.'s Renewed PI Reply Br. I held a hearing 
on March 1 7, 2026. The National Trust's motion is now ripe for decision. 
IV. Statutory Background 
The National Trust's claims require consideration of three main statutes. 
3 U.S. C. § 105(d). Section 105, titled "Assistance and Services for the President," 
provides for the employment of staff members to assist the President and authorizes 
appropriations for expenses related to White House administration. Most relevant here, 
§ 105(d) provides: "There are authorized to be appropriated each fiscal year to the 
President such sums as may be necessary for[] (1) the care, maintenance, repair, alteration, 
refurnishing, improvement, air-conditioning, heating, and lighting (including electric 
power and fixtures) of the Executive Residence at the White House.'' 3 U.S.C. § 105(d). 
The statute continues: "Sums appropriated under this subsection for expenses described in 
paragraph[] (1) ... may be expended as the President may determine, notwithstanding the 
provisions of any other law." Id. This statute was enacted in 1948, see Act of June 25, 
1948, ch. 644, §§ 109, 110, 62 Stat. 672, 679, and Congress added the language about 
"care, maintenance, repair ... " in 1978, see Act ofNov. 2, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-570, § 105, 
92 Stat. 2445, 2446. 
Michael J. Rigas, in his official capacity as Acting Administrator of the General Services Administration; 
Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United States; the Executive Office of the 
President; Susie Wiles, in her official capacity as White House Chief of Staff; the Office of the Executive 
Residence; and Robert B. Downing, in his official capacity as White House Chief Usher. They are referred 
to collectively in this opinion as "Defendants." 
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40 USC. § 8106. This statute provides that "[a] building or structure shall not be 
erected on any reservation, park, or public grounds of the Federal Government in the 
District of Columbia without express authority of Congress." 40 U.S.C. § 8106. This 
provision was originally enacted in 1912, see Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 355, 37 Stat. 417, 
444 (codified at 40 U.S.C. § 68 (1912)), and was recodified in 2002, see Act of Aug. 21, 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-217, 116 Stat. 1062, 1206. 
54 U SC. § 100101. The National Park Service ("NPS") Organic Act provides that 
the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the director of the NPS, 
shall promote and regulate the use of the National Park System by means and 
measures that conform to the fundamental purpose of the System units, 
which purpose is to conserve the scenery, natural and historic objects, and 
wild life in the System units and to provide for the enjoyment of the scenery, 
natural and historic objects, and wild life in such manner and by such means 
as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations. 
54 U.S.C. § 10010l(a). Congress later reaffirmed these purposes through a 1978 
amendment known as the "Redwood Amendment." See Act of Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-250, sec. I0l(b), 92 Stat. 163, 166 (codified at 54 U.S.C. § I00I0I(b)(2)). The 
Redwood Amendment provides that the "management" and "administration" of NPS units 
"shall not be exercised in derogation of the values and purposes for which the System units 
have been established, except as directly and specifically provided by Congress." 54 
U.S.C. § 10010l(b)(2). 
LEGAL STANDARD 
A preliminary injunction is "an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded 
upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief." Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 
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U.S. 7, 22 (2008). To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant "must establish that he 
is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence 
of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is 
in the public interest." Id. at 20. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
This case, in essence, is about whether the President has the authority to build a 
ballroom on White House grounds with private funds without seeking authorization from 
Congress. The National Trust asserts that Defendants' actions are ultra vires of statutory 
authority and violate the APA. But why do Defendants even need statutory authority in the 
first place? The Constitution shows why. 
The Property Clause vests Congress with complete authority over public lands. See 
U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all 
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the 
United States."). "Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor and of a legislature 
over the public domain," Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976), and those 
powers are "without limitations," id. at 539 ( quoting United States v. City & Cnty. of San 
Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940)). This "broad" grant of authority "extend[s] 
to ... personal and real property rightfully belonging to the United States." Ashwander v. 
Tennessee ValleyAuth., 297 U.S. 288,331 (1936) (quoting Joseph Story, Commentaries on 
the Constitution of the United States§§ 1325, 1326 (1833)). 
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The Appropriations Clause "provides that money may be 'drawn from the Treasury' 
only 'in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."' Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. 
Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass 'n of Am., Ltd., 601 U.S. 416, 426 (2024) (quoting U.S. Const. Art. I, 
§ 9, cl. 7). "Since the earliest days of our Republic, Congress's 'power over the purse' has 
been its 'most complete and effectual weapon' to ensure that the other branches do not 
exceed or abuse their authority." Id. at 447-48 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting The 
Federalist No. 58, at 359 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (James Madison)). 
The District Clause gives Congress legislative authority over the District of 
Columbia. See U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 8, cl. 17. The Constitution "confer[red]" this power 
on Congress "in broad terms." Nat'! Mut. Ins. Co. of Dist. of Col. v. Tidewater Transfer 
Co., 337 U.S. 582, 589 (1949). 
Together, the Property Clause, the Appropriations Clause, and the District Clause 
establish Congress's primacy over federal property, spending, and the District of Columbia. 
Indeed, Defendants have declined to argue that they have any inherent constitutional 
authority to build the ballroom. See Defs.' Suppl. Br. at 12, 30. So the President must 
identify some law that allows him to demolish the East Wing and construct his planned 
ballroom with private funds. For the following reasons, I conclude that the National Trust 
is likely to succeed on the merits on its ultra vires claims because no law comes close to 
giving the President this authority. 3 
3 Defendants argue that successive preliminary injunction motions are improper. See Defs.' Renewed Opp'n 
at 5--6. But there is no per se bar. And here, "change[s] in circumstances" counsel in favor of considering 
the motion. US. Sec. & Exch. Comm 'n v. Young, 121 F.4th 70, 78 (10th Cir. 2024); see also Gill v. Monroe 
Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 873 F.2d 647, 648-49 (2d Cir. 1989). It was only after the National Trust 
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A. Ultra Vires 
The National Trust argues that Defendants' construction of the ballroom is ultra 
vires. "Literally translated, the Latin phrase 'ultra vires' means 'beyond the powers (of),' 
and as a legal term, the phrase means 'unauthorized' or 'beyond the scope of power allowed 
or granted by law.'" Adamski v. McHugh, 304 F. Supp. 3d 227, 236 (D.D.C. 2015) ( cleaned 
up) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1755 (10th ed. 2014)). 
To succeed on a nonstatutory ultra vires claim, the plaintiff must show that "(i) there 
is no express statutory preclusion of all judicial review; (ii) there is no alternative procedure 
for review of the statutory claim; and (iii) the agency plainly act[ ed] in excess of its 
delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the statute that is clear and 
mandatory." Fed. Express Corp. v. U.S. Dep 't of Com. ("FedEx"), 39 F.4th 756, 763 (D.C. 
Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants have not disputed the first two 
factors, so the principal question before the Court is whether the President has '" stepped 
so plainly beyond the bounds of [his statutory authority], or acted so clearly in defiance of 
it, as to warrant the immediate intervention of an equity court.'" Id. at 7 64 ( quoting Griffith 
v. FLRA, 842 F.2d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Unfortunately, he has! 
Ultra vires review is a high bar-the Supreme Court has described it as "a Hail 
Mary pass." Nuclear Regul. Comm 'n v. Texas, 605 U.S. 665,681 (2025) (internal quotation 
amended its complaint that "Defendants for the first time disclaimed the President's constitutional authority 
to build the ballroom." Mem. Op. at 6 (emphasis omitted). Defendants' late-breaking abandonment of any 
constitutional arguments, as well as Defendants' factual representations about the Office of the Executive 
Residence, were crucial to my decision to deny the National Trust's first motion. See id. at 13. I find these 
circumstances "[]sufficient reason why the grounds were not urged in the earlier application." 43A C.J.S. 
Injunctions§ 365. 
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marks omitted). But it is not insurmountable. Our Circuit has held that the U.S. Postal 
Service's failure to maintain statutorily-mandated pay differentials was ultra vires, see 
Nat'l Ass 'n of Postal Supervisors v. US. Postal Serv., 26 F.4th 960, 972-74 (D.C. Cir. 
2022), and that an executive order barring government contractors from permanently 
replacing lawfully striking employees was ultra vires under the National Labor Relations 
Act, see Chamber of Com. of US. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Most 
recently, the Court of International Trade's decision invalidating the Trump 
Administration's tariffs on ultra vires review was affirmed on the merits by the Supreme 
Court. See V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States, 772 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1369-70 (Ct. 
Int'l Trade), ajf'd in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom. V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. 
Trump, 149 F.4th 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2025), ajf'd sub nom. Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 146 
S. Ct. 628 (2026). 
Here, the National Trust is likely to succeed in its argument that Defendants have 
"stepped ... plainly beyond the bounds of' their statutory authority. FedEx, 39 F.4th at 
763. Indeed, neither 3 U.S.C. § 105, nor the NPS Organic Act, authorize the President to 
build a ballroom on White House grounds. Moreover, his actions run up against an explicit 
statutory prohibition in 40 U.S.C. § 8106. In fact, Defendants' reading of the statutes 
assumes that Congress has granted nearly unlimited power to the President to construct 
anything, anywhere on federal land in the District of Columbia, regardless of the source of 
funds. This clearly is not how Congress and former Presidents have managed the White 
House for centuries, and this Court will not be the first to hold that Congress has ceded its 
powers in such a significant fashion! 
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1. 3 u.s.c. § 105 
Defendants principally rely on 3 U.S.C. § 105(d)(l) as their authority to construct 
the ballroom. See Defs.' TRO Opp'n at 16-17; Defs.' Suppl. Br. at 18, 32-35; Defs.' 
Renewed Opp'n at 10-13. As I read it, 3 U.S.C. § 105(d)(l) is a statute authorizing the 
President to conduct ordinary maintenance and repair of the White House, up to the limits 
of the congressionally appropriated amount. Interpreting 3 U.S.C. § 105(d)(l) to grant 
virtually unlimited authority to the President to demolish and build at will on White House 
grounds is a "patent[] misconstruction of the Act." Changji Esque/ Textile Co. v. 
Raimondo, 40 F.4th 716, 722 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting FedEx, 39 F.4th at 764). How so? 
Let's start with the kind of statute 3 U.S.C. § 105 is: an authorization for 
appropriations. Section 105 says "[t]here are authorized to be appropriated each fiscal year 
to the President such sums as may be necessary for" specific purposes. 3 U.S.C. § 105(d). 
"The expression 'authorized to be appropriated' clearly indicates that no appropriation is 
made or intended to be made, but the bill when enacted becomes the authority of law for 
an expected appropriation in the future[.]" GAO, The Red Book 2-54 to 2-55 (4th ed. 
2016) (quoting 27 Comp. Dec. 923 (1921) (ellipses omitted)). An "authorization act" is "a 
directive to Congress itself, which Congress is free to follow or alter ... in the subsequent 
appropriation act." Id. at 2-56 (citing B-323433 (Comp. Gen. Aug. 14, 2012)); see also, 
e.g., Maine Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 590 U.S. 296, 307-10 (2020) (relying 
on GAO Red Book to interpret federal appropriations law). Since § 105(d) is an 
authorization act, it must be read in conjunction with the relevant appropriations statute, 
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which is the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024. See Pub. L. No. 118-47, 138 
Stat. 460, 532 (2024). 
So what do these statutes authorize the President to do? Section 105(d)(l) 
authorizes the use of appropriated funds for "the care, maintenance, repair, alteration, 
refurnishing, improvement, air-conditioning, heating, and lighting (including electric 
power and fixtures) of the Executive Residence at the White House." 3 U.S.C. § 105(d)(l). 
The corresponding 2024 appropriations act provides "[f]or the repair, alteration, and 
improvement of the Executive Residence at the White House" at a fixed sum­
$2,475,000-which is appropriated specifically "for required maintenance, resolution of 
safety and health issues, and continued preventative maintenance." 138 Stat. at 532. 
Section 105(d)(l) plainly authorizes the President to conduct ordinary maintenance 
and upkeep of the White House, and nothing more! Reading the text as an "[o]rdinary 
reader[] of English" would, Heating, Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Distribs. Int'! v. 
EPA, 71 F.4th 59, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2023), the list of authorized actions-which includes words 
like "care, maintenance, repair" and "air-conditioning, heating, and lighting"-bring to 
mind things like replacing the lightbulbs, fixing broken furniture, and changing the 
wallpaper, not wholesale demolition of entire buildings and construction of new ones. 
Defendants point to "alteration" and "improvement," arguing that these terms are 
"capacious" and permit the President to "modify" the White House and "make [it] better," 
including by constructing entirely new buildings like the ballroom. Defs.' Renewed Opp'n 
at 10. A brazen interpretation, indeed! Those two words cannot bear that weight, for a few 
reasons. 
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First, the meanmgs of "alteration" and "improvement" are "narrowed by the 
commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis-which counsels that a word is given more 
precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated." United States v. 
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008). Here, the "neighboring words," id., including 
"refurnishing," "heating," and "maintenance," all strongly suggest minor "alteration[s]" 
and "improvement[s]," 3 U.S.C. § 105(d), not wholesale demolition and reconstruction. 
See also, e.g., Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 146 S. Ct. 628, 643 (2026) (reading "regulate" 
in the context of its "neighboring words" to conclude that "Congress did not intend for 
'regulate' to include the revenue-raising power" (first quoting Williams, 553 U.S. at 294)); 
Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 544 (2015) (reading "tangible object" to refer 
"specifically to the subset of tangible objects involving records and documents"). Reading 
"alteration" and "improvement" narrowly also comports with the "cardinal principle" that 
courts should "give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute." Duncan v. 
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Second, reading § 105( d)(l) to grant limited authority to the President to maintain 
the White House is consistent with the principle that Congress "does not ... hide elephants 
in mouseholes"-meaning that Congress "does not alter the fundamental details of a 
regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions ." Whitman v. Am. Trucking 
Ass 'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). As our Circuit has explained, "the American Trucking 
rule rests on a ... modest intuition about how we use language." Heating, Air Conditioning 
& Refrigeration, 71 F.4th at 67. "Ordinary readers of English," id., would not expect 
Congress to grant the President unchecked construction authority over the White House 
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through two disparate words in a statute about replacing furniture. Cf Eiden v. Nebraska, 
600 U.S. 477,513 (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring) ("[C]ontext is ... relevant to interpreting 
the scope of a delegation.").4 
Defendants argue that canons of construction have no place in ultra vires review. 
Defs.' Renewed Opp'n at 11. Please! The Supreme Court itself has made it clear that 
courts have a duty to locate the "single, best meaning" of the statute, no matter the cause 
of action. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369,400 (2024). Ultra vires review 
does not suspend commonsense interpretive canons, nor does it grant the government 
flexibility to adopt an "utterly unreasonable" reading of a statute that is "contrary to the 
[statute's] plain language." Nat'! Ass 'n of Postal Supervisors, 26 F.4th at 977-80 (applying 
canon of construction to reject agency's reading of statute in ultra vires case). Even in 
ultra vires cases, courts retain their duty to apply "commonsense" canons of construction 
grounded in the way ordinary people read English. Williams, 553 U.S. at 294. 
Third, Defendants' interpretation of § 105(d)(l) lacks any discernible limits. 
Courts, however, generally do not read statutes to give the "broadest imaginable definitions 
ofits component words," divorced from "linguistic and statutory context." Dubin v. United 
States, 599 U.S. 110, 120 (2023) (quoting Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 523 
(2018) (alterations incorporated)). Under Defendants' reading, virtually any change to the 
White House could be framed as an "alteration" or "improvement." Indeed, some might 
even view tearing down the White House and building a modem skyscraper in its place as 
4 The "American Trucking rule" is different from the major questions doctrine, which the National Trust 
has not argued applies here. See Heating, Air Conditioning & Refh'geration, 71 F.4th at 67. 
16 
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an "improvement." As Defendants have argued it, so long as the White House grounds are 
"developed" or "occupied by buildings and structures," Defs.' Renewed Opp'n at 10, the 
President has complete authority to engage in whatever construction activity he sees fit. 5 
How grand! 
Fourth, Defendants' interpretation of§ 105(d) loses sight of its "statutory context." 
Sackett v. EPA, 598 U.S. 651, 675 (2023). Section 105(d)(l) is an authorization of 
appropriations. While it gives the President discretion to spend funds "as [he] may 
determine, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law," that discretion applies only to 
"[s]ums appropriated under"§ 105(d)(l). 3 U.S.C. § 105(d). Section 105(d) simply does 
not speak to the President's authority to spend funds not appropriated under the statute. 
Defendants must concede that the President is not spending "[s]ums appropriated under" 
§ 105(d)(l) because $2.475 million does not come close to supplying the approximately 
$400 million required to construct the ballroom. See Defs.' Suppl. Br. at 34. So both the 
plain language of the statute and the annual amount that Congress has appropriated to the 
President pursuant to§ 105(d)(l) limit the President's authority.6 
To make up the gaping chasm between the § 105(d)(l) appropriations ($2.475 
million) and the projected cost of the ballroom ($400 million), Defendants have identified 
5 Defendants suggested at oral argument that "bulldoz[ing] the entire White House and build[ing] something 
completely different in its place" would "exceed[] the scope of 'alteration and improvement."' Jan. 22, 
2026 Hr'g Tr. 41:18-22. But if demolishing one wing of the White House and building a new structure is 
permissible, it is difficult to understand how demolishing the rest of the complex would cross the line. Both 
could conceivably "bring [the White House] into a more profitable or desirable state." Defs.' Renewed 
Opp'n at 10 (quoting Improve, Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed. 1989). 
6 The precise and limited language of the 2024 appropriation-for "required maintenance, resolution of 
safety and health issues, and continued preventive maintenance"-further supports a limited reading of 
§ 105(d)(l). 138 Stat. at 532. 
17 
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a convoluted funding scheme that they argue permits the President to fund the ballroom 
using private donations. Defendants' argument goes like this: Congress has authorized the 
Secretary of the Interior to accept donations "for the purposes" of the National Park 
System. 54 U.S.C. § 101101(2). National Park Service donations may be "appropriated 
to be disbursed" as trust funds. 31 U.S.C. § 132l(a)(l 7), (b)(l). The Economy Act permits 
the Secretary of the Interior to transfer funds to the White House account because NPS has 
"contract[ ed]" with the Office of the Executive Residence ("EXR") for the ballroom 
project. 31 U.S.C. § l 535(a); see Suppl. Deel. of Jessica Bowron [Dkt. #30-3] i1i112-13. 
So, according to Defendants, this aptly described Rube Goldberg contraption authorizes 
the President to use private donations to the Secretary of the Interior for the purposes of 3 
U.S.C. § 105(d)(l). 
While its legality is not squarely at issue here, this funding mechanism is, to say the 
least, a far cry from affirmative congressional authorization. Defendants cannot evade the 
limitations of§ 105(d)(l) and the 2024 appropriations act through a series of unrelated 
statutes that say nothing about the President, the White House, or the construction of a 
ballroom. 
Finally, "[s]tatutory history points m the same direction" as my reading of 
§ 105(d)(l). Sackett, 598 U.S. at 673. Plaintiff's historical annex lays out a nearly 
unbroken history of congressional authorization for construction and major renovations at 
the White House. See generally Annex. Not only did Congress authorize specific changes 
through legislation, see id., but in some instances Congress exercised its oversight authority 
over specific projects, see, e.g., H. R. Doc. No. 18-60, at 1 (1824) (examining the "work 
18 
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done on the South Portico of the President's House"); An Act To Provide for a Commission 
on Renovation of the Executive Mansion, ch. 51, 63 Stat. 45 (1949). In other cases, 
Congress authorized appropriations of funds for the "building to accommodate the offices 
of the President" and left the "details" to be "approved by the President." See Act of June 
28, 1902, ch. 1301, 32 Stat. 419, 460 (authorizing construction of the original East and 
West Wings). There is zero evidence that when Congress enacted the relevant language in 
§ 105( d)(l) in 1978, Congress intended a sea-change in the way that it authorizes and funds 
construction at the White House.7 
In sum, Defendants ask this Court to ignore the full text of the statute in favor of 
two words plucked free from all statutory context. Because Defendants' reading of the 
statute is clearly contrary to its plain meaning, their reliance on § 105( d)(l) is likely ultra 
vires. 
2. 40 u.s.c. § 8106 
Because Congress holds the keys to the Nation's property, the President must have 
some statutory basis to build the ballroom. Section 105(d)(l) doesn't work, so the Court 
7 One clue that Congress did not intend to give the President vast construction authority in§ 105(d)(l) is 
Congress's use of similar language in a different statute. See Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 
233 (2005) ("[W]hen Congress uses the same language in two statutes having similar purposes, particularly 
when one is enacted shortly after the other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to 
have the same meaning in both statutes."). In 1966-a little over a decade before the relevant version of 
§ 105( d)(l) was enacted-Congress passed a law providing that "the Administrator of General Services is 
hereby authorized to plan, design, and construct an official residence for the Vice President of the United 
States in the District of Columbia." Pub. L. No. 89-386, § 1, 80 Stat. 106, 106 (1966). In a separate 
subsection, Congress authorized the Administrator to provide "for the care, maintenance, repair, 
improvement, alteration, and furnishing of the official residence and grounds, including heating, lighting, 
and air conditioning." Id. § 3. Construction of the Vice President's residence was delayed indefinitely due 
to "economic conditions." The Vice President's House, N.Y. Times (Apr. 27, 1966), 
https://perma.cc/E7KK-4X38. But the statutory text indicates that Congress knew how to distinguish 
between construction and maintenance. 
19 
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could find the President's actions ultra vires on that basis alone. But to underscore 
Defendants' lack of statutory authority, Congress has affirmatively prohibited the 
"erect[ion]" of "[a] building or structure" "on any reservation, park, or public grounds of 
the Federal Government in the District of Columbia without express authority of 
Congress." 40 U.S.C. § 8106. 
Defendants do not dispute that, if the statute is valid and applicable, then the 
ballroom qualifies as a "structure" in a "park ... of the Federal Government in the District 
of Columbia." Defs.' Suppl. Br. at 29. Indeed, the statute appears to be a "specific and 
unambiguous statutory directive." FedEx, 39 F.4th at 764 (quoting Griffith, 842 F.2d at 
493). It commands, without reservation, that anyone who constructs a building on federal 
parkland in the District of Columbia needs the "express authority of Congress." 40 U.S.C. 
§ 8106. 
Not surprisingly, Defendants raise a number of objections to the application of 
§ 8106. None, however, overcome the statute's clear text. 
First, Defendants argue that the phrase "express authority of Congress" in § 8106 
refers to a general "authority from Congress to build-not to build a particular structure." 
Defs.' Renewed Opp'n at 19. The National Trust's interpretation would, according to 
Defendants, implausibly require Congress to approve specific buildings on a project-by­
project basis. But whether § 8106 requires general or specific authorization is beside the 
point because Congress has not provided any authorization to Defendants. Without 
question, Congress has not specifically authorized the ballroom construction! And, as 
discussed throughout this opinion, Defendants have not identified any statute giving the 
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President or any other Defendants freewheeling authority to construct buildings at the 
White House or in the District of Columbia. So the level of specificity that § 8106 requires 
is not dispositive here. 
In my view, § 8106 is most naturally read to require some form of authorization from 
Congress to construct a building, and an appropriation of funds-either a lump sum for 
construction or a specific appropriation for a particular project-would easily satisfy that 
requirement. Indeed, an appropriation from Congress is authorization to use funds for a 
specified purpose. See 31 U.S.C. § 130l(a); see also U.S. Dep 't of Navy v. FLRA, 665 F.3d 
1339, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ("The [Appropriations] Clause does not permit an 
agency ... to authorize the expenditure of funds beyond what Congress has approved." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). It is as simple as that. 
Second, Defendants argue that § 8106 should not be read to constrain the President 
or limit construction at the White House absent a clear statement. Please! A clear statement 
rule makes sense when Congress is legislating in an area where the President exercises 
overlapping constitutional authority. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-
01 (1992) (declining to read the APA as subjecting the President to judicial review "[o]ut 
of respect for the separation of powers and the unique constitutional position of the 
President"); Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1991). But Defendants here 
have disclaimed that the President has any inherent constitutional authority over 
construction at the White House and have conceded that Congress's constitutional authority 
over federal property is "exclusive." Pl. 's Suppl. Br. at IO; see Defs.' Suppl. Br. at 12, 30. 
In addition, Congress has continued to exercise, via its appropriations authority, close 
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oversight over spending at the White House-including by prescribing the number of staff 
and their compensation. See generally 3 U.S.C. § 105. I therefore decline to read§ 8106 
as excluding the President. 8 
Third, Defendants offer a series of historical points showing, Defendants contend, 
that § 8106 cannot really mean what it says. Defendants argue that Congress did not intend 
§ 8106 to apply to NPS or the White House. Defendants point to examples of buildings 
constructed by NPS on national parkland and by the President on White House grounds to 
argue that§ 8106 is not a viable constraint on Defendants' authority. See Defs.' Renewed 
Opp'n at 19-23. Of course, when the "text is clear," courts "need not consider ... extra-
textual evidence." NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 580 U.S. 288,305 (2017); see also Exxon Mobil 
Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) ("[T]he authoritative statement 
is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material."). In any 
event, Defendants' extratextual evidence is neither "uniform[]" nor "compelling." NLRB, 
580 U.S. at 305. 
Defendants first argue that Congress enacted § 8106 in 1912 to stop "unauthorized 
third parties" from building on federal land in Washington, D.C. and did not intend§ 8106 
to constrain the Government. See Defs.' Renewed Opp'n at 19 (explaining that at the time, 
D.C. federal property was "illegally used as dumps, or occupied by shacks, gardens, [and] 
railroad companies"). While other statutes from the era suggest "unlawful occupation" of 
"public lands" in D.C. was a concern of Congress, see Act of April 28, 1902, ch. 594, 32 
8 Defendants' point proves too little for yet another reason: even if § 8106 does not apply to the President 
himself, it still applies to EXR and the other Defendants. 
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Stat. 120, 152 (directing U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to prevent "unlawful occupation" 
ofD.C. public lands), this vague historical evidence has no connection to the text of§ 8106. 
Moreover, Defendants' argument cannot be reconciled with their suggestion that § 8106 
applies to Government agencies besides NPS. See Defs.' Renewed Opp'n at 23. Nor does 
Defendants' reliance on post-enactment legislative history, see id. at 20, move the needle. 
See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 242 (2011) ("Post-enactment legislative 
history (a contradiction in terms) is not a legitimate tool of statutory interpretation.").9 
Defendants next attempt to exclude NPS from the reach of§ 8106. They point to a 
similar statute enacted in 1912 that applied to the Department of the Interior. See Defs.' 
Renewed Opp'n at 22 ("No expenditure for construction of administration or other 
buildings ... exceeding one thousand dollars shall hereafter be made in any national park 
except under express authority of Congress." (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 451 (1912))). At the 
time, federal parklands in D.C. were not part of the National Park System. See Exec. Order 
6166 (June 10, 1933). So it appears that Congress enacted one rule for D.C.-no buildings 
without express authority of Congress-and another rule for national parks-no buildings 
over $1,000 dollars without express authority of Congress.10 
9 In fact, the post-enactment history cited by Defendants is consistent with the view that NPS has relied on 
congressional appropriations for construction authorization. Major Ulysses S. Grant III testified to the 
House Subcommittee on Appropriations in 1926 that § 8106 "has been never been construed to prevent 
such construction by the park authorities within the limits of the appropriations." Dist. of Columbia 
Appropriation Bill, 1927, Hr'g Before Subcomm. ofH. Comm. on Appropriations 533, 69th Cong. (1926) 
( emphasis added). The transcript goes on to reflect that the buildings in question had, in fact, been presented 
to Congress and that Congress had appropriated funds for their construction. Id. 
10 Historical practice, including the way that Congress expressly exempted NPS from the prohibition in 
what Defendants argue was a comparable statute in 16 U.S.C. § 451, see Defs.' Renewed Opp'n at 22, 
suggests that NPS has never had a blank check under the NPS Organic Act to construct buildings, regardless 
of the source of funds. 
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The existence of a separate statute governing national parks does not mean, 
however, that§ 8106 ceased to apply once federal parks in D.C. joined the National Park 
System in 1933. While Congress repealed 16 U.S.C. § 451 in 1996, Congress has never 
repealed 40 U.S.C. § 8106, and in fact recodified it in 2002. See Act of Aug. 21, 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-217, 116 Stat. 1062, 1206. The stronger reading of this history is that 
Congress means what it says! Congress has removed the threshold construction limitation 
applicable to NPS for national parks across the country, but has maintained § 8106's 
limitation on parks in the District of Columbia. 
Undaunted, Defendants argue that NPS has erected "countless structures on national 
parkland" without "express congressional approval" and suggest as a result that the Court 
should read § 8106 as a dead letter. Defs.' Renewed Opp'n at 20. Unfortunately, that is 
not how statutory interpretation works-the Court must give effect to the unambiguous 
text of a statute even if there is contrary historical evidence. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg 
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) ("If we do our job of reading the 
statute whole, we have to give effect to this plain command, even if doing that will reverse 
the longstanding practice under the statute." (internal citations omitted)); Exxon Mobil 
Corp., 545 U.S. at 568. In any case, it is not so clear that the structures identified by 
Defendants were built without Congress's knowledge or authorization. 11 
11 For example, the National Capital Region Headquarters and U.S. Park Police Headquarters, see Defs.' 
Renewed Opp'n at 14, were constructed as part of Mission 66: a "ten-year project" "proposed ... to 
Congress in 1955" and "funded by Congress." Mission 66: Birth of the Modem National Park, NPS 
(accessed Mar. 24, 2026), https://perma.cc/9VLT-C3V6; see also Act of June 13, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-573, 
70 Stat. 257, 262 (appropriating over $15 million for "construction ... of buildings, utilities, and other 
physical facilities"). 
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Finally, Defendants point to a handful of examples of construction at the White 
House since the enactment of § 8106 to argue that § 8106 does not apply to the White 
House. See Defs.' Suppl. Br. at 31. I disagree. Congress authorized the 1933 West Wing 
expansion and the 1942 East Wing expansion through general appropriations. 12 And to the 
extent President Ford's 1975 pool and President Trump's 2019 tennis pavilion are 
"building[s]" or "structure[s]," see 40 U.S.C. § 8106, they were never challenged in court, 
are not visible to the public, and were for the President's private use.13 Without question, 
Defendants have never engaged in a construction project of this size and scale using 
donated funds. "This 'lack of historical precedent,' coupled with the breadth of authority 
that [Defendants] now claim[], is a 'telling indication' that [the ballroom] extends beyond 
[Defendants'] legitimate reach." NFIB v. Dep 't of Lab., Occupational Safety & Health 
Admin., 595 U.S. 109, 119 (2022) (quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Acct. 
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505 (2010)). For these reasons, the National Trust is likely 
to succeed on its ultra vires claims under both 3 U.S.C. § 105(d) and 40 U.S.C. § 8106.14 
12 In 1933, Congress authorized a "comprehensive program of public works," including "construction, 
repair, and improvement of ... public buildings." National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, §§ 202, 220, 
48 Stat. 195, 201, 210 (1933). One such construction project was the 1934 West Wing renovations. See 
Annex at 7-8. The National Trust suggests that funding for the 1942 construction of an expanded East 
Wing, including a secure underground bunker, came from a national-defense appropriation. See id. at 9; 
Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, 56 Stat. 226, 236 (providing funds for 
"public buildings and grounds in the District of Columbia"). 
13 To be sure, the one statute that expressly cites 40 U.S.C. § 8106-the statute authorizing the construction 
of bonsai facilities at the National Arboretum, see Act of Oct. 21, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-11, 107 Stat. 1046, 
1051--does not fit neatly into the National Trust's narrative. Congress's practice of excluding construction 
projects from the scope of § 8106 has not been consistent. But nothing in the text of § 8106 requires 
Congress to cite § 8106 in authorizing legislation, and in any event inconsistent congressional practice 
cannot limit the clear text. 
14 Defendants argue that the National Trust's interests "are quite plainly beyond the zone of interests 
protected by" 40 U.S.C. § 8106, Defs.' Renewed Opp'n at 25, and therefore the National Trust's ultra vires 
25 
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B. Administrative Procedure Act 
Defendants have not been entirely consistent in this litigation as to which entities 
remain involved with the ballroom. Before the Court's denial of the National Trust's first 
motion for a preliminary injunction, Defendants represented that EXR was "managing the 
[ballroom] project under the President's direction," Defs.' Suppl. Br. at 3, and that NPS 
was "indisputably not directing the [ballroom] project," id. at 17 n.7; see also id. at 23. I 
went on to hold that the National Trust was not likely to succeed on the merits as to its APA 
claims because EXR was likely not an "agency" within the meaning of the APA. Mem. 
Op. at 13-16. The National Trust added claims arguing that shifting responsibility from 
NPS to EXR violated separation of powers and was ultra vires. See Second Am. Compl. 
,r,r 217-24. Both the Court and the National Trust were under the impression that, as 
Defendants themselves stated, NPS "had (and has) no role in directing the Project." Defs.' 
Suppl. Br. at 23; see PI. 's Renewed Reply Br. at 16. 
So it came as a surprise when Defendants' most recent brief invoked NPS's 
construction authority as an independent basis for denying the National Trust's motion. 
Defs.' Renewed Opp'n at 1. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how Defendants can rely 
on NPS's construction authority while claiming that NPS "had (and has) no role in 
claims premised on that statute must fail. I find it unlikely that the zone of interests test applies here. See 
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 812 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (reasoning that parties "need 
not ... show that their interests fall within the zones of interests of the constitutional and statutory powers 
invoked by the President in order to" bring ultra vires claims); see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. 
Trump, 453 F. Supp. 3d 11, 48 (D.D.C. 2020) (whether the zone of interests test applies to ultra vires claims 
has not been resolved). If it were otherwise, litigants injured by ultra vires action would often be precluded 
from suit "since the litigant's interest normally will not fall within the zone of interests of the very statutory 
or constitutional provision that he claims does not authorize action concerning that interest." Haitian 
Refugee Ctr., 809 F.2d at 812 n.14; see also Ctr.for Biological Diversity, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 48. 
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directing" the ballroom project. Defs.' Suppl. Br. at 23. In a sleight-of-hand maneuver, 
Defendants argue that NPS chose to "contract" with EXR under the Economy Act, which 
would suggest that NPS is still involved with the ballroom project as a party to a contract, 
with EXR as its agent. See Defs.' Renewed Opp'n at 18. Therefore, in the alternative, to 
the extent that NPS is directing or otherwise involved in the ballroom project, the National 
Trust is likely to succeed on its claim under the APA that the ballroom construction is 
"contrary to law" in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 8106.15 
Regarding Defendants' arguments about the NPS Organic Act, nothing in the text 
of the statute grants NPS blanket authority to engage in construction in national parks. The 
statute provides that NPS "shall promote and regulate the use of the National Park System 
by means and measures that conform to the fundamental purpose of the System units[.]" 
54 U.S.C. § 10010l(a). Such purposes are "conserv[ing] the scenery, natural and historic 
objects, and wild life in the System units" and "provid[ing] for the enjoyment of the 
scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life in such manner and by such means as 
will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." Id. This general 
statement of purpose does not say anything about NPS 's authority to construct buildings. 
Instead, historical practice not surprisingly shows that Congress has given limited 
authority to NPS to construct by authorizing appropriations for those purposes. See, e.g., 
Commerce, Justice, Science; Energy and Water Development; and Interior and 
15 The Court must evaluate any APA claims in the alternative to the National Trust's ultra vires claims, 
because if the National Trust is able to obtain "judicial review" via the APA, nonstatutory ultra vires review 
is not available . See Changji Esque!, 40 F.4th at 722 ( quoting Griffith, 842 F.2d at 492). 
27 
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Environment Appropriations Act, 2026, Pub. L. No. 119-74, 140 Stat. 5, 100.16 Defendants 
identify a handful of structures built with donated funds in D.C. and argue that these were 
authorized by only the NPS Organic Act. Defs.' Renewed Opp'n at 18. Please! Even if 
these buildings were somehow comparable to the ballroom project, the available evidence 
strongly suggests that Congress was aware of these projects and at least indirectly 
authorized them. 17 
The NPS Organic Act is best read for what it is-a statement of NPS's general 
purposes. Defendants conflate taking actions "consistent with [NPS 's] enabling 
legislation" with affirmative construction authorization. See Defs.' Renewed Opp'n at 16. 
Particularly in light of 40 U.S.C. § 8106's express prohibition, the broad language of the 
NPS Organic Act cannot supply the requisite authorization for construction of the ballroom. 
II. Irreparable Harm 
To obtain injunctive relief, the National Trust must show that it is "likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief." Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. The threat 
of harm must be "both certain and great, actual and not theoretical, beyond remediation, 
16 Defendants do not purport to be relying on NPS's construction appropriation for the White House 
ballroom. In any case, NPS construction appropriations in recent years expressly limit the use of "National 
Park Service Donations" to "adjustments and changes within the origi,nal scope of effort for projects funded 
by the National Park Service Constrnction appropriation." See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, 
Pub. L. No. 118-42, 138 Stat. 25,226 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., 140 Stat. at 101 (same). So NPS 
cannot, in fact, use donations to construct buildings on national park lands outside the scope of construction 
appropriations. And it is highly doubtful that NPS could "contract" with EXR to avoid the limitations on 
NPS 's construction authority. 
17 Defendants cite the new U.S. Park Police Stables on the National Mall as an NPS construction with 
donated funds. But it appears that Congress initiated this project. See Commemorative Works Clarification 
and Revision Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-126, 117 Stat. 1349, 1353 (directing the Secretary of the Interior 
to produce a report "setting forth plans" for the "relocat[ion]" of "the National Park Service's stable and 
maintenance facilities"). 
28 
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and of such imminence that there is clear and present need for equitable relief." Mexichem 
Specialty Resins, Inc. v. EPA, 787 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Aesthetic and environmental injuries are typically "irreparable" because they are 
"seldom ... adequately remedied by money damages" and are "often permanent or at least 
of long duration." Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence v. Salazar, 612 F. Supp. 2d 
1, 25 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vil!. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 
(1987)). 
According to the National Trust, one of its members, Professor Alison Hoagland, is 
a longtime D.C. resident and a professor of historic preservation who regularly visits 
President's Park to "enjoy the historic buildings" and take in "the beauty of the L'Enfant 
Plan." Deel. of Alison K. Hoagland ("Hoagland Deel.") [Dkt. #2-3] ,r 9. Hoagland also 
gives walking tours and has published scholarly articles on Washington's historic 
architecture, to which the White House is central. Id. ,r 8. Hoagland alleges that 
construction of "a ballroom of the proposed form and scale" would cause "permanent and 
irreparable harm to the White House and President's Park," thereby damaging her own 
"aesthetic, cultural, and historical interests." Id. ,r,r 13-14. 
I previously concluded that these alleged aesthetic injuries established a substantial 
likelihood of Article III standing. See Mem. Op. at 7-13. 18 The National Trust's alleged 
18 Defendants urge the Court to revisit its standing analysis, see Defs.' Renewed Opp'n at 29-33, but I 
decline to do so. As I previously held, the National Trust has established a substantial likelihood of 
associational standing to challenge the construction of the ballroom, see Mem. Op. at 7-13, and I 
reincorporate that analysis today. Defendants offer two points in response, neither of which alter my 
conclusion. Defendants first argue that Hoagland cannot claim aesthetic injury from the ballroom because 
the new structure will "scarcely be seen from any public vantage point." Defs.' Renewed Opp'n at 29. That 
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aesthetic injury also establishes irreparable harm for purposes of a preliminary injunction. 
Hoagland has adequately described the "specific ways in which, in the absence of the 
injunction," her "interests in ... [the] aesthetic ... use and enjoyment" of the White House 
grounds "will be irreparably injured." Nat'/ Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 324 
(D.C. Cir. 1987); see also, e.g., Fund for Animals v. Norton, 281 F. Supp. 2d 209, 220-22 
(D.D.C. 2003) (aesthetic injury from hunting of mute swans sufficient for irreparable 
harm). 
At the temporary restraining order stage in December 2025, I held that the National 
Trust had failed to demonstrate a "sufficiently imminent risk of irreparable harm" because 
below-grade structural work had just begun and Defendants' construction plans were still 
in flux. Mem. Order at 2-3. Things have changed. Above-ground construction will begin 
sometime in April 2026. Stanwich Deel. ,r 20. Moreover, the design plans are nearly final. 
On February 27, 2026, the Commission of Fine Arts approved the ballroom's concept 
design submission as a "final design." See T. Luebke to J. Fisher, CFA 19/FEB/26-1, 
https://perma.cc/CV2F-VE6M (cited in Martin Suppl. Deel. ,r 6). On March 5, 2026, 
Defendants submitted "preliminary and final site and building plans" to the National 
is pure fiction. Defendants' own renderings show that the proposed ballroom will be clearly visible from 
Lafayette Park, see Exec. Director's Recommendation at 17-18, Nat'l Cap. Planning Comm'n (Mar. 5, 
2026), https://perma.cc/4LFC-YDEJ (cited in Martin Suppl. Deel. ,I 7), and even from the steps of the U.S. 
Capitol, id. at 23; see also Finding of No Significant Impact [Dkt. #14-2] at 6 (ballroom will "creat[ e] a 
visual imbalance"). Defendants further argue that Hoagland's injury is not germane to the National Trust's 
purposes, which, Defendants insist, relate only to the acquisition of property for preservation and exclude 
the White House. Defs.' Renewed Opp 'n at 31-33. "The bar for germaneness, however, is low." AARP v. 
EEOC, 226 F. Supp. 3d 7, 19 (D.D.C. 2016). To clear the bar, an organization need only show "a mere 
pertinence between [the] litigation subject and [the] organization's purpose." Competitive Enter. Inst. v. 
NHTSA, 901 F.2d 107, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). For the reasons articulated 
in my prior opinion, the National Trust has easily done so here. See Mem. Op. at 12. 
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Capital Planning Commission ("NCPC"). Martin Suppl. Deel. ,r 7. The NCPC is 
scheduled to vote on the project at its April 2, 2026 meeting. Id. And once complete, the 
building's foundation could accommodate only "modest changes" to the size and scale of 
the structure. Deel. of Prof. Engineer [Dkt. #30-4] ,r 10. 
As such, the National Trust has demonstrated that injuries to its "aesthetic, cultural, 
and historical interests" are "imminen[t]," "certain," and "great" absent a preliminary 
injunction. Mexichem, 787 F.3d at 555 (typeface altered). If construction continues, the 
harm of an enormous ballroom overshadowing the White House grounds would indeed be 
"permanent." Brady Campaign, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 25. Moreover, the harm will likely 
materialize "before a decision on the merits can be reached." Nat'! Parks Conservation 
Ass 'n v. Semonite, 282 F. Supp. 3d 284, 288-89 (D.D.C. 2017).19 Above-ground 
construction begins in a matter of days, and continued construction will only further lock 
in the size, scale, and styling of the proposed building. 
Defendants contend that the National Trust faces no imminent aesthetic harm 
because Hoagland "will not be able to see any part of the East Wing for many months." 
Defs.' Renewed Opp'n at 35. But Defendants cannot seriously argue that Hoagland has no 
claim for imminent aesthetic harm until the completed building is fully visible. Once the 
19 As the National Trust points out, the Semonite case is a cautionary tale. The Semonite plaintiffs sought 
to enjoin construction of seventeen electrical towers over a river. One of my colleagues found no irreparable 
harm because the project was still in its infancy and therefore denied injunctive relief. See 282 F. Supp. 3d 
at 289. After construction was completed, the court found in plaintiff's favor on the merits but concluded 
that the towers were too costly to remove and, therefore, no injunctive relief was available. See Nat'/ Parks 
Conservation Ass 'n v. Semonite, 422 F. Supp. 3d 92, 94, 100--01 (D.D.C. 2019). If I deny preliminary 
injunctive relief now and allow construction to continue while the case progresses, any eventual victory on 
the merits for the National Trust may likewise prove to be too little, too late! 
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building is complete, any aesthetic harm would be "beyond remediation," Chaplaincy of 
Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006), and courts typically 
find challenges to completed projects to be moot, see Finca Santa Elena, Inc. v. US. Army 
Corps of Eng'rs, 62 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.D.C . 2014) (noting lack of cases where courts 
"ordered a defendant to dismantle a completed construction project"). The National Trust 
need not wait until the last brick is laid to obtain injunctive relief. 
III. The Balance of the Equities and the Public Interest 
The National Trust finally must show that "the balance of equities tips in [its] favor," 
and that "an injunction is in the public interest." Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. When, as here, 
"the Government is the opposing party," these final two factors "merge." Nken v. Holder, 
556 U.S. 418,435 (D.C. Cir. 2022). 
Here too, the National Trust has carried its burden. It has demonstrated imminent, 
irreparable harm in the form of ongoing construction of a ballroom that would, in its own 
words, "overshadow[]" the White House and disrupt the appearance of a historic and 
cultural icon. See supra Part II. The National Trust has shown that Defendants are making 
these irreversible changes without statutory or constitutional authority. While the National 
Trust would be deeply harmed in the absence of an injunction, the Government "cannot 
suffer harm from an injunction that merely ends an unlawful practice." R.lL-R v. Johnson, 
80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 191 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1145 
(9th Cir. 2013)). 
The public interest, too, weighs in favor of enjoining this project pending approval 
from Congress. Congress is the collective voice of the American people in our system of 
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government, see Learning Res., 146 S. Ct. at 672 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (Congress 
reflects "the combined wisdom of the people's elected representatives, not just that of one 
faction or man"), and the Constitution itself vests authority over federal property, including 
the White House, in Congress! See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 17; id. Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; cf 
Clarkv. Cmty.for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 289-90 (1984) (noting that federal 
parkland in Washington, D.C. and around the White House are a "unique resource[] that 
the Federal Government holds in trust for the American people"). After all, the White 
House does not belong to any one man-not even a president! 
Defendants predictably object, arguing that any delay to construction would imperil 
national security and expose the White House to damage. Grasping for straws, Defendants 
call the construction site a "coordinated and managed safety hazard" that has disrupted 
existing security procedures. See Deel. of Matthew C. Quinn [Dkt. #30-5] ,r 8. Thus, 
according to Defendants, any construction delay will undermine national security. Please! 
While I take seriously the Government's concerns regarding the safety and security of the 
White House grounds and the President himself, the existence of a "large hole" beside the 
White House is, of course, a problem of the President's own making! Defs.' Renewed 
Opp'n at 34. Bald assertions of"national security" cannot excuse the Government's failure 
to follow the law and then insulate those failures from judicial review.20 
20 The Court has reviewed the classified ex parte declarations submitted by Defendants. See Mot. for Leave 
to File Deel. Ex Parte [Dkt. #13]; Not. of Lodging Suppl. Ex Parte Deel. [Dkt. #25]; Not. of Lodging 
Second Suppl. Ex Parle Deel. [Dkt. #40]; Not. of Lodging Third Suppl. Ex Parle Deel. [Dkt. #59]. Based 
on my review, I do not find that an injunction halting construction would in any way jeopardize national 
security. But see TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 604 U.S. 56, 74 (2025) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) ("Efforts to inject 
secret evidence into judicial proceedings present obvious constitutional concerns."). 
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I acknowledge that this case raises novel and weighty issues, that halting an ongoing 
construction project may raise logistical issues, and that Defendants intend to seek an 
appeal immediately. I will therefore delay enforcement of the injunction for fourteen days, 
as described in the attached Order. 21 I will also exclude construction necessary to ensure 
the safety and security of the White House from the scope of the injunction.22 
CONCLUSION 
Where does this leave us? Unfortunately for Defendants, unless and until Congress 
blesses this project through statutory authorization, construction has to stop! But here is 
the good news. It is not too late for Congress to authorize the continued construction of 
the ballroom project. The President may at any time go to Congress to obtain express 
authority to construct a ballroom and to do so with private funds. Indeed, Congress may 
even choose to appropriate funds for the ballroom, or at least decide that some other 
funding scheme is acceptable. Either way, Congress will thereby retain its authority over 
the nation's property and its oversight over the Government's spending. The National 
Trust's interests in a constitutional and lawful process will be vindicated. And the 
American people will benefit from the branches of Government exercising their 
constitutionally prescribed roles. Not a bad outcome, that! 
21 The Court gives fair notice to Defendants, however, that any above-ground construction over the next 
fourteen days that is not in compliance with my Order is at risk of being taken down depending on the 
outcome of this case. 
22 I decline to exercise my "broad discretion" to require the National Trust to post a bond. See DSE, Inc. v. 
United States, 169 F.3d 21, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the National Trust's Motion 
for a Preliminary Injunction [Dkt. #51] is GRANTED. An accompanying order will issue 
contemporaneously with this opinion. 
United States District Judge 
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